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THE EXPOSITOR

VOL. IX.

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THE EXPOSITOR

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EIGHTH SERIES

Volume IX



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WARWICK SQUARE, LONDON, E.C

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HEALING ON THE SABBATH DAY.

In all four Gospels the Saviour is brought into conflict with the official expounders of the Law on the question of giving medical aid on the Sabbath day. This is the right rendering of the verb *θεραπεύειν*, inaccurately represented in our versions by "heal." Healing is the work of nature or God, whence legislation cannot deal with it; since work, not speech, was forbidden on the Sabbath, a cure which could be effected by a fiat would not constitute a violation of the Law; nor indeed does the Mosaic legislation any more than any other contemplate the occurrence of the miraculous. In three of the Gospels arguments are produced in defence of the performance of medical operations on the Sabbath. These are all Rabbinical or juristic, i.e. based not on general considerations, but on Scripture, and, since Scripture contains nothing that bears directly on the matter, constructed on approved methods of inference. The method employed in all cases is that which is called *a fortiori*, in the language of the Rabbis קול וחומר, which assumes that if a rule hold good in a case A, it will certainly hold good in a case which might be represented by the symbol *n*A, wherein the cause for the rule is found to a greater degree than in A. The Rabbinical use of this argument has been recently elucidated by L. Schwarz in the treatise *der hermeneutische Syllogismus in der Talmudischen Litteratur*, Karlsruhe, 1901, where much which is ordinarily puzzling is made clear. It is of considerable interest to find that some of the arguments adduced in the

Jewish Oral Tradition are identical with those recorded in the Gospels, whereas in the case of others the Rabbinical treatment throws light on the evangelical record.

The Oral Law, like the Islamic *Sunnah*, to a certain extent embodies the practice of the community as it existed before the adoption of the Law, and the skill of the jurist is displayed in justifying the practice from the Law. Some of the cases which give rise to discussion in the Gospels might be brought under the maxim *Preservation of Life takes precedence of the Sabbath.*[1] The chief authority on the source of this maxim is a dialogue wherein R. Akiba, R. Eleazar, his son R. Ishmael, and some others took part. Reports of this dialogue, which must have taken place, if at all, before 135 A.D., the death-date of R. Akiba, are to be found in four collections of Oral Tradition,[2] with the varieties which are inseparable from this mode of perpetuating history. The main import would however seem to be preserved in spite of numerous differences of detail in the reports. One of the arguments found in the First Gospel is here assigned to R. Akiba, whereas that which is produced in the Fourth Gospel is ascribed to R. Eleazar b. Azariah.

Various sayings which concern the Sabbath are put together by the compiler of the First Gospel in chapter xii. 1-14. The occasion of the first utterance is something done by the disciples on the Sabbath, but there is considerable difference between the Gospels as to its nature. It is necessary to consider these, since the applicability of the maxim quoted above depends on the nature of the situation. According to Matthew and Luke the disciples plucked ears of corn and ate them ; Matthew adds that they were hungry, and Luke that they rubbed them with their hands. Since

[1] פיקוח נפש דוחה את השבת.

[2] Mechilta, ed. Weiss, p. 110 ; B. Yoma 85 *b* ; Sabbath 132 *a* ; Tosifta Sabbath, sec. 16.

their action in all three Gospels is defended by the precedent of David "when he was in need," it would seem that the two features in Matthew, that they were hungry and that they ate, belong to the original narrative. In the code of Maimonides both the plucking and the rubbing with the hand are forbidden.[1] He holds that the ears should be bitten with the teeth, to avoid the suspicion of threshing, which is one of the thirty-nine forbidden categories. He also forbids plucking on the ground that this act comes under reaping, which is also a forbidden category. It is not clear that his authorities bear him out in either case, but his rulings illustrate the controversy in the first and third Gospels. The rules on these matters were so subtle that it is conceivable that the rubbing may have been forbidden by some who permitted the plucking, whence the former detail is added in the third Gospel.

In the second Gospel we are not told that the disciples were hungry or that they ate, but that they *began to make a way*,[2] *plucking the ears*. What this suggests is that they cleared a path for the Saviour, who was walking through a cornfield. Although this interpretation is not in accordance with the argument which follows, it might very well be in accordance with the second argument in Matthew (xii. 5, 6): *the Sabbath may be violated within the Sanctuary; here is something greater than the Sanctuary*. Since however the first Gospel, which alone contains this argument, is clear that the disciples plucked the ears because they were hungry, and ate them, it is unlikely that the second premise *something greater than the Sanctuary is here* refers to the Saviour's presence, and it is probable that it means *there is in this case a principle which takes precedence of the Sanctuary*. That principle is

[1] הלכות שבת xxi. 6, 14. [2] ἤρξαντο ὁδὸν ποιεῖν.

preservation of life, which in one of the records of the dialogue that has been mentioned is said to supersede the Sanctuary on the ground that Exodus xx. 14 ordains that one who compasses a wilful murder is to be taken from the altar to execution. That the Sanctuary supersedes the Sabbath is known from the rule that sacrifice is to be offered on the Sabbath, and this involves slaughter, which is one of the thirty-nine forbidden categories. The argument then is *a fortiori* : if preservation of life supersedes the Sanctuary, and the Sanctuary supersedes the Sabbath, *a fortiori* does preservation of life supersede the Sabbath.

The expression of the text *on the Sabbath day the priests in the Temple profane the Sabbath and are guiltless* is then a reference to a maxim *there is no Sabbath-rest in the Sanctuary*, which is worked out in detail in a variety of treatises. The Sanctuary thus supersedes the Sabbath. The maxim *preservation of life supersedes the Sanctuary* is, as we have seen, based on a law of Exodus which ordains that it shall not furnish sanctuary to a murderer ; and this rule is illustrated by the practice of Solomon with Joab, who seized the horns of the altar. The argument is, as we have also seen, ascribed to R. Akiba, whose style in one of the reports is even more stenographic than that of Matthew ; it is as follows : *if murder supersedes worship, which supersedes the Sabbath, a fortiori does preservation of life supersede the Sabbath.* Other reports are less concise and give the references which have been quoted ; but they display a great deal of confusion, chiefly through misinterpretation of the passage in Exodus ; some supposing that the case referred to is where the sacrificing priest is himself the murderer, others that in which a sacrificing priest is called to give evidence in a murder case. It would appear that these discussions arose after the Temple had ceased to exist, when its employment as sanctuary by those who feared

execution had long been forgotten. This right however regularly belonged to temples in the ancient world, and there is an allusion to it in the case of the murder of the last of the Prophets. That the execution of a murderer is in order to preserve life within the community is also a fairly universal maxim ; *in retaliation is your life* is a text of the Koran. The fact before us is that the *a fortiori* argument which justifies the preservation of life at the expense of the Sabbath in the Rabbinical records has for its middle term the Temple worship, as here ; the particular mode whereby the violation of the Sanctuary was identified with the preservation of life is a detail about which there are various statements ; and what in one of them is part of R. Akiba's argument in another is a wholly different argument by another Rabbi. What however they give us quite clearly is the reference in the premise *something greater than the Sanctuary is here.*

In the narratives of healing in the first three Gospels there is no mention of an operation whereby the Sabbath would be violated. This omission is supplied in the Fourth Gospel, where two cases of healing on the Sabbath are recorded. In ix. 6 a blind man's eyes are treated with a plaster of earth and saliva ; the preparation of this would come under the category " kneading " ; further, the treatment of the eye with saliva on the Sabbath was forbidden according to Maimonides, who is quoting late authorities.[1] In v. 8 a man who has been infirm for thirty-eight years is told on a Sabbath to take up his pallet and walk ; since he was in semi-public jurisdiction at the time, and took his pallet into public jurisdiction, he was thereby violating the last of the thirty-nine categories. It is true that the rules about beds in the codes are very subtle ; a living

[1] See l.c. xxi. 25, רוק תפל is explained in Levy's gloss.

man may be carried on a litter, but not a corpse ; a broken bed may be carried, but not a sound one. It would however appear that the operation recorded was against the law ; and though not directly medical, it might be regarded as quasi-medical, being a test of the patient's recovered strength.

The second of these cures is defended in vii. 22–24 by an argument which the Oral Tradition ascribes to R. Eleazar b. Azariah. It is again of the *a fortiori* type, though our versions by mistranslation conceal this. *For this cause hath Moses given you circumcision, not that it is of Moses, but of the fathers, and on the Sabbath ye circumcise a man.* 23. *If a man receiveth circumcision on the Sabbath, that the law of Moses may not be broken : are ye wroth with me, because I made a man every whit whole on the Sabbath ?* Of course the Greek words ὅλον ἄνθρωπον ὑγιῆ ἐποίησα cannot be rendered thus ; they must mean *because I made a whole man sound.* In R. Eleazar's words : circumcision concerns one out of 248 members of the body and yet it supersedes the Sabbath ; *a fortiori* must an operation which concerns the whole body supersede the Sabbath. In the various reports of his argument the phrase *his whole body* (כל גופו) occurs.

The argument assumes that the maxim *circumcision supersedes the Sabbath* is known or capable of proof. The proof given in the passage before us is found in the Oral Tradition, but is not apparently assigned to R. Eleazar. It is as follows ;[1] by the patriarchal law (Genesis xvii. 10) the operation was to be performed on every male eight days old. This merely gave an age before which it should not be performed ; the Mosaic law (Leviticus xii. 3) ordains that it shall be performed on the eighth day, which is interpreted as the eighth day *in any case.* In

[1] B. Sabbath 132 *a.*

order then that the Law of Moses (as opposed to the patriarchal law) be not violated circumcision is made to supersede the Sabbath.

The words *for this cause* are omitted by various MSS. whether because they were not understood, or to avoid the Rabbinism. The Rabbis take the view that the purpose of the texts is to convey the inferences which they base upon them by approved methods.

There were, as appears from the long discussion in the passage cited from B. Sabbath, various other ways of deducing the maxim *circumcision supersedes the Sabbath* from Scripture. Doubtless this maxim must have been frequently applied, whereas the analogous maxim dealing with danger to life would have been less regularly required. Probably the supersession of the Sabbath by circumcision was historically due to the fact that the latter was the earlier institution.

It is probable that the verse which follows 24, *Judge not according to appearance, but judge righteous judgment,* which is similar to Isaiah xi. 3, 4, has a technical sense in relation to the argument which precedes. Judging according to appearance would seem in this case to mean judging according to the ostensible sense of the text, where the hidden sense should be applied. The law of Leviticus, which in appearance is a repetition of the patriarchal enactment, in reality furnishes the basis for the maxim *preservation of life or restoration of health supersedes the Sabbath.*

Two further texts were quoted in support of the maxim, one of them Leviticus xviii. 5, *my ordinances, which if a man do, he shall live by them,* whence it might be inferred that they were not to be kept when danger of death resulted. This does not appear to be used in the Gospel; but one other text which was used by R. Jonathan b. Joseph seems to underlie the maxim *the Sabbath was made for man and not*

man for the Sabbath. This is Exodus xxxi. 14, *ye shall keep the Sabbath, for it is holy unto you;* where "unto you" might be rendered as *yours*, i.e., in the paraphrase of this Rabbi, *it is delivered into your hands, not you into its.* As is so often the case the Lewisian text of Matthew xii. 7, 8, is the only one which enables us to follow the argument. This, as before, is *a fortiori. Had ye known what is meant by I desire mercy and not sacrifice* (Hosea vi. 6), *ye would not have condemned the innocent; for the lord of the Sabbath is man.* From Leviticus xxvii. 9 we learn that the sacrifice is "holy unto the Lord"; from the passage cited that the Sabbath is "holy unto you." If then mercy takes precedence of sacrifice which is holy unto the Lord, *a fortiori* it takes precedence of the Sabbath, which is holy unto man.

If the presentation of this argument in the other Gospels be compared, we shall find the order Matthew—Luke—Mark. In the third Gospel the premise which is drawn from Exodus xxxi. 14 is represented as a saying of the Saviour, with the word "also" inserted. In the second Gospel this insertion is retained, and the premise which is drawn from Scripture is turned into a conclusion inferred from the maxim which paraphrases it. In Matthew the maxim *the lord of the Sabbath is man* is assumed to be known; and the source of this can scarcely be anything other than the text quoted for this purpose by R. Jonathan, containing the word לכם "yours." In the others the proposition is converted, *the Son of man is lord also of the Sabbath*, with the difference that Luke makes it a new doctrine, whereas Mark deduces it from a maxim *the Sabbath was made for man, etc.*

Where a medical operation might be deferred with apparent safety it was not so clear that the Sabbath might be violated. The existing Mishnah is decidedly against the

permissibility of medical treatment in such a case; according to it a broken limb is not to be set on the Sabbath, nor a joint that is sprained to be put right. A cut finger might be plastered in the Temple, but not outside it. Indeed "healing," רפואה, is practically treated as a forbidden category. The discussion of this subject in the Gospels is of great interest from the jurist's point of view, and indicates that the texts have been revised by experts.

In Matthew xii. 9 a man is in the synagogue whose "right hand," according to the Lewisian text, "had become dry," יבישא הות; in the Peshitta revision the verb הות is omitted as well as the word "right," in order to bring the statement into accordance with the Greek χεῖρα ἔχων ξηράν. The situation presented by the Lewisian text resembles one in a passage of B. Sabbath (148 a). The hand of a Rabbi becomes numbed [1] on the Sabbath, and he discusses the question whether he might or might not treat it. The bystanders in Matthew ask the Saviour for a legal opinion on the case. He compares that of a man whose sheep has fallen into a pit on the Sabbath, and who is permitted to draw it up. So the Lewisian text; according to the Greek the case compared is of a man who has *one* sheep, and is permitted to seize and raise it.

In the third Gospel the argument is removed from the case of the man with the withered hand, and used for a miraculous cure of the dropsy; his account has some variants of great importance (xiv. 5). For the *pit* of Matthew he substitutes *well*, which can only be a mistranslation of the Hebrew *bor*, which is technical in this context; it is used for both pit and well. The compiler of this Gospel had then access to some Hebrew document. Besides this, according to the chief Greek MSS., he substitutes for *a sheep*

[1] שניא. See Thesaurus Syriacus, col. 4234. Rashi is mistaken with regard to the sense of this word.

the words *a son or an ox*, which appear to be a correction, though an incomplete one, for *an ass or an ox*. The Hebrew in these cases uses the word *behemah*, for which the Greek language has no synonym ; the *sheep, ass and ox* appear to be different ways of representing it. But the alteration *son* is to reconcile the statement of the text with the current Mishnah, which contemplates the case of a *child* falling into a pit on the Sabbath day, and prescribes that an inclined plane should be made to enable him to climb out of it. In the case of the domestic animal one rule was that it should be left in the pit, but food be brought to it there ; another that cushions and the like should be thrown in to enable it to work its way out. The principle involved is that cruelty to animals is forbidden by the Law ; and the *a fortiori* argument appears to be : if steps are taken for the restoration to the owner of an animal that has fallen into a pit on the Sabbath and so become unable to move, how much more should such steps be taken in the case of a limb which has become immovable ! The case of dropsy is probably one that comes under the maxim *preservation of life takes precedence of the Sabbath*, since the dropsy was regarded as a disease which might lead to death at any moment ; it seems therefore clear that Matthew and not Luke is right in the assignation of the case.

The differences between the Lewisian and the Greek text of Matthew are traceable to different views of the ascertained practice in the case of the animal and of the maxim to which the case could be referred. The Oral Tradition seems clearly to be against the permissibility of lifting it, which is what is asserted in the Greek text to be permissible ; but the insertion *one* in " one sheep " seems to be with the view of bringing the case under a different maxim, viz., that which we have already cited repeatedly, and indeed on the theory that a sole possession is the life of the possessor.

In Luke xxi. 4 the widow's mite is called her whole life, and Ben-Sira speaks of one who deprives another man of his livelihood as a murderer. The loss of a right hand might therefore be brought under the same maxim. It is however exceedingly difficult in this matter to state whether the Greek or the Lewisian text of Matthew is preferable. Otherwise the originality of the text of the first Gospel is evident; an event occurs in a synagogue on a Sabbath and the Saviour being present is asked for His decision on a practical question; viz., whether the man whose right hand had become numbed should take steps to restore it or might not do so; and the question is answered as a jurist would answer it, by reference to analogies. The answer is followed by a miraculous cure, which perhaps was no part of the original narrative. In the third Gospel the question is not addressed to the Saviour, but *by* Him; and the miraculous cure effected is evidence that good may be done on the Sabbath day. This account then makes the miracle the main part of the narrative and omits the argument. The second Gospel agrees with the third, merely emphasising the fact that the man's hand had been long withered, and introducing some detail.

The process of the narrative then appears to have been as follows. A question having been asked and answered by an argument drawn from the current local practice, those who reported varied the analogy cited in accordance with other local practice; and the differences that are found in the various narratives are all based on the desire to render the answer correct according to the usage of the community to which the reporter belonged; and, as we have seen, until late times there was variety in this matter.

The last argument is found in Luke xiii. 15, where a woman, having a spirit of sickness, was unable for eighteen years to hold herself erect; by a touch of the hand she is

released, and the act is defended by an *a fortiori* argument; binding and loosing are indeed among the thirty-nine categories of forbidden acts; but an exception is made in the case of an ox or ass which is untied and led to the water; *a fortiori* should it be made in the case of a daughter of Abraham, who has been bound by Satan eighteen years.

The rule permitting the loosing of a beast in such a case is found in the codes. The argument appears to have no flaw; and if Hebraism be any evidence of authenticity, this passage should be authentic; for throughout the reader easily recognises the formulæ of the Rabbis.

The Lewisian Syriac, which in the case of the third Gospel is a translation from the Greek, nevertheless represents a very ancient form of it; for "spirit of sickness" it has "spirit" only. In both the Greek and the Syriac texts Christ says to the woman *thou art freed from thy sickness;* and in both in what follows He says *whom Satan bound.* Since "a spirit of sickness" appears to be unique, and since in certain forms of Aramaic the words for *sickness* and *demon* are identical, the conjecture lies near that the Greek *spirit of sickness* is a double rendering of the word for *sickness*, and that the word for *sickness*, which is indeed one specially used of a female complaint, was what was intended throughout this passage. In that case the charge of puerile superstition which has sometimes been urged against this passage would hold good of its translators only.

As Schwarz shows, there are various ways wherein the *a fortiori* argument can be met, and indeed it is clear that the measurement of magnitude in the case of institutions and of offences is not so simple as in that of mathematical quantities. Still, where there was no legislation, but only inference from a code, it was undoubtedly a legitimate process; and in defence of this form of jurisprudence it

may be noticed that the collection of statistics on a scale sufficient for the basing of practical conclusions was difficult if not impossible before the means of communication had vastly improved on what they were in classical times. The Gospels appear however to present a faithful portrait of their times when they make the philanthropic interpretation of the law far less approved than that which neglected this consideration; and though on the whole the oral tradition seems to answer the question of the right to give medical assistance on the Sabbath to some extent in the same sense as the Gospels, there is much variety of opinion on the matter down to quite late times. In a commentary of the beginning of the twelfth century treatment on the Sabbath is said to be forbidden; in the code of Maimonides, himself a physician, this opinion is rejected with extreme bitterness; those who hold it are charged with atheism. But even in the seventeenth century great uncertainty as to its legitimacy prevailed.

A question which is necessarily of great interest is the relation of the Gospel narratives to those Rabbinical collections of Oral Tradition wherein we have found the same arguments. On the one hand it must be admitted that these arguments rest on subtle combinations of passages, which must have been the work of individual minds; some one must have thought them out. On the other hand, as we have seen, the account of their authorship in the Jewish Oral Tradition is confused and self-contradictory; arguments which represent the opposing views of different Rabbis in one report are combined in another as the argument of a single Rabbi. Hence, though these arguments must have been formulated by competent jurists, there is little reason for supposing the ascription in the Jewish Oral Tradition to be correct. The writing down of the Christian tradition is without doubt earlier and possibly many centuries earlier

than that of the Jewish; and in the oldest Gospel, viz., the Lewisian Syriac of Matthew, arguments are used against the Pharisees which could only have emanated from a first-rate expert in the Oral Law. Yet there are difficulties about the ascription of these subtleties to the Founder of Christianity, when they are employed as the Pharisees use them; we all think of the Gospel as a revolt against a system of which the Oral Law contains so extraordinary a monument. Further, the Jewish Tradition seems right in attributing the separate arguments which lead to the same conclusion to different jurists; if, e.g., the argument from circumcision was considered by a jurist conclusive, we should fancy that he would have been satisfied therewith; some other jurist who detected a flaw therein would seek for another prop in the Law for the maxim which required such support. Further, we have seen that the various texts of the Gospels, and to some extent of the same Gospel, are based on different theories of current practice, such as are also noticed in the Oral Tradition of the Jews as belonging to different regions.

Hence in ascribing these arguments to the Founder of Christianity we are confronted not only with an incongruity, but also with the evidence of different hands which the various forms of the argument display. And we are reminded of the practice so widely spread in ancient times of attributing to the Founder of a school or system ideas which seemed worthy of him, though there might be little authority for such attribution. It is however difficult to attribute these arguments to any but persons accustomed to think and to express themselves in the Hebrew of the Rabbinical schools. If, therefore, as seems to be the case, the Gospels contain three layers, a Hebrew layer, belonging to the first Christians, a Syriac layer belonging to the second set of proselytes, and a Greek layer belonging to the

third, we should be justified in assigning the arguments which have been analysed to the first and nearest transmitters of the Gospel.

D. S. Margoliouth.

PROPHETS AND KINGS.

Both Matthew and Luke report a beatitude pronounced by Jesus upon those who were fortunate enough to witness His coming and experience the bliss of the divine reign on earth; but they reproduce it in very different settings and in slightly different forms. The saying runs as follows:—

Matt. xiii. 16, 17.	*Luke* x. 23, 24.
ὑμῶν δὲ μακάριοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ ὅτι βλέπουσιν, καὶ τὰ ὦτα ὑμῶν ὅτι ἀκούουσιν.	μακάριοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ οἱ βλέποντες ἃ βλέπετε·
ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ δίκαιοι ἐπεθύ- μησαν ἰδεῖν ἃ βλέπετε καὶ οὐκ εἶδον, καὶ ἀκοῦσαι ἃ ἀκούετε καὶ οὐκ ἤκουσαν.	λέγω γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅτι πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ βασιλεῖς ἠθέ- λησαν ἰδεῖν ἃ ὑμεῖς βλέπετε καὶ οὐκ εἶδον, καὶ ἀκοῦσαι ἃ ἀκούετε καὶ οὐκ ἤκουσαν.

I.

The text in Matthew is fairly certain. The omission of ὑμῶν after ὦτα by B a bc ff² g¹ q, etc., the addition of γὰρ after ἀμὴν by BDΣ, the vulgate and Syriac versions, etc., the omission of πολλοὶ[1] by a thirteenth-century minuscule (von Soden's *a* 350 = Gregory's 1161), and the omission of καὶ δίκαιοι by B* are not important variations.

[1] Peter of Laodicea lays stress on the fact that "not all" failed to attain this bliss; τινὲς γὰρ ἐπιθυμήσαντες εἶδον καὶ ἤκουσαν, ὡς Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Μωσῆς καὶ οἱ διασημότεροι (cf. Hoinrici's *Beiträge zur Erklärung des N.T.*, v. 1908, p. 150). He follows Origen here (cf. *in Joannem* vi. 3). But this is not the point made by Jesus. The beatitude does not distinguish "many" from a more fortunate and worthy minority; it simply states that a number of prophets and good men had the messianic longing, and yet had not that longing gratified (as Heb. xi. 39–40, 1 Pet. i. 10–11).

It is different with the text of Luke. Here the normal *πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ βασιλεῖς* (quoted in *Clem. Hom.* iii. 53) becomes either :

(a) *προφῆται καὶ βασιλεῖς* : a minuscule of the 12th century (1241 = von Soden's ὁ 371)—

or, (b) *πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ δίκαιοι* : Tatian's Diatessaron, and two manuscripts (*b*, *q*) of the Old Latin version—

or, (c) *πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ βασιλεῖς* : Ephraem Syrus[1] and the Kosinitza tenth-century minuscule 1424 (= von Soden's δ 30)[2]—

or (d) *πολλοὶ προφῆται* : D and four Old Latin manuscripts (a ff² i. 7).

(a) is parallel to the similar omission of *πολλοὶ* in Matthew and (c) is plainly conflate. Neither is of importance, except in so far as (c) attests the existence of *βασιλεῖς*, and thus offers indirect evidence in favour of (a) or of the canonical reading against (b) and (d). It is the two latter variations which demand notice. Of these, (b) may be pronounced without hesitation, harmonistic. It arose in circles where Matthew's text was regarded as superior.[3] The problem of (d) is less simple. This reading is printed as the text of the Latin New Testament in Africa, at Cyprian's period, by Hans von Soden (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, xxxiii. 1909) ; it was apparently the text used by Marcion, for Tertullian quotes the verse in this form in *adv. Marcionem*, iv. 25

[1] Either as "prophets and kings and righteous men" (Codex B), or "prophets and righteous men and kings." But this may be his reading of Matthew.

[2] In Gregory's *Textkritik des Neuen Testamentes*, iii. p. 1418, his numerical equivalent "1434" is a misprint for "1424."

[3] Matthew's version was evidently in the mind of Irenaeus (iv. 22. 1, "multi prophetae et iusti"), Clement of Alexandria (*quis dives salv.* 29, *μήτε δίκαιοι μήτε προφῆται*), Origen (*in Joannem.* vi. 5, x. 43, xiii. 48), and Augustine (*c. Faust.* xxii. 85, "multi iusti et prophetae"), and it was probably recollected by Eusebius in *H.E.* x. 1, 4 (*οἷα τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν πολλοὶ τῷ ὄντι δίκαιοι καὶ θεοῦ μάρτυρες ἐπεθόμησαν ἐπὶ γῆς ἰδεῖν*, κ.τ.λ.).

("dico enim uobis, quia prophetae non uiderunt quæ uos uidetis"). Baron von Soden adds, in his textual apparatus, Methodius as another witness to this reading, but Methodius seems to have Matthew not Luke in mind [1] when he writes (*Orat. in Ramos Palmarum*, ii). : "una accedite socii, eaque discetis, quae Moysi ac prophetis reliquis fuerunt in desiderio," for in his only other reference (*Conuiuium decem Virginum*, vii. 7) he quotes Matthew, omitting *καὶ δίκαιοι* ("dico enim uobis, quod multi prophetae cupierunt uidere quae uidetis"). Still, even when we leave out Methodius, the early existence of the reading not only in Marcion, but in the circles in which the primitive Latin text of the church originated, is a point in its favour.[2] The omission of *βασιλεῖς*, however, is more intelligible than its insertion. The same reasons may have led to its deletion as led to its change into *δίκαιοι*, if Matthew's text is original. Tertullian may have only been quoting enough for his immediate purpose, and on the whole the textual case against *καὶ βασιλεῖς* is not strong enough to justify Blass's excision of it from Luke. We may therefore accept *πολλοὶ προφῆται καὶ βασιλεῖς* as the original form of the Lucan text ; it explains most readily the genesis of the other readings. Whether *ἐπεθύμησαν* or *ἠθέλησαν* represents the primitive Aramaic word used by Jesus, is a minor question, and one which it is difficult to answer satisfactorily. The general sense, in either case, is unaffected.

[1] Perhaps with a vague reminiscence of Luke xxiv. 27. But probably Origen (*in Joann.* xiii. 48, *οὐχ ὡς ὑποδεέστεροι δὲ οἱ προφῆται καὶ Μωσῆς ἀρχῆθεν ‹ οὐκ εἶδον › ὅσα οἱ ἀπόστολοι κατὰ τὴν Ἰησοῦ ἐπιδημίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς περιμένοντες τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου*) suggested the combination ; at any rate he anticipated it.

[2] *Προφῆται*, by itself, might have been understood in the broader sense of the term which is implied, e.g., in Tobit iv. 12 (*υἱοὶ προφητῶν ἐσμεν. Νῶε, Ἀβραάμ, Ἰσαάκ, Ἰακώβ, οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ.*) ; in Philo it describes Moses and David, in Sirach it includes Job ; Sirach (xlvi. 1), also endows Joshua with prophetic functions.

II.

From the text we now turn to the different contexts of the saying, which have to a certain extent affected its form.

In Mark's narrative the parable of the sower is followed by a request from the disciples that Jesus will explain to them "the parables" (iv. 10).[1] After a general statement upon the scope and object of parables (iv. 11–14), He upbraids them for not understanding "this parable," i.e., the parable of the sower (iv. 12: *οὐκ οἴδατε τὴν παραβολὴν ταύτην, καὶ πῶς πάσας τὰς παραβολὰς γνώσεσθε*). Both Luke and Matthew omit the reproach, but Matthew inserts at this point our beatitude (xiii. 16, 17). It follows the citation from Isaiah (xiii. 14, 15) upon the blindness of the general mass, and in conformity with that citation not only opens with the double reference[2] to eyes and ears, but begins with *ὑμῶν*. The inner circle of the disciples is contrasted with the outsiders who cannot understand the secret truths revealed by the parables, and Jesus congratulates the former on being initiated into the profound meaning of the stories.

Luke reserves the beatitude for a later situation, when the seventy return from their mission and report to Jesus their experiences of success. The delight expressed by Jesus (x. 21) in an outburst of thanksgiving to God is followed by two sayings which are addressed to the disciples. Each is introduced by the phrase *καὶ στραφεὶς πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς εἶπεν*, the second with the addition of *κατ' ἰδίαν*. The first of these (x. 22) corresponds to what Matthew has put earlier (xi. 27); the second is our beatitude. That is, while

[1] Yet only one has been spoken, unless we suppose the plural includes the distant "parable" ii. 36 f. The Western text of Mark avoids this difficulty by reading *τίς ἡ παραβολὴ αὕτη* (D.) for *τὰς παραβολάς*, but this is plainly harmonistic (cf. Luke viii. 9, *τίς αὕτη εἴη ἡ παραβολή*).

[2] Prov. xx. 12: *οὖς ἀκούει καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρᾷ· Κυρίου ἔργα καὶ ἀμφότερα.*

Matthew makes Jesus congratulate the disciples on understanding His parables as a revelation of the kingdom of heaven, Luke makes Him congratulate the seventy (and their converts?) on their experience of the kingdom in operation. It is generally agreed that the Lucan setting for the beatitude is preferable. In Matthew it comes in with a certain abruptness. "It creates an exaggerated impression as to the extent of the new departure. The parabolic teaching of Jesus, as exemplified in the sower and other parables here collected, was not an absolutely new feature. He had always been speaking more or less in parables." [1] Of the two settings, Luke's is the more apt. Even Keim, the protagonist of Matthew, admits this (*Jesus of Nazara*, iv. p. 61). Whether the group of sayings in which Luke places it is in its proper historical setting,[2] is a further question, which depends upon the view taken of the relation between Luke's tradition of the mission of the seventy and the Matthaean tradition which also puts the sayings as a pendant to the woes on the irresponsive Galilean towns, but fails to connect them with the corresponding mission of the twelve (ch. x.).

III.

The special position assigned to the saying by Matthew has affected, as we have seen, the first part of the beatitude. We have now to inquire whether this throws any light upon the remarkable divergence in the second part, the contrast between Matthew's δίκαιοι and Luke's βασιλεῖς. It is of

[1] Prof. A. B. Bruce, *Expositor's Greek Testament*, vol. i. p. 197.

[2] Wendt (*Lehre Jesu*, i. p. 93), and B. Weiss (*Die Quellen der synoptischen Ueberlieferung*, p. 31) insert the beatitude in its Lucan form (though retaining δίκαιοι and ἐπεθύμησαν) after Matt. xi. 28–30, like Mr. J. F. Blair in *The Apostolic Gospel*, pp. 34, 127–128, and O. Holtzmann (*Life of Jesus*, pp. 285–286). This re-arrangement does not obscure the consciousness of being the long-expected realisation of God's purpose, which Jesus voices in the saying (cf. Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*, pp. 280 f.).

minor importance to ascertain whether Jesus was congratulating the twelve or the seventy. Numbers do not matter. It was His followers, in any case, and He was congratulating them on their religious privileges.[1] But who were in His mind as He spoke of the religious yearnings in past days? The prophets and—whom?

A twofold attempt has been made to explain *δίκαιοι* and *βασιλεῖς* by what may be called the linguistic method. The hypothesis is that the two Greek words are variant renderings of a single Semitic term. Resch, for example, pointed out (*Paralleltexte zu Lucas*, 1895, pp. 206–208) that נָדִיב, "noble" or "princely," becomes in the LXX *δίκαιος* (Prov. xvii. 8) as well as *βασιλεύς* (Prov. xix. 6, Num. xxi. 18); why, then, should not *nadīb* in the original gospel-tradition have been translated by Matthew and Luke as "just" and "royal"? This appears plausible. It is not ruled out of court by the fact that *δίκαιος* in the LXX means "liberal" or "generous," not "righteous," in the broad religious sense of the term; if the Semitic word could be rendered by *δίκαιος* in a specific sense, there would be no reason why the author of Matthew should not use it in the general sense to translate *nadīb*. Dr. Abbott,[2] however, prefers another solution (*Clue* 272 i, 105 a). He notices that *mlák* (= messenger) and *mlk* (= king) may be confused.[3] Thus, when the chronicler (1 Chron. xxi. 19, 20) re-tells the story of 2 Sam. xxiv. 19, 20, *mlk* (מלך) becomes *mlák* or "angel" (מלאך). May not the original *mlák* of

[1] In the *Pesikta* (ed. Buber, p. 149 a, b) on Isa. lxi. 10, "Israel shall say, Blessed the hour in which messiah was born; blessed the womb that bare him; blessed the generation which seeth, blessed the eye which is deemed worthy to behold him."

[2] He argues, against Resch, that Luke would have rendered נָדִיב by *εὐγενής* (Luke xx. 12 *ἄνθρωπος τις εὐγενής*). He might, but he might not.

[3] Dr. Ginsburg (*Introduction to the Hebrew Bible*, 1897, p. 141) notes that in 2 Sam. xi. 1 "the Massorah itself tells us that the redactors of the text inserted *Aleph*, converting הַמְּלָכִים, *kings*, into הַמַּלְאָכִים, *messengers*."

the Semitic gospel tradition, in the sense of "messenger of God," have been paraphrased by the author of Matthew and misunderstood by Luke? The former rendered it by δίκαιος, the latter translated it as if it were *mlk*. Neither of these conjectures is more than ingenious, however, and both depend upon the further and precarious conjecture that Hebrew was the original dialect of the oral or written tradition.

Those who decline to go behind the Greek text have to explain which of the two forms is secondary, and why. Most editors[1] regard βασιλεῖς as the original term. Luke preserves this phrase of the saying as it lay in Q; Matthew, with his predilection for δικαιοσύνη, altered "kings" to "just persons." Elsewhere Matthew does group "prophet" and "righteous person" (x. 41), though in a different setting, with reference not to the past, but to contemporaries. On the other hand, when Luke (xi. 50–51) reproduces the saying preserved in Matthew xxiii. 35, he carefully omits[2] δίκαιον after αἷμα and τοῦ δικαίου after Ἄβελ. If he is right in this, then the Matthaean form is another item of evidence in favour of the secondary character of δίκαιοι in xiii. 17. Matthew certainly uses δίκαιοι more often than either Mark or Luke (e.g. xiii. 49, xxiii. 28, xxv. 37, 46); in xiii. 43 he substitutes it for the συνιέντες of Daniel xii. 3, which is all the more remarkable because the συνῶσιν of the quotation in *v.* 18 echoes on in *v.* 19 and *v.* 23. On the other hand, it is only fair to recollect that the term "just" or "righteous" was common in the religious vocabulary of Palestine, and that Matthew may be reproducing not incorrectly the language of Jesus at this point. Besides, it might be urged, Luke as a Pauline disciple, would hesitate to admit

[1] So e.g. recently Harnack (*Sayings of Jesus*, pp. 25, 26, 135), and Loisy (*Les Evangiles Synoptiques*, i. 912).

[2] In xi. 47 he had already omitted Matthew's clause, καὶ κοσμεῖτε τὰ μνημεῖα τῶν δικαίων, just as (vi. 35) he has no place for καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους.

that there were *δίκαιοι*, and thus might be tempted to alter the term. This is the position of Wendt and Bernhard Weiss,[1] but the latter offers no explanation of Luke's preference for *βασιλεῖς*. Even if his hypothesis about Luke's motive for objecting to the use of *δίκαιοι* as misleading were well founded, it would only explain its textual omission, not the substitution for it of *βασιλεῖς*. An argument from the context might even be developed to show that the Lucan *βασιλεῖς* was adopted in order to suggest a contrast between these earthly kings and the divine reign which they longed to see on earth. Luke's form of the saying emphasises not so much the fact as the object of the vision enjoyed by the disciples. He describes Jesus sending out the seventy to proclaim the imminent advent of God's *Βασιλεία* (x. 9 *λέγετε, ἤγγικεν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*, x. 11 *ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ*). This is the burden of their message. In the authority of Jesus, especially in the exorcism of demons which they, as well as he, were able to effect (x. 17), they saw His successful invasion of Satan's *βασιλεία* and the inauguration of the divine reign on earth. "Kings of old," Jesus reminds them, "wished to see that sort of *βασιλεία*, but what was hidden from them is now before your eyes; they longed to hear this proclamation of God's sovereignty, and you, fortunate men, hear it in My preaching and see it in the exercise of My authority." If that is not too subtle an explanation, it might be turned against Luke in favour of Matthew. On the other hand, such a stress on *βασιλεῖς* need not be editorial. Jesus might conceivably have employed it—in which case the probabilities of *βασιλεῖς* as a reproduction of the original Aramaic are increased.

Upon the whole, the case for *βασιλεῖς* seems slightly stronger than the case for *δίκαιοι*, but I cannot feel that

[1] *Die Quellen des Lucasevangeliums*, pp. 68–70: "für den Paulusschüler *δίκαιοι* überhaupt nicht gibt, die er darum auch x. 24, xi. 47 entfernt."

it is as strong as the case for the superiority of Luke's historical context over Matthew's. We have still to justify *βασιλεῖς* upon grounds of internal probability.

(i) If Matthew's *δίκαιοι* is due to his Jewish predilections, may not Luke's Hellenistic affinities explain his *βασιλεῖς*. Was there some Hellenistic tradition which led Luke either to write the latter term, or to substitute it for the *δίκαιοι* of Q? We know the ancient idea expressed in the line, "delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi." Was the reverse of this considered to be true? Could kings by their piety secure revelations of bliss for their peoples? Were they, either as representing their nations or in their supreme capacity, held to be specially fitted for receiving revelation? This is argued by Herr Franz Boll, in a recent monograph *Aus der Offenbarung Iohannis* (Teubner, 1914), whose sub-title is *Hellenistische Studien zum Weltbild der Apokalypse*. His proofs resolve themselves (pp. 136–42) practically into two allusions. The first (a) occurs in the well-known Leipzig magical papyrus, which contains the following passage: *τούτων τὴν ἀκάματον λύσιν καὶ θεοφιλῆ προσεφώνησά σοι, τέκνον, ἣν οὐδὲ βασιλεῖς ἴσχυσαν καταλαβέσθαι* (Dieterich, *Abraxas*, p. 187, 9). This looks a suggestive parallel, though the revelation is merely astrological; but there is no collocation of kings and prophets. The latter omission is partially rectified in (b) the second piece of evidence cited, viz., the Egyptian theosophy which appears partly in astrological and partly in semi-mystical forms. In the pseudo-Lucianic *de astrolog.* i. (*ἡ μὲν σοφίη παλαιὴ . . . ἔστιν ἔργον ἀρχαίων βασιλέων θεοφιλέων*), and especially in Firmicus (*Math.* viii. 5: diuini illi uiri et sanctissimae religionis antistites Petosiris et Nechepso, quorum alter imperii gubernacula tenuit), we do find that the priest and the king are associated as the recipients of the higher wisdom. Herr Boll does not quote either of these passages, but he notices the Egyptian tra-

dition and calls attention to some lines in Manilius (*Astronomicon*, i. 40 f.):

> Et natura dedit uires seque ipsa reclusit
> regalis animos primum dignata mouere
> proxima tangentis rerum fastigia coelo,
> qui domuere feras gentes oriente sub ipso . . .
> tum qui templa sacris coluerunt omne per aevum
> delectique sacerdotes in publica uota
> officio uinxere deum; quibus ipsa potentis
> numinis accendit castam praesentia mentem,
> inque deum deus ipse tulit patuitque ministris.

This was written between 9 and 14 A.D. The idea is that the original founders of astrology were kings and their priests; it was to them in turn, says the poet, that the universe (= "mundus," in the Stoic sense) revealed its secrets and opened the inner knowledge of the heavens. But this seems a rather remote and irrelevant parallel to bring forward as the clue to the Lucan form of our beatitude. Egyptian priests, as in the cult of Isis, could be called "prophets" upon occasion. It is also true that in the theosophy represented by the Poimandres literature the king and the prophet or seer make their appearance together; the former asks for, and the latter imparts, the Hermetic secrets (cf. Reitzenstein's *Poimandres*, pp. 348 f., 354). But the Lucan beatitude does not make the king precede the prophet, or consult the prophet. Herr Boll is sure that Luke's βασιλεῖς is more likely to have been original than Matthew's δίκαιοι. Only, his explanation makes it practically impossible to believe that Jesus uttered the saying; and, on internal grounds, I do not think we are shut up to that explanation. Against a different and closer background, we do not need such a far-fetched hypothesis to account for the Lucan form, even if it be secondary.

(ii). That background is not the idiosyncrasies of the third Gospel. The special references to kings in Luke's tradition

of the teaching of Jesus (e.g. xiv. 31 *ἢ τις βασιλεὺς κ.τ.λ.*, xxi. 12—where *βασιλεῖς καὶ ἡγεμόνας* reverses the order of Mark and Matthew—and xxii. 25 *οἱ βασιλεῖς τῶν ἐθνῶν, κ.τ.λ.*) throw no light on the saying; neither does his substitution [1] of *βασιλεύς* for *ἐρχόμενος* in the cry of the disciples at the entry into Jerusalem (xix. 38). One Lucan passage remains, the description of king Herod in xxiii. 8: *ἦν γὰρ ἐξ ἱκανῶν χρόνων θέλων ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ ἀκούειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἤλπιζέν τι σημεῖον ἰδεῖν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενον.* Is it feasible to connect this with the beatitude? The hypothesis has occurred to me that Luke possibly meant to put Herod, who wanted in vain to see Jesus perform some exploit or feat, as an illustration of the royal persons who failed to see what the disciples saw. Is that tenable? On second thoughts, no. Jesus was referring to kings of the past, and the beatitude implies that their disappointment was their misfortune, not that it was their fault. They died without witnessing the promised messianic order, but it was not because they were undeserving. Jesus refused to gratify Herod's frivolous curiosity. But the point of the beatitude is that the very piety of these old kings could not avail to yield them that experience of the messianic era which the disciples enjoyed in the fellowship of Jesus. We must therefore set aside this explanation.

(iii.) The royal form of the beatitude did not come from the Septuagint or from the later literature and traditions of Judaism. It is quite impossible to suppose that passages like Neh. ix. 32 (*ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἡμῶν . . . καὶ τοὺς προφήτας ἡμῶν*) and Isa. xxix. 10 (*τῶν προφητῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῶν*) could have suggested this collocation of prophets and kings.[2] On the other hand, the well-known

[1] It makes up for his omission of Mark's *εὐλογημένη ἡ ἐρχομένη βασιλεία τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Δαυείδ.*

[2] The parallel in 2 Macc. ii. 13 (*ἐπισυνήγαγεν τὰ περὶ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ προφητῶν βιβλία, καὶ τὰ τοῦ Δαυείδ*) is closer, but still it is no more than a verbal coincidence.

tradition which is voiced in Sirach's hymn of praise (xliv.–xlix.) probably explains why prophets and kings could be regarded as representative types of religious desire. Beside the great prophets, Sirach reckons a trio of good kings (xlix. 4), David, Hezekiah, and Josiah. The Old Testament chronicler (2 Chron. xv., xvii.) generously tends to include Asa and Jehoshaphat in this list of honour, but Sirach's severer[1] estimate of the monarchs is bound up with his high appreciation of the lives of prophets (Samuel, Nahum, Elijah, Elisha, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and the twelve) and of the priests from Aaron and Phinehas to Simeon the son of Jochanan. The New Testament naturally ignores the priests; in 1 Peter i. 10–12, e.g., only the yearnings of prophets are mentioned. Jesus, in speaking of "many . . . kings," approximates to the Old Testament point of view rather than to that of Sirach; but even the latter justifies the right of *βασιλεῖς* in this connexion, unless we treat *πολλοί* in a prosaic spirit. We are apt to do this, however, and to create an imaginary difficulty, the same sort of difficulty which led some circles in the early church to omit either *πολλοί* or *βασιλεῖς* or both from the beatitude. "Let any reader," says Dr. Abbott, "dispassionately consider (i) how 'many' of the kings of Judah and Israel can be called decently 'good,' not to say rivals of prophets, (ii) how far from favourable to the general character of royalty are Christ's remarks about (Mark x. 24) 'those who are reported to rule over the nations.' Then surely it must seem impossible that He should have bestowed this eulogium on kings." I do not see why it should be inherently impossible. The second of the points made by Dr. Abbott falls to the ground when we remember that this beatitude refers

[1] The dolorous fate of kings and rulers in Enoch (see Charles' note on xxxviii. 5) is a Dantesque criticism of the Roman power or of the later Maccabean princes.

to the kings of Judah and Israel, and that his word on the rulers of nations describes pagan or semi-pagan contemporaries. As for the first point, the Old Testament and Sirach are sufficient to show that some kings at any rate had a halo of sanctity. Prophets were often at issue with kings rather than otherwise; they had to rebuke kings for irreligion. But not invariably.

> "Young Obadias,
> David, Josias—
> All were pious."

The nursery song halted in rhyme, but it was true to the Old Testament position. There were kings, like David, Josiah, and Hezekiah, who hoped for the reign of God on earth; the messianic hope[1] was held to have been before their minds; their piety was read in the light of the end; and in this sense it was natural to say that both prophets and kings had cherished religious aspirations and yearnings which only now were being realised. It is pedantic to cavil at *πολλοί* in a tense outburst like this. Jesus is speaking in a generous, impassioned tone of sympathy with the past, which naturally dwelt upon the long line of good men in the days of old; even if the saintly kings were exceptions,[2] from the historical point of view, they were shining exceptions, from the devout point of view, and in the bright dawn of the divine order around Him Jesus recalled the scattered stars that had preceded the dawn, without reference to the surrounding darkness. Jesus is

[1] Cf. *Ascensio Isaiæ* (ed. R. H. Charles), iv. 13, though the text is uncertain.

[2] Among the later heroes who, for all their active faith, did not receive the promised messianic bliss, the author of Hebrews (xi. 32–40) only mentions one king: *περὶ Γεδεών, Βαράκ, Σαμψών, Ἰεφθάε, Δαυεὶδ τε καὶ Σαμουὴλ καὶ τῶν προφητῶν*. The omission of kings like Hezekiah and Josiah is, to a modern, as strange as the inclusion of *κριταί* like Barak and Jephthah.

far more than a poet, but He is more a poet here than a chronicler. What lies behind this beatitude is an appreciation of Israel's nobler past, not a census of the good and the false, either among kings or among prophets.

JAMES MOFFATT.

ONCE MORE THE CRETANS.

THIS is the fourth time that I am venturing to claim the hospitality of the EXPOSITOR for researches of mine which are concerned with the famous quotation of St. Paul from Epimenides, a Cretan Poet, in which he denounces the unveracity and general degradation of the Cretans. It is not necessary to resume in detail the three previous articles, except so far as they are the proper prologue to some new matter which has recently come to light. It is sufficient to recall the discovery [1] of four lines of Greek verse in a Syriac dress, which were said to be taken from the lost *Minos* of Epimenides. Of these lines the second was the famous line in the Epistle to Titus about the everlasting mendacity of the Cretans, while the fourth line was shown to be the origin of St. Paul's statement on Mars' Hill, that "in Him we live and move and have our being," a passage which, as far as I know, had never been suspected of being taken from a Greek poetical source. This important recovery, both for the classical scholar and for the New Testament interpreter, is to be credited to the great Theodore of Mopsuestia, from whose proscribed writings it had passed into those of the fathers of the Nestorian Church; such as Isho'dad of Merv, and the person or persons responsible for the great Nestorian commentary on the Scriptures as read throughout the circle of the year and known as the *Gannat Busamé* or *Garden of Delights.*

The form in which the restored verses were offered to criticism will be found in the article entitled: "A Further Note on the Cretans," [2] and it should be observed in this

[1] EXPOSITOR, Oct. 1906, "The Cretans always Liars."
[2] EXPOSITOR, April, 1907.

connexion that an emended retranslation has recently appeared in that amazing work of erudition and insight which has just been published, the *Zeus* of Mr. A. B. Cook. In this work, the verses are turned, or returned, as follows : [1]

> Σοὶ μὲν ἐτεκτήναντο τάφον, παναπέρτατε δαῖμον,
> Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί·
> Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ σὺ θάνες, ζώεις δὲ καὶ ἵστασαι αἰεί·
> Ἐν σοὶ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινεόμεσθα καὶ εἰμέν.

Mr. Cook remarks on the connexion between the discourse on the Areopagos, and the quotation in the Epistle to Titus as follows :

" Paul, when preaching at Athens, quoted the words of Minos and attached to them in perpetuity a significance at once deeper and higher. *He must have been aware that the fine concluding phrase referred originally to the Cretan Zeus* ; [2] for elsewhere he cites Minos' description of the Cretans as given in the same context."

I am not quite sure whether this is the last word on the matter of the relation of the two Biblical passages to one another. If Mr. Cook is right, that the verses as spoken by Minos are not " a flat negation of the Cretan faith," but that " they more probably preserve to us the view taken by the genuine mystic of Idaean Zeus," it will be clear that St. Paul must also have known the reason for calling the Cretans liars, viz. : their supposed tomb of Zeus, and it may be questioned whether the generalisation which shuts up all Cretans for all times in the cage of the liar would have been made by a person who knew the original sense of the passage, and treats the words of Minos elsewhere with such sympathetic insight. The matter seems to require a closer consideration. Meanwhile Mr. Cook, with whom I am glad as always to find myself in good agree-

[1] *Zeus*, p. 664. [2] Titus i. 12.

ment, has definitely placed the verses in question, as I have done, in the mouth of Minos. This is done on the faith of the extract made by the Syrian Father, Isho'dad, who tells us [1] that "Minos, the son of Zeus, made a panegyric over his father and said" (then follow the restored verses of Epimenides). It appears, then, that Mr. Cook agrees with me that the verses are spoken by Minos, into whose mouth they are placed by Epimenides.

Now let us come to the new matter with which the present article is concerned. It will be remembered that we quoted from Isho'dad's commentary on the Acts an important passage, which was reasonably referred to Theodore of Mopsuestia. Now there is extant not only the commentary of Isho'dad upon the Gospels and the Acts, but also one upon the Pauline Epistles; and it becomes therefore proper to inquire whether the commentator has anything to say on the Epistle to Titus with its famous reference to Epimenides and the Cretan Liars. On turning to the passages, very slight and scanty, in which Isho'dad disposes of the Epistle to Titus, we find the following interesting sentences:

"*The Cretans are always liars, evil beasts and idle bellies,*" etc. Now a poet of Crete, who was considered a prophet among them, some say his name was *Maxanidus*, others that it was Minos, son of Zeus; but he calls him *a prophet*, according to the idea of the heathen about him, and it is evident from his adding *their own*: now this man, because many said about his father, who had been called Dios, but afterwards changed his name and was called Zeus, that is to say *living*, that he went up to heaven and became higher than all the gods: the Cretans alone said that he was a tyrant and a rebel, and when these said that he was not a mortal man, but an immortal god, the Cretans on the other

[1] Expositor, Oct. 1912, "St. Paul and Epimenides."

hand said that he was killed, and showed his grave among them. For this reason Minos said about them that they were liars, and think contrary to the ideas of all men; and that they resemble destructive beasts, and are eager to falsify the writings of the poets. So the Apostle, too, finding them liars in their dealings with him, employed this saying about them for their reproof; and not as confirming or accepting or praising that poet." It will be recognised that this is an important addition to our material for criticism of the passages in the Acts and in the Epistle to Titus. In the first place, it is not a mere repetition of the passage which we had previously recovered. On the other hand, it again shows traces of the influence of Theodore; this we can see in two ways. First, when we compare the language of Isho'dad in Acts with what we have here:

Acts.	*Titus.*
The Cretans used to say of Zeus, that he was a prince (*τύραννος*), and was ripped up by a wild boar . . . and his grave is with us. Accordingly Minos, the son of Zeus . . . said, etc.	The Cretans alone said that he was a tyrant (and a rebel) . . . that he was killèd, and they show his grave amongst them. For this reason Minos said about them that they were liars.

Here there is clearly a common matter, and an underlying common narration. If, however, this tradition is examined closely, it is a Greek tradition: both forms represent Zeus as *τύραννος*, but in the Epistle to Titus the Greek *τύραννος* has been misunderstood, it occurs in a bad sense, and is translated with an amplification (tyrant and rebel).[1] So

[1] It may be a double translation, from the point of view of the Prometheus Vinctus.

the two Syriac passages are independent modifications of an original (Theodorean) statement. The Greek origin of the comment comes out clearly in the etymology which is given of the name Zeus from ζῶν, living. In the second place we can find our way back to Theodore on another line. The commentary of Theodore on Titus is extant in the Latin, and for a large fragment in the Greek, and if we compare the passage in which Theodore deals with the Cretans, we shall again see some coincidences ; for example :

Theodore.	*Isho'dad.*
Quoniam autem hoc de illis dicit apostolus qui ex gentibus crediderant, evidens est.	This, then, he said about those who had believed from amongst the Gentiles, as wishing to grieve them, for having forsaken the truth, etc. ("wishing to grieve" is the Latin "arguens eos," which appears in the context).
"Proprium" autem "eorum poetam" prophetam dicit qui ista dixit : qui utique non fuerat ex Judaeis, sed ex gentibus.	He calls him a "prophet," according to the idea of the heathen about him, and it is evident from his adding "their own."
Dictum est autem a poeta Cretensibus eo quod derogare illis noluit, ea ratione quam promittebant se Iouis posse sepulchrum in suis monstrare, non homine existente Iove (ut poeta opinabatur) sed deo : (corr. : sed ut poeta opinabatur, deo).	When these said (? this man, sc. Minos, said) that he was not a mortal man, but an immortal god, the Cretans on the other hand said that he was killed and they show his grave among them.

The agreement between the two commentators is significant; evidently Isho'dad sources are Theodorean; he has the same object in view as Theodore, to explain how St. Paul could quote a Gentile prophet without endorsing the prophet on a wider scale than a single quotation; and he quite understands here, as elsewhere, that the Lie is the Tomb. Since, however, the poet-prophet in Theodore's commentary is not mentioned by name, the question arises as to whether there are Theodorean sources beyond the commentary. We are sure that Isho'dad is using the commentary: his opening sentences will show that; but there is more matter, mythologically speaking, than the commentary could hold. It seems necessary, therefore, to assume that either the original commentary of Theodore has been abbreviated, or some other writings of his have been drawn upon. The supposition in either form is reasonable enough: the second appears to be the more probable solution.

Returning to the new extract from Isho'dad, we see clearly, as already stated, the meaning of the Cretan lie. *They show his grave:* for this cause Minos said about them that they were liars.

The extract shows a doubt as to the identification of the Cretan prophet. Maxanidus is a Syriac corruption of Epimenides (the latter part of the names makes the identification for us, for the former part we have confusion of Syriac letters): was the prophet, then, Epimenides or Minos? Isho'dad seems disposed to treat Minos as the prophet. The confusion was not unnatural, when Minos appears as the spokesman in the passage quoted from Epimenides.

Reviewing the matter, as re-opened by the new quotation, we may say that practically the whole of the previous investigation is confirmed, with regard to the origin of the

two Pauline quotations; they are recognised as coming from a lost Greek poem by Epimenides. St. Jerome said that the title of the last poem was περὶ χρησμῶν. We incline to believe it was named Minos, after the principal speaker in it. There is just a possibility that it may have been popularly known as "Minos: or concerning Oracles."

It will be interesting, in conclusion, to compare the corresponding matter in the commentary of Bar Salibi on Titus:

"*One of themselves, a prophet of their own:* i.e. Aratus the heathen: and he calls *the Cretans liars*, because they announce other gods than one: and he [Paul] brought forward this testimony from them, that from their own he might put them to shame: and he says that *this testimony of theirs is true* against that lying mood of theirs; for Zeus is buried there, according to the poet."

Here the only statement that has survived from the original mythology is that the Grave of Zeus is the Lie of the Cretans; and even this fact is obscured by putting the responsibility for the lie upon the poet who contradicted. Epimenides too, has given place to Aratus under the influence of the address to the Areopagus.

RENDEL HARRIS.

THE PSALTER AS AN AID TO WORSHIP IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

In this connexion no attempt is made to draw any distinction between Public Worship and Private. Certainly the Psalter does not favour any such attempt. The Psalms are full of worship, but the ever-recurring *crux* as we pass from one to another of these great poems is, *Does the speaker speak for himself or for his nation?* Is it the Jewish Church which is praising God, or is it some lonely exile bemoaning his separation from his people? We can hardly ever say with conviction, "This Psalm is purely personal, and this again is purely national."

Indeed an intertwining of things personal with things public belongs to the very nature of worship. Worship must start in the heart of the individual, but by its nature it reaches out for communion with other hearts as it approaches the Throne of God. Worship is an attempt to ascribe to the Creator and Redeemer *His due*, and that task is beyond the power of any individual. How intensely the Psalmists realised the fact is shown throughout the Psalter. The singer is not content even with inviting his fellow-men to join him: "O magnify Jehovah with me, and let us exalt His name together" (Ps. xxxiv. 3); he proceeds further to call on the aid of the powers of Nature:

> "Praise ye Him, sun and moon,
> Praise Him, all ye stars of light" (Ps. cxlviii. 3).

Worship cannot remain private without denying its own nature.

We are indebted to the Old Testament generally and to the Psalter in particular for much picturesque language and many illustrative phrases which help us to realise the

true nature of worship. The standard illustration is that which represents worship as an approach to God. In the earliest representations preserved in the Old Testament this Approach was shown under figures which suggest a *natural* relationship. JEHOVAH is regarded as the Chieftain of His worshippers, and they are regarded as His people, His kin, His relations. When a Psalmist writes, "Know ye that JEHOVAH is God; He hath made us; and we are His; we are His people and the flock of His pasture" (Ps. c. 3), his language points to ancient thoughts which must seem very strange to prosaic Britons. The language is more anthropomorphic than most of us realise. When the Psalmist says, *We are His people* (עַמּוֹ), his language all but coincides with that of the heathen poet who said, *τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν* (Acts xvii. 28).

So the oldest notion of worship which we can trace in the Old Testament was, in the poet's words, an

> "Infantine,
> Familiar clasp of things divine."

The worshipper approached his God as his chief, with a present in his hand in token of fealty; he saw the *face*, the very presence, of his God; and he ate and drank in His presence (Exod. xxiv. 11). The notion of a sacrifice offered by the people mingled with the notion of a feast given by their Chief. Worship was joyous and unrestrained: the people sat down to eat and to drink and rose up to dance lascivious dances (Exod. xxxii. 6).

Such self-indulgent worship had (not unnaturally) its cruel side. Those who felt that their God was their kinsman looked to Him to sustain their blood-revenge. So Psalm cxxxvii. stands in direct descent from the thoughts of those who had treated their God so familiarly as their clansman and their Chief. Hatred of their enemies was in their eyes

only a form of loyalty to their Divine king. "*Do not I hate them*, O JEHOVAH, *that hate Thee?*" is the exclamation of a Psalmist who yet has much to teach us of the wonderful ways of God (Ps. cxxxix. 21).

When therefore we speak of the Psalter as an aid to worship, we must not forget that there are passages which are no aid at all, but on the contrary a hindrance. It is not fitting that the Psalter should be used in its entirety in Christian worship. If at the present time every single Psalm finds its place in the Daily Offices of the Church of England, the fact is due rather to the practical difficulties of revision than to any widely held conviction that such Psalms as lxix., cix., and cxxxvii. are suitable as they stand for Christian worship.

But our present concern is not with a few Psalms which, when sung, strike a false note in a Christian service, but with the Psalter as a whole, which surely stands foremost among books in the world as a help to worship.

It occupies this high position, in the first place, because it is a book whose main concern is with righteousness (δικαιοσύνη), or, perhaps we should rather say, with a righteous God. Just as in the Epistles of St. Paul, so also in the Psalter, the chief key-note is—the righteousness of God!

It is not that the Psalmists all grasp the thought with the same clearness and firmness as the Apostle, but still it dominates the Psalms as a collection. We may go further and say that it is *intended* so to dominate. The Psalms of David, i.e. those called so in special headings, begin with Psalm iii. But two anonymous poems are prefixed to the Psalter, and the first of these strikes the keynote of righteousness which is heard throughout the book. Psalm i. describes the working of *the Righteousness of God* as it affects the individual: the righteous man is known to JEHOVAH and he prospers, when the wicked and their works are driven

into oblivion. A stronger and at the same time a calmer assertion than this Psalm makes of what Bishop Butler calls the moral government of God, is difficult to conceive.

In other Psalms the Psalmist seeks to prove the righteousness of JEHOVAH by an inductive method. Thus the writer of Psalm cvii. proves by examples the co-related goodness and righteousness of God. The Divine government, he says, brings the chastisement of captivity or of sickness upon the rebellious and the fools, and then on their repentance breaks the bonds of the one and brings healing upon the other. A moral government is being carried on, and men ought to praise JEHOVAH for the glimpses of it which He shows them.

In other Psalms, again, the singer sees God's righteousness in the promise of the future. For the present the ungodly triumph, but JEHOVAH the King is coming to judge the earth, and the Heaven above and the peoples below will perceive the glory of His righteousness. Of the coming of this future judgment the Psalmist has no doubt whatever; he is no wistful half-doubter; he has seen the day with prophetic eye and rejoices, and he calls upon earth and sky and sea to share his joy: "Then shall all the trees of the wood rejoice before JEHOVAH, for He cometh, for He cometh to judge the earth" (Ps. xcvi. 12, 13).

It is this insistent and vivid presentation of God's righteousness in the Psalms which must be mentioned first, when we affirm that the Psalter is an aid to worship. It is not possible for man to worship a God whom he believes to be unrighteous, nay, it is not even possible to pay true worship to a Being of whose righteousness we are in any doubt. "Righteous art Thou, O JEHOVAH, and upright are Thy judgments" (Ps. cxix. 137; cf. Rev. xvi. 5–7) is the basal confession from which worship begins. It is the conviction of God's righteousness which above all things imposes

upon man the duty of offering worship. From that conviction come the clear, strong, unfaltering tones which distinguish so much of the worship of the Psalter.

Further, man is *imitative*; he cannot help learning from those to whom he draws near. As he realises that the righteousness of his God puts him under the obligation to offer worship, so he will realise that it calls upon him *to be himself righteous*. The Psalter deepens the impression. The Psalmist is drawn to worship: he exclaims, "I will call upon JEHOVAH who is worthy to be praised" (Ps. xviii. 3). In what does this "worthiness" consist? The Psalmist himself answers clearly and emphatically a few verses later, in language describing the righteousness of God,

> With the merciful Thou wilt show Thyself merciful;
> With the perfect man Thou wilt show Thyself perfect;
> With the pure Thou wilt show Thyself pure;
> And with the perverse Thou wilt show Thyself froward.
> (Ps. xviii. 25 f.).

In other words the unrighteous man cannot approach the righteous God: the worshipper must draw near at least with the aspiration of becoming like his God. The Psalter teaches us pretty plainly that worship which stands deliberately aside from godliness is nothing. So a Psalmist exclaims:

> O Thou that hearest prayer,
> Unto Thee shall all flesh come.
> When iniquities (דִּבְרֵי עֲוֹנֹת) prevail against me,
> Thou Thyself dost purge away our transgressions.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Let us be satisfied with the goodness of Thy House,
> With the holy place of Thy Temple (Ps. lxv. 3, 4).

Worship (we are thus taught) is a purifying influence. There is no true worship where there is no moral approach to God.

Indeed, man cannot worship any God but one whom he believes to be righteous; this is a *sine qua non*. A wicked spiritual Being, like Moloch or the Babylonian Nergal, may be deprecated by unholy offerings, a non-moral Being may be coerced with magic, but true worship, the acknowledgment of *worth* in a Divine Being, can be paid only to a righteous Deity, as to JEHOVAH as the Psalmist conceived Him, or to God the Father as St. Paul represents Him in the Romans. True worship, moreover, he cannot offer apart from the aspiration on his own part after righteousness.

But there are other qualities—if we may use the word in reference to the Godhead—which the Psalter ascribes to God and by reason of which it stirs us up to worship. Righteousness may leave men convinced, *but cold*; graciousness (or goodness) touches men to the heart. "Give thanks unto JEHOVAH, for He is gracious," is an invitation repeated and again repeated in the Psalms.

This graciousness or goodness of JEHOVAH (Heb. חסד) is usually translated in LXX by ἔλεος, but it is not quite the same thing as our English "mercy." God's graciousness is shown in his consideration for the individual: He may punish him or He may relieve him of punishment, but in either case God shows His *khesed*.

> And to Thee, O Lord, belongeth graciousness;
> For Thou renderest to every man according to his work (Ps. lxii.12).

Here again, then, the Psalmist helps us towards worship by emphasising for us the righteous God's *righteous care* for the individual. What we commonly call God's *mercy* is (viewed from another standpoint) His *righteousness*. The well-known maxim concerning the Law must be emended when we apply it to the final Source of law; we must write, *De minimis curat Deus*.

Further, the Psalter helps devotion by its vivid presen-

tation of the unalterable, imperishable relation between God and man. It sets us the example of worshipping God as the One who is *eternal* in his graciousness towards man.

> Thou art the same,
> And Thy years shall have no end.
> The children of Thy servants shall continue,
> And their seed shall be established before Thee.
> (Ps. cii. 27, 28.)

Or again, we may cite the frequent refrain :

> O give thanks unto JEHOVAH, for He is good ;
> For His mercy (*khesed*) endureth for ever.
> (Ps. cvi. 1 *et passim.*)

In the face of the continual confession that JEHOVAH'S graciousness is eternal, it is hardly right to talk as confidently as some do of an almost complete absence of belief in a life after death among the writers of the Old Testament.

The facts seem to be roughly as follows. In the first place the ancient Israelite was indeed tied tightly by his very religion to this life. He had a Holy Land given him by covenant by his God ; it was not merely a good land of milk and honey, it was a *sacred* land to be kept as a trust. Further, he had—not a goodly number of cathedrals and great churches—but just one building set absolutely without rival in the midst of this Holy Land as the house, the dwelling of his God.

In this house an elaborate worship was carried on which served the double purpose of helping the Israelite to approach his God and of enabling him to realise his union with the rest of his nation to whom alone this Holy Land belonged, in which the holy house was established. This worship appealed powerfully to the eye, the ear, and the desire to *act* in accordance with the sentiment of the hour. So the Israelite did not merely perform his worship ; he *exulted* in it. One Psalmist recalls with joy that the enemies

of Israel—heathen prisoners no doubt—had witnessed it.

> They have seen thy goings, O God,
> Even the goings of my God, my King, into the sanctuary.
> The singers went before,
> The minstrels followed after,
> In the midst of the damsels playing with the timbrels.
> (Ps. lxviii. 24 f.)

And when the endless procession entered the Temple there was still more of colour and sound and movement. Ben Sira describes the central figure of the service—the High Priest himself :

> How glorious was he when he looked forth from the tent
> And when he came forth from within the curtain !
> As the morning star from among thick clouds,
> And as the full moon on the feast-days ;
> When he put on robes of honour,
> And clothed himself with garments of beauty,
> When he received the portions at the hand of his brethren,
> As he stood by the altar-fires.
> He stretched forth his hand to the cup,
> And poured of the blood of the grape.
> Then shouted the sons of Aaron . . .
> For a remembrance before the Most High. (Ecclus. l. 5 ff.)

This was worship which made men feel alive in every sense ; their blood coursed freely ; all was sight and sound and movement. It was the worship not of two or three hundred, but of tens of thousands. It was the exciting worship of pilgrimage, not the quiet service of the parish church. It was not congregational but national. We cannot estimate its religious effect, but its social and national effect was very great. It has been remarked how often Jewish movements for freedom started in the course of the worship at one of the feasts (cf. Josephus, *Arch.* xx. v. 3).

Thus an Israelite lived—lived intensely, in his worship, and yet so many of the elements of which it was composed belonged to this life. His worship, in fact, did not quicken

his faculties for contemplating a life beyond the grave. When he died he felt himself cut off from the land of the living, the Holy Land, from the house to which he had gone with the multitude, nay, from the very presence of God; for were not the Passover and Pentecost and the Feast of Tabernacles the three great occasions for *appearing before* JEHOVAH?

But though many of the Psalmists felt intensely the spell of the Temple worship they also realised more than the rest of Israel the fact that approach to God was not confined to the occasions which the Temple supplied. In the Psalter we begin to feel that religion is ceasing to localise her God.

> Whither shall I go from Thy spirit?
> Or whither shall I flee from Thy presence?
> If I ascend up into heaven thou art there;
> If I make my bed in Sheol, behold Thou art there;
> If I take the wings of the morning
> And dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea,
> Even there shall Thy hand lead me,
> And Thy right hand shall hold me (Ps. cxxxix. 7 ff.).

Moreover in the Psalter we feel that religion is ceasing to confine herself within the limits of sacrifices and public ordinances. The singer of Psalm xix. prays that *the words of his mouth* may be accepted as a sacrifice (*v.* 14), and similarly another Psalmist expresses the hope that his meditation on the works of creation will be sweet unto the Creator (civ. 34). Thus room is being found in religion for the thoughts and offerings of an individual. The worth of the worship of the single soul is coming into view. The further step of a hope that this soul will still after death be able to cling to the eternal unchanging God is not a long one to take. There are surely indications that the step was taken by some Psalmists, e.g., in Psalm xvi. 10 f.; xvii. 14 f. It is difficult to believe that the Psalter as a whole is cabined

and confined by the chilling conviction that communion with God and all worship of Him is cut short by death. The hope, the aspiration of some Psalmists at least, is for a continuance of communion, and if of communion, then surely also of worship. Worship and communion are indeed one in the Psalms.

Finally, the Psalter encourages us to face the mysteries of life in a spirit of worship. Indeed, for man worship is conditioned by partial knowledge. So we are taught in the Psalms to bow down before a God who has revealed only what Job calls "the outskirts of his ways" (xxvi. 14). We worship what is great, but not too great for the human heart to reach after. The conviction so often expressed by Psalmists of the existence of a righteous government over men gives them a certain calmness in contemplating the mysteries of life. As they were content to worship in spite of these, so may we, too, be content.

A question—a general question—still remains to be put briefly; it is this: Can old-world devotions—prayers of at least 2000 years ago—really help our worship, the worship which we modern men strive to render to God? Why, even the Psalmist—several Psalmists indeed—cry out to sing unto JEHOVAH *a new song* (xxxiii. 3; xcvi. 1; cxlix. 1). We have all heard of "devotional dust." Are we sure that the Psalms of David do not become "devotional dust" as we sing them again and again in public worship?

Let us confess at once, in answer to this question, that there is no mechanical virtue in the Psalter. It does not straightway become a help to worship, if we cut it up into portions, and use all the portions regularly. Worship rises towards God on wings one of which touches thought and the other labour; a thoughtless and idle repetition of Psalm passages only chains us to earth. But the religious man is heir of all the ages and debtor to his own. In his worship

he must bring forth things both new and old, mingling the two together that nothing be lost, and revivifying ancient prayers by applying them to modern situations. The Church of the past is in a true sense *one* with the Church of the present; the old examples are seen to be full of life when we apply them with an honest and teachable heart, as we seek after God.

W. Emery Barnes.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE LIFE OF NATIONS.[1]

In days like these it does not seem an easy or a hopeful undertaking to bring into anything like a happy relationship those two great forces, the Christian Religion and the Life of Nations. As one looks out upon the state of Christian Europe and ruefully contemplates the fratricidal struggle now in progress on the Continent and on the seas, one is fain to ask whether, apart from all other changes that may be made upon the maps we use, it is any longer right to colour Europe as Christian in the religious chart of the world. We speak of France and Austria as Roman Catholic countries, of Germany and Britain as Protestant, of Russia as Greek Orthodox, but is there such a thing as a Christian nation? Has the Christian Religion anything whatever to do with national life and international relations? Have nations as nations anything to do with it?

I speak of the *life* of nations. You may doubt their Christianity: you cannot doubt their life. They are alive in deadly earnest. They bristle with life. Their nerves tingle with racial feeling. In constant fear of one another, they start at the slightest alarm. They breathe an atmosphere of perpetual suspicion. They go about their daily business armed to the teeth. Their fingers grasp the hilts of their swords upon the slenderest provocation. At the back of the countless motives which have converged to bring about the war, behind the ambitions of princes and statesmen and journalists who count the lives of Christian men and the fruits of toilsome industry and the gains of hard-won civilisation but as dust in the balance against

[1] A lecture for the times delivered at the opening of the School for Christian Workers in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen, October 9, 1914.

the schemes of aggrandisement which an age of restless enterprise has thrust upon their imagination, there throbs the elemental pulse of national and racial energy, fevered by the spectacle of great existing empires as well as by the record of empires in the past, stirred by the dread lest present opportunities of expansion should be lost which are destined never to be repeated. "The period," says General von Bernhardi, "which destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be past," and he quotes the lines of Schiller:

> The chance that once thou hast refused
> Will never through the centuries recur.

The crime of Serajevo, the assassination of the gifted and far-seeing Austrian Archduke, that fateful episode which has exploded the perilous accumulations of European race-hatred and race-jealousy, was itself the passionate and violent recoil of a national spirit stung to the quick by a sense of oppression and wrong. Utterly lawless in its character, it was to be avenged by measures as lawless. The ultimatum to Servia and the ultimatum to Belgium were affronts to national self-respect and assaults upon national existence.

We thought we lived in the Christian Era. It now appears that our European peoples have not in their international relations reached the level of the Old Testament code of obligation, let alone the New. What statesmen are pleased to call *national necessity* is at liberty to recognise no law. Culture in the hour of peril may invoke the aid of Anarchy. Treaties unrevoked and unrepudiated are *scraps of paper*. "Parchment is parchment: steel alone is force," the German Chancellor has said. As an English professor of history puts it: "In a treaty with an enemy

that treaty is binding only so long as you can make your enemy see gleam behind the parchment the point of a sword." Honour, chivalry, courtesy are quaint old-world masks to be worn at the fancy-dress festivities of diplomatic peace but to be ruthlessly flung aside when war emerges. Conferences at the Hague are debating-society meetings for the ventilation of pious and academic international opinion. Consideration towards unarmed civilians and women and children is a sentimentality which only helps to prolong a war by mitigating its horrors. It was appropriate to the leisurely tourney-warfare of the olden time, but now it must go. War in grim earnest has no time for it. There is no place for religious texts and social maxims in the business-like columns of a military time-table.

So that is where we stand in the year of grace 1914. International law is a luxury, one of the refinements which must be dispensed with on the tented field. As if the evolution of mankind had for its final issue no goal beyond brutal strife, biology is commandeered by science-loving militarists to prove from the authority of history that after all the human frame contains no higher organs than teeth and nails. Hearken, ye dentists; give ear, O ye chiropodists, to the glad tidings! War is the instrument of divine selection, the God-appointed scourge of effete nations. "The end-all and the be-all of a state," says Treitschke, "is power." "Might is the supreme right," dutifully answers his disciple Von Bernhardi, "and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just solution. . . . War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with. . . . The sages of antiquity long before Darwin recognised this." "God will see to it," piously affirms Treitschke, "that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race."

Peace is not the end of war, but war the goal of peace. "Peace is at best a truce on the battlefield of Time." "Our people," says Von Bernhardi, "must learn to see that the maintenance of peace never can or may be the ultimate object of a policy." "It has always been the weary spiritless and exhausted ages," says Treitschke, "which have played with the dream of perpetual peace." In a word, a new evangel is come to the decaying world: "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth war, ill-will toward men." Children of the soil, bring in your ploughshares: they will make brave swords at Essen. Bring in your pruning-hooks: the world has need of spears. A shame to keep back iron for your husbandry which Death requires in order to lengthen the blade of his scythe.

One must not be bitter even about bitter things, although Christian sorrow from the first has always been stern in presence of a culture grown cold and calculating and pharisaic. Our national indignation is as nothing to our Christian mortification and regret, as we contemplate this outcome of the work of nineteen centuries. During the past months the thought which has been uppermost in the mind of every Christian worker in the land has been something higher and deeper even than patriotic anxiety and resolution. Our national conscience has been clear, so far at least as concerns the present catastrophe. But we have a European conscience, since Europe has been the historic stronghold of Christianity and for long its missionary base. We have felt a deep sense of Christian humiliation at thought of the spectacle which Christian Europe has been presenting to the non-Christian world. We have been haunted by those penetrating words of our reputed Master: "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." International alliances we have. They form and re-form, they come and go. But international affection,

international generosity, international fraternity does not exist in Europe, and is not yet in sight upon our horizon. "The friendship of nations," says a recent writer, "is an empty name." Our largest conception hitherto has been the creation and maintenance of a mechanical Balance of Power, and our own national policy, so far as we have had one, has been to employ our weight doggedly and impartially in either pan of the scales so as to preserve a rough and ready equilibrium. Not a very noble policy, I dare say, not a very disinterested policy, either, for a power which has already satisfied its appetite for territory throughout the globe, but certainly a policy which for the time made, as it was sincerely intended, for the peace of the world. And now even the balance-of-power method of securing peace has failed, having this woeful result, that through its operation not two powers only, but seven are entangled in the fell work of destruction.

More recently we have turned as a nation to two other measures of international relief: *first*, to proposals for the reduction and limitation of armaments, and *secondly*, to arbitration by a common court of appeal. As to the first measure, while it was to our honour that we took the initiative as the greatest sea-power in proposing to lighten the ever-growing burden of unproductive armaments, and while our motive was not fear but a genuine horror at their economic waste and a desire to set free in every land the resources which they consumed for the accomplishment of urgently needed social reforms, it was, I am afraid, too much to expect that the perpetuation of the present military *status quo* on sea and land would appeal to other nations as attractively as to us. Are they always to be content with the trough of the sea while Britannia with her trident rides in state on the crest of the wave? Armaments can no more be regulated by an international sliding-scale than can the

output of industry or the rate of birth among the peoples. The friends of to-day, alas, are the foes of to-morrow, as witness our past relations with Russia and France, our allies in the present conflict, or with Germany now at last our enemy, or with Turkey. "Whatever principle," wrote the late Professor Cramb, "may govern individual friendships, alliances between nations and states are governed by self-interest only." Whichever way we go in search of guarantees of peace, we find sooner or later that the recognised methods end in vanity. Diplomacy, whether straight or crooked, plays a game which knows no finish. The sword may conquer, but the hand that draws it may lose its grip through age or ease or vice or sheer fatigue. Arbitration would be as good for nations as it is for individuals at strife if only it were as easy to secure judges both competent and free from bias. We trust that international disputes will more and more be settled, as they are between the Anglo-Saxon peoples, by friendly conference and by mutually accepted arbiters drawn from the public men and experts of the nations concerned, or, failing that, by final recourse to the Tribunal at the Hague, where something like a cosmopolitan and juristic interest, if not an absolute and superhuman impartiality, may be counted upon. The great difficulty, however, remains that there are issues so elemental, resting on instincts so fundamental, that to patriotic minds the very thought of submitting them to external determination is treason. The life and the freedom of a high-spirited people, endowed with a sense of vocation, ennobled by honourable traditions and cherishing a distinguished history, are not things which it will lightly commit to alien judgment, however sympathetic or dispassionate. The demand of a swiftly growing population, keen, highly educated, full of resource and intensely conscious of its nationality, for room in which to expand and

to liberate its energies is not a claim to be ignored with impunity or narrowly weighed with legal calculation. Rising nations are young giants awkwardly stretching their limbs and awaking to their strength, to whom it is irksome to learn the restraints of old-standing law and convention. In the grand struggle of the rival nations for places in the sun there is a great and an almost inevitable danger that etiquette and decorum, law and reason, chivalry and Christian forbearance, may be cast to the winds. The distinction between defence and aggression is apt to fade away. Modern strategy harps on the offensive as the true defence. The attacker always pleads that invasion is his only defensive. In short, all are defending themselves, and none will allow that they are the aggressors. Slav and Teuton, Celt and Saxon, all alike are afraid of racial suffocation and extinction. They race for the open air, they madly struggle towards the sunshine, sure only of this, that God will reward the first out, and the Devil will take the hindmost.

To the strong and highly gifted German race in Germany and in Austria, a people profoundly concerned about their future in the world and as profoundly convinced of their imperial mission and powers, the urgency of the present struggle lies in the consideration that if Servia and the other Slavonic Balkan states are allowed to grow strong and to make good their political and economic independence, whether under Russian patronage or not, then the Teutonic dream of a vast empire expanding to the South and East, to include the rich and historic, though neglected dominions of the Sultan in Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia, is doomed to bitter failure, and the one great undeveloped territory left for European occupation and settlement on the face of the earth is to be shut for ever against them. On the other hand, in the North the Low Countries, already in the grasp of German

capital and commerce, must be merged, willingly or against their will, by economic or by military measures, in the German federation, so that an outlet to the North Sea and the English Channel and the wide oceans beyond may be secured for the New Empire. These are great visions, in themselves worthy of a great people, called up to view by the vast empires of the British and the Russian Crowns as well as by imperial systems of the past. We have no right to frown on them as such. If they can honourably be realised without crushing freedom or invading sacred rights, without rapine and without fraud, it is not for us to grudge our gifted cousins an enterprise so exalted, and on those terms we have consistently refused to place impediments across their path. The obstacles confronting them have not been of our making. They are so serious, so numerous, and so likely to be aggravated in the future that the temper both of German statesmen and of the German people contemplating them has given way to unreasoning suspicion, impatience and irritability. The obstacles are principally these. *First*: other nations have been experiencing a precisely similar awakening, and are naturally disinclined to make way for Germany. Her ambitions have stimulated theirs. Their armaments have grown with hers. In the light of her own struggle Germany might have been expected to appreciate and sympathise with their resistance. *Secondly*: the deliberate refusal of the modern makers of the Empire under Bismarck's guidance to seek for colonies across the seas was the loss of the nation's greatest opportunity, so that Germany has herself alone to blame for her inferior position. And *thirdly*: the conventional code of international honour and duty which respects the sanctity of treaties, restrains the operations of war according to set rules of humanity, and jealously safeguards the delicate obligations of neutrality, is in itself

a most formidable handicap to an aggressor. In face of these obstacles to world-wide empire, Germany has been subjected to a searching test in recent years. Her moral self-restraint, her chivalry, her faith and honour have been upon their trial. We ought not to judge her harshly. We have not as a people stainless hands with which to stone her. But it has become clear to absolute demonstration from the speeches of her sovereign, the writings of her most influential historian, the canonisation of the policy of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck, the literary utterances of a statesman so eminent as Prince von Bülow and a soldier so weighty as General von Bernhardi, together with their sequel in the course of recent events in diplomacy and in the field, that she has succumbed to her national temptation.

Whatever be the issue of this murderous war, whichever side is victorious, the world will look back upon an unforgettable declaration of national policy so ruthless, unscrupulous, calculating, and opportunistic, that it would be a wrong to the memory of high-minded peoples in antiquity to call it pagan. It has been a revelation so disconcerting that we are not content to vent our indignation upon the great nation which has without shame disclosed it, but are asking ourselves in dazed misgiving whether all our Christian nations are not involved in the sin and scandal, whether our own proud empire which we had deemed the home of liberty and the guardian of nationality and peace was won by hands as pitiless and kept by means as vile. History, I fear, makes answer that no nation has an unspotted past, that no political empire has ever yet rested upon foundations unstained by blood, that no people is without a share in the sins which have shattered the peace of the world to-day. But before I turn to higher ground and discuss our common responsibility two things arising out of the present crisis deserve to be remarked.

In the first place, necessity or no necessity, there is something peculiarly mean and unchivalrous in discarding rules of fair play or restraints upon brutality when you are all the time counting upon your adversary to respect them even to his own loss. What would have been the strategic plight of Germany if Britain secretly had bribed or coerced Holland and Denmark to give her a wayright for her forces against Essen and Kiel? Not only is Germany one of the original guarantors of the neutrality of Belgium by formal treaty, but so lately as in 1907 the Emperors of Germany and Austria pledged themselves at the Hague that "with a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to force in relations between states" they would, "in case of serious disagreement or dispute, before an appeal to arms have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices and mediation of one or more friendly powers" (Convention I.); and in the fifth convention of the same Conference they gave their signatures to the law that "the territory of neutral powers is inviolable" and "belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys across the territory of a neutral power." Within seven years this double pledge has been flagrantly broken in the face of the world. The German Chancellor spoke of the violation of Belgium as a wrong done under necessity to *her*; but he was silent as to the wrong it inflicted upon France as an honourable belligerent disadvantaged by her word, and he said nothing of his country's offience against the law of nations and against truth and honour. To what treaty can the same perjured hands ever again be permitted to append their signature? Even if Germany were to win, she would emerge a power rich in spoils but beggared in honour, her word not worth the paper which it soiled.

And in the second place, on Germany's own principle that might is right, and that it is a nation's duty to strike

down its rival at the first opportunity, hitting either above the belt or below, stabbing either in the front or in the back, attacking either in secret or in the open, by night or by day, Britain might, and should, long ago have legitimately strangled her rival's infant fleet, and combined with other powers to crush her growing army. For our abstention she can think of no other explanation than fear or laziness or stupidity or mistaken and shortsighted self-interest. These are the only motives credited to us in the utterances of her responsible statesmen. What peace, one may well ask, can ever await her or any empire upon these principles? Even were she to win, what kind of life would be in store for her with fresh enemies plotting revenge and learning to apply her sordid and vindictive policy to her own destruction when the chance arose? That way lies madness. That way lies not only national murder, but national suicide. So blind can men of talent, like lesser men, become through jealousy, ambition, and greed of power. Ernest Renan, French though his genius was, once wrote that when he first became acquainted with German thought he felt as though he were entering a temple. What edifice of shame would now supply him with a simile, were he still alive, to describe the latest phase of the thought of the great nation which he revered?

I have dwelt upon these facts because the state of the world to-day presents us with an arresting illustration of our failure in Europe to rise to ethical and Christian conceptions of national duty and international obligation, and indeed makes a merely abstract or academic treatment of my subject for the time impossible. It is essential that we should realise that the ultimate responsibility for the present predicament of Christian Europe rests upon the broad shoulders not of Germany alone but of all the nations. Victory will avail us little, our victory will avail the world

little, if we do not firmly grasp the stern fact that the racial rapacity of all our virile peoples must be curbed, that Germany is not the inventor and patentee of the policy whose chief representative she has become, that the rôle of bully, buccaneer, or pirate is as pernicious and insufferable when played by nations under arms as by individuals on the lesser stage of common life. As a recent writer puts it: "what is wanted is not a rearrangement of the States of Europe, but a reform of the state of Europe." We may tinker at the political map of the Continent, rearrange frontiers with a fuller regard for nationality and language, make fresh treaties, take securities for future peace, reduce armaments till they approximate to their just proportions as a joint force of international police, lay down a scheme of arbitration under heavy penalties to be enforced by an overwhelming combination of guaranteeing powers, or refashion the balance of political and military strength, but these are measures at best palliative. We need a new spirit among the nations, a new conception of national vocation, a different estimate of racial power and prestige, a quickened sense of international responsibility. In a word, the peoples of the earth must be born again.

To be born again! For proud nations as for proud men that remains a hard saying. Can a full-grown nation enter again the womb of history and be reborn? Nations, like individuals, have their higher and their lower selves, their corporate ideals, duties, responsibilities, their consciences, their regrets, repentances, fresh resolutions. Where there is a sense of right, an instinctive reverence for law and honour, a sense of God and of the Divine authority of national obligations, there exists a pledge and guarantee of better international relations in days to come. The militarism of to-day refuses to look above the sordid and immediate interests of the particular state to which it hap-

pens to belong. Its highest maxim is: "My country, right or wrong." Cruelty, wrong, fraud, lying, perjury, are not respectable, it is constrained to admit, in social life, but in nations at open or secret war they are legitimate. According to it, nations are always either at open or secret war, and for their health ought to be; but with a refreshing inconsequence it has no prophecy against that dismal day when the final conqueror shall find itself with Alexander the Great left with no further worlds to conquer and with no further enemies to fight. Martial law, it seems, supersedes not only civil but also moral law. Conscience as well as commerce is to be held up by war. If you are simple enough to trust the professions of your enemy, you deserve to be struck down, you are not fitted to survive. In war all's fair. It is a game, like diplomacy, in which craft, cunning, evasion, make-believe, are as valuable as strength. Says Treitschke, the Berlin historian, the arch-preceptor of present-day German imperialism, a writer who has constructed history with the same fine disregard of international scruple which he seriously inculcates: "Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." And again he says: "The Christian duty of sacrifice for something higher does not exist for the state, for there is nothing higher than it in the world's history. . . . A sacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradicts the idea of self-preservation which is the highest ideal of a state." And Prince von Bülow, after a eulogy upon German love of law, feels obliged to add the reservation: "Law must certainly not be considered superior to the needs of the state. *Fiat jus et pereat mundus* does not apply to politics."

To me it appears that in such utterances the very voice of Antichrist is lifted up. It is a doctrine of devils, not a

gospel. And the diabolic in it is not superhuman. It is less than human. It is a return to the brute, instead of being the birth of superman. The more closely you examine its ugly features, the more it reveals its connexion with the cloven hoof, tail, horns, and all! But let us take heart of grace; the ears of the ass surmount the whole. It is asinine in its brutality, folly through and through. For what kind of a world does it hold out in prospect to its dupes? A world of nations each at deadly variance with its neighbours, all without honour, none with a word to trust, none with an open brow and candid countenance, each with a God of Battles of its own, each a law to itself, each loftily superior to the altruistic dictates of Christianity. The world that we know is not a paradise. The age we live in is far from golden. But it should be our fervent prayer to be delivered from such a dispensation as that which the Antichrist of militarism is heralding with its brazen trumpets as the kingdom of the future.

When Rome in the year 410 was sacked by Alaric and his Goths, who, it is worth remembering in these days, were careful to spare the Christian churches and the fugitives who sought sanctuary in them, there arose among the Romans a great outcry against the Christian Religion. Christianity, they said, had enfeebled the manly spirit of the citizens, had dried up the old pagan springs of valour, had opened the gates of Rome to the victorious Northmen. To that belated outbreak of the worship of Mars we owe the greatest of the ancient vindications of our Faith, Augustine's work on the City of God, in which it was retorted that it was Rome's love of ease and pleasure, its lack rather than its acceptance of the Spirit of Christ, that had relaxed the manly virtue of its people. To-day in the modern world our Faith is again challenged in like manner, and stands in need of vindication against a similar assault and calumny.

A frenzied nationalism, akin in spirit to the Jewish nationalism which crucified Christ because His life and message and Messiahship would not be narrowed down to it, is thrusting aside the Cross and its restraints. It either denies to Christianity the right to influence the public relations of modern peoples while paying lip-homage to its claims on private life, or, more consistently, it extrudes it both from public and from private affairs in favour of the new materialism of a grossly secular and politica "Culture."

At last a group of pacific nations have armed themselves in concert against this great conspiracy. With a grudge and a sigh and a shudder they have drawn the sword in self-defence. They are to be instruments of the rule that they that take the sword shall perish with the sword. But let us have done with illusions. "Not by strife shall strife be ended," as a wise man in the East has taught us. The nations have need to betake themselves to the school of Christ, the Teacher whom they have scorned. "Put up thy sword into its place." "Love your enemies." "Do good to them that hate you." "Bless them that curse you, and pray for them which despitefully use you." What legacy will this titanic struggle bequeath to Christian Europe? A changed map in our school geographies. In our manuals of history a stern lesson to world-conquering usurpers. A warning to prosperous peoples to make more wholesome use of peace and wealth and power. A million soldier-graves, marked and unmarked. A million broken hearts and homes. A million and more of crippled men, in the cities and hamlets of Europe, torn, maimed, disfigured, with the brand of Cæsarism burned into their flesh. But alas, the cruelty, the brutality, the fatuity of it all! War the court of God! Call it rather the arbitrament of devils.

What has the Christian Church been doing all these years of golden opportunity? At civil war within her own borders, she has been powerless either by precept or by example to inspire peace, and to persuade the nations to embrace that fear of God and that mutual reverence within His world-wide family which are the only security for peace. But out of this war's barbarity surely the compassion of Heaven will persuade men to revise their conceptions of nationality and of empire. As self-government and freedom are extended throughout the world the *possession* of colonies and empire in any vainglorious sense will become an obsolete idea, for they will possess themselves, and as in the United States or Canada they will grow more and more composite racially. Places in the sun, though that luminary shines on the unjust not less than on the just, will not be won by exterminating one's neighbours. God has other methods of providing for the survival of the fittest races than those of the Prussian barrack and the Berlin lecture-room. The loose-knit texture of our Empire, whose frailty and penetrability have so vividly impressed the rapacious imagination of our enemies, is in truth the secret of its elasticity and tenacity and freedom; and the reason why we do not live at warlike tension, with every nerve tingling and every sinew strained, is simply that we are, and mean to be, at peace. As a people and empire we have our own sins and shortcomings, and they are serious and melancholy enough, but at least we are conscious of them, and are beginning to face them in the sight and with the help of God. But we have been delivered from the madness of deliberate aggression, and we have never played the bully's overbearing part. If we have been given greatness it has come through grace to learn from failures, and not through a megalomaniac passion for dominion.

The more one ponders the state of the world and the

position of our nation and empire, the more one's conviction grows that Christ alone has the power to save us from ourselves, that His religion is the only elixir of national health and life, that His conception of manhood and womanhood, of wisdom and destiny, is the sheet-anchor of our civilisation and morality. It is idle to proclaim the binding obligation of His precepts upon our life as citizens if you deny that the State and the Empire are subject to His sceptre. No honest man can be loyal to a thieving State. No murderous State can appeal to the patriotism of a citizen who believes that God has said: "Thou shalt not kill." The rules which through the long ages have patiently been evolved by our race for the guidance of daily life in the family and in the State, the ethical and civil laws which govern and protect our conduct in life for the highest good of all, cannot be repudiated in substance when nation meets nation and international relations are engaged in. And as the law of common life was the schoolmaster of the world to lead men towards Christ and His ideal, so in the intercourse of nations the Lord Jesus Christ stands out as the Great Teacher and the Great Exemplar. His attitude to the narrow jingo patriotism of His own people, to Rome and its Cæsar, to the Samaritan, to the Syro-phœnician, and to other Gentiles, is profoundly opposed to the militarist patriotism and imperialism which still rears its head in shameless menace above the Christian world. The missionary enterprise of the Christian peoples is a world-wide confession of our homage in Church and State to a higher law than public selfishness. Nations, like individuals, cannot live by bread alone, certainly not by bread snatched by violence from their neighbours and from their neighbours' children. Their life does not consist in the abundance of the things, land, wealth or population, which they possess. They have a higher life to live, a spiritual destiny to rise to, temptations

of empire to wrestle with, and above all a Lord to whom they must give account. God is not mocked. The nation which does not fear Him and honour the laws of righteousness which He has inspired cannot be exalted. Its pride is the prelude to its fall. Its violence is the signal for its doom. Not by truculence and arrogant power, but by steadfast devotion to Christian honour and duty alone can we build up the true strength of our people. There are in daily life, in the home, at the market, in business, and in the hidden heart, opportunities innumerable for the exercise of the highest manhood, the courage that faces danger and defies defeat, the spirit that struggles and dares. We must give the lie to that foul travesty of truth and experience which figures as a motto on the title-page of General von Bernhardi's unblushing exposition of the militarist faith—it is fitly taken from the anti-Christian Nietzsche—"War and courage have done more great things than love of one's neighbour." And we must disown and discredit the pernicious doctrine which Bernhardi advances in his attempt to show that, although Christian morality rests on the law of love, combat, "a sword," is its very essence, and that all its analogies, if applied in the political sphere, lend countenance to war. He says: "Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. . . This law can claim no significance for the relations of one country to another, since its application to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The love which a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of love for his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably lead men astray." And in a later passage he furnishes us with a peculiarly callous application of his doctrine when he concludes his reference to the future relations of China and Japan with the words: "If the two nations joined hands it would become difficult for us to maintain an independent position

between them: the political rivalry between the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive."

Again I say, we must away with this voice of Antichrist, this utterance of international hate and cruelty. Let us make war upon the rancorous spirit of war in the name of the Prince of Peace who came not to take life but to lay down life not only for His own countrymen but for all the world. Among ourselves let us cultivate habitual fairness in all our references to foreign nations. Incalculable harm was done by the old sneer at things "made in Germany," which was justly resented. If the phrase on British lips meant cheap, showy and flimsy, the shame was our own that we should have offered the goods for sale on every counter and should have bought them in such quantities, for the German supply responded to a British demand. Our young people badly need to be instructed and inspired to be courteous and considerate towards foreigners, and their parents are far from perfect in their attitude to foreign things and persons and ideas. Just at the present moment a wave of blind and indiscriminate dislike for everything German is not unnaturally sweeping over our people, German thought, literature, invention and art. German teachers are being dismissed after long years of faithful service, sometimes for fear that their pupils may break through their discipline at this time. It is of course the same in Germany, though that does not right the wrong. Truth, science, art, literature, invention—these may come to us from German sources and claim not only the ready hospitality of our minds but the instant gratitude of our hearts. If we allow ourselves, even in resentment at a great political wrong, to cherish unjust and petty and indiscriminate prejudice against the good that has come to us from one of the greatest peoples in the world, then we answer sin with sin, we betray the spirit of our holy Religion,

and we delay the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth. Our insularity may be our defence, but it may also be a snare. And if Germany dislikes us, the reason may be not simply that we have prospered and she is jealous, but that in some way we have shown ourselves not wholly likeable. Peace on earth, goodwill among nations, can never be established, even in Christendom, till international charity in thought, in speech and in action has banished prejudice and pride and suspicion and ignorant or mistaken resentment. Meanwhile our own duty is plain. We have to give Christ His rightful place in our national life, in the individual heart, in the home, in Church and in State, in business, in learning and in affairs. The hallowed glow which He brings to our own experience is already radiating forth into the outer world as well as transforming our social life at home. The termination of slavery throughout our empire, the universalising of education among our youth and the opening up of every career to every class among our people, the recognition of the sacred urgency of home and foreign missions, these are public fruits of the spirit of Christ which are the promise and earnest of yet wider achievements. Let each of the kingdoms of this blood-stained earth of ours set Christ upon its own throne, upon the throne of its sincere affections, and immediately the frontiers of prejudice and separation will fade away, leaving One Kingdom, though many tongues, at the foot of the One Throne.

WILLIAM A. CURTIS.

WAS JESUS REALLY TEMPTED?

In his great book, *The Christian Faith*, Haering writes with reference to the problem of evil, "Inasmuch as temptation always consists in offering counterfeit good, while moreover evil itself in the last resort as compared with good is mere pretence and falsehood, the Evil One is called the Liar."[1] This statement describes accurately the true meaning of the word "temptation," as well as the distinctive work of the tempter. It is of course well known that the Hebrew and the Greek words in the Bible used for "tempt" and "temptation" cover all the shades of meaning implied in trying, testing and attempting, and the English words themselves in 1611 were practically used in the same broad sense. Nevertheless temptation, as correctly understood and with its full content, connotes, as Haering explains, the solicitation to evil, putting to the test with evil intent, and the attempt to persuade the subject to do evil that good may come, the evil being disguised as good. It is, to speak in a figure, the act of presenting the bait with the hook concealed.

There is, of course, nothing new in this view of the matter, nor does it occasion any especial difficulty. The most serious difficulty arises when we consider in what way our Lord was tempted in all points like as we are. In the limited and local conditions in which He found Himself, and during the period of a single human lifetime, how could He possibly have been tempted by all the forms of temptation which His followers have to experience? Further, how could One who had no faulty disposition, no evil passions or appetites to which the power of evil could appeal, nothing within to which the solicitation could be made,

[1] *The Christian Faith*, vol. i. p. 487.

have been tempted at all in the true or ordinary sense of the term temptation? With regard to evil propensities the Master could truthfully say, "The prince of the world cometh: and he hath nothing in me." Within our Lord's consciousness there was nothing to betray Him to the forces of evil without, nothing in harmony or in league with the tempter.

On the other hand, we are never free from the latent evil, from

> . . . "Pangs of nature, sins of will,
> Defects of doubt, and taints of blood.

If mortals of the ordinary type are subject to these limitations, how could a perfectly holy Being be tempted, and how could the Incarnate Son of God ever have suffered the force of temptation as we have to experience it? This is the critical question for all ages of Christian doctrine, and upon its answer largely depends our conception of the Person of our Lord. But it should be remembered that the same difficulty arises with regard to the perfectly innocent person, primordial man, the first Adam. It would seem as though neither Adam nor Christ could ever have known the force of temptation, for in neither case was there any predisposition, inherited or acquired, to evil upon which the tempter might work. It must be our endeavour, therefore, to find an explanation which will enable us to see that the temptation in both cases was a reality and not a mere pretence.

On reflection it will be found that, strictly speaking, temptation appeals not to the evil but to the good in us. Where the heart is filled with bad feelings and passions, evil only requires favourable conditions and opportunities, or, at least, the suggestion in order to manifest and actualise itself. Where there is an evil heart, as in sensual appetites, a jealous or resentful disposition, a selfish nature, the responsibility for the wrong has already begun, as we are taught in the Sermon on the Mount; the overt act is the

expression of the wrong that exists within. When the act emerges, it is not a case of yielding to temptation, however it may seem, inasmuch as no art of subtlety is required to bring the sin into being. Nor should we be deceived by that ambiguous word, possibility. Possibilities of evil are mere abstractions unless there is already some evil bias or germinal wrong. Where that latent wrong is found, if there is a defect of will, favouring conditions are alone necessary in order to bring the evil to full fruition. The most common and perhaps the most useful illustration we can use is that of the drunkard. The proximity of a number of brilliantly-lighted and attractive public houses or the example of friends drinking in his presence may furnish an inducement by way of suggestion. The unexpected meeting of old friends, the plea that it is "only for this once," may afford an excuse for excess to the man himself, if he is already predisposed to give way to his appetite, but it is hardly necessary in this case that temptation should be brought to bear in the sense of disguising the evil under the form of a good. Doubtless the term "temptation" is made to cover all such cases, but there is surely no call for the Arch-tempter to hide his hand or to employ any high degree of craft or subtlety in order to lead the victim into sin. Temptation is never presented as an evil to the evil within a man's consciousness, because no one deliberately chooses to do evil, unless his nature is wholly perverted, in which case temptation is entirely superfluous.

On the other hand, temptation is an appeal to what is good in a man, with the object of perverting that good. Its plausibility lies in the fact that evil is presented in the form of a good, promising to lead to an end which in itself is right and good, or it may be as working upon the highest aims, purposes or ideals that we may cherish. In the fine old-world story of the Fall the tempter indicates the end as the

possession of the god-like character of being able to know good and evil. No worthier end could be suggested nor could he have appealed to a nobler sentiment than that of becoming as God. The tempter took care, however, not to say that the method of disobedience and the practice of evil would destroy the keenness of moral sensitiveness, and would lead to the forfeiture of the knowledge of the good without attainment of any true knowledge of evil as sin. Every man who is tempted is appealed to on the side of his nature where some good end is desired or desirable. For example, the man who misappropriates trust-money seeks to find relief from temporary embarrassment, it may be for the sake of keeping his home together or on account of a sick wife or a young family, has the best of all motives, as motives go, and his intention is to meet the obligation on demand. Again, when a man creates discord or sets up petty persecution "for the good of the Church," the temptation is very subtle and clever, and the tempter thereby achieves his masterpiece of perversion. To induce a good man to act in a dishonourable or disloyal manner, to do the devil's work with the best motives, and, as the man believes, for the highest ends, for the sake of the truth or in the interests of the community, is the finest stroke of Satanic art. Then does the devil indeed transform himself into an "angel of light." To promote right ends by wrong means, to do God's work with a zeal He will not own, the attempt to bring about a great good by doing a little wrong means the undoing of all the good and the defeat of all noble purpose. It is hardly worth while, nor does it deserve the name of temptation, to beset a good man with utterly repellent suggestions, but it is more than many of us can withstand, the promise of success and achievement beyond our wildest dreams by some small compromise which under the circumstances is made to appear justifiable. The best men are

assailed just where their best impulses and intentions are promised speedy and facile fulfilment. But of course we should not be open to temptation at all were not our knowledge finite, and our powers of achievement limited. Nevertheless the higher our aims and ideals, the more are we, finite beings, exposed to temptation and the greater the refined subtlety brought to bear upon us in the appeal.

If this view be accepted, Christ was not only exposed to real temptation, but temptation was greater in its subtlety and delusiveness for Him than for any of us. The three forms of temptation in the wilderness are variously explained, but in each case it evidently was the success of His Messianic calling and ministry that was made the ground of appeal. Passionately yearning, as He was, for the triumph of the Kingdom of God, fired with enthusiasm for His task, methods were suggested to Him of great promise and potency. To become a wonder-worker on a large scale, to make Himself an imposing and a dramatic personality, suggestions of methods, striking, showy and sensational, to ally Himself with the great world-powers not for His own sake, but for the sake of His mission, in order that He might bring the masses of the people to His standard for the sake of the Father's glory, this was the appeal of the tempter, supported ostensibly by Scripture warrant.[1] The appeal was made to the intense and fervent desire of the Master to bring as many men as possible to the right, to win them for the Kingdom, an appeal to the Messianic consciousness and responsibility, and it was doubtless renewed again and again throughout His ministry. The appeal was never more powerful, we may imagine, than when it was repeated through the remonstrance of His Apostle, Peter, to take an easier way than that of the cross, and the Master recognised

[1] See Haering's *The Christian Faith*, pp. 688, 689.

the craft of His old enemy in the Apostle's suggestion. More sensitive than any other to the proximity of weakness, pain and sin, more pitiful and compassionate, more keenly hurt by treachery or disloyalty, it must have been terribly difficult for Christ to refuse what promised a solution of all His difficulties. As Man He had to resist the tempter, and He did resist through a deep insight into the meaning and purport of Scripture and through perfect sympathy with His Father's will, and this was more complete than the devil gave Him credit for. As Man He was tempted, because the Son of God was set in finite conditions and limitations, but His complete trust and loyalty to the Father gave Him the practical knowledge that it could never be right to attain even the highest ends by improper means or by an act of disobedience, nor in the best interests to do even a little wrong.

Temptation was more real and trying for Jesus than it is for us, because it was to Him an appeal to that which was of the highest moral consequence to the race. One writer, the Rev. A. Morris Stewart, has said, "We see the essential futility of this assault when we realise that it was an appeal to a selfishness which was not in Jesus." [1] If indeed it was an appeal to a non-existent selfishness, the temptation was a farce, and any appeal to imagined evil propensities must have rendered the whole process unmeaning. To constitute the temptation a reality for Christ, it must have been an attempt to divert and pervert the good, as it is in the case of every one of us. Jesus was therefore tempted like as we are by that great power, which gathers itself into an evil will and intelligence, whose consummate art is to disguise itself in a garb of sanctity and make the suggested evil appear as good, and which promises the attainment of the

[1] *The Temptation of Jesus*, p. 168.

desired ends by such unhallowed means. Needless is it to point out what complete and disastrous ruin would have resulted if Jesus had yielded in the slightest degree to the suggestion of the Evil One.

We may go further than this and assert with confidence that Jesus was tempted *in all points* like as we are, and yet without sin. There was certainly no inducement to indulge in the lower passions. He did not feel the cravings of the dipsomaniac, or the impulse to grosser faults: as we have seen, these are not the materials upon which temptation, properly speaking, works. He was tempted at the points at which we are always assailed, the high moral endeavour, the exalted aim, the purposes of good, just where we would realise ourselves and extend our influence for good, it is to these that the enemy of souls appeals and by perversion to make us defeat our own ends by employing unlawful means —means that it is his specific work to gild and beautify so as to appear worthy of the end which is sought. All temptation is essentially the same, and there is not an aspect of it which our Lord did not experience, and which He did not resist by an appeal to a Higher Law and a Higher Will. There is not one form of true temptation that we have to endure which Christ had not to face and overcome, and it always resolves itself into an inducement to effect what is proper and praiseworthy by such methods as God would disown and disapprove.

We have the Scriptures as Christ had for our guidance and enlightenment, and we have also His example to illumine and inspire us. But more than this, we have the presence and the help of our Lord to strengthen and support us. Like a nobler Orpheus, He breaks for us the charm and the spell of the plausible and fascinating suggestion, and He exposes the evil that lurks beneath the pleasing bait. He passed through all human experience, sin apart, and He

was tempted in all points like as we are, in order that He might succour them that are tempted. Never alone are we called upon to face the subtlety of the Arch-fiend, for He who has overcome for us will overcome in us. The fascinations of a suggestion that we could never resist by ourselves alone will become, through His presence and power, the means whereby we may reach our highest development and effectiveness. When we say, "Lead us not into temptation," we shall find that this prayer is finally answered, as every true prayer is always answered, by coming to possess the Christ Himself.

J. G. James.

BELIEF AS AN ELEMENT IN RELIGION.

I.

It is not an uncommon thing, nowadays, to hear a man, or even a preacher, say that though he is interested in religion, he has no sort of interest in theology. If we seek out the real grounds of such a declaration, we shall find that it has its roots in the idea that for the ordinary man religion is not so much a matter of belief as a matter of practice. A man's religion, and therefore his worth in God's eyes, depend, not on what things he believes, still less on what things he says he believes or thinks he believes, but entirely on what things he does and on the spirit in which he does them. To give full assent to all the articles of a creed is not religion; but to go through life, as Jesus went through life, in a spirit of unselfishness and brotherly kindness, in devotion to the highest ends, in willingness to learn the discipline of sorrow, in repentance and perseverance, in the love of simple and noble things —that is pure religion and the only true essence of Christian piety.

Those who take this view are quite conscious of the novelty of their position. They know that through all the Christian centuries belief has been looked upon as essential to the very conception of religion—as being, perhaps, its *most* essential element; so that "creed" and "persuasion" and "faith" have been used as its almost interchangeable synonyms. It is, indeed, in deliberate revolt from this older view that the position in question has been developed. It is often our best men who find it most difficult to subscribe to the older doctrinal codes. It is those who are most anxious to find true satisfaction in religion that find least satisfaction and least meaning in the elaborate articles

of the traditional confessions or the elaborate *loci* of the traditional theologies. Hence it is in conscious opposition and revolt, and from motives with which any thinking man must largely sympathise, that so many of our most spiritual writers, and not a few of our most effective preachers, have tended to minimise the element of belief in religion, and to rest satisfied with fine feeling and noble and chivalrous conduct.

Such a revolt was indeed in some sense natural and inevitable. Sooner or later it was bound to become plain that many of the matters on which the creeds gave pronouncements, whether or not they were of import for scientific theology, had little or nothing to do with practical religion. There was a great deal of the official ecclesiastical doctrine which the plain man did not understand and did not want. And it was the perception of the fact that his religion was none the less devout and complete for this, that led men to think that it was not creed or belief that mattered in religion but something which was largely independent of it. The plain man, it is said, knows nothing of the Nicene Creed; he does not *want* to know anything of the Nicene Creed; he does not *need* to know anything of the Nicene Creed. That Creed and all other creeds are the business of theologians. They were the theologians' handiwork and they may be left to their inventors. But the plain man may enjoy as great a peace of heart and as great a purity of desire, though he knows nothing of them at all.

Of course, there are a great many in our modern world who do not hesitate to declare that theology has no value of any kind, that there is "nothing in it," that it is a dead science which has no claim on the attention of anybody. But it is not with a view like that that we are here dealing. The people of whom we are thinking take up a very much

less radical, if also a less decided, position. They do not question the legitimacy of a science of theology; they do not doubt, or they do not express their doubt, that theologians may really be able to substantiate certain beliefs as being genuinely true. But they assert that *religion* in no way depends on the ability to substantiate these beliefs, or even to understand them. Belief is a matter of theology, and theology is secondary to, and in no way a precondition of, vital religion. This being so, it is of course necessary further to determine the relations of piety and belief, and this may be done in a variety of ways. The most familiar and influential is that which was first made current by Schleiermacher in the second of the *Reden*. Religion, he teaches, does not consist in belief, or in the holding of certain ideas; that is science which is in many ways the converse of religion. Religion consists rather in certain feelings, and these feelings may not hold within them any explicit element of belief. There is, it is true, such a thing as religious belief or theology; but this consists in a *description* of the immediate feelings, and is therefore secondary to them, coming after them, and being founded upon them. And such description is only for the philosophically trained expert. We must, says Schleiermacher, avoid "the confusion between religion and that knowledge which belongs to theology." "Wherefore it follows that ideas and principles are all foreign to religion. . . . If ideas and principles are to be anything, they must belong to knowledge, which is a different department of life from religion. . . . Would you now call the general description of the nature of your feelings that is the product of this contemplation a principle, and the description of each feeling an idea, you are certainly free to do so. And if you call them religious principles and ideas, you are not in error. But do not forget that this is scientific treat-

ment of religion, knowledge about it, and not religion itself." Again, "I cannot hold religion to be the highest knowledge, or indeed knowledge at all. Wherefore what the Christian layman has in less perfection than the theologian, and which manifestly is a knowledge, is not religion itself, but something appended to it." The motive which necessitates this conclusion is always said to be that obviously "quantity of knowledge is not quantity of piety." [1]

II.

Such is the view which we wish here to discuss. We must clear our way to passing a final judgment on it, however, by pointing out one fruitful source of misconception. There can be no doubt that such an argument as we have sketched above owes a large part of its plausibility to the particular nature of the examples which it selects. It was said, for example, that the plain religious man has no necessary concern with the Nicene Creed, and from that it was concluded that his religion was something which was largely independent of belief. Well, we shall all agree to the premiss, we shall all agree that no man's religion will suffer because he does not know, or cannot understand, the subtleties of Nicaea. But a very little reflection will convince us that the true reason why the plain religious man does not need to appropriate the Nicene Creed is also a reason why the thinker does not need to appropriate it, namely, that—so far—it is not true. In other words, such a creed is not necessary for religion, the reason is not that right thinking is not necessary for religion, but that such a creed is not necessary for right thinking. The thorough-going objection to creed in general is thus due to the fact that the objection to the out-worn creeds is not thorough-going or definite enough. To those who feel

[1] *Ueber die Religion*, tr. Oman, pp. 56, 46–7, 102–3, 35.

that the traditional symbols do not interest them it may seem a cautious and reasonable position not to question their truth, but only to question their practical utility. In reality, such an attitude is but the product of a mental laziness which prevents men from seriously facing the question of religious belief and the *partus intellectualis* that would be involved in working out a confession for themselves. And here we have its inevitable result—the lapse of interest in Christian truth. Whereas all that is proved is not that credal religion is imperfect religion, but that the creed of Nicaea is an imperfect creed.

In still another way, however, the example chosen is a special one. For our modern difficulty with the older creeds arises not merely from their particular contents, but from their whole nature and form. Not only can we never again go back to the particular confessions of Athanasius and Calvin, but it is hard to see that we can ever hold a confession of that sort at all. Our faith cannot attain such elaboration, such detailed completeness. We feel, and we are quite justified in feeling, that many of the issues raised by the older creeds, important though they may be for science and metaphysic, are neither here nor there for the simple man's religion—and in religion we are all simple men. Moreover, if such schematic elaboration is impossible even in the individual's faith, how much more impossible is it in regard to our common and uniform ecclesiastical confessions. Hence we shall readily grant that if by creed is meant a detailed and exhaustive cosmological system such as is presented in the Augsburg and Westminster Confessions, then its relation to personal piety is indeed remote.

But supposing that, instead of thinking of an old-time creed or of a creed that resembles the old-time creeds in respect of the characteristics which have chiefly gone to

put them out of date, we think of the central religious convictions of an enlightened and thoughtful modern Christian; then shall we say that such beliefs as these are indispensable to practical religion or not? This, and this alone, is the real question at issue. And our view of the matter is simply that where there are no such convictions present, there is no good reason why we should speak of religion at all. As a matter of fact, it is probably true that when such convictions are allowed to slip, religion relapses into morality pure and simple, combined perhaps with certain more or less instinctive aesthetic emotions, like delight in existence or tranquillity of mood. There is, of course, a true sense in which knowledge is not an end in itself in religion, as it is generally taken to be in philosophy. What matters in the end is rather the attitude of mind with which life is faced than the view of life on which that attitude is based; not the revelation itself, but the response to the revelation. That we do not deny. What we deny is that there can be any response if there has been no revelation. Mr. Bertrand Russell has recently told us that "mysticism is to be commended as an attitude towards life, not as a creed about the world."[1] But we should claim that the attitude we take towards life should, if it is to be intelligent, correspond point for point with what we know about the world in which that life is to be lived. Religion differs from morality precisely in that it always exhibits this transcendental reference, which is a reference beyond human society and finite purposes to the Eternal Purpose of the Unseen God. And this is why the element of belief is so important in religion, while it is—in a comparative view—so secondary in morality.

Undeniably there is a certain attractiveness about the view that religion can proceed without any definite belief.

[1] See article on "Mysticism and Logic" in *Hibbert Journal* for July 1914.

It seems such an easy solution to so many difficulties. The modern mind is in many ways finding it growingly difficult to read the face of the Eternal. The riddle of the Universe becomes more and more perplexing, and the old certainty, the πληροφορία πίστεως, seems so difficult to attain. At the same time the practical values of Christianity appear still so certainly supreme. Christian reverence and Christian humility, the spirit of praise and of prayer, that infinite trustfulness of Jesus, that unworldliness of John, that unselfishness of Paul—about these things there is no doubt; they are still the joy and delight of all good men. Hence some have thought that perhaps they could have the one without the other, that they could retain the Christian attitude without the Christian conviction, or the Christian gladness without the Christian faith. In particular, this view was more widely spread than is perhaps generally realised among the great English literary figures of the nineteenth century. There were many who had lost all interest in the creeds that were taught them in their youth and who preferred to say as little as possible about creed at all, and yet who had unbounded admiration for the Christian temper and the Christian life. He who so formulated it was not the only one who believed that religion was, in its ultimate truth, nothing more than "morality touched with emotion." And beyond England there was Goethe who, in his earlier development at least, would always have it that in religion the original simplicity of feeling was everything and conceptual formulation a mere useless and burdensome addition.

"Gefühl ist alles; Name ist Schall und Rauch."

This would indeed be an easy solution if only it were a solution at all. But it is difficult to see that it is not rather a mere shirking of the problem, a putting off of the evil day.

It is true, and it is illustrative of a main characteristic of religion, that the happiness of the religious life and the fellowship of the religious community may be largely partaken of, while all questions of transcendent belief remain unsettled. A man may take delight in the atmosphere of the Christian Church before he has ever made up his mind about the Christian God. But before we conclude that the two things have therefore no interdependence, let us remind ourselves of another fact. The real test of the adequacy of any religious programme is not whether its practice may, on occasion, arouse in its devotee a peaceful and reverent frame of mind or even a sense of the beauty of holiness. A Christian should feel that in a Buddhist temple, the staunchest Protestant should feel it in a Roman Catholic cathedral. The only true and sufficient test is whether the form of religion in question can remain with a man through all the changing phases and changing fortunes of his life, in business and recreation, in loneliness and in company, in sorrow and in joy, in such a way that its comforts will never seem hollow to him nor its promises vain. And a religion which has within it no firm and assured faith can never stand this test. We may think of a man who is faced for the first time in his life by a heavy and bitter sorrow which ruins his happiness,—perhaps it is a father whose only son has been cut off in the pride of his young days. Well, a religion of mere feeling will not help him much then. What the man wants to know is what this crushing sorrow *means*. Who has sent it to him, who has planned it for him ? Is it mere mechanical chance tramping out its unthinking course ? Or is it the far-sighted decree of a superior wisdom and of a kinder purpose ? It is not mere curiosity that makes him ask these things, it is his moral and spiritual nature. And he must have an answer to them if he is to regain his peace of mind—he has no

right to regain his peace of mind until he has had an answer. It sounds easy to say—as many have said—that a man's instinct will show him how to face such a sorrow, just as a man of gentlemanly nature will face death no less calmly and courageously though he has never reflected on its meaning. But have we really any right to take our sorrows in this way, resignation being nothing but forgetfulness, and the lapse of time appearing as the only cure of our woes? Such a course is a betrayal, not only of our intelligent, but also of our moral nature. To the man who knows how sacred and profound the communion of human spirits can become, its sudden and premature rupture will necessitate a further philosophy than that. The doctrines of the Divine Purpose and of Immortality will then appear to him, no longer as proceeding from intellectual curiosity or metaphysical speculation, but as an attempt to answer questions which are of the most practical importance to the simplest of men. The happy optimism that "all's right with the world" is not necessarily or in itself religious. It only becomes religious when it is religiously grounded, when it is based on some such conviction as that "God's in His heaven." Perhaps also we may claim that not until it is so based is it even intelligent.[1]

To say that the search for truth is a pre-eminent concern of religion, and that religious feeling and religious emotion must be regarded as secondary to the intelligent apprehension of religious reality, is often branded as an old-fashioned and narrow intellectualism. Perhaps, however, we have said enough to show that there are certain very

[1] Cf. Rauwenhoff, *Religionsphilosophie*, Deutsch. Uebers., 2. Aufl. p. 66. "Darum will ich wohl mit Matthew Arnold Religion 'morality kindled by emotion' nennen, aber nur unter dem Vorbehalt, dass die Gemütserregung dabei immer als durch die Vorstellung einer übersinnlichen Macht hervorgebracht gedacht wird. Wo dies fehlt, kann nicht von religiösem Bewusstsein die Rede sein."

practical situations in a man's life when he cannot face the world and life any longer until he understands them better, when consequently to find their meaning is, as Browning says, his only meat and drink. And if that is so, then there is nothing old-fashioned, nor anything one-sidedly intellectualistic, about the hope that when feeling is paralysed and instinct fails and bare morality is comfortless, then we shall know the *truth*, and the *truth* shall make us free.

III.

It is very seldom, however, that truth is to be attained by way of absolute denial. Mistaken as the view under discussion may be, we cannot believe that it is *wholly* mistaken; hence we should not rest content until we are able to formulate our own case in such a way that it will be seen to include certain justifiable underlying motives of the view we have been opposing. And indeed there is one respect in which we have not yet done justice to the anti-credal feeling. It is undeniably true that the part played by belief in religion has often in the past been wrongly apprehended, and even in a sense exaggerated. Salvation was often made to depend on orthodoxy in such a way that it was held to be sinful to hold other views about religion than those which were held by the Church. Heresy was thus a moral offence, and heretics were burned. But there is a right and a wrong conclusion which may be drawn from that fact. The wrong conclusion is that any religion which contains a creed must necessarily fall into this intellectualistic error. The right conclusion is that a creed which is intellectualistic is not a creed in the religious sense—that is, a confession of spiritual conviction—at all. For the idea that the holding of correct religious beliefs is necessary to salvation is only absurd so long as our ideas of what salvation is and of what the correct religious beliefs

are, are absurd. There is no absurdity in saying that a belief in the moral government of the world is a necessary condition of man's highest spiritual welfare.

Perhaps the best way of making clear to ourselves where the true view lies is to endeavour to see clearly just at what point Schleiermacher fell short of it. It will be remembered that Schleiermacher's contention was that religion can neither be knowledge on the one hand, nor action on the other; it can neither be a system of doctrines nor a code of morals. "Only by keeping outside the range both of science and of practice can it maintain its proper sphere and character. Only when piety takes its place alongside of science and of practice as a necessary, an indispensable third, as their natural counterpart, not less in worth and splendour than either, will the common field be altogether occupied and human nature on this side complete."[1] Now Schleiermacher was right in thinking that religion is not mere knowledge as such. To identify religion with knowledge pure and simple would be to make it dependent on, and obtainable by way of, scientific and philosophical inquiry, and to make clearness of thought the measure of spiritual perfection. Which is, of course, a *reductio ad absurdum*. He was also right in thinking that religion is not merely a matter of practice, as we have already sufficiently shown. But it was a wrong and an artificial step to conclude that therefore religion has nothing directly to do with knowledge and practice, but takes its place alongside of them as an independent third quantity. Belief and action being thus excluded from the sphere of religion, Schleiermacher had no alternative but to connect religion with *feeling*—a correlation the perplexities and obscurities of which are too well known to require recapitulation here. What Schleiermacher should have concluded was, not that

[1] *Loc. cit.* p. 37.

religion has to do with neither knowledge nor practice, but that it has to do with *both* knowledge and practice. In religion knowledge and practice join hands. Religion is not mere knowledge, because it is practical knowledge—knowledge which is morally relevant and morally conditioned; it is not mere practice, because it is a practice which is dependent on transcendental belief.

One reason why Schleiermacher did not see this was—to put it somewhat bluntly—that he did not know his Kant. He was so much a disciple of the Romantic reaction that even the man who had "removed knowledge to make room for faith" seemed to him to belong to the intellectualism of the *Aufklärung*. And yet the following passage from the *Critique of Pure Reason* really goes nearer to the root of this matter than Schleiermacher was ever able to go. "The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centred in the three following questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? The first question is purely speculative. . . . The second question is purely practical. . . . *The third question . . . is at once practical and theoretical.* The practical forms a clue to the answer of the theoretical and—in its highest form—speculative question."[1] This correction of Schleiermacher by means of Kant has been in essence adopted by most modern theologians, and in particular by the Ritschlian school.[2]

[1] *Op. cit.*, tr. Meiklejohn, p. 488.

[2] As an illustration of the *cul de sac* into which we are led by failing to grasp this position, I may quote from an article by a recent writer the following summary of its results. "I have attempted to show, then, that religious knowledge is not different in kind from scientific knowledge, but that it is scientific or philosophical knowledge (1) systematised and (2) poetically expressed. And I have further pointed out that the dogmatic certainty derived equally from all articles of the ancient creed cannot be found in any form of modern knowledge. If we are still to speak of religious knowledge, that element in its older form must be

The doctrine that religion as giving *practical* knowledge is to be distinguished from the theoretical knowledge of science and speculative philosophy, and that as giving practical *knowledge* it is to be distinguished from all that is merely ethical, is really the secret of the solution of all the difficulties and apparent contradictions which have come before us in this paper. Our creeds have been falsely intellectualistic because they contained articles that were rather the result of old-fashioned scientific speculation than of living religious conviction. But that is no good reason why such conviction should be itself discounted. When our creeds, whether ecclesiastical or individual, are so framed as to contain nothing except what is witnessed to and demanded by our common consciousness of spiritual value, and, what is consequently of practical importance to us all, ministering to the most practical needs of heart and life, then they will be of daily interest, not merely to philosophers and theological specialists, but to all serious-minded men.

IV.

There is perhaps no more frequent hindrance to the recognition of the truths which we have here been endeavouring to defend than a certain misinterpretation of the character of Jesus' message. A final word must therefore be spoken on this matter.

(1) To begin with, the idea is not uncommon that Jesus did not offer any answer to such ultimate questions as that of the being and nature of God. He was concerned, it is said, rather with how men should live than with how they should think. A recent writer of considerable weight has,

omitted, and its place is supplied by the courage which dares to acknowledge ignorance." (C. Delisle Burns, on *What is religious knowledge?* in *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1914.)

for instance, told us that "the Gospel when it was first preached was a way of life and not a theology."[1]

Now no one will wish to say that there is no element of truth concealed behind a statement of that sort. In a strict sense, theology is a learned scientific discipline and has no proper existence outside of the schools. It bears the same relation to religious beliefs as the abstract science of ethics does to our moral judgments; it systematises them and does something to unify them; it translates our common expression of them into the abstract and technical language of science. And the Gospel, when it was first preached, certainly did not contain a theology in that sense of the word. But it is, if anything, still further from the truth to say that it contained merely "a way of life." The contrast of "scientific theology" and "way of life" does not exhaust the alternatives—indeed it leaves out the only true alternative; for the contrast should rather be drawn between scientific theology and religious belief. No view of the teaching of Jesus can approximate the truth which fails to recognise that its very nerve and centre was formed by a *way of belief*.[2] It was of the essence of His message to inculcate a certain view of God and the world. And when it is said that Jesus did not teach a theology but a way of life, there is no doubt that the amount and the nature of the difference between the teaching of a religious leader and a scientific system of theology is wrongly conceived. The latter differs from the former chiefly in being more systematic in form and more abstract in expression. The true religious teacher is always and primarily a religious thinker, and no less than the theologian is he concerned with religious truth. No man has ever taught a more

[1] Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 4. The opinion, it should be said, is expressed merely in passing.

[2] Using a German distinction, we may say that Jesus taught not merely a particular *Lebensweise*, but also a particular *Lebensanschauung*.

definite view of the nature of God's relation to man and of the purpose of human life than Jesus of Nazareth. Moreover, if it were true that religion was not concerned with ultimate questions of that sort, then theology also could not properly have any concern with them ; for by accepting a part in them, it would be importing into the study of its subject-matter a point of view which was foreign to the subject-matter itself.

(2) There is, however, another and equally hurtful, though certainly less extreme, view which is often taken of the nature of the original Gospel teaching. Admitting that Jesus did teach certain definite ideas about the nature of God, it is often said, and still more often implied, that He neither offered nor possessed any *proofs* of these ideas. He believed these things and taught them, but He had merely taken them over from the religion of His fathers. Since He was only a religious teacher and not a philosopher, the question of the *grounds* of these beliefs did not arise for Him. It is for the Christian philosopher to find a basis in reason for that belief in God which Jesus, in common with all teachers of practical religion, was content to assume.

This view we believe to be wholly mistaken. We cannot doubt that Jesus clearly knew not only what He believed, but also why He believed it. By spiritual reflexion He had convinced Himself of the truth of the doctrines which He so consistently taught. And He did not conceal His reasons ; His manner of persuading the people of the truth of His message was just that which any religious reformer must adopt—He gave them, that is to say, His grounds for His beliefs. Let us take one or two examples. A favourite and central doctrine of Jesus' was that God's care of humanity and the kindness of His purpose towards them and His readiness to forgive their sins were without limit and without reserve. How was He wont

to establish this doctrine? One very frequent argument was apparently this: "Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven, shall He not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?" (Matt. vi. 30). Or again: "Ye are of more value than many sparrows" (Matt x. 31). Now it is true that that argument is here expressed in a vivid, concrete form, and is clothed in the language, if not of poetry, at least of prophecy. But that is only to say that it is expressed in a form which is appropriate for popular discourse and not for academic discussion. What has to be noted is that the difference is only one of form—perhaps hardly more than one of language. All we have to do in order to make the argument of Jesus an argument suitable for philosophical discussion is to express it in the formal and abstract language of the schools. Jesus' belief in God's care was manifestly in this case a result of reflexion upon the relative moral value of human personality on the one hand and of vegetable and lower animal life on the other. And the evident meaning of His proof was this: "To any true moral perception it will be clear that human personality is of infinitely greater value than the life of a vegetable or of a lower animal. There are many evidences that God cares for these lower existences. But we must believe that God has a true sense of value. How much more then will He care for human lives!" That is not only an argument of a genuinely "philosophic" nature, but it is an argument with which few theologians can afford to dispense. In this abstract dress it is more suitable for purposes of philosophic discussion; but is it any clearer, any more convincing, or, in its essential meaning, really different?

Another and still more ultimate type of argument which Jesus was wont to use in support of his belief in God's willingness to help and to forgive men may be mentioned.

We are told, for example, that He supported His dictum that "every one that asketh, receiveth," in the following manner. "Or what man is there of you, whom if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone? Or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent? If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in Heaven give good things to them that ask Him!" (Matt. vii. 9–11). Abstractly expressed, this means: "Is it reasonable to suppose that the values which finite man has realised are higher than those realised by the Power which controls the Universe? Do not the values which man realises in his moral life rather give him the highest clue he can find to the nature of God? Goodness is not merely a subjective ideal, it is of the inmost essence of ultimate reality. Hence if kindness is really good, how much kinder must the Infinite be than the finite!" The parable of the prodigal son represents a similar argument from analogy—a fact which is often obscured because it is not realised that the parabolic element is in this case an essential part of the meaning, and no mere accident of its popular or prophetic form. The argument rests upon the idea that our surest clue to the nature of God is to be found in the highest region of our own experience. And the object of the story is to bring home to the minds of Jesus' hearers that there is nothing nobler in human life than a father's unconditional forgiveness and undying love; and so to press home the conclusion that it is in terms of such love and such forgiveness that we must think of God.

Some one will still say, perhaps, that there is a yet more ultimate question than that of the nature of God—the question whether there is any God at all: and that that "metaphysical" question Jesus never faced, having simply assumed the traditional answer. There is a certain truth

in such a statement. In Jesus' day there was no need to prove the existence of God to men, because nobody questioned it. The idea that the world-process had no conscious purpose to guide it, had not seriously occurred to any one on Hebrew soil. Hence the only question was whether the purpose guiding the world was bad or good, whether God was an angry judge or a loving father. It is probably quite true, therefore, that the grounds which men have for believing that there is *some* purpose in things and *some* power behind things did not require to be so fully thought out by an ancient religious teacher as they would by a modern one. Nevertheless it must be recognised that the type of proof required is in no way essentially different from that which was habitually employed by Jesus. And who can doubt that, in the last resort, not Jesus alone, but also all the great prophets, knew why they believed in the existence of a Divine Purpose, and that the ground of their belief was not in essence any other than that which modern theologians have to offer? On any true view, therefore, the difference between such a doctrine as Jesus taught and a theological system which understands its business and does not concern itself with speculations that are of no religious interest, is in the first instance of a formal nature only. Jesus' religious teaching was everywhere morally relevant; it contained nothing that was not of paramount importance for practical life. In that a true theology will resemble it. Jesus' discovery of the doctrines which He taught was, as we have seen, always morally conditioned. And in that also a true theology will not be different.

JOHN BAILLIE.

FURTHER INTERPRETATIONS OF NEW TESTAMENT PASSAGES.[1]

MATTHEW v. 27–28: *ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη, Οὐ μοιχεύσεις. ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ βλέπων γυναῖκα πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν ἤδη ἐμοίχευσεν αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ.*

The Church has universally, or almost universally, interpreted *γυναῖκα* as "a woman" in general, and has regarded the command as referring to male lustful concupiscence towards woman in general. There is no need to present a chronologically arranged catena of interpretations to show that this has been the view taken. I merely give one instance, from Ambrose, *Expositio Psalmi cxviii.* 8, 34, §1: hic utique cogitauit, ut uideret mulierem, ut uideret ad concupiscendum; sed mala haec cogitatio relinquat uias suas. Alius non cogitauit quidem, sed subito aspexit et captus est et uidit et concupiuit et ideo lapsus est. Quodsi fragilem suum considerasset affectum et ante timuisset, ne, cum uidisset mulierem, mente caperetur et animo, utique non prospexisset ad mulierem, ne concupisceret eam, etc.

But surely this interpretation is in conflict with Jewish thought, and is an unwarrantable extension of the thought of Jesus. To the Jewish mind adultery was possible only with a married woman, the chief evil in their eyes being the possibility that illegitimate offspring might be foisted on the man. The word *γυναῖκα* has an unfortunate ambiguity in Greek, but it normally implies "married woman," even though it does not explicitly indicate that. Marriage was much more the usual condition for mature women in ancient civilised states than it is to-day. But in any case the reference is clearly to lustful desire towards *a married*

[1] See the EXPOSITOR, Eighth Series, vol. viii. pp. 94–96.

woman, another's wife, only. Jesus elsewhere condemns fornication in the strongest terms, Mark x. 19, Matthew xv. 19, and from the latter passage it is clear that He would condemn the evil impulse leading to it, but He does not do so in Matthew v. 28.

Luke xii. 38: *κἂν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ κἂν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ φυλακῇ ἔλθῃ καὶ εὕρῃ οὕτως, μακάριοί εἰσιν ἐκεῖνοι.*

Such seems to be the true text in the above passage. The difficulty of its interpretation is mirrored in the variants given by our authorities. The principal variants are stated in the new apparatus to the Revisers' Greek Testament (Oxford, 1910), and form the subject of one of the most detailed discussions in the voluminous introduction to Von Soden's edition. They need not be repeated here. The question people ask is, Why are the second and third watches specially selected out of the four for mention? My answer to this is that it is in these watches that it is most difficult to keep awake. Let any one try to keep awake for a whole night. A person in normal health will manage to keep awake, as many students do, during the first quarter of the night. It will be desperately hard to do so during the second and third quarters. But, if one has held out to the end of the third, the fourth will not offer so much difficulty, whether because the advent of day is near or for some other reason. This clause is absent from the parallel account in Matthew, and may be another touch due to the observant physician.

Luke xix. 33, Acts xvi. 19, the use of *κύριοι*.

In the Expositor for July, 1914, p. 95, I argued that in these verses *κύριοι* means "master and mistress," according to a well attested but not equally well known Greek and Latin idiom. It seems desirable to collect evidence for this

and analogous usages, because the necessary information is not readily accessible. For the purpose I avail myself of notes of the late Professor John E. B. Mayor, on Juvenal, *Satires*, xi. 105, xiii. 52, and on Tertullian, *Apologeticus*, c. 22.[1] The fact that my examples are almost entirely Latin does not mean that the usage is not also Greek. Even the standard Latin grammars of Kennedy and Roby have nothing to say on the subject, and we have to go back to Ruddiman-Stallbaum, ii. 36–37.

domini (= (*dominus* and *domina*): Virgil, *Eclogues*, iii. 16 (possibly); Ovid, *Amores*, ii. 2, 32; Juvenal, *Sat.*, 6, 4.

ἀδελφοί (= ἀδελφός and ἀδελφή): Euripides, *Electra*, 536.

fratres (= *frater* (*fratres*) and *soror* (*sorores*)); cf. Spanish, *hermanos*; Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, iv. 61; Tacitus, *Annals*, xii. 4; Calpurnius Flaccus, *Declamations*, 43; *Digest*, i. 10, 38. 14, 35; *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, v. 1091, 3497, 4908; viii. 1574, 1858, 2088, 2583, 2786, 2844, etc. More examples in Neue-Wagener, *Formenlehre der lateinischen Sprache*, i. (Leipzig, 1902), p. 896.

reges (king and queen): Livy, i. 39, 2; ii. 2, 11; xxxvii. 3, §§ 9, 10; Seneca, *Medea*, 56; Juvenal, *Satires*, 13, 52.

filii (son and daughter, sons and daughters): cf. Spanish *hijos*; Valerius Maximus, ii. 4, 5; Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, ix. 3 § 63; Tacitus, *Annals*, xi. 37; Calpurnius Flaccus, *Declamations*, 12; *Digest*, l. 16, 84; *Codex* v. 27, 5; *Corpus Inscr. Lat.* ii. 5072; v. 1142, etc. More in Neue, *op. cit.*, p. 896.

soceri (father- and mother-in-law): Virgil, *Aeneid*, ii. 456; Ovid, *Metam.* iii. 132; Livy, xxvi. 50, 6; Statius, *Thebais*, xi. 217; xii. 201, etc.; in inscriptions frequently, see Neue, p. 897.

[1] The notes of Prof. Mayor on Tertullian's *Apology* are not yet published, but will shortly go to press under my editorship. My part-proprietorship in them may excuse their use here.

aui (= grandfather and grandmother): Varro in the grammarian Probus, *Corp. Inscr. Lat.* iii. 3181, etc.

pueri (= boys and girls): Val. Max. ii. 4, 5 (*ter*); *Inscriptions de l'Algérie*, 3582.

patres (=parentes): [Verg. *Aen.* ii. 579]; Statius, *Thebais*, ii. 464; *Corp. Inscr. Lat.* v. 1658, 5320, 6128; ix. 1866; Orelli's *Inscriptiones*, 4579; Burman's *Anthologia Latina*, iv. 10 (= Meyer's 1164).

dei (= Pluto and Proserpine): Statius, *Silvae*, ii. 7, 121.

tyranni (= Pluto and Proserpine): Seneca, *Consolatio ad Marciam*, 19, § 4.

Τυνδαρίδαι, *Tyndaridae* (sons and daughters of Tyndareus): Synesius, epigram in *Anthologia Graeca*, iv. 4; Horace, *Sermones*, i. 1, 100.

Tonantes (= Jupiter and Juno): Seneca, *Medea*, 59.

Compare also the somewhat similar uses of *Castores* for Castor and Pollux (Neue, pp. 592 f.), *Quirini* for Romulus (Quirinus) and Remus (Juvenal 11, 105), *Polluces* for Castor and Pollux (Symmachus, *epist.* i. 89; 95; Servius on Verg. *Georgics* iii. 89; cf. Hor. *Carmina*, iii. 29, 64).

A. Souter.

THE PROPHET OF THE GOD OF LOVE.

Hosea.

When we turn from Amos to his younger contemporary Hosea, we become sensible of a great change. The interval of time is not great, but nations, like individuals, sometimes live by months and not by years. The kingdom of Israel declined very rapidly after the death of Jeroboam II. King succeeded king in swift succession, and the people sank deeper and deeper into ruin under the increasing exactions and repeated ravages of Assyria.[1] Of Hosea's public ministry we know nothing; we have no record that he met kings and priests and nobles face to face. No vivid picture of his activity is preserved to set by the side of the dramatic meeting of Amos the prophet with Amaziah the court-priest of Beth-el.[2] It may even have been the case that both the denunciations and the comforting words of

[1] The chronology of the last days of the kingdom of Israel is uncertain, and in particular it is difficult to see how the *twenty* years assigned to Pekah in 2 Kings xv. 27 can be fitted into any scheme which takes note of the chronological *data* derived from the Assyrian monuments. The following scheme (E. L. Curtis in Hastings' *Bib. Dictionary*, i. 399) is in agreement with Assyrian chronology, and may be accepted as approximately correct.

741 B.C. Death of Jeroboam II.
741 B.C. Assassination of his son and successor Zechariah.
741 B.C. The usurper Shallum put to death.
741–737 B.C. Reign of Menahem (tributary to Assyria).
737–736 B.C. His son Pekahiah reigns and is assassinated.
736–734 B.C. Reign of the Assassin Pekah. He is assassinated by Hoshea. First captivity of Israel.
734–722 B.C. Reign of Hoshea. Samaria captured by the Assyrians. Second captivity of Israel.

[2] Amos vii. 10–17.

Hosea were read for him by his disciples[1] or placarded upon the walls of Samaria[2] to bear witness in the absence of the prophet himself. He may have been in fact what he is often called—a writing prophet.[3]

The task of Hosea in Israel was something like that which Jeremiah was given more than a century later to execute in Judah. The time was past when repentance could avert the punishment of captivity; the only hope was of a restoration after chastisement. Hosea has little or nothing to do with the political situation of Israel as such, though he condemns the fickleness with which the rulers at one time courted the support of Egypt and at another professed their willingness to submit to Egypt's mighty rival Assyria.[4] But Hosea has no "policy"; he does not play the part of king's counsellor;[5] he is a religious teacher demanding "repentance" and "mercy" as the firstfruits and sacrifices which are acceptable to JEHOVAH.[6]

Full as the book of Hosea is of references to contemporary events and politics, the Prophet had no political rôle to play. His book is not a *Flugschrift;* it is not a tract written for a passing occasion which has lost its significance by the lapse of twenty-seven centuries. Rather is it the case that the crisis of a far-distant age called forth the statement of a doctrine necessary for all time from a Prophet who was indued with unequalled power for stating it. Hosea teaches that Israel's sin need not bring destruction, for chastening has been provided as an alternative. Israel has

[1] Cf. Jer. xxxvi. 5, 6.
[2] Cf. Isa. viii. 1; Habakkuk ii. 2.
[3] Cf. 2 Chron. xxi. 12.
[4] Hos. vii. 11.
[5] The case was somewhat different with Isaiah, who was in a position to recommend a policy of abstention from alliances to Ahaz and Hezekiah.
[6] Hos. vi. 6.

to do, not with a blind Avenger of wrong, but with a Father, who can receive repentance, if it be offered, and can grant mercy, if it be sought. This proclamation by Hosea of JEHOVAH'S fatherhood of Israel marked an epoch in the history of Religion as truly as the appearance of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in the history of the world's literature.

Indeed it matters little that the Divine Fatherhood taught by the Prophet was asserted only for Israel: what does matter is the fact that Hosea taught an adoptive and moral fatherhood which, if true, could not be limited to a single people. The Hebrew prophet utters a word which must come one day to be "writ large" in the pronouncement of the Apostle of the Gentiles to the Galatians: "For ye are all sons of God, through faith, in Christ Jesus."[1] The significance of Hosea for ages far remote from him in time lies in this fact. The passage in which he sets forth the paternal love of God for Israel contains the largest part of the Divine message which he bears for the Christian Church of to-day.

The great doctrine of God's Fatherhood of men is represented in the Old Testament by the teaching of the Prophets, headed by Hosea, that JEHOVAH is the Father of one people, of Israel.[2] In this instance, as in many others, the Old Testament is not contrary to the New; on the contrary, the older teaching serves as an introduction to the Christian revelation. But it was necessary that the doctrine of the Divine Fatherhood should be communicated *in the first place* only to a nation which could receive it with understanding, because it had first been taught the doctrines of Monotheism and of the moral perfection of the True God. Such a doctrine as that God is the Father of Men would have been disastrously misunderstood if it had been flung promiscu-

[1] Gal. iii. 26.

[2] See Isa. i. 2; lxiii. 16; lxiv. 8; Mal. i. 6; cf. Ps. lxviii. 5.

ously into a world unprepared to receive it, a world penetrated through and through with heathen thought. It would have been as pearls cast before swine. The heathen world, not only of Greece but of Asia also and of Egypt, was only too familiar with a currupt form of the affirmation that God is the Father of men. The genealogical sequence, gods as the first generation, demi-gods or heroes as the second, and men or Greeks as the third, is a commonplace in the Classical poets, and their verse is defiled with stories of the intrigues of gods and heroes with women of the earth.

So common were such stories in the ancient world that they do not pass unnoticed even in the Bible itself. The "sons of God," or "sons of gods," we read in Genesis,[1] took to themselves wives of the daughters of men, and begat sons who made themselves a name by the deeds of pride and wickedness which brought the flood upon the earth. This whole monstrous brood of giant-oppressors was destroyed and Noah and his family alone survived to replenish the earth. Who more exactly these wicked "sons of God" were, the sacred writer does not say. He touches a heathen legend, but he does not adopt it in its entirety; he uses a part of it only to illustrate his own theme. Such monstrous wickedness as that which caused the Flood could not, he felt, have had a purely human origin. The men who thus defied JEHOVAH were giants (*Titans* the Greeks would have called them), they were the offspring of supernatural beings, demons or gods.[2] Whatever they were, they were swept away, and the men who survived the Flood were the purely human descendants of Adam. Thus lightly does the sacred writer

[1] Ch. vi. 1–8.

[2] The word *Elohim* ("God") is of plural form in Hebrew, and is used both of the true God (probably without consciousness of its form), and also, as a plural, of the gods of the heathen. The phrase "sons of *Elohim*" is thus a relic of Semitic paganism.

touch the legends on which heathen fancy loved to dwell.

Very different from these in tone and in substance is the teaching of the Old Testament that JEHOVAH is the Father of Israel. The Hebrew Prophets who proclaim the Divine Fatherhood do not forget the human origin of their race. The eponymous ancestor of the Israelites is not JEHOVAH (be it reverently said), but Israel (Jacob). If any wish to trace the genealogy beyond Israel he only reaches Abraham, the human worshipper of JEHOVAH.[1] "Thou art our Father," writes the Prophet, "though Abraham knoweth us not, and Israel doth not acknowledge us."[2] The Fatherhood of God is thus something higher than physical fatherhood. According to the teaching of the Old Testament JEHOVAH took Israel as his son by a great act of adoption and made him into a nation by a great act of revelation, and by a prolonged course of nurture and of education.[3] The Fatherhood of God for Israel rests on the facts of Israel's history.

Now Hosea (ch. xi.) says that JEHOVAH found Israel a servant in the land of Egypt and adopted him as a son; he says further that JEHOVAH is still Israel's father, yearning for the return of his rebellious child.

But it is to be remarked how little there was in the circumstances of the Prophet's time to teach him this; signs of God's fatherly favour were certainly *not* visible to the general eye. Israel had anarchy within and the standing menace of Assyrian invasion from without.

But a Prophet differs from the ordinary man just in the fact that his view is not limited to the present. In his assertion of the Fatherhood[4] Hosea shows us that his eye

[1] The modern suggestion that Abraham was originally thought of as a god lacks proof, and in any case has no bearing on the present subject.
[2] Isa. lxiii. 16.
[3] Cf. *Lex in Corde*, pp. 200–1 (on Ps. xcv. 6).
[4] Hosea xi.

is fixed on certain significant events of the past which for an inspired mind like his could never lose their meaning, however confusing the aspect of the present might be. These events are four in number.

First, Israel had been a serf in Egypt and had been delivered from the place of bondage.[1] Secondly, Israel had been in the wilderness, and had issued from it a new people conscious of a national life.[2] Thirdly, Israel had received a code of moral law.[3] Lastly, Israel had attained to the possession of a fertile land.[4] The unspiritual man will say that all this was "a tale of little meaning" in the Prophet's day, and unprofitable for present instruction. He will assert, moreover, that all the events happened merely by "natural" causes. Not so Hosea. For him the four great events, however distant, had a present significance.

JEHOVAH'S fatherlike care in Egypt, by the Red Sea, and in the Wilderness, together with the gift of the moral law and the gift of the land of Canaan, assured Hosea of the abiding fact that Israel was JEHOVAH'S adopted son.

HOSEA XI. 1–11.

JEHOVAH THE FATHER OF ISRAEL.

DIVINE LOVE IN THE PAST (*vv.* 1–5*a*).

1. Though Israel was a servant,
   Yet I set my love upon him,
   And called him out of Egypt to be my son.

2. *My prophets* called them,
   Yet they went their own way,
   Sacrificing to the Baalim and burning incense to graven images.

3. Yet it was I who taught Ephraim his steps,
   Taking them in my arms;
   But they knew not that I had tended them.

[1] Chap. xi. 1.
[2] Chap. ii. 14, 15.
[3] Chap. viii. 12.
[4] Chap. xiii. 5, 6.

4. With the cords of a man I caught them,
I drew them with bonds of love;
Yea, I was to them as one that removes a yoke,
My bridle was in their jaws,[1]
And I turned them to me that I might feed them;[2]
5. *Saying*, He shall not return unto Egypt. . . .

The Prophet dwells on these great events of the history of Israel. He recalls the fact that the people put God's parental love to a heavy strain throughout the Wilderness wanderings; the more Moses and Aaron called upon them to follow JEHOVAH, the more they fell into apostasy and sacrificed to the Baalim (*v.* 2). And yet the LORD was guiding Ephraim[3] all the time teaching them how to live and how to journey in a *land that was not*[4] *sown*, and feeding them with manna and with quails, when they sighed for the fleshpots and the cucumbers of Egypt (*vv.* 3–5*a*).[5]

DIVINE LOVE IN THE PRESENT (*vv.* 5*b*–11).

But now Asshur[6] is his king,
For they refuse to return *unto me*—

6. And the sword rages against his cities,
And consumes his mighty men and devours them,
Because they followed their own counsels.

7. And my people hesitate to return to me! . . .[7]

8. How shall I give thee up, O Ephraim?
How shall I surrender thee, O Israel?
How shall I make thee as Admah?
How shall I set thee as Zeboim?
My heart is changed within me,
All my compassions are kindled.

[1] The metaphor changes. The prophet thinks of Israel as a young child in ver. 3, but the "cords" and "bonds" of ver. 4*a* make the transition easy in 4*b* to the metaphor of an animal in harness.

[2] An emendation which every Hebrew student will recognise underlies this translation.

[3] i.e., Israel. [4] Jer. ii. 2.

[5] Cf. Exod. xvi. 3, 4; Num. xi. 4–6, 31–35.

[6] The national God of Assyria.

[7] The line omitted cannot be satisfactorily translated; the text appears to be faulty.

9. I will not execute my burning anger,
I will not return to Ephraim to destroy,
(For I am God, and not a man,)
As a Holy One in the midst of thee,
And I will not come as an Avenger.

10. After JEHOVAH shall they walk, when he shall roar as a lion,
For he shall roar, and as children they shall come trembling from the West.

11. They shall come trembling as birds out of Egypt,
And as doves out of the land of Asshur,
And I will cause them and their households to dwell *here*, saith JEHOVAH.

But from the past the Seer turns swiftly to the present. He declares that Israel is now repeating the apostasy committed in the Wilderness and that the punishment also will be repeated, this time by means of the sword of the Assyrians (*vv.* 5*b*–7). Hosea has declared Israel's judgment, as he was bidden, in the name of JEHOVAH, but he does not at all forget that Israel's judge is also Israel's father. He recollects how ruthless a foe is the Assyrian; he knows that the parental love which JEHOVAH has for His people will not allow Him to leave Israel to the mercies of such an enemy. In his vision he is swiftly transported to the day of punishment and he hears JEHOVAH cry out as a father, "How shall I give thee up, O Ephraim?" God's adopted son is indeed to be chastised, but not destroyed. The fate of the cities of the Plain ("Admah" and "Zeboim")[1] is not to overtake him (*v.* 8). JEHOVAH, the prophet says, will not "return to destroy," i.e., He will not repeat the work of chastisement until His people is destroyed, but He will limit the punishment which He inflicts. The presence of God in His Holiness in the sinful cities of Israel, in Samaria in particular, must involve their total destruction, and so JEHOVAH declares that He will not enter in nor present

[1] Gen. xix. 24, 25; cf. Gen. xiv. 2.

Himself in His awful character as an Holy One and Avenger ("Watcher," *v.* 9).[1]

Of what nature the limited punishment was, does not appear from *vv.* 8, 9, and in *v.* 10 we are transferred to a fresh stage of the historical development. Looking back from this we see that the Prophet has seen in vision a great blow fall upon Israel, leading to a wide dispersal of the people; some of them live in fear in the south-west in Egypt, some in the north-east in Assyria, in Mesopotamia and beyond. But now the love of the Father of Israel manifests itself in mercy and favour. JEHOVAH will give the signal for the return of His people; He will "roar like a lion," and then He will go before them as of old in the Wilderness, and will bring them back to dwell in their own homes once more (*vv.* 10, 11).

This passage, so full of hope,[2] is taken by some modern scholars to be a later addition to Hosea's prophecy. It is a commonplace with the critics of to-day that the pre-exilic Prophets were Prophets of Judgment and that passages of hope found in their writings are due to writers of post-exilic time. Thus Dr. Cheyne wrote as early as 1895: "Criticism is in fact showing more and more clearly that passages of a comforting tendency were frequently inserted by late writers in prophecies which seemed to them too dispiriting for edification."[3] The observation is not without foundation, but the application of the principle of criticism suggested by it is beset with many and great difficulties. The Prophets were the "Pastors" of Israel, and in proportion as they understood their work they were accustomed

[1] The phrase "A Watcher even an Holy One" is found in Dan. iv. 13 [10], where it describes a Heavenly Being who superintends the execution of punishment.

[2] *Vv.* 10, 11, together with parts of *vv.* 8, 9. (Nowack, *Die kleinen Propheten*, in loco.)

[3] *Introduction to Isaiah*, p. 93.

to blend promise with threatening and words of hope with words of reproof. They were not as heathen soothsayers announcing dead oracles of a doom of fate which nothing could avert, they were stewards of the living oracles of the LORD, which are *profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for discipline in righteousness.*[1] When an Amos or a Hosea speaks of evil to come, his words are meant primarily as a call to his people to repent of their works, that JEHOVAH also may "repent" concerning their punishment and say, *It shall not be.*[2] When, again, such a Prophet speaks of good to come, his promises are conditional on the repentance and amendment of the people. Of absolute prediction, whether of good or of evil, there is very little in the writings of the Prophets, but these able Pastors of the Old Testament mingle warning for the stiff-necked with encouragement for the weak-hearted. A change of tone, therefore, from that which is "dispiriting" to that which comforts is a very uncertain criterion by which to infer a change of authorship.

In the case of the present passage no reasonable partition between two authors is possible. As the passage stands we see a prophet (who is at the same time a man) struggling between two great emotions and illustrating in his own person the contest taking place in a higher sphere between the Divine Justice and the Divine Mercy. The omissions from the text proposed by Nowack and others tone down the contrast and succeed only in leaving us with a less convincing representation of the mind of Hosea. The words of Chapter xi. as they stand are threaded together as on a golden thread by the Prophet's conviction of the fatherly love of God for Israel. Nothing, he teaches, is impossible to such love. It brought Israel out of Egypt

[1] 2 Tim. iii. 16.
[2] Amos vii. 1–6.

and it can bring Israel back from the Assyrian captivity now impending.

We have no record to show that Israel repented at this preaching of Hosea. We do not know that the conditions of his promise were fulfilled, and that a return of Israel was the consequence. The probabilities are perhaps the other way. The fall of the kingdom of Israel, however, is a fact of history. Their northern and eastern territories were overrun by the Assyrians and the inhabitants carried captive "to Assyria" in the days of Pekah, king of Israel (2 Kings xv. 29). Samaria itself was captured and its people removed to Mesopotamia and Media "in the ninth year of Hoshea," the successor of Pekah (2 Kings xvii. 6). But we do not know with what degree of thoroughness his removal of Israel was carried out. It is highly improbable that the *whole* of the population was removed, for doubtless the poorest would be left in Samaria by the Assyrians as at a later time in Judah by the Chaldeans.[1] Again, we cannot be sure that the bulk of those who were led captive were really taken as far as Assyria itself, i.e., beyond the Euphrates. The language of 2 Kings is quite general; it would be satisfied if the flower of the population only was removed to Mesopotamia and Media. But of a return from exile of the northern tribes our records say nothing, yet so meagre are they, that their silence is anything but conclusive as to the fact. Judah, we know, came back and had a prolongation of national life, but we are not in a position to make the same assertion with regard to Israel.

A case like this puts us to the test to decide whether we have or have not the true and high conception of the nature of prophecy. If we think of the Prophet primarily as a foreseer and foreteller of particular future events, we shall find these two verses of Hosea not a little disappoint-

[1] Jer. xxxix. 10.

ing. Here, we shall say, is a definite prediction of the return of the Ten Tribes from exile, and we have no kind of assurance that it was ever fulfilled. But we surely do wrong to Prophecy if we thus regard a Prophet as a mere fortune-teller for his nation. Hosea gives no absolute promise; indeed he believes that God's love cannot work out its full purpose unless it be met by prayer and repentance and moral activity on the side of Israel. This doctrine of the conditional restoration of the nation is more fully set forth by the Prophet in the closing chapter of his book. But it was a hard lesson for the ordinary Israelite of the eighth century, persuaded as he was that JEHOVAH must stand by the nation which sacrificed to Him and called Him Lord, even if that nation was morally corrupt. "Who is wise," asks Hosea, "and he shall understand these things? prudent, and he shall know them? for the ways of JEHOVAH are right, and the just shall walk in them; but transgressors shall fall therein." [1]

W. EMERY BARNES.

GNOSTIC SKETCHES.

IT will be generally admitted that the chief reason why gnosticism has so long remained an undeciphered historical enigma is that an erroneous method of investigation was applied to it. Ecclesiastical testimony was put on the same level as the remains of gnostic writings. The latter, including complete works such as *Pistis Sophia* and the Coptic treatises of the papyrus of Bruce, were used simply as complemental material, not as documents of primary

[1] Hos. xiv. 9 (cf. Ewald *in loco*). Nowack, with excess of ingenuity, declares that this verse is the addition of a sympathetic reader. Is the cry, *He that hath ears to hear let him hear* (Luke viii. 8; cf. Matt. xiii. 9; Mark iv. 9) also a reader's addition?

importance. Harnack was the first to break with this method. His Latin essay on Apelles and his well-known chapter on Marcion in his *Dogmengeschichte* showed the advantages of a method which was the reverse of the former one. He may be said to have discovered and brought back to the light of history these two gnostics. The life which now animated these figures was in itself sufficient for any real historian to justify the method employed. Unfortunately Harnack's method does not seem to have been well understood. In his remarkable book, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, W. Bousset completely set aside the question concerning the method, practically stuck to the old one, and launched out into comparisons between gnostic doctrines and various religions from that of Babylon to the syncretistic creeds and cults of the first centuries of the Christian era. The results are very brilliant and such as to entice most minds. I am afraid they are precarious.

The fact is that when properly examined and criticised, it will be found that ecclesiastical testimony is not reliable. We do not incriminate the honesty of such writers as Irenæus, we only assert that, owing to various circumstances, the testimony of the Fathers concerning gnosticism is not only not complete, but not always correct, and is such as to mislead. It requires to be controlled by all the light which can be drawn from the original gnostic writings and the fragments of gnostic literature which are extant. This method we have advocated.[1] The whole study of gnosticism we have attempted [2] rests on it and is simply an exemplification of what it appears rightly to yield. In the following

[1] *Introduction à l'Etude du Gnosticisme au II^e et au III^e siècle*, 1903, 144 pages.

[2] *Gnostiques et Gnosticisme*, 1913, 480 pages. In this volume are given the documentary proofs which space does not allow us to give in the above articles.

pages we shall sum up the results of the method applied first to Valentinus and his school, and next to the gnostics made known to us by the *Philosophumena* of Hippolytus.

Valentinus, the great arch-heretic, whose name has so long been, and perhaps is still, for timorous Christians symbolical of the worst peril to which the Christian faith has been exposed, is one of the most remarkable instances of the importance which ought to be attached to the method of investigation applied to gnosticism.

Suppose we form our idea of this Valentinus from the testimony of ecclesiastical writers, what will be the result? In the lost treatise of Hippolytus, which can so easily be restored, there was a notice on Valentinus. It gave a short account of his particular system. The only idea that can be derived from this notice as to what sort of a mind Valentinus may have been, is that he was a mere metaphysical dreamer. He got hold of the notion of divine couples, perhaps derived from Egyptian mythology, and peopled the invisible world with couples of abstractions he called *αἰῶνες*, arranged in a certain order according to a fixed number. If we turn next to the great chapter which opens Irenæus's *Adversus omnes hæreses*, we find an elaborate account of Valentinus's teaching. The author warns us that he has made use of contemporary information. This means that there are in his account, mingled with Valentinus's teaching, elements of the teaching of his school. This may explain, one may suppose, the contradictions, the repetitions, the general unevenness so striking in this chapter. However that may be, Valentinus comes off badly at the hands of Irenæus. From his account he appears to us a still more extravagant speculator than we supposed him. And lastly, if we turn to Epiphanius, and, setting aside what that author simply copies from the writings of his predecessors—that is if we merely take into account what he writes himself about

Valentinus—the latter will appear to us, if possible, as a still wilder dreamer. Now if this heretic was really such as he is portrayed by these ecclesiastical writers, how can you help asking yourself how such a man came to have an influence which was so dreaded by the Catholic Church? How came he to make so many disciples, to found so many associations and, as we shall see, to penetrate to such a degree the doctrine of most of the heretics of his century and the next with his own views and even with his language? That is a problem indeed. If he was nothing but the delirious dreamer we have learned to know, he never could have been very dangerous to the Church. Our perplexity increases still more when we consider what kind of disciples this Valentinus gathered about himself. Had they been a set of half-cultivated enthusiasts, we should have understood how they could be attracted and persuaded by this dreamer. But the few of them that we know were far from being wild enthusiasts. Here is for example Ptolemæus. A letter of his has escaped the universal destruction of gnostic writings. This letter is quite sufficient to show that he was a shrewd thinker, a remarkable interpreter of Scripture, a cool mind, and for the time a critical one. Certainly he was not the man to be deluded by meaningless and extravagant speculations. If Valentinus had had nothing else to offer him, he would have turned away from him. The same may be said of Heracleon. No less than forty fragments of his commentary on the Fourth Gospel have been handed down to us. They abundantly prove that he was as learned and as keen an interpreter of Scripture as Origen himself. If he became one of the chief followers of Valentinus, it can only be because he found in his system higher thought and better stuff than wild metaphysical dreams. There can be no doubt, then, that ecclesiastical writers have given us of our heretic a portrait which is not true to the original,

and which is not even fully intelligible—I mean, which does not harmonise with the best-known facts.

Now Clement of Alexandria quotes in his *Stromata* several short fragments of letters and homilies of Valentinus. This is original and authentic material. Let us turn to these fragments and see if they can give us a more adequate idea of the great heretic.

Here are a few lines in which Valentinus tries to explain the relation of the visible Cosmos with the higher invisible world. "The Cosmos," says he, "is but the image of the higher sphere. What makes the value of a copy? It is the original, the majesty of the figure it portrays. In the same manner, whatever value the Cosmos may have derives from the higher world."

Let us now ask whence cometh this most interesting conception of the Cosmos. Assuredly it is no importation from some vague oriental creed, nor will any genuine historian have the idea of searching its origin in what we call syncretism. Why, this is most distinctly a philosophical conception, and we know its father. It is none other than Plato. This is his doctrine of the relation between the world of eternal ideas and the visible Cosmos. Hinted at in these few lines, of course expressed rather in the language of later Platonism than in that of Plato himself, there can still be no doubt as to whence the conception proceeds. The man who wrote these lines has the family likeness. His spirit is akin to that of Plato.

Let us now turn to a fragment which unveils another aspect of this Valentinus. The full translation of this passage will enable us more easily to appreciate its value. "There is only One that is good, whose presence is manifested by the Son. Through Him alone can the heart become pure, once every bad spirit has been expelled. Now a multitude of spirits by their indwelling in the heart prevent

it from being purified. Each one of these evil spirits exercises the influence which is peculiar to itself. They inflict sore damage on the soul through evil desires. One can compare the soul in such a case to a public inn. Ill-behaved people pierce the walls, dig holes, fill them with refuse of all sorts. They have no care of the place. So is it with the soul. As long as it is neglected, it remains soiled ; it is inhabited by demons. But when the Father, alone good, has a care of the soul, it is enlightened. Blessed is he whose soul is in such a condition, i.e., enlightened, for he shall see God."

In the background of this soul-tragedy lurk undoubtedly notions that recall ideas, images and conceptions we meet with in the " mysteries " of the second century and in the syncretistic religions and cults of the time, but the inspiration of the whole piece is genuinely Christian. This page betrays in the writer a deep feeling of the gravity of sin, of the depraving effects of passion ; but on the other hand, it shows he has an equally deep longing after moral purity and a full and absolute confidence in the power of God and in His willingness to purify the soul. Are not these true Christian feelings ? Where, in pagan documents, do you find, I would not say similar sentiments—such there are—but these feelings expressed with the same force ?

So we have in this Valentinus intimately united together a philosopher and a Christian. In a third fragment he appears to us as what we may call a metaphysical poet. Long has he brooded over the strange contrast between the higher and the lower nature of man. Whence does it come ? Our poet-philosopher carries the problem back to the origin of mankind. The lower nature, that is the body and the ψύχη, is the work of inferior divinities, angels, the chiefest of whom was probably in Valentinus's view, though he does not state it here, the δημιουργός. But when these inferior creators least thought of it, He that is on high,

the supreme God, let a divine seed drop in man, and, behold, this human being began to utter words that seemed too great for it. Its creators, the angels, felt a sudden awe fall on them. Such is the reverence a great artist feels before the masterpiece, statue or image of a god which has come forth from his hands. It is greatly to be deplored that the fragments of Valentinus are so few, but those we have seem, to us at least, full of significance. The mind they reveal is surely no ordinary one. They allow us at least to surmise and guess what the man really was. I think it can hardly be denied that he was a spirit akin to that of Plato, that he seems to have been able to embrace the whole Universe in his speculation, that he understood the problem that underlies human destiny and that he tried to solve the problem as far as a Christian mind, at once fervid and cultivated, could do it in those days.

Now is it not evident that the idea thus obtained of the mental nature of Valentinus will greatly help us in discriminating, among the various and mongrel materials which go under his name, what is likely to belong really to him ? If he was in fact such as the fragments reveal him to have been, we shall not be tempted to put to his account speculations or doctrines of an inferior kind. We shall expect the teaching to correspond to the teacher.

Of course this criterion *by itself* would be too subjective, too exclusively psychological. For we all know to what strange errors, arbitrary hypotheses, psychology applied to history and facts will lead if not used with the greatest caution. Fortunately we are not destitute of a more objective and concrete criterion. We have, in the short treatise of Hippolytus, the *Syntagma*, a brief outline of Valentinus's system. It looks quite authentic ; it seems to be what we may call the metaphysical or theoretical background of the Valentinian traditional teaching. It is the essence of the

system, and likely to be the very doctrine of the founder. This view is moreover confirmed by the fact that the speculation or metaphysics which we know to have been professed by Heracleon and Ptolemæus, the greatest of Valentinus's disciples, did not differ from that which is summarised by Hippolytus. On the other hand we have ground for believing that these two men, however distinguished and original they were in other respects, did not innovate as regards the metaphysics or the essential speculations of their master. The outline of Hippolytus must then be considered as true and authentic. We have thus, as it were, two full rays of light, emanating from Valentinus himself, which will help us to dispel the deep darkness which envelops his person and his system.

Let us now project this twofold ray of light on the long chapter which Irenæus devotes, in his first book of the *Adversus omnes haereses*, to Valentinus and his school. Heinrici, as far back as 1871, was the first critic who attempted to unravel the various threads of tradition mixed up by Irenæus in this chapter. This piece of excellent work was not duly appreciated at the time. I do not suppose that at the present day a competent critic could be found to pretend that there is any kind of unity in the chapter of the Bishop of Lyons. The fact is, it is full of repetitions and contradictions. It bears on the face of it its hybrid character. The critical problem we have to face is how to disentangle the different elements which make up this chaos. Apply to it our double criterion. You will have no difficulty in at once distinguishing in that chapter what I may call two layers of traditions. The older and by far more coherent one, which makes up the greater part of the first half of Irenæus's description of the Valentinian system, is manifestly what derives from Valentinus himself. The other layer, that is, the part of the description which is more confused

and contradictory, seems to derive from mere hearsay, from the oral information which Irenæus tells us he gathered himself. Judging at once from its nature and character and from the fact that this part of the notice is founded on oral information and not on written record, we are led to conclude that we have here not the teaching of Valentinus himself, not even that of his first great disciples who wrote books which existed in the time of Irenæus, but the teaching of the Valentinian school which existed in the days of Irenæus, say about the year 185. It would be, in that case, the teaching of the third generation of Valentinians. If the critical analysis is pursued a step further, I think we can still discover in the notice of the *Adversus omnes haereses* traces of the teaching at least of Ptolemæus, if not of Heracleon.

Suppose the results of our critical analysis admitted by competent men, let us then turn to that part of the notice of Irenæus which reproduces the teaching of Valentinus himself. Disentangled from the mass of later Valentinian teaching it stands out quite clearly, and what is more, you perceive at once how strikingly it corresponds with the outline of Valentinus's teaching we have in Hippolytus's short treatise and, moreover, how its character harmonises with that of the authentic fragments. The historian has the feeling that he stands on true historical ground.

The system of the famous heretic undoubtedly consisted of philosophical myths. At the summit, far beyond the reach of human thought itself, confined to the unknown and unknowable, was the principle of all things, the Supreme, God absolute, *ἀῤῥητός*, undefinable. Then comes the *Pleroma*. This is the first myth. This Pleroma, consisting of divine couples half abstract, half concrete or personal, fifteen in number, embodies the effort the Supreme makes in order to issue forth from abstraction into being. It is

(excuse the barbarous term) a sort of process of externalising His being on the part of the Father. Then comes the second myth, that of *Sophia*. This is the thirtieth æon, the last, the furthest removed from the source. The latter fact explains how and why the fall begins with her. Valentinus, like Plotinus, has the idea that the further an entity or being is removed from the supreme principle, the weaker it is, the lesser is its divinity; the image of the Supreme grows fainter, paler, more indistinct, the further it is removed; it will decrease till it disappear, and then ὕλη or matter will appear. What was Sophia's sin? It was what we might call intellectual curiosity. She aspires to know the Father. How Hellenic is this thought! Not oriental certainly. But in steps the third myth. It is that of *Horos*, limit. Human curiosity must be limited. It cannot go beyond a certain point. The attempt to go beyond is what the Greek tragedians called ὕβρις. That is the sin of Sophia, and Horos embodies the divine law which arrests the folly and crime of excessive curiosity. Another example of true Greek thought. Sophia is now represented as seething with passion. All is trouble (ταραχή) in her. Four passions rage in her being. And now we have a fourth and really beautiful myth. The four passions of Sophia transform themselves into the four elements that are constituent and component of the Cosmos itself. This means the passage from the invisible to the visible, from the higher to the lower world, from spirit to matter. Such is the significance of this myth. Some eighty years later, Origen himself will imagine a theory of the origin of the bodily elements and of ὕλη, matter, which does not really differ essentially from that of Valentinus. He too will ascribe the origin of matter and of the visible Cosmos to the fall of the rational essences or spirits in the higher world. It is the same idea, only divested of its poetical and mythical garb.

We have next Valentinus's doctrine of Redemption. Unfortunately Irenæus gave it in that part of his notice which manifestly is of a mixed character. We are no longer on safe ground; and though I think criticism can still extract out of this chaos the heretic's doctrine, still we need not enter just now into a discussion which would lead us too far.

Enough, I may suppose, has been said to convince those of us who are not familiar with gnostic texts that this Valentinus was at once a philosopher and a poet, that he had that essentially Platonic gift of embodying in artistic symbols deep views, and that in his thoughts blended harmoniously Greek ideas, oriental influences and truly Christian inspiration. Now is not this exactly the idea of the man which the authentic fragments convey? This agreement between the unprejudiced impression made on the mind by the too few remnants of the man's own words, and the results of the critical analysis we have made of the best patristic testimony, seems to me no mean presumption in favour of the method we propose and advocate.

What may be considered, if not as a proof, at least as a sign of Valentinus's genius is the fact that he gathered about himself disciples that were undoubtedly highly distinguished men. Most of them we only know by name; fortunately there are two of them who have not entirely disappeared from our view. These are Heracleon and Ptolemæus. Had we nothing but the notices we read in the Fathers, we should remain quite ignorant of the importance of Heracleon. Now we know through Origen that this man wrote an extensive commentary on the Fourth Gospel. So important did this work appear to Origen, that he largely quoted it in his own commentary on the same Gospel. Curiously indeed Irenæus, Hippolytus, Epiphanius know nothing of this work; they do not appear to have had any idea of its existence. Were a modern historian or critic to betray

such ignorance about the men he wrote of, his testimony as well as his judgment would be at once discarded. Fortunately, as I just mentioned, we have extracts of Heracleon's commentary. Dr. A. E. Brooke, of Cambridge, has shown that these forty fragments, when duly examined, are quite sufficient to let us know what were the religious and theological ideas of Heracleon. His excellent critical study of the fragments of Heracleon has made it plain that there was no essential difference between this man's method of interpretation and Origen's own; that in many points they agree; that in a general way his doctrines are more Christian than one would have expected; and that if he maintained the general system of his master, he had no tendency to develop the speculative side of it. In a word, the fragments reveal a most interesting figure. Instead of a fanatical heretic, you have a Christian theologian who in some respects has rather advanced views. As to Ptolemæus, he would come rather badly off at the hands of his ecclesiastical historians had not one of them, Epiphanius I mean, given *in extenso* a letter of his to a Christian lady of the name of Flora. This letter, as Harnack observes, gives us a wholly different idea of the man from what ecclesiastical tradition represented him to be. He treats in that letter of the religious value of the Old Testament. He does it with a fine discriminating spirit. He betrays nothing of the radical iconoclast. If we may trust a passage of the *Adversus omnes haereses* in which he is named, and which consists of a short commentary on the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, Ptolomæus no more than Heracleon introduced changes in the metaphysical speculation of his teacher. Just as Heracleon's endeavour seems to have been to give to his master's system a strong scriptural and exegetical foundation, so was it Ptolemæus's part to consolidate the dogmatic basis of the system. To Valentinus himself belonged the creative genius, to his

disciples pertained the necessary task of elaborating the arguments and proofs on which to rest the whole system.

One of the advantages of thoroughly sifting ecclesiastical testimonies regarding the Valentinian school, is that not only we begin to have a truer idea of the personality of Valentinus and his first followers, but that also we descry more clearly the character of the later Valentinians. Allow me to sum up the results of long and minute critical analyses. At the end of the second century, in the time of Irenæus and Tertullian, the school of Valentinus had greatly degenerated, just like that of Basilides. The result was that the traditional teaching of the founder became altered in every way. The lofty symbolism of Valentinus was no longer understood. New elements of speculation were introduced into the primitive system. It is no wonder that it now appeared to a sober mind like that of Irenæus as extravagant and dangerous. These later Valentinians were those he knew, those he met with and questioned as to their doctrines, whose influence he had as a bishop to counteract. These heretics, how could he consider them otherwise than as dangerous ? He saw only too clearly where they would lead the Christian Church. We should certainly ourselves have been not less severe in our judgment on these men and their tenets than the Bishop of Lyons. Is it surprising that with his deficient means of information, being not even possessed of the writings of the first leaders of the Valentinian school, and destitute as he was of all critical spirit, Irenæus judged of Valentinus, Heracleon, Ptolemæus after the pattern and model of the Valentinians he was acquainted with ? It would be unfair to ask him to distinguish accurately between the fathers of the Valentinian school and their degenerate successors of his day.

We can thus, with the help of the authentic fragments and documents we possess, have at least an idea of the history

of the Valentinian school and its evolution during the first three generations of its adepts, that is to the end of the second century. The man of genius came first; he was succeeded by men of talent who gave to the system its scriptural and dialectical foundation. Lastly came men of far inferior value. They had neither exegetical science nor philosophical talent; their culture was mediocre, and the true spirit of Christian piety seems to have been greatly lacking in them. No wonder that they brought much discredit on the heritage that fell into their hands.

II.

The subject is so vast that I must limit myself. I ought now to turn the reader's attention to Marcion and his school. I believe that the method we propose, applied to the documents of the history of this celebrated heretic, completely renews it and gives it new life. A few remarks will suffice. It is now nearly thirty years since A. Harnack wrote the famous chapter on Marcion in his *Dogmengeschichte*. It struck every student of ancient church history as a sort of revelation. A Marcion quite unknown to us seemed suddenly to rise up before our eyes. Harnack took his stand on the remnants of the authentic material which Tertullian, in his great work *Adversus Marcionem*, quoted or analysed. With the help of this documentary evidence, he showed us that Marcion was no metaphysician, no philosophical speculator, but a religious spirit, perhaps mistaken but earnest, in fact a biblical theologian whose whole system proceeds from an intense desire to get to true primitive Christianity, which he thought had been altered and disfigured by Judaism. In one of his first studies, already referred to, a Latin academical dissertation, Harnack had already put into full light the historical figure of the most eminent of Marcion's disciples, I mean Apelles. This short study is a most remarkable

example of the advantages which can be obtained by the method which seeks its information from the direct sources rather than from posterior testimony. Harnack showed with brilliant success how much true light can be elicited from the authentic fragments, if only properly handled. The result of his study of Marcionism was that at least one chapter of the history of Gnosticism seemed at last to have been satisfactorily deciphered. For a long time this was not questioned. Then Professor Bousset, in his learned and ingenious book on Gnosticism (*Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, 1907), emphatically rejected Harnack's views. He maintained that Marcion was, like Valentinus and most of the Gnostics, a speculative mind; in fact, that his system consisted essentially in a dualism, that is not merely a biblical one, but a metaphysical dualism. He saw in Marcionism an offspring of Persian dualism. How came this distinguished critic to views which implied a reverting to ecclesiastical tradition? Why, by his simply dismissing the method adopted by Harnack. Bousset, in this case, trusts the testimony of different ecclesiastical authors more than he does the *direct* evidence which can be gathered from Tertullian's work. I must say that I greatly doubt whether, at least on this point, Bousset will be followed. For my part, I have tested as thoroughly as I could the views of Harnack, and the more I have done so, the more have I been struck by the genuine historical truth they exhibit.

In accordance with the method I have adopted, I pass over those Gnostic sects which appear about the end of the second century, but of which we have no other knowledge than what may have come to us by the channel of the Fathers; and I come at once to that group of *Gnostics revealed to us in the Philosophumena of Hippolytus*. This work became known to us only in 1851. It is now generally

recognised as due to Hippolytus of Rome, and to have been written about 225 A.D. The *Philosophumena* makes us acquainted with no less than eight Gnostic schools or sects, of which, till the discovery of that work, we knew little more than the mere names. What made the discovery highly important was that the author quotes and analyses Gnostic treatises of which we were utterly ignorant. At first a great deal was thought of this new information. It seemed to disclose the very origins of Gnosticism. Later on, in 1885, Salmon of Dublin startled the world with the hypothesis that Hippolytus had been mystified by a clever forger; the documents he gave him were worthless, mere forgeries. Staehlin endeavoured to establish the hypothesis on a thorough scientific basis. But soon after doubts were expressed, for example by Anz. I myself in 1903, in a short study on Gnosticism, criticised and rejected the hypothesis. Others came to the same conclusion, and since then it has been generally abandoned. Harnack, and after him Bousset, have given it up. I think it may be considered as exploded. All these discussions have not been useless. It seems to me that we are now in a position to work out and deduce from the documents a more truly historical view of the sects of the *Philosophumena* than was formerly possible. The space at my disposal constrains me to sum up the results of a prolonged study of the question without being able to give here the full proofs. The first thing that strikes the student of the *Philosophumena* is that the eight Gnostic sects that book reveals to us have a general likeness; as regards the half of them, it may be called a family likeness. This point has been clearly and forcibly made evident by Salmon and Staehlin. But, on the other hand, a close study of these same sects shows just as clearly that there are between them at least as many, if not more, differences than there are resemblances. Some of these differences

are fundamental. That is, they are differences bearing on the doctrines which are at the basis of the different systems. For example, you have a dualist conception of the Universe—not absolute, but mitigated—in the systems of the *Naassene* or the *Sethiani*. You have just the contrary in the system Hippolytus puts under the name of Basilides. There is no possible way of conciliating or combining the two systems.

Once you become aware of this fact, you find yourself obliged to *classify* the eight sects into several groups, quite distinct one from the other; the resemblances between them are merely superficial, secondary and easy to explain. But that is not all. Suppose we take the first of these groups, that is the *Naassenes*, the *Peratæ*, the *Sethiani*, and Justin the Gnostic. Examine them carefully. You will soon perceive that if the four systems which form this group rest on the same fundamental ideas, are in fact four varieties of the same system—branches, so to speak, springing from the same trunk—the authors of them were teachers (*διδάσκαλοι*) of very different talent and culture. The Naassene is evidently a very confused mind. He has read all sorts of books, he has scraps of knowledge of the most heterogeneous sort, but he has no method, he is unable to discriminate between different facts and doctrines. The result is that his system is confusion itself. Take now the next system; it is that of the sect called Peratæ. The contrast is striking. Very incomplete is the sketch of this system which Hippolytus has drawn from the work of an unknown teacher of the sect. But he has given enough to let us see that this man thought clearly, handled ideas with preciseness and accuracy and knew how to express them in appropriate formulæ. Indeed he seems to have studied, if not Aristotle himself, at least philosophers of his school, and in all likelihood the Stoics. Pass on to the following member of the same group, I mean the Sethian (*Σηθιανοί*). We can hardly imagine a

greater difference between this Gnostic and the two preceding ones. This one is a poet. He has what I may call a mythological turn of mind, he delights in high-flown figures of speech and strange imaginations. And so on.

The only critical view that can actually be taken concerning the Gnostics revealed to us by the *Philosophumena* is, if I am not mistaken, that there existed at Rome in the beginning of the third century a number of Gnostic schools and sects, which are not to be confounded with the schools of the second century we know of. They have their peculiar type of Gnosticism. Among them are several groups of schools that are evidently akin to each other. There are also very different ones. As they seem to have been in close contact, and very possibly to have more or less worked together, undermining the Church, in spite of their differences, the same books came to circulate among them, and with the books spread among them certain formulæ, figures of speech and terms. We need not be surprised that churchmen like Hippolytus seem to have been ignorant of their existence till all of a sudden they became aware of their active propagation. Epiphanius about a century and a half later got to close quarters with a sect of Gnostics in Alexandria, quite unknown to the bishop. He discovered that about eighty persons belonging to the Church already formed part of this sect. It was a mere chance that this group was detected. Had not Epiphanius, then a young man, come into contact with them, and had he not been enticed by them so far as to allow them to believe they could safely trust him with some of their peculiar tenets, the sect would have long escaped all discovery. Since space will not allow me to give a full description of the eight schools of Gnostics Hippolytus reveals to us, let me choose among them a single system. I think that will suffice to show how peculiar, how original were these schools, and

how curious and interesting for us is their speculation.

Here is Basilides. I need not insist on the fact that the system which Hippolytus puts under that name has but a very remote relation to the true Basilides. It may even be doubted whether his system has anything to do with the teaching of the school which bore the name of that heretic in the beginning of the third century. We must just consider this so-called system of Basilides as one of those belonging to the group of the Gnostics of Rome. How it came into connexion with the name of Basilides we do not know.

This unknown Gnostic, then, starts with an idea of God which the wildest metaphysician had not yet conceived of. More than one philosopher had declared that even thought, *νοῦς*, is unable to reach God, that His essence cannot be expressed, that He belongs to a sphere higher and more abstract than that which belongs to thought. This Gnostic goes beyond even that point. He declares that even existence cannot be predicated of God. The only terms which can be applied to Him, and even these are totally inadequate, are that "He is He that is not," *ὁ οὐκ ὢν θεός*. This is no definition of God. The words we use here are mere signs which point to God without specifying if He exists or not.

This God means to create the world. Our Gnostic takes care to remind us that when he talks of the will of God, that is a mere way of speaking. You cannot say that God has a will, a conscious will. *τὸ δὲ "ἐθέλησε" λέγω, σημασίας χάριν, ἀθελήτως καὶ ἀνόητως καὶ ἀναισθήτως*. What then does this God create? Not the Cosmos, but the seed or germ of the Cosmos. This germ has no concrete form or reality.

How is the real world to issue forth from this germ? Not by way of emanation. Our Gnostic expressly discards

emanation. The germ contains what the author calls sonships, *υἱότητες*. They are three, each one of denser substance than the other. The one of purest essence breaks forth from the germ, the cosmical germ, *πανσπέρμια*, and goes upwards to "Him that is not."

The second sonship is unable to follow the first. A wing, which reminds one of that which is given to the soul in Plato's myth of Phædrus, is given to this sonship, and borne on this wing she ascends near to the first. The third sonship remains buried in the universal germ.

The Spirit has been compelled to leave the second sonship and becomes the barrier which is to separate the Cosmos from the higher world, *τὰ ὑπερκόσμια*. It will now receive the name of firmament, *στερέωμα*.

Next from the universal seed bursts forth the "Great Ruler." For wisdom and beauty he is unsurpassed. He rises, but his upward career is arrested by the firmament. He imagines he has reached the ends of the Universe and that he is Lord of the world. He creates for himself a son more powerful and wiser than himself. He loves his son and makes him to sit on his right hand. The region where these two reign is what our Gnostic calls the "ogdoad," a term familiar to Gnostic theology. Then bursts forth from the *σπέρμα* a second Ruler, who also creates a son for himself, and they reign in what is called the "hebdomad." This second Ruler, *ἄρχων*, creates our earth.

But what of the third sonship? Her hour has come. That hour is at the same time the token and the signal of Redemption. The process of salvation is going to begin. The problem, says our Gnostic, is to elevate the last sonship to the upper world and have her enthroned beside the two others.

The Gospel—in some way personified—after having passed through the powers and sovereignties and dominions and

every name that can be named—comes forth ; that is, itself remains in the upper regions, but its *action makes itself felt.* This is exactly the sort of action which Plotinus attributes to his νοῦς or to ψύχη in his system. In this way the son of the first ruler is touched ; he in turn enlightens his father, and the first ruler acknowledges his error. His son, himself enlightened, reveals to him the God "that is not" and the constitution of the Universe, and thus all the beings that dwell in the ogdoad are enlightened. Then comes the turn of the Ruler of the hebdomad and its indwellers. Lastly, mankind has to be enlightened, and with it the third sonship has to be delivered. The upper light comes down from the hebdomad and rests on Jesus, son of Mary. After Him, the third sonship, purified in its turn, will at last be enabled to ascend upwards.

The general redemption is consummated. Everything and every one is in place. How are they to be kept there ? Well, the cause of the general disturbance was the covetousness of knowledge. To put an end to it the supreme God spreads on the whole Universe what the author calls the "great ignorance." Each being becomes ignorant of what is above him and has no desire to learn to know that whereof he has no idea. Ignorance guarantees universal order.

Did our available space allow it, we should have no difficulty in showing that the Gnostic system we have here does not belong to what we may call the creative period. It supposes a long evolution of Gnostic ideas anterior to itself. Analyse the constituent elements of this speculation and you will find that they all derive from the great systems of the second century.

Though no creative mind, still our Gnostic has his share of original thought. He cannot be confounded with the other Gnostics Hippolytus makes us acquainted with. He

differs from them on very essential points. I think he can be best defined as a scholastic. The essence of a scholastic, whether he belongs to the Middle Ages or to another time, consists in his tendency to push ideas to their extremest consequences without any regard to the reality of facts. At the same time the very abuse of logic develops the subtlety of his intellect. Now this is just the turn of mind at once noticeable in our Gnostic. His idea of God, for instance, is nothing but the idea of God current among philosophers since Plato, only logically extended as far as language can express the process. Here logic, verbal logic, goes beyond thought itself. His idea of sonship is another example. With the notion of the Logos, the great intermediate principle, Christian thought associated from the beginning the idea of sonship. Our Gnostic has simply exaggerated the notion. Were we to review all the other ideas of this Gnostic, we should notice in every case the same fact. Of course his originality cannot be compared with that of Valentinus or Marcion. His is more of a formal and external nature. It is that of the Valentinians rather than of their master. His way of grasping the ideas of his greater predecessors has led him to combine them anew with a general system which looks more original than it really is. Still it is far from being devoid of interest.

Were it possible for us to examine in the same way the notices we have in the *Philosophumena* on Simon the Magician, on the Sethians, on the Peratæ, we should come to the same conclusion. We should find that these Gnostics are all theologians, and that all of them have inherited from the great Gnostics of the second century the principal ideas that form the basis of their teaching. These essential views and speculations each one of them shapes and readjusts according to his fancy or his bent of mind. As regards the result, there is the greatest variety between them. Some

display a real talent, even considerable originality, in this work of rearrangement and new setting of primitive Gnostic ideas and conceptions. Others are very poor artists, mere craftsmen. Among them there is even one so enslaved by one idea—and that is the most absurd fancy one can imagine—that he may be styled a mere maniac, I mean the one called Monoïmus in the *Philosophumena*.

All these theologians have a general resemblance to one another, and more than one point in common. This can be accounted for by the fact that they are contemporaries, that they belong to the same *milieu*, that their common adversary is the Church, and that they evidently had some intercourse one with another. On the other hand, they profess distinct types of Gnosticism and the differences between them are considerable. What best explains these differences is the evident liberty and freedom of thought they enjoyed. They were not bound either by a book or by a dogmatism or by an ecclesiastical institution. Each man was free to take from the teaching of his predecessors what he chose and to fashion the matter thus acquired according to his fancy.

This group of Gnostics revealed to us by Hippolytus is of great historical importance, not only because it gives us the proof that Gnosticism existed and was alive in Rome at the end of the second century or at the beginning of the next, but because the analyses of their teaching we read in the *Philosophumena* enable us to have a glimpse into the inner life of a Gnostic group of the third or fourth generation. We have enough to see what was their degree of culture, the influences that acted on them, the books they read, the ideas they discussed, their own bent of mind and even what talent they had. We also get a fair idea of what were their moral aspirations. As to the nature and degree of their Christian faith, we have to be careful in what we state. Are we sure

that Hippolytus has not omitted passages essential on that point? Had we not the Coptic documents, for example, could we dream that Gnostics revered Jesus Christ as these documents prove that they did? This is a point which may be assumed to be quite clear to those who are acquainted with the Coptic documents.

EUGÈNE DE FAYE.

CONNEXION OF DEATH WITH SIN ACCORDING TO GENESIS II.–III.

EVEN the most liberal interpreters of Scripture commonly agree, or agreed till quite recently, that, as part of the doctrinal contents of the narrative of the Fall in Genesis ii.–iii. is to be reckoned the teaching that man in his original state of innocence was destined never to die; that death with man was the punishment of sin. Wellhausen, in his *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels* (3rd ed. p. 314), does not hesitate to acknowledge implicitly that this was the author's meaning. St. Paul (Romans v. 12), looking back to our narrative, proclaims that "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, because all have sinned. . . ." In the Old Testament, too, at least during the last centuries before Christ, the same view of the signification of the Genesis narrative was the current one among the Jewish people. Ecclesiasticus xxv. 33 we hear as an echo of that traditional exposition: "From woman does sin trace its origin, and through her we all die"; and in the book of Wisdom ii. 24: "Through the envy of the devil death entered on earth."

However, not only the doctrine of original sin as a whole, but even this particular point, that death, as a punishment, would be the sequel of the sin of the first man, has been represented lately by some scholars as quite foreign to the funda-

mental meaning of the paradise-story. The notion of a causal connexion between the transgression of Adam and death has, according to these critics, been imposed much later upon the biblical narrative by the speculation of Jewish scribes, which has been accepted by the Christian Church.[1]

It may be interesting to examine how the defenders of this view deal with the statements of the texts which to others appear to countenance most explicitly the old belief.

Let us, in the first place, consider the words in which the divine command is expressed, Genesis ii. 17: "... of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat; *for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.*" Is not man threatened here with death as a punishment for sin? Of course he is, one will answer; yet not with death, absolutely speaking, as opposed to immortality or never-dying; but *with death to be incurred on the very day of the transgression* of the command. Against such an interpretation of the sanction of the divine command the reader at once will object that this cannot be its meaning, seeing that, as a matter of fact, man did not die immediately, on the very day of his transgression. According to some scholars, as Skinner (*Comm. on Genesis*, 1910, p. 67), "the simple explanation is that God, having regard to the circumstances of the temptation, changed His purpose and modified the penalty." To such a change of the divine purpose, however, not the slightest allusion is made in the narrative, and the tone in which the threefold doom is pronounced, Genesis iii. 14 ff., does not at all indicate a mitigation of the penalty first intended. But then Tennant

[1] Tennant, *The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin*, Cambridge, 1903; E. Albert, *Zu Gen.* 3, 17–19; *I. Der Tod eine Strafe der Sünde?* Zeitschr. für die Alttest. Wissenschaft, xxxiii. 1913; p. 1 ff. Id., *Ein neuer Erklärungsversuch von Gen.* 2 u. 3 (ibid. p. 161 ff.).

and Albert insist that the penal sanction enforcing the command was not, in fact, seriously meant on the part of God. God by representing the fruit as deadly intended only to deter man from transgression by suggesting the fatal consequence that the eating of the forbidden fruit would involve. Therefore He says: "*in the day* that thou eatest of it, thou shalt surely die." The threat was not fulfilled; man did not die on the very day that he sinned. This, however, cannot be urged against the plain meaning of the words, but only shows that the words had no other purpose than to impress fear upon man, as the practice runs with regard to reproofs administered to children.

E. Albert, in the second of his two papers quoted above, attempts indeed to prove that throughout our paradise story the two first human beings are thought of as children. But he in vain endeavours to explain away the difficulty arising against his view from the exultant address of the man to the woman when he first saw her (Gen. ii. 23 f.), and from the fact that the two human beings are spoken of in the narrative as man and wife. It is also quite preposterous to pretend that the beasts (Gen. ii. 19–20) are represented as playmates for the "child."

What we have chiefly to object to in this interpretation of the sanction of God's law is that it makes the biblical author charge God with a lie, whilst on the other hand all agree in extolling the moral standard of that same author as a very high one. According to Tennant's and Albert's exposition, the author, when he attributed to God the menace that man would die on the day that he ate of the tree of knowledge, would have represented God as saying what He did not mean. Then the lie would have been conceived of by the author as something quite natural, as a matter of course, since the narrative does not offer a

word of explanation concerning it. And, moreover, the author would have made God a wanton liar, telling what was not true, without motive or excuse of any kind. For why could not Jahve, in order to deter man or to impress fear upon him, have announced those punishments which He really proposed to inflict on man? Why should He not have said: On the day that thou eatest thereof, thou wilt surely be driven out of paradise, doomed to lifelong painful labour and misery? Why should he have thundered only with false threats, when in truth such dreadful penalties were in store for the sinner?

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E. Albert tries to strengthen his explanation of God's menace by comparing Genesis ii. 17 with another passage, Exodus x. 28, where the same phrase occurs. Here Pharaoh says, speaking to Moses: "... for on the day that thou seest my face thou shalt die." The phrase is the same indeed, but we fail to see that the comparison throws much light on the point.

The question, evidently, is not, whether God's words in Genesis ii. 17, taken by themselves, *could* not have the meaning which Albert puts upon them, but whether they *must of necessity* be taken in that sense. If they were susceptible of another interpretation, we should still have to cling to this on account of the moral considerations mentioned above.

Let us now look at 1 Kings ii. 37 ff., whence perhaps we may derive better elucidation than from Exodus x. 28. Solomon forbids Shimeï to go out of Jerusalem and warns him: "On the day that thou goest out and passest over the torrent Cedron, know for certain that thou surely shalt die." That this is the meaning of the Hebrew and that the original text should not be translated: "On the day thou goest out ... thou shalt know ... that thou shalt surely die" (as

if it were the "knowing" which shall take place on the day of the transgression) may be inferred from the consideration of the purpose of Solomon's warning and also from a comparison with such passages as Genesis xx. 7; and on the other hand Genesis xv. 23, Joshua xxiii. 13, 1 Samuel xxviii. 1; . . . whence we learn that יָדֹעַ תֵּדַע is to be taken here not as signifying the future, but as equivalent to the imperative. The meaning is: Know now that on the day that thou goest out thou shalt die!—Now it happened that after three years Shimeï trespassed and went to Gath in the land of the Philistines to seek and bring back from there his runaway slaves. When he had returned to Jerusalem he was denounced to Solomon, who summoned him and reminded him of his prohibition: "Did I not make thee swear by Jahve and protest unto thee saying: On the day that thou goest out and walkest about know for certain that thou shalt surely die?" Afterward Solomon sent Benaiah, who executed the death-warrant on Shimeï. No one will believe that all those events and proceedings: (the departure and journey of Shimeï to Gath, his complaint there and his exertions to obtain from king Achish his runaway slaves; his return with the slaves to Jerusalem; the denunciation to Solomon; the summons to appear before the king's tribunal; the execution of the death-warrant) took place on one and the same day. Therefore when Solomon, in pronouncing the sentence, reminds Shimeï that herewith the threat is to be fulfilled *that he would die* on the day of his trespassing, it is evident that the words of the threat had no other meaning than this: On the day that thou goest out, know for certain that death-penalty stands fixed against thee. In the same way we understand the address of Pharaoh to Moses: On the day that thou seest my face, thou standest under death-doom. Thus also in Genesis ii. 27: "On the

day that thou eatest thereof thou standest under death-doom, death-penalty shall stand fixed against thee." How the doom was to be conceived in respect of the manner and time of its fulfilment, we should have further to determine according to the context.

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If it were true that the menace expressed in Genesis ii. 27 ought to be understood, not as a legal sanction, but as affirming that death would be the natural sequel of the eating of the fruit (it being suggested that the fruit was poisonous), the interpretation provisionally proposed would at once fall to the ground. But not only can it by no means be proved that such is the meaning of the divine warning, God's words point manifestly to the opposite. Not a single word in Jahve's address permitted Adam to suppose that the forbidden tree and its fruit were by nature dangerous to life or health. Jahve does not even content Himself with indicating the tree in a general way, He names it plainly by the name that signifies its nature and properties: "*of the tree of knowledge of good and evil* thou shalt not eat . . ," and E. Albert himself rejects decidedly, and with good right, every attempt to tamper with the text on that point.[1] But how is it possible, then, to read here that God intended to deter man by representing the fruit as poisonous and deadly? How was it possible for man to understand the threat as if it meant that death would be the natural sequel of the eating? A fruit which is by its nature apt to confer the knowledge of good and evil ought not therefore to be dangerous to the health of even another being than it was intended for. In short, the terms in which the divine command is expressed evidently show that the threat enforcing it is to be understood as referring to a legal penalty to be incurred by disobedience.

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[1] L.c. p. 180.

Tennant and Albert further allege the following argument in order to support their explanation of Genesis ii. 17. Jahve Himself, thus they argue, acknowledges, Genesis iii. 22, that the serpent had spoken the truth to the woman. For, just as the serpent had foretold (iii. 5), Jahve states that "the man is become as one of us, knowing good and evil." Now, that truth-speaking serpent had also promised to the woman: "Thou shalt not die" (iii. 4); and this was meant in opposition to the woman's statement: "Of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said: ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die." The promise of the truthful serpent, however, could be true only in so far as it meant that men would not die on the very day that they ate of the fruit. Thus the woman had meant that death was to be expected on the very day of the trespass.

Tennant goes so far as to think that it is possibly implied in the paradise-story that the serpent was a genius, favourable to man.[1] Albert, on the contrary, is convinced that it personified, at least originally, an evil power.[2] But we need not investigate possible discrepancies or inconsistencies in the utterances of opponents.[3] A close consideration of the argument just indicated may help forward our own search for the real teaching of the paradise narrative.

The argument rests entirely on the assertion that the

[1] L.c. p. 43.

[2] L.c. p. 187.

[3] Is not Tennant under the impression that death by itself is proposed in the narrative of Genesis as a consequence of sin, when he shows himself inclined to admit parallelism and connexion between that narrative and the supposed data in old Egyptian literature, where death would be imputed to the fault of the first woman (l.c. p. 36)? or when he likewise feels himself strongly impelled to consider as a parallel to our Genesis narrative the passage in the old Babylonian epic where Eabani curses the woman who seduced him, as being the cause why he is become liable to death (pp. 41–42)?

serpent, according to God's own testimony, spoke the truth, and nothing but the truth, to the woman. However, the serpent had, in contradiction to God's threat, said two things to the woman: (1) you shall not die; (2) God knows that you, by eating of the fruit, will be as *elohîm* who know good and evil.[1] Now, the so-called testimony of God refers only to the second part of the serpent's address, and does not in the least concern the first one, which alone interests us at present. But then, even as regards the second point, does God at all bear witness (iii. 22) to the truthfulness of the seducer? Our own view of God's words in this passage is, that they relate to the serpent's promise that man would be as *elohîm*, knowing good and evil, not as a positive confirmation of what the serpent had said, but in an ironical way as comparing with the glorious things promised with the miserable things that had come. We do not want, however, to urge that view here. Let us suppose that Jahve (Gen. iii. 22), speaking of man who "is become as one of us" . . . means to acknowledge that man really has acquired knowledge of good and evil; would this be bearing witness to the truthfulness of the serpent? By no means. The serpent had not only said: "you will be as *elohîm* . . ."; but: *God knows* that . . . you will be as *elohîm*" . . ., thus openly ascribing to God motives of jealousy and envy towards man. In this false distortion of God's purpose, in the suspicion thereby aroused in the mind of the woman, lay the very point and proper intent of the

[1] It is not as *God* Himself that the serpent intends to say that men will be; if this had been its meaning, it would have referred to the subject *God*, just expressed before, by means of the personal pronoun (God knows that you will be *as Himself* . . . כמוהו). The repeated noun *elohîm* points to a different subject, determined by the phrase in the plural: *who know good and evil*. Who those *elohîm* or divine beings were, to whom men should contrive to become equal, we have seen in our former article on *The Literary Origin of the Narrative of the Fall* (Expositor, December 1914).

serpent's malignant discourse; all the rest about the nature and efficacy of the forbidden fruit man already would have known, in so far as it were true, before the serpent had spoken. Now Jahve evidently does not ratify (iii. 22) the charge brought against Him by the serpent. Thus the truthfulness of the serpent, even for the second part of its assurance to the woman, is in no way acknowledged by Jahve; how much less for the assertion that *man would not die*, to which on Jahve's part there is not made (iii. 22) the faintest allusion? The foundation on which Tennant's and Albert's argument rests is not a solid one.

Moreover, Tennant and Albert forget, before pronouncing between Jahve and the serpent, to take any account of a witness who surely deserved to be heard. Jahve holds a judicial inquiry about the sin committed. "Hast thou"—thus He questions the man—"eaten of the tree that I had forbidden thee to touch?" The man answers: "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, gave me of the tree, and I did eat." And Jahve said unto the woman: "What hast thou done?" And the woman answered: "*The serpent beguiled me and I did eat!*" Thereon the inquiry is closed and the sentence pronounced, beginning with the serpent: "Because thou hast done this . . ." Anyone who would maintain that the serpent, in the second part of its address to the woman, when it said to her that men would be as *elohîm* knowing good and evil, had spoken the truth, should the more decidedly infer from the testimony of the woman that at least in its first assertion, when it said: "you will not die," it had lied and caused deception. It would seem indeed too bold on the part of exegetes to pretend that the author of what is according to themselves one of the most beautiful narratives of the Bible did not know himself what he meant, introducing to us on the one hand the serpent, in the scene of the temptation, as holding up plain truth against Jahve's

lie, and on the other hand mentioning its deceitfulness as the first cause of sin, in the account of God's inquiry, which latter evidently hangs closely together with the description of the temptation.

By means of the data hitherto considered one may, with full right, frame the following argument. When the serpent said to the woman: "Thou shalt not die," that was a lie. This we infer from the complaint of the woman herself, who, according to the scheme of the narrative, should have known it best. Now, the promise of the serpent could not be false, except in so far as it pretended that man would *never* die, for in all truth man was to live still a long time after he had sinned. And since the false assurance of the serpent must be understood as contradictory to what the woman had just adduced, we come to the conclusion that the woman, when she mentioned God's warning, not to eat of the fruit lest death should follow, intended to say that man, if he ate of the forbidden fruit, would be condemned *eventually to die.* Since further, in her record of God's threat, the woman must be held to have been aware of its true meaning, we reach the final statement that the menace uttered by God (ii. 17), in the first place, was actually to be understood as signifying: On the day that thou eatest of it thou standest liable to death-penalty; and secondly, that it did not threaten merely a more or less early death to be undergone, but a downfall out of the condition of exemption from, to the condition of liability to, death.

* * * * *

This point of doctrine the author or, if one prefers, the redactor who gave the narrative its present form, distinctly exhibits in the use he makes of the image of the *tree of life.* He shows us the man having originally access to both wonderful trees of the Paradise. One of them, the tree of knowledge, man may not touch nor eat thereof. But to

eat of the other one, of the tree of life, he is not forbidden. This cannot but signify that man, before sin, was destined never to die. The execution of the death-warrant after sin is described as an expulsion of man out of Paradise, and that expulsion takes place to prevent man from ever approaching the tree of life again. Which is to say: once out of the Paradise, once deprived of his original state of blessedness, man lost his privilege of deathless life.

We do not see that there are convincing or very serious grounds for considering the mention of the "tree of life" as a later interpolation, or as the result of a partition of the original notion of the tree of "knowledge." The trees, both of which occur also in the Babylonian legend,[1] have their proper, strongly marked character indicated by their respective names. The opinion that the tree of life has been introduced by a later hand in Genesis ii. 9 is not supported by the construction of the sentence. Here it is the very "tree of life" itself to which the phrase *in the midst of the garden* directly relates; the tree of knowledge is more sharply put in view beyond the syntactical connexion on account of the pre-eminent place it is to occupy in the subsequent narrative. There is only one clause in the whole narrative which could give rise to a noteworthy difficulty, that is, when the woman says to the serpent (iii. 3.): "... But *of the tree which is in the midst of the garden*, God hath said: Ye shall not eat of it ..." Here indeed it does not seem to be supposed that in the midst of the garden there was still another tree, the tree of life. But on a close examination the difficulty vanishes. The narrator abstained from making the woman name the tree of knowledge by that name, but let her make use of a circumlocution, in order to present more sharply to view the *divine prohibition* as the proper reason why the eating of the fruit was sinful; and

[1] Dhorme, *Revue biblique*, Nouv. Série iv. (1907), p. 271 ff.

then also most probably because in the address of the tempter the eminent quality of the tree, even as being the tree of knowledge of good and evil, must presently be made use of as a means of seduction. Now, in his anxiety to find a fitting circumlocution, the narrator has recourse to a somewhat inaccurate expression, it being left to the reader to understand the true reference.

* * * * *

What Jahve, in the author's mind, really meant when He warned man that he would die on the day that he would eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, the reader may at last learn again from the sentence pronounced against the man after sin (iii. 17): "Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying: Thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; (18) thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; (19) in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken; for dust thou art, and to dust shalt thou return."

That the last words of that sentence, *v.* 19, are directly addressed to the man, and not at the same time explicitly to the woman, cannot be urged against their signification as a sentence of death. Whatever be their supposed purport, they must be taken as concerning also the woman. To the man alone, too, even before the creation of the woman, the command and the accompanying threat had been directed: "Of the tree of knowledge thou shalt not eat," etc.; and none the less did the woman know that the command and threat concerned also herself.

Of course in the divine sentence death is represented as the natural end of man's life. Immortality, thus, was never conceived of by the author as having been man's natural

condition. Safeguard against death, according to him, was prepared for man by God by means of a medicine which would have continually checked and averted the natural agencies which make for death. This is the obvious teaching conveyed by the use made in the narrative of the figure of the tree of life. Through sin man lost his privilege and was left to undergo the fate natural to every creature that grows and breathes.

The closing sentence of the doom pronounced against the man does not keep its full weight and purpose, when one understands it as signifying simply the end of life as the end of man's sorrow and pains, as if nothing more were meant than: In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat thy bread *as long as thou livest, till thy death.* If the author had not intended to say anything more than that, he would have used just an expression of that sort, as he does in *v.* 17, and in the curse of the serpent, *v.* 14. Why does he now insist most emphatically on the necessity to which man is subject to die, first in an indirect way: . . . "till thou returnest to the ground, *for out of it wast thou taken*," and then again in those solemn, crushing words: "*for dust thou art, and to dust shalt thou return*"? The fact that the author makes God state so pressingly the reason why man, according to the law of his nature, tends to an unavoidable death shows unmistakably that he intended to signify that herewith a change had taken place in the destiny of man. The doom which is here pronounced and which presently, through the expulsion of man out of the neighbourhood of the tree of life, receives an initial execution, is nothing but the fulfilment of the divine warning in Genesis ii. 17: "On the day that thou eatest of it, thou shalt surely die!"

A. Van Hoonacker.

ST. LUKE AND THE ECLIPSE.

The narratve of St. Luke in the Crucifixion, according to Westcott and Hort's text, lies under the imputation of representing that the sun was eclipsed about the time of full moon. If there are degrees in miracle, this would be the greatest and most far-reaching miracle that the world has ever known, the moon being in two places at once. The mere statement is too staggering to human thought. For this reason, perhaps, the Authorised Version translated τοῦ ἡλίου ἐκλείποντος, *And the sun was darkened*, as if it was impossible for St. Luke to have meant an eclipse. The Revisers must have felt that A.V. hardly did justice to the Greek, and they rendered *the sun's light failing*, thus preserving the form of the sentence in Greek, while they admitted that *light* is not in the original and added in the margin, "Greek: *the sun failing*." This treatment of the passage, however, implies that they, like the translators of 1611, could not suppose that St. Luke meant an eclipse, but that his phrase was poetical. The effect, however, is to draw a veil over the fact that he uses language which in any other book would be rendered without a moment's hesitation, *while the sun was being eclipsed*. To go behind the time when this verb meant eclipse and no other kind of failing of light is quite impossible. We shall not be persuaded, even by Hort, that ἐκλείπω can be used of the sun without meaning an *eclipse*. Blass, a most eminent Greek scholar and an impartial theologian—he declined to be called a theologian—omits the words from his text of Luke and says, "apparently an interpolation."

But then our able and valued Alford had long ago done the same, although he shows better judgment in the text of this passage than in his note, which says, "the gloss

(τοῦ ἡλ. ἐκλ.) shows a right apprehension" of the previous words. It is never satisfactory to call anything a gloss or interpolation without some colourable reason. I believe there is a colourable reason, a good sufficient reason, for omitting the words, and that it has never yet been stated. It has been in my mind two or three years, and I fancy it is partly due to a suggestion of Dr. Abbott's, that perhaps *the sun* here "represents" *Elias*, but I do not think he has shown precisely in what way it "represents" *Elias*. Before coming to it, there are one or two observations to be made upon the ancient testimonies to the textual state of the passage.

Luke xxiii. 44, "And it was about the sixth hour and darkness came upon all the earth (*or* land) until the ninth hour [(*a*) and the sun was darkened] [(*b*) the sun being eclipsed)] and the veil of the temple was rent in the midst."

Origen is our earliest authority, and he says (about 245 A.D.) that some copies had *and the sun was darkened, the sun being eclipsed*, while several copies omitted *the sun being eclipsed*; "and perhaps," he adds, "some one wishing to say something more palpable (as it were) for *and the sun was darkened*, dared to put *the sun being eclipsed*, thinking the only cause of the darkness to be an eclipse." Thus Origen attests the fact that in 245 there were texts which had both the two bracketed passages—which we can scarcely conceive that Luke left in writing, so clumsily combined—while Origen suggests that the second is a *daring* gloss. But we may probably say that a copyist of Luke was not insensible to the warning at the end of the Apocalypse of the penalty attached to any one who adds anything to the words of this book, or diminishes aught therefrom. He would avoid either fault, but of the two he would rather, perhaps, insert on literary grounds, if he thought there was a fear of omission, than omit on astronomical grounds.

It was not his business to think or know astronomy. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that he would not omit *the sun being eclipsed* if he found it in his model.

The question is a nice one and admits of a good deal of *a priori* reasoning. Here we can only indicate one or two points that are fairly obvious. Origen by his remark may have meant substitution or may have meant paraphrase added to the true reading. If he meant substitution, he does not account for the fact that no copies had only the substituted reading (*eclipse*). The copies containing it had it as a paraphrase or explanation of *and the sun was darkened*. This was perhaps his meaning, although he says, "dared to put" the second for the former.

Nor did the paraphrase ever displace the former. For the Sinaitic, Vatican, and Paris MSS. have the longer reading ($a + b$), while the Alexandrine and Cambridge MSS. have (a) only. Those who believe in the paramount merits of D as representing most often the very earliest text—of course no MS. is trustworthy throughout—are glad to find D supported by A here, in not declaring the occurrence of a miracle that affected the whole universe while it passed without notice by Seneca and Pliny, who, being then alive, carefully described less striking occurrences of the same sort and in more remote regions. This unique character of the event described is a consideration which overrides all so-called "canons of textual criticism," which are still not far from the melting pot, as Professor Clark's studies have recently indicated. To show the value of D, the present writer hopes to have an opportunity of exhibiting a passage in St. Mark's gospel where the D text presents an alternative reading to our Mark so nearly coeval with our Mark that the three subsequent evangelists had to deal with it, and have dealt with it, each in his characteristic fashion. If ever the time arrives when D comes into its

own, the phenomena of the New Testament will have begun to wear a very different aspect from the present, and the exegesis of many passages will be different accordingly. So much, then, may be said of the importance of the fact that D Luke supports the copies which in 245 A.D. omitted the eclipse.

We now turn to the fact that the oracle of Psalm xxii. 1, quoted by Mark (*Eloi Eloi*) and by Matthew (*Eli Eli*) immediately after the mention of the darkness until the ninth hour, is omitted by Luke. In Mark–Matthew it leads on to the mention of *Elias* which Luke omits also. On the other hand Luke is about to lay stress in Acts ii. upon the *wonders in the heaven and signs upon the earth . . . the sun shall be turned into darkness*, by means of a long oracle of Joel. Perhaps, then, it is the less surprising if he increases in the Gospel the stress upon the darkness. For he does so when he adds *and the sun was darkened* to the statement of Mark that darkness came, etc.

But again we observe that this second mention of darkness has its parallel in Joel, which has previously said: Joel ii. 2: "Before his face the earth shall be confounded, and the heaven shaken, the sun and the moon shall be darkened together (*συσκοτάσουσιν*)."

Now since there are two mentions of darkness in Luke and two in Joel, and since Luke avows that one of the two is from Joel (Acts ii.), there is much reason for supposing that the basis of the other is likewise Joel. And the language of Joel ii. 10 is expressive of a conjunction (*συσ-*), or an eclipse, and so apparently may well have suggested the idea of an eclipse, to "some one," but not of necessity St. Luke.

Convinced as I am from the examination of several hundreds of passages that the evangelists resorted for some of their facts to the Greek Bible, I do not now insist that this

is one of those, although if it should be proved that Luke himself asserted an eclipse, it would be reasonable to find that he drew it from the oracle. And this oracle, moreover, is supported by another referring to *the day of the Lord:*

Isaiah xiii. 10: "For the stars of heaven and Orion and all the order of heaven shall not give their light, and *it shall be dark* (σκοτισθήσεται) *while the sun is* rising, and the moon shall not give her light. And I will command for *the whole* (so Mark xv. 33) world evil things. . . ."

It is worth observing that when this prophecy becomes narrative, the words καὶ σκοτ. τοῦ ἡλίου (but not the next following word ἀνατέλλοντος) become καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη τοῦ ἡλίου (the next word being ἐκλείποντος). It certainly looks as if the "some one" in question had his eye upon this oracle with this particular construction of the genitive absolute. But we can perhaps see more closely into his mind than that. For he had read also another oracle which determined the hour of the darkness more exactly:

Amos viii. 9: "And it shall be in that day, saith the Lord, that the sun shall set *at midday*, and the light shall *darken together* upon *the earth* in day-time."

The *sixth hour* was midday. Here, too, is *the earth* (or *land*) connected with *the darkness* (συσκοτάσει), as the Synoptics mention it. Moreover this oracle guides the interpretation of Isaiah xiii. 10, *while the sun is rising*; for the sun continues in a sense to rise until midday. And in this sense the present participle (ἀνατέλλων) *rising* is used in Ecclesiastes i. 5.

Thirdly, the oracle concerning *Jesus of Naue*, i.e. Joshua, son of Nun, must have been in his mind's eye, for it contains a consecutive summary of the most astounding prophecies of Jesus of Nazareth—a dozen in so many lines—to which reference must be made another time. At present I can only quote—

Ecclesiasticus xlvi. 5: "Was not the sun fettered (ἐνεποδίσθη), by his hand (*or* spirit)?"

This is a vague expression which could easily suggest a darkening of the sun, yet without an eclipse. Moreover, since *hand* and *spirit* are interchangeable in O.T., *by his hand* would be interpreted "by the departure of His spirit, which He yielded up to the Father on the Cross"; after which the next verse describes, "And one day was added unto two"—which make up the duration of the sojourn in the grave.

However, returning to the fact of the absence in Luke of *Eli . . . Elias*, we may say that Luke has an *ellipse*, not an *eclipse*. The suggestion now to be made is that a harmonist some fifty years before 245, when harmonies began to assume importance, noticed this ellipse or omission and marked the same in the margin, thus: ⩕ περὶ Ἠλειοὺ ἐλλείπει, i.e., "Here note ellipse of passage about Elias," or more simply still, Ἠλειοὺ ἐλλείποντος. (The Greek for Elias is Ἠλειού, indeclinable.) There is every probability that a copyist seeing this next to ἐσκοτίσθη ὁ ἥλιος would consider that Ηλειου was a slight error for ηλιου and would "restore" it. After ηλιου was settled, the "restoration" of εκλειποντος from ελλειποντος would be of the simplest and most natural kind. Hence the error which ℵBC, etc., have perpetuated. ℵ has ἐλλιπόντος: this accords equally well with this theory, which I believe satisfies all the data.

We can determine fairly well that the reading of the eclipse began to creep into the text between 200 and 245 A.D. The *Gospel of Peter* (circa 165) is a work that was likely to contain it, if then known, and it does not. It says that at midday darkness overspread all the land of Judæa (this is how it interprets τὴν γῆν); that they were afraid the sun had set while He lived; that many went about

with lamps; that at the ninth hour the sun shone out; but nothing about an eclipse. Nor in Tertullian (c. 197) is there an eclipse. He says, *sol tenebricavit*, the sun darkened, *adv. Jud.* 13: *dies subducta est*, daylight was withdrawn, *Apol.* 21. The *Acts of Pilate* (300 ?) is not of much use to any one, nor are the later fathers, mentioned by Hort.

Space forbids the further pursuit of the subject here. But what is wanted is the discovery of the sort of person or persons—names are less important and less easy of attainment—who added to the later chapters of Luke the passages which are known as "Western (interpolations or) non-interpolations" (see R.V. margin). The difference of the non-, strange to say, matters little. The clue to this discovery, as to other discoveries in the Gospels, is to be found in the Greek Bible, but the relation of the interpolator to St. Luke is obscure. At present it is possible to hold that he was not St. Luke himself, but it does seem as if St. Luke had a well-meaning but injurious early editor in the second century, possibly in the first half of it; that he ransacked the oracles of LXX which had already yielded to the evangelist their fruitful store; that he squeezed the oracles too hard, and extracted from them a certain amount of indigestible matter.

E. C. Selwyn.

"*JULIAN THE APOSTATE.*"

A Parallel.

I believe that when we get far enough away from the present terrible state of things to reflect upon how it all came about, we shall perceive that what we witnessed was a deliberate attempt to find a basis other than the traditional Christian basis for human life; and the difficult overthrow

of that attempt. Certainly it was as I was reading the terrifying political literature of modern Germany, its Bernhardi, and Treitschke, and, earlier and greater, its Nietzsche, and even such frank and casual *obiter dicta* as we have in Count von Buelow's *The German Empire*,—that there kept coming back upon my mind the idea that I had read all this before, that once before positions of the kind had been advanced, that once before Christianity had been rejected by the great ones of the earth, that once before the attempt had been made to remove the Christian basis from an entire Empire, and to revert to what was believed to be a manlier and more reasonable foundation,—and that that attempt had dramatically failed. When, in one of those terrifying German books—terrifying as a thing is terrifying which reappears when we were all supposing that we were done with it for ever—I read that the world-struggle which was imminent was, in spirit, a struggle between "Corsica and Galilee," the phrase brought clearly to my mind the parallel I had been thinking of.

I had been thinking of "Julian the Apostate."

That word "Galilee" had brought back to my mind the fine story which is really too good not to be true: "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean," with which, if I can order my way, I shall conclude.

This war which is upon us is too big a thing to have had a merely local and accidental origin. Of every great war, we may say with St. Paul, that it is not "a conflict with mere flesh and blood, but with the despotisms, the Empires, the forces that control and govern this dark world—the spiritual hosts of evil arrayed against us in a heavenly warfare."

What terrified the early Church in Julian's movement is what sends the cold waves down my back as I read the literature on which, as it appears, modern Germany has

uttered and reinforced her soul. The early Church had had experience of cruel Emperors, and of bad people generally. But while she was suffering contempt and persecution at their hands, the Church could comfort herself by two lines of reflection. For one thing, she felt in her soul that persecution and the world's contempt were keeping the fire of her own faith clean and passionate. And for another thing, she could always say with her Master, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

But face to face with the movement under Julian, she was deprived of these resources. For Julian knew a great deal about Christianity. He thought he knew everything about it, and he did—all that an extremely able and sensitive man may know about something in which, nevertheless, he does not believe. It was, he pretended, because he knew what Christianity was, and because he observed its influence, that he was led to the rejection of it as a private faith, or as a basis for society on the large scale.

And again, his rejection of Christianity was something altogether different from anything the Church had experienced. Julian did not propose to persecute Christians. In fact, he did not propose to take Christianity seriously. In my own view, a man is not taking Christianity seriously, who is merely prepared to tolerate it; who will even admit that it is true enough in certain cases, and for certain people, but is not the truth, is not the express will of God.

What made Julian's rejection of Christianity so unusual was, that Julian was a sincerely religious man. His gods were the old gods of Greece and Rome, the symbols of strength and beauty. That whole region in which Christianity moves—including its ideas of sin, penitence, forgiveness, pity, the spiritual advantage of poverty and weakness—all that was obnoxious to him. Had Julian been a private citizen, he would probably have done nothing

more than write some tracts against the entire Christian scheme—as indeed he did. Being the brilliant man he was, and an Emperor to boot, the movement which he inaugurated became so thorough, its principles received such prestige and outward expression, that the episode of Julian forms one of those recurring crises of history in which two formulas for life struggle for the mastery and one or the other must accept defeat. In the fourth century it was Julian who was overthrown.

I take courage from the sign.

There are two views of history which have had their advocates. There is the view that strong personalities create events ; and there is the view that, on the other hand, strong personalities are themselves simply the expression of the world-spirit, the *élan vital*, the soul in things, which blindly, or with its own intention, is forever urging its way. There is something attractive in either theory : the truth includes both. There does seem to be an element of what we call accident in history—a man of a certain type appearing at a certain time which gave him his very stage and opportunity. And yet at the same time, when one ponders an age deeply, say the age of Napoleon, or the present crisis, one feels that for a long time forces had been gathering beneath the surface, which had to find some outlet through persons and events. History is organic. There is a background and soil which give the figures on the stage their *milieu*. Without that background the figures would be irrelevant and futile. Without those figures the background would be voiceless and featureless, like a dull sea or a desert of sand.

It is an absolutely sound thing to say that if any one element had been different in the age of Julian, everything would have been different. If the Christian Church of the fourth century had been more Christian, more unmistake-

able, less corrupt, Julian's movement would not have been called for. If Julian had been, in the depths of his own soul, a Christian, he would have set himself to cleanse the Augean stables, instead of blaming Christianity for the immoralities, and insincerities, and hypocrisies with which he saw it associated. As it was, he saw Constantius, his uncle, the secular head of the Church, receiving though a murderer honours which should be reserved for saints. But there is no end to the " ifs and ans " which we can imagine, any one of which might, we suppose, have averted this particular crisis. Just as we might speculate, with Carlyle, as to what course the history of Europe would have taken if Louis XVI. had not waited for that yellow Berline in which to escape from Paris, or if it had not gone quite so slowly, or if a dissatisfied Frenchman had not happened to see the face of Louis through the window, and gone ahead to arrange for his apprehension. Or what course would the history of England and of America have taken if Oliver Cromwell had sailed for New England, as at one time he intended?

Interesting as such speculations are, I feel that we are secularising history when we make too much of them. Behind all those things which we call accidental we seem to be aware of something solemn and inevitable which, had this or that failed, would have found some other way of achieving substantially the same result.

Take the present crisis. Whilst we must take care how we say that war was inevitable lest we should be understood to mean that we are all puppets in the hands of a kind of Ironical Devil; nevertheless we may say that, given certain things and certain persons, given Bismarck, and Nietzsche, and those others whom I have named, given that these men have dominated without rebuke the fluid spirit of a people, given forty years of increasing prosperity, in which

their chosen principles seem never to have failed,—and it was inevitable that soon or late that people should attempt a colossal application of the spirit and policy which had carried them thus far.

Julian challenged the nature and disposition of things as he had found them, and in the day of his overthrow he discovered that Christianity, once operative in human affairs, remains forever a standard and rebuke. Modern Germany, on her own witness, is out to-day to assail the accepted nature and disposition of things; and I believe she also is about to learn that there are words which, having once been spoken, can never be forgotten, that there are ideas which, having for ages held sway in the name of God over man's natural wildness and excess, cannot be repudiated without bringing on a day of such darkness, that it will appear to be the end of the world, and indeed will be the end of man as we had come to know man, and on the whole, had come to love him.

Again and again, in my reading of the literary and philosophical work which lies at the back of German political action, I have had the same feeling as I am conscious of in reading about Julian. Again and again I find myself in entire agreement with charges which Germany and Julian alike make against things as they are. Julian hated the slovenliness and want of erectness and thoroughness amongst Christians, just as Germany hates and despises the sentimentalism and social indolence of all nations not Teutonic. Both Germany and Julian associate this indolence and effeminacy with Christianity as popularly understood. Therefore, in the case of both, their polemic against Christianity has long since got beyond the denial of the metaphysical doctrines of the faith, and beyond the denial of the claims of the personalities of the faith. They have both moved right on to the rejection of the ethic and per-

sonal habit of Christianity, as being contrary to reason, and unequal to the demands of life.

Now, with much of this criticism we should all do well to agree, even though we are aware that it is based upon a misunderstanding of true Christianity. In fact, the mistake which Julian made and which representative writers of Germany have made, is the commonplace mistake of refusing Christianity because of the low level in moral energy of an enormous number of people who profess it. Their reasoning is not so crudely expressed as this, but essentially it is not different,—that, since the Latin races, let us say, are easy-going, sentimental, lazy, not very clean, all this is due to their traditional piety, which encourages such ways of living, which certainly does not rebuke such ways of living. Our proper attitude towards such a criticism, if we are wise, is not to say there is nothing in it, but to admit that there is a great deal in it; thereupon we ought to show, by the way we address ourselves to the removal of unworthy features, that these unworthy features are not due to our Christianity, but survive in spite of our Christianity, the not yet transformed qualities of our hereditary human nature.

For example—and these are the matters to which we shall attend when this war is over,—it s a shocking fact that there should be such poverty and squalor in a land like our own, in which, to say no more, the religion of Jesus, with its demand for justice as well as for pity, is the acknowledged religion of the state. But to reject Christianity because of those very things from which Christ came into the world to deliver us, is on a level with rejecting a gold currency because there are in circulation many counterfeit coins.

Julian and these German philosophers charge Christianity with ministering to certain undesirable human instincts,

and with undermining the strength and hardihood of people. Well! we must not be astonished; George Eliot, once upon a time, said that the ethics of Jesus were effeminate; and this although the symbol of Christianity is a cross; and although Jesus declared more than once that in order to follow His way, it would take as much out of a man as it does to cut off your left hand with your right; that you might be compelled to pluck out your own eye rather than go one step further on your way once known to be wrong.

The fact is, it may not be, and it is not, Christ that these men impugn, but the more-than-half worldly and accommodating and unreal thing which has been allowed to take the name of Christianity. It ought never to be possible, as it was in Julian's day, and as it must be in our day,—otherwise the thing would not have occurred,—to criticise Christianity in the name of a higher and more wholesome way of living. And the answer to all such criticism is, not to write a book in defence of Christian doctrine, or of Christian ethics in the abstract, but to manifest a life in ourselves, and as Christians to organise such a life of health and moral energy in the State, that such criticisms shall fail because of their sheer unreality and irrelevance.

The truth is—as every serious student of history has confessed, including the devout Catholic, Dante—when Constantine made Christianity the religion of the State, he almost extinguished it. Constantine, whom it takes a singular want of humour to consider a Christian at all, issued the edict making Christianity the religion of Rome, in 306. Julian became Emperor of Rome in 361. And in that interval of fifty years Christianity had simply touched bottom. Constantine, wishing to use the Church for his own purposes, to make it an instrument of power, gave it wealth and privileges, thus radically transforming it.

"It was no longer that religious brotherhood, composed of poor and humble people, often persecuted, without worldly influence, and content with the simple worship celebrated in obscure and private dwellings. Triumphant Christianity felt the need of imposing itself on the multitude by means of a luxury that attracts, and legends that strengthen the faith. In its evolution it profited by the spirit of the times; in contact with paganism it became worldly, and acquired many pagan habits. Hence the pomp, the luxury and the numerous hierarchies that were prevalent in the fourth century. The liturgy was developed, and by means of the councils dogmas were formulated and defended with the greatest ardour. The life of the clergy and the bishops no longer resembled that of the primitive Church. It became corrupt and luxurious. Ammianus describes the bishops of the cities, who, 'enriched by the gifts of the matrons, drove around the streets, seated in coaches; splendidly attired, and lovers of abundant banquets, surpassing those of the Imperial table.'

"As long as Christianity was compelled to use all the strength of a minority in resisting persecution, it was a powerful moral force with men and developed in them sentiments of heroic virtue. But Christianity, when victorious, rested quietly in security and peace, leaving man free to return to the indulgence of his passions and to devote to evil all the energies that were no longer engaged in the supreme combat."

It may be wrong in reason for Germany, as for Julian, to attribute to Christianity vices which are indeed contradicted by Christianity; but the proper answer is not to dispute such logic, but to remove such facts.

What I mean by much that has gone before, from which I now pass, is simply this, that if Christianity had been more vital, more real, more obviously mastering the minds

of men, Julian the Apostate would have had no case, and the characteristic teaching of Germany, which has found its occasion in this European crisis, would never have found a hearing. It is thus that we are all to blame. We have all of us in various ways allowed men to misunderstand Christianity. Christianity does not make men prostrate. It offers to men who acknowledge themselves prostrate a basis on which to recover their self-respect. Christianity is a faith for the poor and the defeated, for the halt and maimed and blind. But its whole object is to make *men* of us all, to give us the victory over disabling things, to make the blind see, and to restore the lame to the ranks. It is a charge against Christianity which can quote many things in its support, that it has been construed as encouraging blindness for the sake of blindness, and poverty for the sake of poverty, and a suffused incompetence and imbecility as though these were the marks of the children of God.

But to proceed, let me say something more definite of Julian, who after all is my subject, though I have confessed that I chose him on a pretext. He was born in the year 331 of our era. Constantine, called the Great, who almost ruined Christianity by making it the religion of the State, was his uncle. This gave Christianity a bad chance with the young man Julian. We all of us begin by taking our ideas of religion from one or two people whom we happen to know very well. It is therefore not to be wondered at that Julian suffered all his life from a perverse and uncomprehending attitude towards the Christian religion. The next Emperor, Constantius, was no better than Constantine. Constantius murdered Julian's mother. You cannot be astonished, therefore, that from the dawning of his intelligence Julian was disposed to think the worst of Christianity. Indeed just as in the course of a long reading on Nietzsche

I cannot recall his ever having met a truly good and able Christian man, but only Christian courtiers and worldly-wise men, neither can I recall any hearty and fine friendship that Julian ever had with an able and good man, who was at the same time a Christian. Both Nietzsche and Julian judged of Christianity by some wretched examples of men.

Julian was a child of genius. Even the accounts of him which we have from Gregory of Nazianzus, who was his exact contemporary, cannot conceal the Emperor's eminent and unusual qualities. He was nervous, restless, many-sided; a great soldier, who, in a brilliant campaign, overcame the Gauls against whom Constantius had sent him in the hope that there he would find a grave. But far from that, the Gauls, whom Julian overcame, rallied to his standard, proclaimed him Emperor, and fought under his eye from that day until the day when, in the retreat from Ctesiphon, he fell under the javelin of a Persian. It is said that so resourceful and various was Julian, that he could at one moment write a report, dictate another, and listen to a third. He was a poet, a writer of essays, a priest of the gods, deeply versed in the occult. We have an account of him from Gregory, prejudiced indeed, but full of insight. It was written after the death of Julian, and when the Empire, which for a short time had withdrawn its public support from the Church, had returned to the ordinance of Constantine.

"I was not favourably impressed with the jerking motion of his neck," says Gregory, "the shifting shoulders, the roaming eyes, that turned from one side to another, having in them something of the maniac; the unsteady shaking feet, which seemed unable to support his weight, his nostrils dilated with pride and disdain, the lineaments of the face ridiculous and conceited, the immoderate and sudden laugh; the gestures of assent and dissent without reason; questions

confused and irrelevant, the answers no better, intermingling the one with the other, without order or reason."

But that, I repeat, is the report of a good but properly prejudiced man. In any case Julian died at thirty-two: so we must be charitable. Men of genius who die at thirty-two are not to be estimated by the headlines of copy-books. He was Emperor for only two years, and in that time, to say no more, he marched at the head of conquering armies from France to Persia.

The hostility to Christianity which, until he ascended the throne, he concealed, went on deepening thereafter until the end. It is difficult to see how a man of Julian's ability could be so unfair, so blind to the idealism of Christianity, so unable or unwilling to discriminate between the hypocrisies which throve in a church because it was fashionable and worldly, and the essence of the whole matter, which he might have found by a study of the Gospels. He was able enough and philosophic enough to discriminate between the pure ideas underlying the stories of the gods and those stories themselves. And yet I cannot find in Julian even one sentence in which he lashes professing Christians for their disloyalty to their own master,—such, for example, as I recall in the noble and pathetic words of Nietzsche: "There has been only one Christian in this world and He died on Calvary."

The fact is, there is a type of mind which becomes positively furious at the whole body of Christian ideas. W. E. Henley in our own day seems to me to have had the kind of mind I mean. They cannot, or will not—it is the same—see anything except a wretched cringing and cowardice in the cry for forgiveness. And any one who confesses to this particular need becomes to them, there and then, almost nauseous, as Robert Louis Stevenson became to Henley. They cannot understand that in seeking forgiveness from

God, a man, far from running away from the consequences of his actions, is trying to face them, to stand up to them. He is not asking God to let him off. He is asking God to punish him if He will and as He will, but not to cast him away. The cry for forgiveness is really a cry for life, for energy to make good so far as is possible for the folly of former days.

Poor Julian was to learn that even Christians had not a monopoly of vice and hypocrisy. He became lonelier as he went forward. He began, as lonely people will unless they are on guard over themselves, to be superstitious. He cultivated soothsayers. In fact, he did for Paganism what Constantine did for Christianity; he established it. And soon all the low creatures who had come in with Christianity when it became a safe and profitable thing began to pour in with Paganism now restored to favour.

There is probably always a touch of madness in genius; and genius in an Emperor is almost sure—for want of criticism and the kindly rebuke of friends—to lead on to something unsafe.

Julian began to have an obsession that he was the Messiah. He believed that he was a vessel chosen by the gods. He declared that he was guarded continually by a host of angels. It was for this reason that on his last battlefield he refused a breastplate, and the javelin of a Persian buried itself in his side.

Before the end his bitterness against the Christians became a disorder of the mind. He boasted to an ecclesiastic that, on the termination of the war, he would treat the Christians with so much severity that the Son of the Carpenter would be unable to aid them; whereupon the ecclesiastic rejoined that the Son of the Carpenter was at that very moment preparing him a coffin.—A story which shows two things; first, that Julian was becoming excited

and even unworthy of himself ; and second, that his hostility to the Church was already beginning to separate in the Church the dross from the gold, and to bring out brave men. The moment the Church was dethroned it began again to mount its proper throne. The Arian gang went out, with their enlightenment and their vague theology. The Athanasians, by their virtue and qualities of character, had become the leaders. And the Church, like Peter after his lapse, had recovered her great way of speaking : " We must obey God rather than men."

The career of Julian has more than once, even in our day, attracted the minds of thoughtful men. To men who have an eye for the play of principles in history, it will always have a fascination. Merejkowsky and Ibsen have pondered Julian. Curiously enough it was the proclamation of the German Emperor in Versailles in 1871 which set Ibsen thinking of Julian. Did Ibsen foresee that Germany, which had committed itself to certain principles, would encounter a hostility in the nature of things ? Nothing is impossible to genius. At any rate, here is the story of Julian's end.

It is a great saying that he who takes the sword shall perish by the sword. Every victory which Julian gained seemed to lead on to another war. At last he invaded Persia. With infinite pains he transported a great army across the Tigris to the very walls of Ctesiphon. There the tide of prosperity failed with that awful unmistakeableness which a dramatist loves to detect. The Persians would never come to a decisive battle. They hung upon the Roman flanks as old Kutuzow hung upon the flanks of Napoleon in that terrible retreat. Everything happened amiss, as when the waters came back upon the Egyptians, so that their chariots drave heavily, and God looked at them from the edge of a cloud.

At last a battle was offered and accepted. Julian, ever

brave, and now recklessly brave, rushed into the midst of it. It was then that a javelin flung pointedly at him grazed his arm and lodged in his liver. He tried to pull it out with his naked hands, but it cut them. Ibsen tells us that the javelin which slew Julian was the very spear with which the Roman soldiers had pierced the side of Jesus as He hung upon the Cross. In any case, as a fact in symbolism, Julian was slain by an instrument which had been dipped in the blood of Christ. As he lay dying he delivered a beautiful message to his henchmen. And as he died he seemed to see something in front of him, just overhead: to which, according to the record, he spoke with his last breath, saying, "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean."

There is something which is not to be set aside in this recurring confession, "Thou hast conquered, O Galilean," for it has the support of history. It is simply the fact that wherever enmity to Christ has become organised, and has proceeded to act strongly upon its own principles, wherever, in short, the attempt has been made to dethrone Christianity, it has failed. All sorts of things are forgiven to nations, as Christ promised they would be—all sorts of hypocrisies and treacheries even. But the sin against the Holy Ghost, the denial of the spirit and mental type of Christianity, the reasoned repudiation of Christianity as the way and the truth and the life, the reversion to the pre-Christian and diabolical view of man's nature—*that*, on the evidence of history, has not been forgiven a people.

A nation which acts upon a reasoned rejection of the Christian way may not immediately be overwhelmed by contrary events; but in the depth of its soul it comes to perceive something which chills its heart and paralyses its arm.

JOHN A. HUTTON.

THE NEW HEAVEN AND THE NEW EARTH.

In the New Testament the doctrine of the New Heaven and the New Earth finds its fullest expression in the Apocalypse, but traces of it are to be found in some of the other books. It is interesting to trace its development from its beginnings in the Old Testament down to the latter half of the first century A.D., and this paper will deal with that part of its history. The writings which are of most value for our purpose, apart from the canonical Scriptures, are *Jubilees* (109–105 B.C., Charles), 1 *Enoch* 31–71 (94–64 B.C., Charles); 91–104 (95–64 B.C., Charles); 2 *Baruch* (60–100 A.D.), 4 *Esdras* (at or about 100 A.D., Box), and the *Sibylline Oracles*.

The earliest doctrine appears to have been that the heavens and the earth were eternal, and would never be removed (Pss. xciii. 1, xcvi. 10, civ. 5, cxlviii. 6; Eccles. i. 4). But it was also thought that they were less eternal than God and His salvation (Pss. xcv. 4–5, cii. 24–7 [Heb. i. 10–12]; Isa. li. 6); and as time passed, the religious leaders of Israel, feeling dissatisfied with the present state of the earth and its inhabitants, looked forward to the coming of a time when a great transformation would take place, when God would create a new heaven and a new earth in which even the beasts of the field would undergo a refining influence (Isa. xi. 6 ff.; lxv. 25). This idea may have been of Persian origin, but it may also be the offspring of Jewish religious thought, since certain passages in the Old Testament (Ps. cii. 26; Isa. xxxiv. 4, li. 6; Joel iii. 16) show that to the Jews the destruction of the present order of things was not inconceivable (see Charles, *Eschatology*, pp. 127–9).

I.

The Birth of the New Creation.

There are different conceptions as to how the New Heaven and the New Earth are to be brought to pass:—(1) They may come through the purification and transformation of the present order of things. This, e.g., is the teaching of the Book of Jubilees. (2) When the present world perishes through its inherent corruption, God (*a*) will renew or quicken it, or (*b*) provide a world which is incorruptible. (3) After the total destruction of the present universe by fire or otherwise, the New Heaven and the New Earth will appear.

(1).—*The Purification and Transformation of the Present Order.*

The beginnings of this doctrine are to be found in the Old Testament (Isa. lxv. 17 ff., lxvi. 22, cf. li. 16). A New Heaven and a New Earth are to be created (ברא, Isa. lxv. 17), or made (עשה, Isa. lxvi. 22). Jerusalem is to be transformed; joy and rejoicing are to take the place of weeping and crying (lxv. 18–9). The infirmities of old age are to vanish (*v.* 20). God's people will enjoy temporal prosperity in His immediate presence. Even the wild beasts will become tame, carnivorous animals becoming graminivorous (*v.* xxv.; cf. xi. 6–9).

In 1 Enoch xci. 16 (cf. civ. 2), only a New Heaven appears, but in xlv. 4–5 both the heavens and the earth are to be transformed and to become a blessing for the elect. In Jubilees "the heavens and the earth shall be renewed,[1] and all their creation, according to the powers of heaven" (i. 29); and this shall come to pass through the merits of Jacob and his seed (xix. 24–5) and the sanctification of

[1] Yet in xxiii. 18 it is said that "the earth shall be destroyed."

Mount Zion (iv. 26). The sanctuary of the Lord will be in Jerusalem (i. 29, iv. 26), where He will descend and dwell with His people throughout eternity (i. 26–8; cf. xxv. 20–1; Test. Dan. vi. 6).

The Book of Jubilees further appears to teach that there are three periods in this process of renewal :—

(*a*).—In connexion with the Deluge it is said that God "made for all His works a new and righteous nature, so that they should not sin in their whole nature for ever, but should be all righteous, each in its kind alway" (v. 12). Elsewhere the Deluge is called "the first end" (1 Enoch xciii. 4; cf. x. 2), the first time God brought the anger of His judgment upon the human race (Adam and Eve xlix. 2; 2 Pet. iii. 6).

(*b*).—The seed of Jacob, in whom the name of the righteous patriarchs is blessed, "shall serve to lay the foundations of the Heaven, and to strengthen the earth, and to renew all the luminaries which are in the firmament" (Jub. xix. 25; cf. ii. 21).

(*c*).—The completion of the process of renewal takes place at the establishment of the Messianic Kingdom, when the sanctuary of the Lord is made in Jerusalem on Mount Zion (i. 29), which will be sanctified for a sanctification of the earth (iv. 26).

(2).—*The Corruptible World renewed or replaced.*

In the divine compassion (4 Esdr. vii. 132 ff.) the creation shall be renewed (vii. 75; 2 Bar. xxxii. 6, cf. 4, lvii. 2; cf. Rev. xxi. 5), or quickened (4 Esdr. v. 45); or "the age which is not yet awake shall be aroused" (vii. 31). The present world is in the last stage of corruption and decay. and the divine intervention is needed to set things right.

The present time is defiled with evils (2 Bar. xliv. 9), a world of tribulation (li. 14), full of sorrow and impotence

(4 Esdr. iv. 27). A vast field of evil has been sown, and its fruits must be reaped that the field in which the good is sown may come (*vv.* 28–9). "That which runs now, runs into vanity" (2 Bar. xliv. 10). The handwriting of decay is visible on everything. Instead of health there is disease; instead of strength, weakness and impotence; instead of delight and joy, worms and corruption (2 Bar. lxxxiii. 10 ff.).

The world and everything it bears on its breast is growing old. It waxes old like a garment (Isa. li. 6). The energy of youth is turning into old age, and every beauty of gracefulness is becoming faded and hateful (2 Bar. lxxxiii. 12). The creation is already grown old, and is past the strength of youth (4 Esdr. v. 55; cf. xiv. 10). The youth of the world is past, the strength of creation exhausted, and the advent of the times is very short (2 Bar. lxxxv. 10).

The present world is corruptible (2 Bar. xxi. 19), a world of corruption (xl. 3; 4 Esdr. iv. 11; 1 Cor. xv. 42), of corruption in the moral sense as well as in the physical (2 Pet. i. 4). In it many transgress, and are polluted with much wickedness (2 Bar. xxi. 19) The end of that which is corruptible is therefore greatly to be desired (lxxiv. 2). The creation, says St. Paul, shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God (Rom. viii. 21). This corruptible (world as well as body) must put on incorruption (1 Cor. xv. 53).

This is a transitory world (2 Bar. xlviii. 50; 4 Esdr. vi. 20). Its pride and glory shall soon turn into humiliation and shame, into dust and silence (2 Bar. xxxiii. 13, 14, 16). "Everything that is shall become the prey of corruption, and be as though it had not been" (xxxi. 5). Whatsoever is now is nothing, and being corruptible shall pass away (xliv. 8, 9; 4 Esdr. vii. 114; 2 Enoch lxv. 10A). The end of all things (Sib. iii. 796), the end for all who are in the

present age shall come (2 Bar. lxxxv. 14). The age which is corruptible shall perish (4 Esdr. vii. 31). The fashion or shape (σχῆμα) of this world, the world and the lust thereof, shall pass away (1 Cor. vii. 31 ; 1 John ii. 17). Heaven and earth (Matt. v. 18=Luke xvi. 17 ; Mark xiii. 31=Matt. xxiv. 35 ; Luke xxi. 33), the first heaven and the first earth (Rev. xxi. 1) shall pass away, shall fly away (xx. 11), and there shall be no more sea (xxi. 1). The age which is about to pass away shall be sealed (4 Esdr. vi. 20). Then the righteous will behold the world which is now invisible, the time which is now hidden from them (2 Bar. li. 8). Then the hour will come which will abide for ever, the new world which does not turn to corruption those who depart to its blessedness (xliv. 12).

(3).—*The Total Destruction of the Present World.*

There was also a belief that the world would not merely die of old age, as it were, but that it would meet with a violent end. This end would come in an universal convulsion or conflagration.

The removal of the present world causes the greatest commotion of all its elements. The heavens and the earth, and even the heaven of heavens shall quake (Joel iii. 16 ; 1 Enoch lx. 1). God shall shake the whole creation (2 Bar. xxxii. 1), the heavens, the earth, the sea, and the dry land (Haggai ii. 6 ; Heb. xii. 26–8). "The whole world shall hear a rumbling and a mighty roar" (Sib. iv. 175). "The Lord will send down great destruction, and the earth's whole composition shall perish" (2 Enoch lxv. 10B ; cf. 11). The foundations of the earth shall tremble and be shaken, for they know that their end is to be changed (4 Esdr. vi. 16). The first heaven must depart in order that the new heaven may appear (1 Enoch xci. 16 ; Rev. xxi. 1). The heavens shall be rolled together as a scroll (Isa. xxxiv. 4), depart as

a scroll when it is rolled together (Rev. vi. 14). "God, whose dwelling is in the sky, shall roll up the heavens as a book is rolled" (Sib. iii. 82). He shall change them as one changes a garment which has grown old (Ps. cii. 26; Heb. i. 11–2). The sun shall set never to rise again, and the light of the moon shall be no more (Sib. v. 477 ff.). The stars shall fall from heaven (Mark xiii. 25; Matt. xxiv. 29). The whole firmament in its varied forms shall fall on the earth and on the sea (Sib. iii. 83–4). The host of heaven shall fall, as the leaf falleth off from the vine, and as a falling fig from the fig-tree (Isa. xxxiv. 4), as a fig-tree casteth her untimely figs when she is shaken of a mighty wind (Rev. vi. 13). The greatest confusion will take place among the heavenly bodies, and falling headlong to the earth they will leave the sky starless (Sib. v. 512 ff.; cf. 155 ff.). In the battle of the stars the New Creation will come forth (v. 212).

The Flood destroyed the old world (1 Enoch x. 2, lxv. 6, cvi. 15; 2 Pet. iii. 6), and in this sense was an "end" (1 Enoch x. 2), "the first end" (1 Enoch xciii. 4; cf. Adam and Eve xlix. 3), but the second end, it was by some believed, was to be by fire (Adam and Eve xlix. 3). God is a consuming fire (Deut. iv. 24, ix. 3; Heb. xii. 29), and with fire He judges the wicked (1 Enoch xci. 9, c. 9, cii. 1; Jub. ix. 15, etc.). In His wrath He shall destroy the whole race of men with a mighty conflagration (Sib. iv. 160–1). "Fire shall come upon the whole world" (iv. 173). There shall be a great celestial conflagration on earth (v. 211). The whole earth, with all the race of men, with all the cities and rivers and the sea, shall be burned up and reduced to dust and ashes (iv. 176–8). There "shall flow a ceaseless cataract of raging fire, and shall burn land and sea, and the firmament of heaven and the stars and creation itself it shall cast into one molten mass and clean dissolve" (iii.

84–7). "The heavens being on fire shall be dissolved" (2 Pet. iii. 12). "The heaven and the earth which are now are kept in store, reserved unto fire . . . The heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements or heavenly bodies (στοιχεῖα) shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up" (iii. 7, 10).

There will be no longer any measurement of time, since the lights in the firmament of heaven shall have ceased to exist (Gen. i. 14; 1 Enoch lxxii. 1). There shall be a time of not counting, endless, with neither years nor months nor weeks nor days nor hours (2 Enoch xxxiii. 2, lxv. 7); neither darkness, nor evening, nor morning; neither noon, nor night, nor dawn (4 Esdr. vii. 40; Sib. iii. 89); neither shining, nor brightness, nor light, save only the splendour of the brightness of the Most High (4 Esd. vii. 42; cf. Rev. xxi. 23); no spring, no summer, no winter nor autumn (Sib. iii. 90; 4 Esdr. vii. 41). "Then no more shall be the luminaries twinkling orbs" (Sib. iii. 88); "neither sun, nor moon, nor stars; neither clouds, nor thunder, nor lightning; neither wind, nor rain-storm, nor cloud-rack; neither heat, nor frost, nor cold; neither hail, nor rain, nor dew" (4 Esdr. vii. 39–41).

II

The Nature of the New Creation.

The New Creation shall rejoice like a conscious being (1 Enoch li. 4–5). The heavens shall exult, and the earth be glad (T.L. xviii. 5). They shall be an eternal blessing for all the elect (1 Enoch xlv. 4–5). The present world offers many perplexing problems to the thinking mind (4 Esd. iv. 1 ff.), but the new world will be the solution of all difficulties (iv. 22 ff.). It is, therefore, an object of desire and of hope (2 Bar. xliv. 11; Col. i. 5, 27), and in the present time each

one may choose for himself its glories (2 Bar. liv. 15; cf. Rom. ii. 7, v. 2). The creation itself longs for its deliverance, for it is now groaning and travailing in pain (Rom. viii. 19 ff.).

Under (3) we have seen that the stars are sometimes regarded as falling from heaven. God shall then be the giver of light (cf. Isa. lx. 19, 20). The light of the Lord of Spirits shall appear on the face of the holy, righteous, and elect (1 Enoch xxxviii. 4). Sun, moon, and stars having passed away (4 Esdr. vii. 39; Sib. iii. 58), there shall be neither shining, nor brightness, nor light, save only the splendour of the brightness of the Most High (4 Esdr. vii. 42). In the New Jerusalem there is no need of sun or moon, for the glory of God lightens it, and the Lamb is the light thereof (Rev. xxi. 23; cf. xxii. 5).

When the luminaries are not regarded as being destroyed, it is said that they shall be renewed (Jub. i. 29, xix. 25), and shall give sevenfold light (1 Enoch xci. 16; cf. Isa. xxx. 26). Light shall have overcome darkness for ever (1 Enoch lviii. 5, 6), and the righteous shall be in the light of the sun (lviii. 3; cf. xxxviii. 2). The light of righteousness shall shine for them (Wisd. v. 6), and becoming partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light (Col. i. 12), they shall receive great light (2 Bar. xlviii. 50). Thenceforward there shall be neither night nor darkness, but great, endless, and indestructible light (2 Enoch lxv. 9).

In the New Creation there is no sea (Rev. xxi. 1), from which the powers of evil come (Dan. vii. 3; Rev. xiii. 1). It retires into the abyss (Ass. Mos. x. 6). In the first of the seven heavens, however, Levi sees "a great sea hanging" (T.L. ii. 7; cf. Rev. iv. 6); but his vision is concerned with the present universe.

The present world is defiled with evils (2 Bar. xliv. 9), but the new world shall have no evils of any kind (lxxiv. 3). Healing shall banish all disease (Jub. i. 29). The voice of

weeping and the voice of crying shall no more be heard (Isa. lxv. 19). No torment shall any more touch the righteous (Wisd. iii. 1). Delivered from the straitness and painfulness of the present time, they shall receive with enjoyment spacious liberty (4 Esd. vii. 96). "They shall hunger no more, nor thirst any more; neither shall the sun light on them or any heat" (Rev. vii. 16). "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes" (xxi. 4; Isa. xxv. 8). "There shall be neither sorrow nor crying nor pain (Rev. xxi. 4) nor curse" (xxii. 3). All sorrows shall have passed away (4 Esdr. viii. 53; Ass. Mos. x. 1; cf. Isa. xxxv. 10).

No more shall the infirmities of old age afflict men. Even where it is not assumed that men shall live for ever, death shall no longer be preceded as often at present by a death in life. Every old man shall fulfil his days, and he that dieth at a hundred years old shall die a child (Isa. lxv. 20). In the New Creation the righteous are like the angels, and have entered "the world which ages not those who come to it" (2 Bar. li. 10, 16). For them weakness is abolished (4 Esdr. vii. 114 Eth.), infirmity extinguished (viii. 53).

There had for long been a belief that in the Messianic Kingdom death would no more have dominion. God, it was said, shall swallow up death in victory (or, for ever, Isa. xxv. 8). He shall ransom the faithful from the power of Sheol and redeem them from death; the plagues of death and the destruction of Sheol shall disappear (Hos. xiii. 4). In the New Creation likewise mortality shall have been brought to an end, the angel of death reproved, and Sheol sealed so that it may no longer receive the dead (2 Bar. xxi. 22, 23). Its inhabitants shall not come to a limit of days (1 Enoch lviii. 6). Death shall be no more (Rev. xxi. 4), shall be hidden (4 Esdr. viii. 53), destroyed (1 Cor. xv. 26), cast into the lake of fire (Rev. xx. 14). He who wields the power of death, the Devil, shall be destroyed (Heb.

ii. 14). "When this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory" (1 Cor. xv. 54).

Though Hades is sometimes regarded as the final abode of the wicked (Ps. Sol. xiv. 6, xv. 11; *Ant.* XVIII. i. 3), it is also said that in the New Creation Hades shall be no more. Hades shall flee away (4 Esdr. viii. 53); shall, like death, be cast into the lake of fire (Rev. xx. 14); or shall be sealed so as no longer to receive the dead (2 Bar. xxi. 23).

The Messiah having overthrown the prince of the kingdom of evil (T.R. vi. 12; T.L. xviii. 12; T.D. v. 10, 11; T.B. iii. 8; cf. Matt. xii. 29; Luke x. 19; Rev. xx. 2, 3), Satan and his legions shall have no place in the New Heaven and the New Earth. "Satan shall be no more, and sorrow shall depart with him" (Ass. Mos. x. 1). As in the Messianic Kingdom, there shall be no Satan nor any evil destroyer (Jub. xxiii. 29; cf. xl. 9, xlvi. 2, l. 5); for, like sin, the Devil is excluded from the New Creation (Rev. xx. 10). His work is to tempt men to commit iniquity (T.A. vi. 4–5; T.G. iv. 7; T.D. iii. 6; Mart. Isa. ii. 7), but the heavenly life of the righteous is free from all manner of temptation. There wickedness cannot change their understanding, or guile deceive their soul (Wisd. iv. 11).

In the World to Come sin can find no place (cf. 1 Enoch x. 16, 20). The seventy weeks of Daniel "are determined upon to finish the transgression and to make an end of (or, seal up) sin" (Dan. ix. 24). "Unrighteousness shall disappear as a shadow" (1 Enoch xlix. 2). "All evil shall pass away" (lxix. 29). "Violence shall be cut off from its roots, and the roots of unrighteousness together with deceit, and they shall be destroyed" (xci. 8). "The works of the godless shall vanish from all the earth. . . and all shall be in goodness and righteousness; and sin shall no more be

mentioned for ever (xci. 14, 17), shall perish in darkness for ever, and no more be seen from that day for evermore" (xcii. 5). "The paths of wickedness shall suddenly be destroyed and vanish" (xciv. 1), and God shall make an end of all wickedness and sin (c. 5; cf. cvii. 1). In the New Creation He "shall make for all His works a new and righteous nature, so that they should not sin in their whole nature for ever, but should be all righteous each in his kind alway" (Jub. v. 12). "Evil shall be blotted out, and deceit extinguished" (4 Esdr. vi. 27). The evil germ or root shall be sealed up (iii. 22; viii. 53), self-indulgence abolished and infidelity cut off (vii. 114; cf. Sib. iii. 373 ff., v. 429 ff.).

The present world is corruptible and the scene of corruption (2 Bar. xxi. 19, xl. 3, lxxiv, 2, lxxxiii. 15; 4 Esdr. iv. 11, vii. 31, 96, 114; Rom. viii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 42, 50; 2 Pet. i. 4), but the World to Come is incorruptible (2 Bar. lxxiv. 2; 4 Esdr. iv. 11 (?)). Corruption shall have passed away (4 Esdr. vii. 114), been vanquished (vi. 28), forgotten (viii. 53). Henceforth there shall be nothing corruptible (1 Enoch lxix. 29), for all corruptible things shall have passed away (lxv. 10; 2 Bar. xliv. 9). Incorruption shall have come (1 Cor. xv. 50), and the creation shall have been delivered from the bondage of corruption (Rom. viii. 21).

This world waxes old (Isa. li. 6; 2 Bar. lxxxiii. 12, lxxxv. 10; 4 Esdr. v. 50–5, xiv. 10; Heb. i. 11) and decays (2 Bar. xliv. 10, lxxxiii. 10 ff.), but the future age does not die (2 Bar. li. 3); it is near to those things which die not (lxxiv. 3). The present heaven and earth shall be shaken and removed (Joel iii. 16; Hag. ii. 6; 2 Bar. xxxii. 1; 4 Esdr. vi. 13–16; Sib. iv. 175; Heb. xii. 26–28), but the New Heaven and Earth cannot be shaken (Heb. xii. 28).

The present heaven and earth shall pass away (4 Esdr. vii. 39, 40; Matt. v. 18; Luke xvi. 17, etc.), but the World to Come is eternal (4 Esdr. vii. 113). The New Heaven is an

eternal blessing and light (1 Enoch xlv. 4). The New Creation dureth till eternity (lxxii. 1). After it comes there will be many weeks without number for ever (xci. 17). God will dwell with the faithful throughout eternity (Jub. i. 26), and His sanctuary shall be built among them for all eternity (i. 27). For all eternity He shall be King on Mount Zion (i. 28).

The New Creation shall have no end (2 Bar. xlviii. 50). It is a time that passes not away, the hour which abides for ever (xliv. 11–12). In it the righteous shall not come to a limit of days (1 Enoch lviii. 6).

The Holy City (Rev. xxi. 2, 10, xxii. 19; cf. Isa. xlviii. 2, lii. 1, etc.; Sir. xxxvi. 13; Ps. Sol. viii. 4), the New Jerusalem (Rev. iii. 12, xxi. 2; cf. T.D. v. 12), "a city builded" (4 Esdr. viii. 52, x. 27, 42, 44), shall be the centre of the blessedness of the World to Come (1 Enoch xc. 28–9; 2 Bar. iv. 2–6, xxxii. 2–4; 4 Esdr. viii. 52–3, x. 27, 42, 49, xiii. 26). In it there is a temple (Jub. i. 26–29; 1 Enoch xc. 28 ff.). Such is the general belief with regard to the Messianic Kingdom (1 Enoch xxv. 5; Tob. xiii. 10, 16, xiv. 5; T.B. ix. 2; Sib. iii. 772–6, v. 422–7), but once it is clearly asserted that there is no temple in the Heavenly City (Rev. xxi. 22). This assertion is made on the ground that God and His Messiah are visibly present and therefore need nothing to symbolise their existence (xxi. 22). There is a temple in the present heaven (T.L. v. 1, xviii. 6; Azar. xxxi.; Rev. xi. 19, xvi. 17), and therefore we naturally infer that there will be one in the New Creation (cf. Rev. iii. 12, vii. 15).

In the present heaven God sits on a throne of glory (T.L. v. 1; Ass. Mos. x. 3; Matt. v. 34, xxiii. 22; Heb. viii. 1, xii. 2; Rev. iv. 2 et passim), and He shall do so also in the New Creation. The seven martyred brothers "stand beside the throne of God and live the blessed age" (4 Macc.

xvii. 18). According to Revelation those who come out of the great Tribulation are before the throne of God, and He that sitteth on the throne shall tabernacle over them (vii. 15; cf. xxi. 3). The throne of God and of the Lamb is in the New Jerusalem (xxii. 1, 3).

We have already seen that sin is excluded from the New Creation. Righteousness, on the other hand, is present as never in the old world. The righteous seek out the secrets of righteousness and find it (1 Enoch lviii. 4, 5). They walk in the paths of uprightness (cv. 2), in ways which are broad and safe (4 Esdr. vii. 13). They have an upright way (1 Enoch lxxi. 17), and God gives them faithfulness in the habitation of upright paths (cviii. 13). The light of uprightness is established for ever before the Lord of Spirits (lviii. 6). "All shall be in goodness and righteousness" (xci. 17). In the New Creation all God's works are of a new and righteous nature (Jub. v. 12); in it dwelleth righteousness (2 Pet. iii. 13). There there is the fountain of righteousness which is inexhaustible (1 Enoch xlviii. 1). "Righteousness is grown and faithfulness is sprung up" (4 Esdr. vii. 114). "Faithfulness shall flourish . . . and truth . . . shall be made manifest" (vi. 28).

For the righteous wisdom is preconstituted (4 Esdr. viii. 52), and in the New Creation it is found in its perfection (1 Enoch xci. 10). There are many fountains of wisdom (xlviii. 1), and it is poured out like water (xlix. 1).

Life is another of the blessings of the New Creation, life which is never-ending (1 Enoch lviii. 3, 6, lxii. 16, lxxi. 17, ciii. 4, cviii. 13; John vi. 51, 58). It is called "eternal life" (1 Enoch xl. 9, lviii. 3; cf. 2 Enoch xlii. 3, lxv. 10; T.A. vi. 6), ζωὴ αἰώνιος (Mark x. 17, etc.; cf. Ps. Sol. iii. 16; 4 Macc. xv. 3). There are fountains of the water of life (Rev. vii. 17, xxi. 6), and a river of the water of life (xxii. 1); and he that is athirst is invited to take of this

water freely (xxii. 17). Unhappy are those who have forsaken the fountain of life (1 Enoch xcvi. 6).

There are also garments of life for the righteous, garments which grow not old (1 Enoch lxii. 16), and the crown of life for those who love God (Jas. i. 12), for those who are faithful unto death (Rev. ii. 10). The tree of life too offers its fruits to the pious (Rev. xxii. 2, and some MSS. of xxii. 19; 4 Esdr. vii. 123, viii. 52).

The World to Come, like the present, has its treasures, treasures which consist of the good works of the righteous which pass before them into the heavenly regions, or are bestowed on those who give a fair proportion of their earthly goods to the poor and needy. Enoch tells his children, "Whosoever of you spends gold or silver for his brother's sake, he will receive ample treasure in the world to come" (2 Enoch l. 5; cf. Tob. iv. 8–10; Mark x. 21 [=Matt. xix. 21; Luke xviii. 22]; Luke xii. 23; 1 Tim. vi. 17–19). The gatherers of the treasures of faith are sealed, and therefore will not fail to attain to the blessings which await them (4 Esdr. vi. 5). The treasure of works laid up with the Most High will be revealed to the righteous in the last times (vii. 77). Out of their own deeds they will receive their reward (viii. 33; cf. T.L. xiii. 5–6; Ps. Sol. ix. 6, 9). Without fear they depart out of this habitation, because with God they have a store of works preserved in treasuries (4 Bar. xiv. 12). At the Last Judgment the treasuries in which the righteousness of all those who have been righteous in creation is gathered will be opened, as well as the books in which are written the sins of all who have sinned (xxiv. 11). Those to whom is given the World to Come are they who have acquired for themselves treasures of wisdom, and with whom are found stores of understanding (xliv. 14). "Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven" (Matt. vi. 20; cf. Luke xii. 33).

In the Fourth Gospel Jesus says, "In My Father's house are many mansions" (xiv. 2), and He promises at the same time to prepare a place for His disciples (*vv.* 2, 3). Their heavenly dwelling-places, like their treasures, are regarded as being already prepared for the righteous, even in books like 1 Enoch 37–71 which teach the coming of a New Heaven and a New Earth. In a parable Jesus speaks of "the everlasting habitations" (Luke xvi. 9). In vision Enoch sees "the dwelling-places of the holy, and the resting-places of the righteous," which dwellings are with God's righteous angels (1 Enoch xxxix. 4, 5); he sees also the dwelling-place of the Elect One under the wings of the Lord of Spirits, and his spirit longs for that dwelling-place (xxxix. 7, 8). He sees "all the secrets of the heavens . . . the mansions of the elect, and the mansions of the holy" (xli. 1, 2); the dwellings of the wise with the righteous and holy and elect (xlviii. 1); the dwelling-places of the righteous with the Son of Man (lxxi. 16). He is represented as saying to his children, "In the great time (sc. to come) are many mansions prepared for men, good for the good, and bad for the bad, without number many. Blessed are those who enter the good houses, for in the bad there is no peace nor return" (2 Enoch lxi. 2, 3).

The present world is imperfect: its evil is neither fully evil nor its good fully good (2 Bar. xxiii. 9). The New Creation shall be perfect (1 Cor. xiii. 10). Its blessedness is so great as to be at present inconceivable (ii. 9). It is as yet invisible and hidden (2 Bar. li. 8), and though prepared (4 Esdr. viii. 52), has yet to be awaked (vii. 31).

WILLIAM WATSON.

PELAGIUS' DOCTRINE IN RELATION TO HIS EARLY LIFE.

It is now universally admitted that a knowledge of a man's life is helpful, if not indispensable, to a knowledge or understanding of his teaching. The experiences through which Augustine passed make it easier to explain his doctrine. The character of the teaching of his opponent Pelagius has been regarded by some as directly due to the fact that he had led a cloistered life, devoted to books but unacquainted with the ways of the outside world. In this short article I suggest that a further explanation may be found in the experience of his early life under his parents' roof. The only excuse that can be put forward for my venture into the domain of the theologian and the psychologist is the fact that I am in possession of unprinted materials, namely a pure text of Pelagius' commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul in its original form.[1]

From certain passages in this commentary, which I am about to cite, the idea has come to me that Pelagius had had some bitter experiences in connexion with his father, that his father had been over-insistent on obedience, and that Pelagius had rebelled. The young Irishman (or Briton), whose polished style shows that he had received a splendid education, and must therefore have been of wealthy family, may have found in the unpleasantness of his relations with his father an occasion to cut connexion with his home and make the very long journey to Rome. Some good reason for this emigration on his part is needed, for he appears to have been the earliest British Christian to emigrate permanently.

[1] See *The Commentary of Pelagius on the Epistles of St. Paul, the Problem of its Restoration* ("Proceedings" of the British Academy, vol. ii. pp. 423 ff.); *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, xxxviii. (1913), col. 442.

A man who had definitely quarrelled with his father, for what appeared to him the best of reasons, would be more likely to adopt the view that each new soul was absolutely clean on coming into the world, and that sin could not be inherited.

Here are the passages :—

Romans i. 30, *Disobedient to parents.* Pelagius : " True parents are those who by the seed of the Word beget into light and eternal life." Surely quite an irrelevant remark, unlike the usual Pelagian directness, and suggesting that he knew too much of parents whom he regarded as false.

Romans xvi. 19, *Wise unto that which is good.* Pelagius : " Obedience is good, but only if it be rational."

1 Corinthians vii. 36, *And if need so requireth, let her do what she will ; she does not sin, if she marry.* Pelagius : " If it must be so on account of the daughter's will ; for parents ought of course *to guard* till the legal age (is reached), and *to teach* what is better (best) ; if, however, she refuse, let that be done which is inevitable." There is no word here of insistence on obedience even before the legal age.

Ephesians vi. 1, *Children, obey your parents in the Lord.* Pelagius : " He prepares them for the training (*disciplinae*) by which he orders them to be trained (*erudiri*) by their parents in a godly way." There is more teaching than discipline here again.

Ephesians vi. 4, *And, (ye) fathers, provoke not your children to wrath ; but nurture them in the chastening and admonition of the Lord.* Pelagius : " Whether by beating them to excess and unreasonably, or, lest by provoking them to worldly pursuits, you make them learn to be ill-tempered : but train them in the lessons of the divine law. *Such are the parents, therefore, that he teaches sons (children) to obey.*" Note the qualification of the last sentence.

Colossians iii. 20, *Children, obey your parents in all things,*

for this is well-pleasing in the Lord. Pelagius omitted this verse altogether, as the manuscripts, of various provenance, unanimously attest. Needless to say, there is also no comment on them. The fact that he had commented on Ephesians vi. 1 as above, is hardly sufficient reason for the omission of the verse and comment here. There is no parallel case, but instead we often find a note repeated, where a parallel passage occurs. As the notes are glossarial, there are hardly any backward or forward references in the commentary.

I trust that the cumulative effect of the evidence here given is to remove my suggestion from the realm of mere fancy.

A. Souter.

PROFESSOR ROBERTSON'S NEW TESTAMENT GRAMMAR.[1]

THIS is a large book; it contains fourteen hundred pages, and each page runs on an average to about four hundred words. Here and there a slight amount of repetition occurs, and some space might have been saved in the third part of the splendid index. Most indices of texts, in volumes of this kind, are compiled on Dryden's principle :—

> "These are the chief; to number o'er the rest,
> And stand like Adam numbering every beast,
> Were weary work."

But those who have helped Professor Robertson in the index have not been weary. It is an uncommon experience to find an index too elaborate, but the list of texts here would not have been less serviceable if it had been restricted to those which are specially handled, and thus the size of the volume might have been reduced to some extent. This is a detail, however. The size of the work has to be estimated in view of its aim. It is remarkable because it is large, but it is large because it is remarkable. In the first place, it is a complete grammar. Schmiedel stopped his revision of Winer fifteen years ago in the middle of a sentence. Professor Moulton's work has not got past its first volume yet. It is true, we have Blass's work, which, especially in Debrunner's hands, gives an up-to-date, adequate sketch of the subject. But Professor Robertson has the credit of having brought out first a complete New Testament Grammar, in the light of modern research, on the lines of Jannaris rather than of Blass. America has out-distanced both England and Germany in this department, and we congratulate the author heartily on his feat. He explains

[1] *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research.* By A. T. Robertson, D.D., LL.D. (Hodder & Stoughton.)

how he inherited the task from Broadus. "He was a disciple of Gessner Harrison, of Virginia, who was the first scholar in America to make use of Bopp's *Vergleichende Grammatik*." And this illustrates the second feature of the work, which is responsible for its size—viz., the fact that it keeps in close touch with comparative philology, and also includes a history of the subject. The student is provided with not only materials for exegesis proper, but also data for following the course of opinion on disputed points and copious references to articles, pamphlets, and books. New Testament Greek is viewed in relation to other languages, ancient and modern. A skilful teacher will know how much of the book needs to be mastered by the ordinary student. Several chapters or sections of chapters are too good for any one except a fairly advanced worker; others condescend to weaker vessels. But it is impossible to speak too highly of the hard and long research which must have gone to the making of the book from beginning to end. It is "designed for advanced students in theological schools, for the use of teachers, for scholarly pastors who wish a comprehensive grammar of the New Testament Greek on the desk for constant use [may their tribe increase!], for all who make a thorough study of the New Testament, or who are interested in the study of language, and for libraries." Unless ours is a singularly ungrateful generation, there must be many in these circles who will appreciate the wide, patient, and careful scholarship which underlies Dr. Robertson's pages. Some will pass, but we hope that more will pause, for their own sake as well as for his.

The introduction (pp. 1–139) sketches the new methods and meterials in Greek philology and grammar. The rest of the book is divided, usefully rather than correctly, into Accidence and Syntax. The underlying principle is that the Greek of the New Testament forms a natural phase

in the development of the Hellenistic Koine; this is no longer a disputed position, but Professor Robertson states the case for it at some length, and shows how it has had to be fought for and won quite recently. On the vexed question of Semitisms he writes reasonably and moderately. But here and there he seems to ignore what is fairly strong evidence for Aramaic influence; for example, the aorist (ἐκάθισαν) in Matt. xxiii. 2 is not "certainly gnomic," and the curious construction in Luke xxiii. 15 (p. 534) may be yielded to Wellhausen as an Aramaism, with one or two other instances in the Synoptic gospels. As he himself admits, "the presumption is now clearly against a Hebraism. But, after all, one has the conviction that the joy of new discovery has to some extent blurred the vision of Deissmann and Moulton to the remaining Hebraisms, which do not, indeed, make Hebraic Greek or a peculiar dialect" (p. 91). The LXX may well have affected the Koine in Alexandria; such local influences are not impossible, and to them we have to add the passage of the oral tradition of the words of Jesus from Aramaic into the Greek of the gospels.

The closing pages of the introduction diverge to discuss the individual styles of the New Testament writers. In connexion with the language of Ephesians and the Pastorals, Albani's essays might have been noted, and it seems rash to add that in the case of the latter "criticism is coming more to the acceptance of all of them [*i.e.*, the Pauline corpus] as genuine." Professor Robertson gently chides the present writer for positiveness in maintaining that the Apocalypse and the Fourth Gospel were written by different hands. I agree that doubts are wiser than certainties here, but his own hypothesis (repeated on p. 416) that "the Apocalypse was composed in Patmos in some excitement, and possibly without careful revision, while the gospel and first epistle probably had care and the assistance of cultured

friends" (p. 137), is much more ingenious than satisfactory, and the evidence of style and language here, as elsewhere, requires to be taken with a wider induction of data.

On the broader field of accidence and syntax the author proves himself an enthusiastic grammarian, who is ready to take over now and then some of the territory which legitimately belongs to the lexicographer or to the commentator. He is also a master of technical and comparative philology, and the references to Modern Greek are particularly timely, especially for the teacher. From Anglo-Saxon it is possible to find some additional parallels and illustrations; for example, in the case of the dative (p. 536), which in Anglo-Saxon, though not in New Testament Greek, is used for the notion of time, and also in the case of ἐπὶ (p. 601), for which there is a parallel in the Anglo-Saxon *on*. An old writer called the prepositions in New Testament Greek "montes doctrinarum," and Professor Robertson has fully recognised their theological importance; they are treated at length and in detail. It might have been well to note the possibility of a different rendering of ἀντὶ in Heb. xii. 2, however (p. 574), and on p. 629 a parallel in the readings of Job i. 5 (LXX) should have been marked for the meaning of ὑπέρ. The remarks on the literary plural (pp. 406–407) are adequate, but to say that "Jesus seems to use it in John iii. 11" is to leave something unsaid. Another passage in the Fourth Gospel which needs fuller comment is John i. 41 (p. 549); the conjecture πρωΐ for the πρῶτος and πρῶτον of the MSS. is very convincing. The chapters on the tenses and moods ought to make the obscurities of the subject clear to the student. The gradual disappearance of the future participle and the preference of the perfect to the aorist participle are corroborated by the evidence of the apostolic fathers, even when the data collected by Mr. H. B. Robison in his recent monograph on the syntax of the participle in

the apostolic fathers is critically sifted. On p. 964 the use of ὅιότι for ὅτι may be illustrated from Polybius, where the former seems to be used after a preceding vowel in order to avoid hiatus; a similar practice may explain the interchange of ὡς and ὁτι, and of πηλίκος and ἡλίκος. Now and then positions are stated rather strongly for some tastes, as on p. 864, where it is maintained that the aorist participle in indirect discourse "is absolutely timeless, not even relatively past." But it is fair to say that these unqualified statements are the exception, and on subtle points like the historic present and the aoristic present perfect the data are marshalled with true precision. The division of the materials for voice, tense, and mood, in which Professor Robertson agrees independently with Jannaris, is on the whole justified by its results; it attains clearness, which, after all, is the main thing in so ramified a field. The same remark applies to the section on the particles, which, it is rightly said, are usually treated by grammarians in quite an unsatisfactory fashion. Here "the New Testament is in the vernacular κοινή, but even so it does not reproduce to any extent the witchery of the old Greek particles. Time has worn them down very much" (p. 1,145). Still less, we may add, is it possible to reproduce several of the shades of meaning in our English.

We lay down this book with a sincere appreciation of the labour which has gone to its making, with a cordial recognition of its aim, and with a sense of gratitude to the author for the real service he has done to the science of New Testament grammar. It is a credit to American scholarship to have produced a volume of this scope and excellence. Many scattered rays of light are focussed in these pages, with a skill which betrays a philologist of ability. It is frequently the case that the reader is put on the track of some line of investigation, which he might easily

have missed, or sent to some quarter for information upon a point which requires special discussion. But the book caters for more than the philologist, and it should be read with this in view. "I joyfully recognise that grammar is nothing unless it reveals the thought and emotion hidden in language. It is just because Jesus is greater than Socrates and Plato, and all the Greek thinkers and poets, that we care so much what Luke and Paul and John have to tell about Him. The chief treasure of the Greek tongue is the New Testament. No toil is too great if by means of it men are enabled to understand more exactly the mind of Christ" (pp. 1,207–1,208). Parsing is a prosaic business at the best, and a preliminary business. But, so far as it enters into the discipline of understanding the New Testament, it is fully commended by Professor Robertson. He justifies and sanctifies it. Perhaps the results which he desiderates will be absorbed by editors and such persons rather than directly by ordinary students; they may filter down to preachers even, instead of being picked up by the latter from the pages of this grammar, unless there are more preachers and students than one imagines who still believe in studying the text for themselves instead of using homiletical makeshifts. But in any case the hard, true work of this grammar will not be thrown away. It is a remarkable achievement, from whatever angle it is considered.

It would not be right to close without a word of praise for the admirable printing of the book, both in the Greek and in the English type. The accuracy of the references and quotations is also excellent when one considers the enormous mass of material which must have been handled.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THE VOCABULARY OF THE GREEK TESTAMENT.[1]

This is the first instalment of a work which is quite indispensable to the student of the Greek New Testament. It supplements Thayer's edition of Grimm by furnishing each word, or practically each important word, with illustrations drawn mainly from the vernacular Greek of the papyri and even of the inscriptions. This material has come to light since Thayer wrote, and it is inevitable that old meanings should in some cases be altered or modified. What the authors print is not simply quotations to be added to Thayer-Grimm's list; they show, from the papyri, how we may have to revise our interpretations of some New Testament terms, in view of their usage in the current language. And even when the material is not important, it is generally interesting, just because it is so unliterary.

At the same time, the authors have been better than their word in the sub-title. The papyri are not always unliterary, and we do get occasional citations from documents and sources which never ran the risk of being consigned to the ancient equivalent for the waste-paper basket. No one will object to the authors for exercising some freedom of choice in this matter. "Strict consistency would, no doubt, demand that we should either abstain altogether from literary illustration, or aim at supplying as fully as possible any such material which might be new." We are glad that they evaded the prongs of this dilemma, and we feel sure that their practice, as shown in this part, will be recognised as sound. To be adequate is not always the same thing as to be exhaustive. Few, if any, scholars in

[1] *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament.* Illustrated from the papyri and other non-literary sources. By J. H. Moulton, D.D., D.Theol., and George Milligan, D.D. Part I. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1914, pp. 100. 6*s.* net.)

this country know the immense ramifications of the papyri as Dr. Moulton and Dr. Milligan do; instead of venturing to criticise them for what they ought to have done or left undone, we should all be congratulating both them and ourselves upon this word-book. It is a work of immense research, of extraordinary interest, and of singular ability. It is also dressed as it deserves. The print is clear; the dark Greek type is a help to the eyes; and we bless the publishers for giving us a good margin to the page, for annotations.

One or two casual annotations may be set down here, partly by way of query. On page 2 the authors refuse to accept φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν as synonyms in John xxi. 15–17. This is rather surprising. They plead that "in so severely simple a writer as John it is extremely hard to reconcile ourselves to a meaningless use of synonyms, where the point would seem to lie in the identity of the word employed." Surely "meaningless" is too severe an adjective in this connexion. Elsewhere in the Gospel the two verbs are used as synonyms (cf. xi. 3, 5, 36, xiii. 23 = xx. 2, iii. 35 = v. 20, xiv. 22 = xvi. 27, etc.), and in the light of the general New Testament usage it is hard to attach any distinctive meanings to the two words in chap. xxi. without ultra-refinement. For example, the use of ἀγαπᾶν in John xii. 43 and 1 John ii. 15, together with the use of φιλεῖν in 1 Corinthians xvi. 22 and Revelation iii. 19, make it very difficult to agree that "in the New Testament ἀγαπᾶν is purged of all coldness, and is deeper than φιλεῖν, though the latter remains more human." It is a point of exegesis, of course, which is in dispute still. However, one is grateful to the authors for remembering the exegete as well as the lexicographer and the philologist, now and then.

On ἀγάπη, Dr. Moulton contributes a supplementary note to *The Expository Times* for December, p. 139.

On *ἀθανασία*, Mr. Conybeare has a note in his *Monuments of Early Christianity* (p. 45), pointing to the distinction between it and "life eternal."

Gradenwitz (pp. 81 f.) shows that *ἀρραβών* meant "a considerable proportion" in the vernacular.

Psichari (pp. 204–205) points out how *ἀφανής* displaced *ἄφαντος* in the prose of the Attic period so effectively that the latter does not begin to reappear in prose until the Hellenistic period.

Herwerden sums up the meaning of *ἀπάτωρ* (p. 55) in the papyri as "spurii, incerto patre nati."

Rabbinic material naturally lay beyond the scope of this vocabulary, but the Midrashic illustrations of *ἄχυρον* (= chaff) in John the Baptist's preaching (p. 100), which Klein printed in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift* ii. 343 f., are apposite.

ἄσπιλος (p. 86) is now found in the Christian prayer discovered in the fourth century (end) papyrus which C. Schmidt has edited for the *Heinrici-Festschrift* (p. 69): "Thou hast redeemed us with the precious and *undefiled* blood of Thine only Son." R. A. Hoffmann's paper in the same *Festschrift* (pp. 130–139) is to be compared with the note as *ἀχειροποίητος*.

The editors ask whether *ἄνεσις* in Acts xxiv. 23 can be a kind of *libera custodia*, and quote my rendering: "allow him some freedom." One of the passages which I had in mind when I translated the clause thus, was Josephus's description of Agrippa's detention in Rome (*Antiq.* xviii. 235), where *ἄνεσις* suggests an idea of this kind.

On p. 24 we may compare the colloquial use of *ἀλόγως* in Cic. *Ad. Att.* vi. 5, where it means "without (giving) any reason."

The linguistic parallel to Heb. v. 9 from "Diodorus Siculus" (p. 15) is not so close as the anticipation of the phrase in Philo (*De Agricultura* 22).

On p. 36 it is suggested that "the essential idea" of ἀνάπαυσις "is that of a respite or *temporary* rest as a preparation for future toil." This may suit Philemon 7, but it is inadequate to Matthew xi. 27.

Considerable use has been made of Vettius Valens, the astrological writer. In his recent monograph, *Aus der Offenbarung Johannis* (1914), Herr Franz Boll has an appendix (pp. 130 f.) of parallels from astrological Greek authors, which he offers as "a small contribution to the Lexicon of the New Testament *quod est in votis*." Dr. Moulton and Dr. Milligan have not attempted to produce a complete New Testament lexicon, but they have begun to give us what we had long desired, and all students of New Testament Greek will hope that the issue of the remaining parts of this fascinating and suggestive work will not be delayed unduly by any accidents of war or of peace.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THE REALITY OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS.[1]

THE last generation solved the problem of the Old Testament and transformed it into a new book. It is the task of the present generation to face the problem of the New Testament. We have discovered at last that the New Testament cannot be kept sacrosanct from criticism. For years the Church has comforted itself with the thought: "Let criticism do its worst with the Old Testament—the New Testament at any rate is safe. Nothing can impugn its veracity or invalidate its authority." That illusion is now completely dissipated. It has been a rude shock to those who felt that criticism would never violate the sanctity of the New Testament any more than Germany would precipitate a European war, to find a race of scholars suddenly spring up and assail the inner fortress of the Christian faith—the reality of the person of Jesus. When Drews and Kalthoff first dropped their bomb and startled the world by propounding the question, Did Jesus ever live at all? and answered it by telling us that the Gospel narrative was myth and not fact, we in England at any rate felt that a certain type of scholarship was suffering from a fit of delirium and had gone well-nigh demented. We treated it as beneath our notice—a freak of criticism—to be pitied rather than answered. And when the Rationalist press began to issue books in support of the movement, and writers in the *Hibbert Journal* to patronise it and even assume that it had made out its case, we still felt that it

[1] A public lecture delivered at New College, London.

was merely a Continental eccentricity communicating itself to the theological libertines of our own land.

The time has come, however, when we are bound to take up the challenge, unless we want the case to go against us by default. You remember Lewis Carroll's remark: "What I tell you three times is true." Well, this myth theory has been said more than three times, and people are beginning to believe there is something in it. It is never wise or prudent to despise an attack, however ludicrous it may appear. We cannot afford to allow the citadel of Christianity to be shelled with impunity, however wild the firing may be, or the rumour will gain ground that we have capitulated to the foe.

We have ourselves to thank very largely for the attack. It is the persistent effort which has been too often made by Christians to place the New Testament above criticism and above the ordinary principles of historical research that is responsible for the violent swing of the pendulum in the direction of Drews and Kalthoff. We have tried to prove too much, and now the taunt is flung in our face: "You can prove nothing at all." We have been so jealous for the historicity of every detail—for every jot and tittle of the narrative—that we have brought upon ourselves the inevitable recoil. We have twisted exegesis and done violence to the canons of historical criticism in our efforts to prove that "all is true," and this is our nemesis. We are now told that nothing is true, and that the Gospels are a fairy-tale from beginning to end.

Now it will be sheer folly for us to take up the position, which is often adopted, that the success or failure of this attack cannot possibly affect the Christian position. "We have the Christian ideas and the Christian experience," it is sometimes argued. "These are the essential things, and they are independent of the historical narrative. What

do the facts matter? Let the facts go if they have to go; the Christian truths are imperishable, and no one can rob us of them. If we lose the historical Jesus we have still the Christ-idea, and that is what really counts. What difference does it make to a man who is living a life of fellowship with God and enjoying the Divine communion and experiencing the power of grace in his heart, whether Jesus ever walked the hills of Galilee or suffered a violent death in Jerusalem? Why should we be 'cribb'd, cabin'd, and confin'd' in the narrow valley of history, when we can roam at large over the broad plains of thought and emotion? Why build upon the shifting sand of dubious facts, when the impregnable rock of Christian experience affords us a sure foundation for our faith? History is always contingent and uncertain, and can never yield us the necessary and invincible convictions that alone can keep the spirit alive. Let the critics and the historians fight out their battles as they may. We may view the result of their conflicts with the most supreme indifference. In the clear upper air of the mountain-top, with the vision of God dazzling our eyes, and the bracing breezes of the Spirit blowing all around us, the puny efforts of the earth-bound investigators in the field of history seem futile and absurd. The facts are but 'as the small dust of the balance.' Let us rid ourselves of their incubus, and then we shall be able to breathe and live."

This argument seems specious and plausible until we come to examine it, but it bursts like a bubble at the first touch of criticism. It is based on the assumption that "ideas govern the world," and that so long as the ideas exist nothing else is needed. It would be much more true, however, to say that "personalities govern the world." Ideas are the mere flotsam and jetsam of life until they are embodied in Personality, and directly this embodiment

occurs, history results. What Christianity offers the world is not merely a set of ideas, but the Incarnation of those ideas in the life of the Son of God—a much more important thing.

> Tho' truths in manhood darkly join
> Deep-seated in our mystic frame,
> We yield all blessing to the name
> Of Him that made them current coin.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> And so the word had breath, and wrought
> With human hands the Creed of Creeds,
> In loveliness of perfect deeds
> More strong than all poetic thought.

Even if we were to grant for the sake of argument that the Christian ideas could have come into existence without the Christian facts, it would be an incalculable loss if we were robbed of the personality of Him who made them "current coin." Vague floating generalities about God and truth and repentance and self-sacrifice would never have created a moral lever that was strong enough to move the world. Take away the personal Jesus, and you reduce the Christian faith to a nebulous and shadowy sentimentality, which cannot but fail to grip the heart and dominate the soul.

But it is an unthinkable hypothesis to suppose that Christian ideas originated independently of the Christian facts. It was not Christian experience that created the person of Jesus—it was the person of Jesus that created Christian experience. I will not stay at the present moment to prove so axiomatic a proposition. It is written broad all over the pages of the New Testament. There is not a single writer in the New Testament who did not believe in the fact of a Historic Christ, and you must tear your New Testament to tatters before you can maintain that the Christian truths arose as if by magic without the teach-

ing and life of a personal founder. And just as the origin of Christian experience cannot be explained without the Gospel narrative, I venture to assert that it could not even be maintained if that narrative were destroyed. Annihilate the figure of Jesus to-day and you will annihilate Christian experience to-morrow. How can you keep the sense of redemption, in the Christian meaning of the term, if you hold that the death upon the Cross is a fiction and a myth? How can you live a life of fellowship with the Risen Lord if He never rose from the dead, and Christ is only an idea and not a reality? Theism and Mysticism of course in some shape or form might still survive, but Theism and Mysticism are not Christianity. To sit lightly to the Christian facts is simple suicide. If the facts ever have to go, the downfall of Christianity in any true sense of the term will be as inevitable as fate itself.

In contending, therefore, for the reality of the Historical Jesus and the substantial truth of the Gospel narrative, we are fighting, not for some outpost of immaterial value, but for the central citadel of our religion. The issues that hang in the balance are vital and supreme.

It will not be possible for me in the present lecture to marshal all the evidence upon which the Christian case rests. That would need a series of lectures and an examination of critical minutiæ which are not susceptible of popular treatment before a general audience. I can only hope to touch in broad outline one or two of the most prominent features of the controversy, and I shall have to content myself in the main with resisting the attack rather than with the attempt to develop a scientific Christian apologetic.

The Christian Gospels have existed now for nineteen centuries, and the person of Jesus has dominated the history of our Western world. They are therefore in posses-

sion, and possession is nine-tenths of the law. If they are to be dislodged, the *onus probandi* must rest with the attack. The great problem which Drews and Kalthoff have to face is this: If the Gospels are a fairy-tale and the figure of Jesus a myth, how did they come into existence; and how did they manage to foist themselves upon the world? The portrait of Jesus holds the field. If there was no reality behind it, how was it first projected into history? The critical nihilists are bound to find an answer to this question before they can take a single valid step in the substantiation of their position.

Now it is quite obvious that the person of Jesus is not the creation of a great dramatist. The Gospels are not a drama at all in the technical sense of the term. We cannot compare Jesus to the *Œdipus* of Sophocles, or the *Agamemnon* of Æschylus, or the *Faust* of Goethe, or the *Hamlet* of Shakespeare. These are simply characters in a play, and though they are more familiar to us than many historical personages, nobody ever dreams of regarding them as anything more than children of the imagination. Jesus has never been and can never be regarded as a *dramatis persona:* from the very first the Church and the world alike have looked upon Him as an actual man "whose feet have toiled along our pathways rough, whose lips drawn human breath." Besides, the dramatist who evolved from his imagination the character of Jesus would take rank among the gods of literature; and no one has ever claimed such a position for the simple evangelists of the New Testament. There is no evidence at all to show that they possessed creative genius equal to the task of inventing the great figure of Christ. The man who could create that figure out of his imagination would be a greater genius than the Christ of his dream, and it would be impossible to credit the

historians of the Gospels with such transcendent powers.

If such a theory as this had been put forward it would have been intelligible at any rate, even though it were quite impossible. But the actual explanation which is suggested does not appear to me to possess even this merit. We are gravely assured that the figure of Jesus is the natural precipitate of the atmosphere of the age. In the first century of our era the air was full of religious and philosophical ideas. The Jewish Apocalyptic writers had dreamed their dreams and seen their visions. A new ethical note was being struck by the Stoics. A fresh interest in Greek philosophy was manifesting itself in the great centres of learning. The religious rites connected with the Greek mysteries were capturing the imagination of the mass of the people and gaining innumerable devotees. There was a remarkable revival of interest in the Isis and Osiris cults of Egypt, with their legends of a dying and reviving God. The spirit of eclecticism, which was the most prominent characteristic of the *Zeitgeist*, caused all these types of religion, and many other phases of faith and thought as well, to meet and fuse; and out of this vortex—out of this clash of rival spiritual forces—somehow or other, the person of Jesus was precipitated. In other words, the Jesus of the Gospels is the result of the fortuitous concourse of the religious and philosophical atoms which happened to be in existence in the first century.

Now if it had been maintained that the Christian religion was in its origin simply an eclectic faith—an amalgam of all that was best in the existent forms of belief—there would have been something to be said for the position, for Christianity has undoubtedly points of affinity with almost every known phase of faith. Such a theory would not of course carry conviction with it, for Christianity is a seamless robe, and not a patchwork made up of frag-

ments taken at random from twenty different cults; but it would at any rate be within the bounds of possibility. The argument could be answered; but it would command respect, and we should not be able to cover it with ridicule and laugh it out of court.

The question we are debating, however, is not concerned with the origin of the Christian ideas, but with the origin of the Christian facts. The problem is, "How did this farrago of odd fragments succeed in enshrining itself in an imaginary personality like that of Jesus of Nazareth, and when it had done so manage to convince the whole world that this imaginary personality was not a lay-figure constructed for the purpose of showing off a new theological wardrobe, but an actual man who had worn our human flesh and walked the wind-swept hills of Galilee?" The history of religion does not afford a single parallel to such a miracle as this.

Myths of course there have been in plenty; but myths belong to the dawn of history. The mind of man has been accustomed to people the dim hinterland that lies behind the period when actual knowledge commences with mythical figures, both human and divine. In the world's infancy imagination ran riot and conjured up strange beings and endowed them with supernatural powers. But in the first century of our era the human race had long since grown out of its childhood. Men indulged their fancy in art and poetry just as they do to-day, but they did not create contemporary myths. They made gods out of their emperors, of course, but that is a very different thing, because the emperors actually existed before the act of apotheosis. The theory we are discussing maintains that Jesus is a legendary figure who never lived at all. It is one thing to create a Divine Augustus out of an actual emperor; it is quite a different thing to create a Divine

Christ out of nothing at all. What people seldom realise is that Christianity was born into a world which was almost as civilised and cultured as our own, except for the achievements of modern science. The Christ-myth, as these critics are so fond of calling it, was evolved, not in some barbarian tribe on the fringe of civilisation, but in the heart of the great Roman Empire. It is simply useless to cite analogies of myths that have arisen among semi-savage peoples just emerging out of the animistic stage. The Roman Empire had long ago "put away childish things." The age which witnessed the rise of Christianity was almost at the same intellectual level as Europe to-day.

Let us try to imagine a modern parallel. Many of the tendencies which were so prominent in the first century have come to the front again in our modern world. We too have a tendency to become eclectic in our tastes and our beliefs. Our Theosophical movements are not at all unlike certain forms of speculation which existed in the Roman Empire. Now picture the modern Theosophists embodying their creed in an imaginary personality and making this imaginary personality live in India or South Africa in the middle of the nineteenth century. Is it at all conceivable that the whole of the civilised world to-day, Theosophists and non-Theosophists alike, could have been brought to believe that this imaginary personality, this figment of the brain of the Theosophists, was a real man who actually existed, and was the founder of the movement? And yet this is exactly what critics like Drews are trying to persuade us happened in the first century. A theory which is an outrage upon common sense when it is tested under present-day conditions cannot surely have been a possibility in the first century.

When civilisation has reached a certain point—and this is what the critics fail to recognise—it is simply impos-

sible to invent a contemporary mythical figure, especially when there is no basis of fact to build upon. In the early years of the third century an attempt was made by the Neo-Platonists—who were beginning to realise that they could not compete with Christianity unless they had a Christ of their own—to do exactly what Drews supposes the early Christians did when they invented the personality of their founder. The Neo-Platonists possessed many advantages which the Christians lacked. To begin with, they had a historical basis to work upon. They took the figure of Apollonius of Tyana, who was a magician and teacher of repute in the last half of the first century of our era. All they had to do, therefore, was to adapt the life of Apollonius to their own needs, drape the figure with their own clothes and add the halo of divinity. The task was put into the hands of Philostratus, one of the most famous philosophers of the day. The enterprise was backed by the support of the court, the Empress Julia Domna being one of its most eager advocates.

Now if it is possible, as the critics say, to create a myth and impose it upon the world, why did the Neo-Platonists, with all their advantages, fail to invent a rival Christ? How was it that a great system of philosophy, which was able to command the highest literary skill and had the eager support of the Court and the world of fashion at the time—and which, moreover, was fortunate enough to possess a recognised historical figure to wear its drapery —how was it, I ask, that this great system of philosophy found itself unable to do for Apollonius what the despised Christian sect had succeeded in achieving for their Christ —without any of the advantages which Neo-Platonism possessed? If there is any truth in the mythical theory, how is it that Apollonius of Tyana did not supersede Jesus of Nazareth? Why did the elaborate work of Philostratus

fall still-born upon the world, while the simple story of the Evangelists won universal credence? The only answer is that you cannot fool the world. The common sense of the race is sufficiently strong—at any rate in civilised lands—to enable men to distinguish between fact and fiction; and the common sense of mankind in the early centuries recognised that Jesus was a reality, while the greater part of the life of Apollonius of Tyana was pure fiction.

But even if we suppose that the impossible happened, and that by some inconceivable miracle out of the welter and chaos of conflicting creeds in the first century, an imaginary figure arose as if by magic and was projected upon the field of history, would that figure have assumed the form of Jesus of Nazareth? If one thing is certain, it is that Jesus does not incarnate the ideals of any sect or cult that existed in His age: nor does He represent in any sense of the term the common denominator of the various phases of religious belief that existed at the time. The very last thing that can be said of Jesus is that He is a natural child of the *Zeitgeist*. Points of contact of course there are between His teaching and some elements in most of the religious sects of the time; but in every case the differences are far more pronounced than the agreements—and in many cases it is the accidents rather than the essence of the creed and the cult that are in affinity with Christianity. We know from classical literature the ideals that dominated the Græco-Roman world at the time—and for the most part they are in flat contradiction with the spirit of Christ.

But it has sometimes been argued with the utmost seriousness that Jesus is the blossom of the great Apocalyptic movement that exercised such a tremendous influence upon Judaism in the century before His birth. There

is no denying the fact, of course—and no well-informed Christian scholar wishes to deny it—that the Apocalyptic movement did a great deal to prepare the way for the advent of Jesus, and provided some very valuable categories for the interpretation of His person. But I venture to affirm that no man who has made a real and independent study of Jewish Apocalyptic as a whole could ever entertain the idea that it was capable of evolving a personality like the Jesus of the Gospels. Jewish Apocalyptic might conceivably have come to its fruitage in the Book of Revelation—it could never have produced the Gospel of St. Mark, and (in spite of the *Testaments of the twelve Patriarchs*) the Sermon on the Mount. We may confidently throw out a challenge. Let any man who feels the attraction of this theory test it for himself. Let him steep himself in Jewish Literature. Let him read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest the contents of the new Oxford Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, till he has absorbed its spirit and incorporated the very essence of its teaching. And then at the end of this process, when he is so soaked in Apocalyptic that it has become a kind of second nature to him, let him see whether there rises up before his mind the vision of the Christ. Nobody who honestly made this experiment would be in any doubt as to the validity of the hypothesis. Whatever figure the Jewish Apocalypses conjure up before the mind, one thing is quite certain—it is not the figure of Jesus of Nazareth.

The simple fact is this. So far from being the amalgam and resultant of the religious ideals of the age, Jesus for the most part was in radical conflict with them. His greatest foe was always the conventional religion of the time. The Jews crucified Him because they considered His teaching an outrage upon their most cherished convictions. The Græco-Roman world rejected His Gospel

because so much of it appeared to be mere foolishness. If the teaching of Jesus is simply a garland of the best religious ideas of the period—if it is simply the survival and embodiment of the fittest thought culled from all the existing sects—why did it challenge so much criticism and rouse so much opposition? Why the persecutions? Why the martyrdoms? Why did the Roman amphitheatre run red with Christian blood?

No; the hypothesis is impossible. The first century could not have foisted upon the world a mythical Christ, and even if it could have done so, the mythical Christ could never have assumed the form of the Jesus of the Gospels.

But even supposing these two assumptions were within the bounds of possibility and that other parallels could be cited in the first century, there are other rocks upon which the theory would inevitably be wrecked. In the first place, it has not a single shred of tangible evidence on its side. All the available testimony is absolutely unanimous in assuming the reality of the historical Jesus. There is not a single discordant voice. Now if there were any truth at all in the mythical theory, we should surely have found in some type of Christianity or other a trace, if not of a denial of the historicity of Jesus, at any rate of indifference to His earthly life. The only argument that the critics can find in support of their case is based upon the attitude of St. Paul. Now it must be admitted of course that Paul's main interest is in the Eternal Christ rather than the historical Jesus. But though this is true, it is equally certain that Paul always assumes the fact of Christ's earthly life. Take the passage in Galatians, for instance—"God sent forth His Son born of a woman, born under the law." How could Jesus have been born if He never existed at all? Or take the great statement of 1 Corinthians: "I

delivered unto you first of all that which also I received; how that Christ died for our sins . . . that he was buried . . . that he hath been raised on the third day." Here we have an undoubted affirmation of historical facts, and not an allusion to mythological ideas. Moreover, unless Paul had believed that Jesus actually lived and died he could never have reached the theological ideas which form the essence of his teaching. The fact of the historical Jesus lies at the very heart of Paulinism, and without it the Pauline theology crumbles into hopeless ruin. It is not sufficient, as Drews and Kalthoff would like to do, to cut out the definite statements, like those which have been quoted from Galatians and 1 Corinthians. Even if we were prepared to do violence to the principles of criticism and use the amputating knife whenever we were faced with a passage that implied the Christian facts, we should still have to recognise that Paulinism ceases to be Paulinism if you rule out of court those elements which rest upon the assumption of the reality of the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Jesus. No half-measures are of any avail; if the mythical theory is true, then the Pauline Epistles as a whole must be thrown overboard. The mythical theory and the theology of St. Paul cannot exist side by side. You may have the one or you may have the other, but you cannot have both. And what is true of Paulinism is even more true of the rest of the New Testament. While the New Testament exists, it forms an insuperable obstacle in the way of the legendary hypothesis. It is only, as has already been said, by demolishing the New Testament that you can leave the road open for the view of Drews and Kalthoff, and while you have no other grounds for tearing up the New Testament, except the desire to remove an objection to the mythical theory, you are not likely to secure general consent to your act

of vandalism. Your method, after all, is nothing less than critical nihilism of the worst kind. But even if you destroyed the New Testament your work would not be done. You would have to "hack your way through" other documents as well. Josephus of course would not stop you for long, though apart from the main passage, which has always been challenged, there are one or two awkward passages which you would have to devise some means of getting round. But what are you going to do about Tacitus? "Christ," says Tacitus, "from whom the Christians obtained their name, suffered the extreme penalty during the reign of Tiberius at the hands of one of the Procurators, Pontius Pilate." This is a categorical statement written within seventy years of the Crucifixion by the greatest Roman historian of the day—a man without the slightest bias towards Christianity, who regards the Christian religion as an "*exitiabilis superstitio*"—"a damnable superstition." Is it to be supposed that he would have missed the opportunity, if it had been possible for him to prove that the superstition was founded upon a myth? What are you to make of the statement? It is all very well for Drews and Kalthoff to suggest that it is an interpolation, but if you are going to ride roughshod over the evidence in this reckless fashion, there is an end of argument altogether. Then there is Pliny's letter to Trajan. Are we to be told that when Pliny describes the Christians of Bithynia as meeting together in the early dawn and singing hymns to Christ as to a God, both he and they knew that the worship was being paid to an idea and a myth, and not to a real person? Critics who would say that would say anything. It simply means that they have torn up the rules of the game, and abandoned the serious investigation of evidence in the interest of their preconceived views. A theory which can only sub-

stantiate itself by the complete abandonment of critical principles stands self-condemned. And the irony of the situation is this: Drews and Kalthoff have no doubt whatever about the existence of a man like Apollonius of Tyana, though the evidence in his case is infinitely inferior to the testimony which we possess about Jesus Christ. Why should there be one rule for Apollonius and another for Jesus? The whole attitude of the mythical school is a *reductio ad absurdum* of historical inquiry. When you can only establish a proposition by burning the evidence or queering the pitch, you may call your method scientific if you like, but it is simply a travesty of truth, not to say a chaos of dishonesty.

But let us look at the matter from another point of view. Christianity in the early centuries met with the most violent opposition. It was attacked with the utmost vehemence from almost every quarter. No stick that would do to throw at it was ever left lying in the road. How is it that we have had to wait until recent times for the taunt that its founder was a myth and its sacred books a romance? Celsus, for instance, anticipated almost every argument that has been brought against Christianity in modern times—why did he not anticipate this? How is it that he came to leave so potent a weapon of attack lying idle in his arsenal? The only possible answer is that there was absolutely no shadow of doubt about the reality of Jesus in his mind, or the mind of anybody else at the time. The early Christians, according to the mythical theory, so completely imposed upon the ancient world that nobody—not even the most violent antagonists of the new religion—ever had the slightest suspicion of the great deception. Every other sort of charge that hatred and malice found it possible to invent (and rarely have they displayed so much ingenuity) was hurled against

Christianity; but this charge, which had only to be plausibly stated to make the Christian faith the laughing-stock of the world, somehow or other eluded the vigilance of its bitterest opponents. How could the world have been so easily duped and deceived? Here is the Apostle Paul, for instance, if we are to believe the evidence of our documents (and not even Drews and Kalthoff are rash enough to suggest that all the documents of the New Testament are pure fabrications)—here is the Apostle Paul about the year 50 preaching the Christ-myth in the cities of Asia. He has made many enemies in the course of his career and they are dogging his footsteps, only too anxious to catch him tripping in some statement. Many of them have come from Palestine itself, and may therefore be presumed to know the facts. Could anything have been more fatuous under the circumstances than the Apostle's proclamation of a Gospel which had at its very centre a belief in the saving efficacy of the death of a man who *ex hypothesi* had never lived? If the mythical theory has any truth in it at all, it is the most inexplicable fact in human history that St. Paul's fierce and implacable opponents should have permitted him to go on preaching his arch-error without the slightest demur. The bubble might have been pricked at the very outset—and yet nobody did it. We cannot assume collusion, for the hostility was too bitter to admit of that. There can be only one explanation. Paul was never challenged upon the point, because it never occurred to anybody to challenge a fact that was indisputable and beyond the slightest suspicion of doubt.

The mythical theory could never have grown up in an atmosphere and amid circumstances such as the New Testament describes. It would have needed fifty years at any rate of isolation and seclusion. You can imagine

conditions under which it might have been possible for such a legend to originate. If, for instance, it had sprung up in the community of the Essenes, living in their quiet backwater apart from the main stream of the world's life, the difficulty would have been much less. You might picture them in their solitudes, brooding over the Old Testament, drinking in with avidity the great utterances of the Apocalyptists, studying with wistful eagerness the long train of Messianic prophecies, and gradually giving shape to their dreams and visions. You can see how a great teacher might in some moment of inspiration adumbrate a shadowy form, as an embodiment of the high ideal, just as the Stoics tried to incarnate their philosophy in a nebulous figure, which they called "The Wise Man." Then, in the process of the years, you can imagine this shadowy form taking concrete shape and assuming actuality. Gradually it takes upon itself a local habitation and a name. Traditions cluster round it, and at last the myth is complete. That is how it might have happened, and according to Drews that is how it must have happened. As a matter of fact, however, that is just how it did not happen. Christianity did not originate in a backwater. "These things were not done in a corner." It is not the child of seclusion. It did not wait for fifty years before it threw its gauntlet at the world. No—if facts count for anything—it is quite certain that Christianity challenged mankind at a date when it was quite possible to obtain the most ample evidence to prove that its main positions were radically wrong. The Christian faith developed in the fierce light that beats upon a new religion. It fought every inch of its way against "clenched antagonisms." The conditions which would have made the evolution of a "dream-figure" possible were all of them absent. You cannot transform a "dream-figure" into an actual man,

in the teeth of opposition, while it is still possible for your enemies to prove that you are wrong. If the Christ-myth had burst upon the world in the year 100, the case might have been different; but in the year 50 the hypothesis is absolutely incredible.

Once more: if there were any truth at all in the mythical theory, we ought to find some evidence of it in our Gospel narratives. I know of course that Drews and Kalthoff try to find some sort of argument in favour of their views in the fact that the Gospel narrative contains some unusual elements. Look at the story of the Virgin Birth, they say—look at the miracles, look at the account of the Resurrection. These are obviously legends, and they could not possibly be woven into the life of an actual man. Well, of course, this is begging the question with a vengeance. I should be the last man in the world to admit that the miracles and resurrection of Jesus belong to the category of legends; but let us for the moment—merely for the sake of argument—admit that the contention is true, and that the supernatural elements have to be eliminated before you can get to the actual historical Jesus. The fact that such a process is necessary does not destroy the value of the narrative. Have the critics forgotten Apollonius of Tyana? His life, as it is written by Philostratus, is full of marvels that never could have happened, and yet no question is raised as to the fact of his existence. Why, I ask again, should there be one rule for Apollonius of Tyana, and another for Jesus of Nazareth? Moreover, as Mr. F. C. Conybeare has shown in his excellent little book on the "Historic Christ," there are plenty of other instances where mythical elements have been inserted into biographies, and yet there are no doubts of the existence of the hero. Few of the great names in antiquity would be able to stand the test which these radical critics insist upon applying

to Jesus. We shall have to revise many of our historical judgments if we are to accept the principles of the new school. For instance, we have been accustomed to start our study of the constitutional history of Greece from Solon, and to regard him as the source and fountain-head of Hellenic law. But when we come to look into the facts we find that our chief source of information—Plutarch and Diogenes—lived seven or eight hundred years after him, and that their narrative is full of contradictory and apocryphal stories. Now if Jesus has to be sacrificed because of so-called legendary material in the records which were written not seven hundred, but only seventy years after His birth, it is simply ridiculous to believe any longer in Solon. And what about Plato? His name only occurs twice in the writings that bear his name, and according to the Drews method these might easily be regarded as interpolations. The two documents which pretend to give us information about his life—i.e., those of Aristoxenus and Speusippus—contain stories which cannot be true; among them, for instance, a parallel to the Virgin-Birth. The conclusion is therefore apparent. On the presuppositions of the mythical theory the probabilities against the existence of Plato are much more certain than against the existence of Christ. In fact, if we pressed the principles of Drews and Kalthoff in other cases, there is scarcely a life in the ancient world that would survive the test. If Jesus has to go, most of the familiar figures of the ancient world must go with Him. The most fatal objection of all to the critical methods of the mythical school is that if they are rigidly applied, they render null and void most of the knowledge which we think we possess of ancient times. The result is simply nihilism. The foundation is cut from beneath historical science—at any rate in its investigations of ancient history—and everything becomes a blank.

There is nothing in the New Testament, therefore, that affords anything like solid support for the mythical theory. On the contrary, the evidence is diametrically opposed to such a view. The life of Jesus—especially as it is depicted in the earlier documents—has none of the marks of a legend. The portrait drawn by Mark, for instance, is so natural and so human that the question has often been raised as to whether it ever rises into the category of the Divine at all. "Did Jesus hold that He was more than man, and if so, how far up in the scale of being did He place Himself?" asks Weinel in his recently translated book, *Jesus in the Nineteenth Century*, and gives as his reply, "We believe it to be a scientific duty to confess that to-day we cannot answer the question with certainty." Now I do not for a moment believe that Weinel is right: it seems to me that the evidence is quite clear and decisive upon the point; but the fact that there should be any doubt about the matter at all, and that Weinel should be able to pen a sentence like this, seems to me to be absolutely fatal to the mythical theory. Let us suppose that the mythical hypothesis is true. What form must the Gospels have assumed in that case? The theory is, of course, that you start with a Christ-idea—an idea that has been derived from current philosophy and religion. This idea gradually takes concrete form in the shape of legend. A Saviour-God becomes clothed with flesh and blood, and assumes human lineaments. Little by little the process of humanisation proceeds, until at last you get the semblance of a man. Here, then, are your stages. First of all a mere idea. Then a dim hazy figure invented to wear the drapery of that idea and all that the idea implied. hen the addition of all the paraphernalia of available myth and legend. Then, finally, the launching of the idea—as a full-fledged man—upon the plane of history

Now is this what you get in the New Testament? What ought to have been the order of the books if this theory were true? Well, I suppose the nearest approach to the Christ-idea is to be found in the conception of the Logos in the Prologue of the fourth gospel—and even that cannot be described as representing the earliest stage in the mythical process, for the Logos of the fourth gospel is not an abstract idea, but a personality. But even supposing that the two by some stretch of imagination could be identified, you will see at once that we are simply confusing the end with the beginning. The Prologue to the fourth gospel is known to be the last word in the Christology of the New Testament, whereas it ought to have been the first. What is now, as everybody admits, the climax of the thought of the New Testament ought to have been its starting point. It took the Church seventy years, at any rate, to reach the Logos conception of Christ—it ought not to have taken a single day. Then the next stage—if the mythical theory were true—would be the Epistles of St. Paul. Of course you would have to strike out all the passages about the earthly relationships of Jesus. He could not have had "brethren" for instance, at this stage, nor have been "born of a woman," nor have instituted a memorial supper. And the allusions to the death and Resurrection must be taken as metaphorical. With these excisions and this interpretation, the mystical doctrine of the Eternal Christ and the Christological utterances of the later Epistles (when denuded of their historical basis) may very well be taken as representing the second stage in the process of the development. Then, thirdly, we have the fourth gospel (as distinct from the Prologue to it), where the Christ-idea is incarnate in human form, and where you get a quasi-historical figure shrouded, of course, in legend and not yet thoroughly human—still well on

the way to humanisation. The one unfortunate thing about the fourth gospel is the author's explicit statement that the book was written to prove that "Jesus was the Christ the Son of God." Now on the supposition that the mythical theory is true, it ought to have been written to prove that the Christ was Jesus, or, in other words, that the Christ-idea had been embodied in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. It is really most unsympathetic of the writer of the fourth gospel (from the point of view of Drews of course) to set out to prove the wrong theory, but we can comfort ourselves with the thought that possibly the verse is an interpolation, written in ignorance and confusion of thought. The Epistle to the Hebrews belongs to the same stage. In it the Christ-idea is still predominant, but it is linked with human touches that imply its embodiment in an actual life. The final stage is reached in the synoptic gospels, and particularly in St. Mark. The Christ-idea has now receded completely into the background and has been superseded by the figure of Jesus. The great theological conceptions which marked the earlier developments have gone, or almost gone, and we are left with a kind of human statue which has thrown off the garments it was formed to wear. Such is the only way in which the New Testament could have originated if Drew is right. First must have come the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel or something similar to it; then the Epistles of St. Paul in an expurgated form and the latest first; then the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews; finally the Synoptic Gospels, with St. Mark last of all. But such a theory only needs to be stated to show the folly of the mythical view. If there is one assured fact of criticism, it is that Mark is the earliest gospel and not the latest; and if there is another certainty, it is that the fourth gospel comes very late. The actual course of

development was the exact opposite to that which the mythical theory assumes. The early Christians did not start with an idea and end with a hero. They started with a hero and a Redeemer and ended with a theology. The mythical theory inverts altogether the real order of events. You cannot derive the synoptic gospels from the epistles of St. Paul, and I venture to add you can only explain the epistles of St. Paul on the assumption that the synoptic gospels contain substantially a faithful record of events.

Much more might be said. From whatever point of view you examine the mythical theory, and in whatever balances you weigh it, it is always found wanting. You cannot destroy the greatest figure that has appeared in history without making history itself as great a desolation as Rheims or Louvain. If the Christ goes, everything goes, and chaos results—chaos in history, chaos in criticism, chaos in faith. The whole world—of which He was the centre—falls to destruction around us, and we are left amid the ruins, bankrupt of knowledge, bankrupt of history, and, above all, bankrupt of faith. The place once occupied by Christ will be filled by Nietzsche or some one worse, and the world will sink into decrepitude and barbarism once again.

H. T. Andrews.

THE WORK OF ST. LUKE: A HISTORICAL APOLOGY FOR PAULINE PREACHING BEFORE THE ROMAN COURT. A REPLY.

It is gratifying to find that British hospitality to our Belgian guests is not confined to the consideration of their material interests only, such as food and shelter, but that our best periodicals offer to the scholars among them a welcome as warm and as cordial as that of the many homes where those who have been so cruelly and ruthlessly separated from their own have found a much-needed refuge. The December number of the Expositor was of particular interest because among its contents were to be found articles from the pens of two noted Belgian professors, Dr. Van Hoonacker, who has been since selected to deliver the Schweich Lecture during the current year, and Dr. D. Plooij. Their contributions, quite apart from their intrinsic values, which it is needless to say were very considerable, made a strong appeal owing to the pathetic conditions under which the authors found themselves among us. The following pages are concerned with only one of these articles, viz. that of Dr. Plooij, in which he attempts to show that the Lucan writings constituted primarily a historical, legal defence of St. Paul before a Roman tribunal, and that they were definitely composed for the information of some of the juridical advisers of the reigning Emperor. To use Dr. Plooij's own words, "St. Luke tried to be the able and eloquent barrister of St. Paul. He succeeded, and his confidence in Roman Law, at least for the case he defended, has been confirmed."[1] I do not remember to have seen it suggested before that the Lucan writings as a whole, including the Third Gospel and the Acts, had a forensic

[1] Expositor, viii. 8, p. 522.

motive, although the idea that the Acts possessed something of the character of an apology for St. Paul and Pauline Christianity is familiar enough. The theory in question as developed by Dr. Plooij in the EXPOSITOR, is in very capable hands, and is supported by all the scholarship at the learned Professor's disposal, and yet, in spite of the undeniable ability with which the case is stated, it fails to be convincing.

To put the matter briefly, Dr. Plooij's position is this. The Acts was written at the point of time where the narrative in the book ends, i.e., at the close of the period of two years which St. Paul spent as a prisoner in his own hired dwelling, and immediately before the commencement of his trial. But it was not only the Acts that was composed at this particular time, for Dr. Plooij's theory demands that St. Luke's Gospel must have been written practically at the same time, so that we are led to understand that we have in the Gospel and the Acts not two separate books, but one book written continuously and without any substantial break between them, and composed with the definite object of providing one or more of the Roman officials, who were in a position to influence the course of St. Paul's trial, with a complete exposition of the history and character of Christianity in general, and of the life and work of St. Paul in particular. The document was to be of such a nature as to contain all the facts relevant to the issue, and St. Luke, therefore, began with the beginning of the Gospel of Jesus and ended where the facts are at an end, *πεπληροφορημένων πραγμάτων* (St. Luke i. 1), a point which the historian only reaches, according to Dr. Plooij, at the termination of the Acts. He finds a confirmation of his theory in the closing words of the book, "teaching the things concerning the Lord Jesus Christ with all boldness, none forbidding him," where we reach the climax and peroration of St. Luke's historical

apology. "The very preaching for which St. Paul has been traduced by the Jews, and for which he will have to justify himself before the Emperor, has been continued by him in Rome, even under the eyes of the *præfectus prætorio* who was responsible for his behaviour, and neither this high authority nor any of the Roman officials has anyhow hindered or forbidden him."[1] Dr. Plooij suggests that this written defence was intended for the edification of Seneca and of Burrhus, the *præfectus prætorio*, whom he identifies with the στρατοπεδάρχης of Acts xxviii. 16 (Bezan Text), both of whom belonged to the *consilium* of the Emperor and would be consulted by him before he finally decided on his verdict.

In the emphasis with which the hostility of the Jews towards the Apostle and towards Christians generally is marked in the documents our writer sees an intention on St. Luke's part to counteract the influence of Poppaea, the Jewish proselyte, upon Nero and his immediate *entourage*.

There is much in the article that commands unhesitating approval, but as a proof of Dr. Plooij's main thesis it cannot be pronounced very satisfactory. It is particularly pleasing to find a scholar of his standing accepting whole-heartedly the Lucan authorship of the Third Gospel and the Acts and expressing such a high appreciation of St. Luke's qualities as a historian, and thus affording such a refreshing contrast to the criticism of the Acts which is typical of continental scholars generally, with the notable exceptions of Zahn and Harnack.

Before dealing with Dr. Plooij's theory as a whole it may be well to point out two or three matters of detail where he does not seem to be in accord with more recent opinion.

(*a*) He apparently gives the πραιτώριον of Philippians

[1] U.s.p. p. 515.

i. 13 a local sense and identifies it with either the Praetorian Camp at the Porta Viminalis, or with the Praetorian barracks attached to the Imperial palace, and maintains that when the Epistle to the Philippians was written the Apostle had been removed from his hired dwelling and was now undergoing a closer imprisonment within the camp or the barracks. The best authorities have now, however, abandoned the local meaning of this term and interpret it of persons, as referring either to the Praetorian Guard, a suggestion which has the powerful support of Marquardt and Mommsen, or, if we follow Ramsay and some others, to the whole body of persons connected with the trial, including the Praefects of the Praetorian Guard and the high officials of the court. The theory that St. Paul, when he was writing the Philippian letter, had been removed from the *custodia libera* in his hired dwelling and was in close custody within the barracks is not viewed with much favour now, and the whole tone of the Epistle, with its cheerfulness and its hopefulness, tells strongly against the suggestion. It is hardly possible to imagine how the conditions delineated in that letter could be compatible with a rigorous imprisonment within barrack walls. The Apostle's intimate knowledge of the progress of the Roman Church and the manifest personal influence that he exerted upon it, the receiving and sending of messengers, letters and gifts, the intercourse with disciples and friends, and the free access to him which all this implies, speak of a comparatively mild confinement, such as that to which he was subjected on his first arrival in Rome and which he apparently still enjoyed when he wrote to the Philippian Church.

(*b*) A second point of detail deserving of attention is the sense in which Dr. Plooij regards the στρατοπεδάρχης in the Bezan text of Acts xxviii. 16. ὁ ἑκατοντάρχης παρέδωκε τοὺς δεσμίους τῷ στρατοπέδάρχῃ. He interprets this as

the title of the *præfectus prætorio* and utilises the identification to support the supposition that one copy of the Lucan writings was meant for Burrhus, who then held that office. The fact that the prisoner was delivered into his custody was omitted from the copy delivered to Burrhus and only the generous treatment meted out to his prisoner, Paul, mentioned with gratitude, and this, according to Dr. Plooij, accounts for the reading in the most authoritative MSS., where this sentence is not found. Our author is well aware that his interpretation of the term is strongly questioned, but is unwilling to accept what is now generally regarded as a more satisfactory rendering of it. In an Old Latin version of the Bezan text the term appears as *princeps peregrinorum*, a phrase the meaning of which gave rise to a considerable amount of conjecture, and for which no very adequate explanation was forthcoming until Mommsen discovered that there existed in Rome a camp called the *Castra Peregrinorum*, which stood on the Caelian Hill, and in which were assembled the officers and men belonging to the legions on foreign service who happened to be in Rome on temporary duty.

Mommsen's theory is that it was the commandant of this camp who was referred to in the Old Latin MS. as *princeps peregrinorum*, and that it was to this officer that Julius, the centurion, himself separated from his unit, reported himself and handed over his prisoner. A "concentration camp" of this nature, where individuals temporarily separated from their units find a home, is a well known feature of our military system in time of war, and, speaking from my own knowledge, I may say that the procedure outlined above harmonises exactly with our own military practice.

(*c*) Another point of doubtful certainty is the very intimate knowledge of St. Paul and his teaching on the part

of Seneca which Dr. Plooij is prepared to endorse, and which he utilises to buttress his theory. The very striking parallels that he finds between the writings of Seneca, whom he identifies with the "Theophilus" of St. Luke's "prefaces," and the teaching of St. Paul he traces to the fact that the former was in possession of actual copies of the Lucan writings. Now that there are parallels, and very remarkable parallels, between Seneca's phrases and sentiments and passages in St. Paul's letters is beyond doubt, but the objections to the theory that Seneca was directly influenced by St. Paul personally or through his letters are weighty and numerous. Most important of all is the chronological difficulty. Even if we accept Dr. Plooij's date of the composition of the Gospel and the Acts they could hardly have been published before the end of 61 A.D. Seneca retired from public life in 62 and died in 65 A.D., leaving an interval of four years at most wherein to account for the Lucan or Pauline influences upon him which are demanded by this theory. Again, there is no difference in this respect between Seneca's earlier and later writings. They all in an equal degree exhibit parallels with Christian teaching, and yet the earlier writings could not possibly have been influenced by St. Paul or St. Luke. A further difficulty consists in the fact that the so-called Christian sentiments in Seneca's work have as much in common with New Testament writings known to have appeared after his death, such as the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Gospel of St. John, as they have with the Pauline Epistles. It is, therefore, a much more plausible explanation that what is common to the works of Seneca and the Christian writings is due, not to their interdependence, but to the dependence of all upon the philosophic culture of the age in which they lived. In the case of St. Paul and Seneca we may trace perhaps the influence of Athenodorus, the

famous Stoic teacher of Tarsus, who afterwards spent some years in Rome and died there in Cato's house.[1] Dr. Plooij rejects the usual interpretation of the verb κατηχεῖσθαι in St. Luke ii. 4 as referring to previous Christian instruction on the part of Theophilus. He maintains that it need imply nothing more than a certain acquaintance with the history and teaching of Christianity on the part of the official to whom the document was addressed. The word does undoubtedly bear this meaning in Acts xxi. 21 and 24, but, without claiming that the word as used in the Gospel has the sense which it possessed later and that Theophilus is here definitely referred to as a "catechumen," the balance of evidence, even within the New Testament itself, is in favour of regarding it as a decisive indication that he was a Christian disciple.

It is noteworthy that in all the three points to which I have drawn attention Dr. Plooij bases his conclusions almost entirely upon the authority of Zahn. Now it is possible to speak of Zahn with all the respect due to the splendid services of that veteran teacher without necessarily accepting his pronouncements upon every disputed point as authoritative and decisive, and I have produced reasons to show that in all these three instances he is possibly mistaken.

I might also observe at this point that Dr. Plooij's conception of the Acts as a pyramid with the Gospel of Jesus as its base and completed by a series of gradually narrowing layers, consisting of the foundation of the Church of Jerusalem, the missionary work of the first Church, the missionary work of St. Paul, and culminating in a point with the arrival and presence of the Apostle in Rome, is not very apposite. An inverted pyramid with the Gospel of Jesus as its point, and then gradually broadening until it reaches its climax in the wide vision of Christianity as the religion of Empire

[1] See Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 354.

and of the world, is a very much more correct description of the plan and development of the historical work of St. Luke.

And now to return to our author's main thesis.

In order to establish his theory Dr. Plooij has to prove first of all that the Third Gospel and the Acts were written at one and the same time and with one single objective. Now that these two documents bear the closest relation to each other and that the second is put forth as a definite sequel to the first are points that call for no discussion, but this is not quite the same thing as our author's contention that they are two parts of one book, composed continuously during one and the same period. The relation between them is not that of the first and second parts of the same volume, published at one particular time, but rather that of the first and second volumes of an extended work, the latter of which followed its predecessor after a substantial interval of time. That this is the case is conclusively proved by a careful study of the language of the preface to either book. Dr. Plooij takes it for granted, as do also some other authorities,[1] that St. Luke's introduction or prologue to the Gospel is intended to cover both the Gospel and the Acts, and interprets the *πεπληροφορημένων πραγμάτων* of St. Luke i. 1 as arriving at their fulfilment only when we reach the incidents recorded in the last chapter of the Acts. It is difficult, however, to see how the introduction can bear this interpretation.

Let us take two expressions only in this passage and examine them in the light of this contention. We shall then realise immediately the difficulty of applying them to both the Lucan writings.

(1) "Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to draw up a narrative concerning those matters which have been

[1] See Vernon Bartlet, *Apostolic Age*, p. 410.

fulfilled among us." Now while there is abundant evidence that there had been attempts to draw up narratives of the facts of our Lord's ministry and records of His teaching previous to the appearance of St. Luke's Gospel there is no trace whatsoever of any similar attempt to construct on any comprehensive scale the history of the primitive Christian Church. The difference between the books in this respect is emphasised by St. Luke himself, who, in his preface to the Acts, in striking contrast to the statement at the opening of the Gospel, gives no hint of any previous document of the same character as the writing he is embarking upon. The two prefaces are in absolute harmony with the facts as far as they are known to us. Gospels, or quasi-gospels, did undoubtedly exist before St. Luke wrote his, but although there might have been fragments describing the life and progress of the Church in certain localities, which the historian utilised for his own purposes, anything like a general history of the primitive and Pauline Church, apart from the Acts, is conspicuous by its absence.

(2) "Even as they delivered them unto us, *who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word.*"

It is more than probable that the sources which St. Luke made use of in the compilation of his Gospel did actually originate with those who "from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word," but it is absolutely certain that the greater part of the Acts was derived from quarters which are not covered by the terms of this reference. St. Philip, from whom he probably derived much of the material contained in the early chapters of the Acts,[1] was apparently a Hellenistic Jew, and in all likelihood was not a member of the original circle of Christ's disciples. To St. Paul, St. Luke must have been indebted for a very considerable section of the book, and even if we adopt the

[1] See the author's *New Testament in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 239–242.

suggestion confidently put forward by J. Weiss, J. H. Moulton, and Ramsay that the Apostle had seen and known our Lord, he was certainly not "from the beginning an eyewitness and minister of the word." We cannot decide with absolute confidence whether St. Luke himself, who supplied from his own knowledge of the most important material incorporated in the Acts, was a personal disciple of Christ or not, although the evidence we possess does not favour the supposition and we can attach but very little weight to the tradition that he was one of the Seventy. But even if he had been a disciple he would hardly have described himself as "drawing up a narrative concerning those matters which have been fulfilled among us even as they delivered them unto us, which from the beginning were eyewitnesses," seeing that he himself had been an eyewitness of a very substantial proportion of the events that he narrates in this particular book. The introduction, then, fits the Gospel exactly but is hopelessly out of place as a prologue to a book which was to include the Acts as well as the Gospel. The Gospel is self-contained and complete in itself and the *πεπληροφορημένων πραγμάτων* find their fulfilment within its own limits, and it is manifestly inaccurate to extend the meaning of this expression so as to cover the further events told us by St. Luke in the Acts. It is impossible that the Evangelist had the intention to issue a second volume dealing with the history of the Church when he started to write his Gospel, but there is nothing in the latter to help us to this conclusion.

The preface to the Acts fully bears out what we have maintained with reference to the self-containedness and completeness of St. Luke's Gospel. Without stopping to argue the point whether *πρῶτος* in Acts i. 1 is to be interpreted in its strict grammatical sense as the first of more than two books, and whether, in consequence, the Acts

is the second in a series of three books, or whether it is simply used loosely for πρότερος, as would seem to be the case elsewhere in the Lucan writings, it is fairly evident that it is meant to mark a new departure and to define an important distinction between this attempt and its predecessor. It is difficult to imagine an author who was simply entering on the second part of one and the same volume, making use of this very definite and distinctive language. Too much weight need not be attached possibly to the use of the aorist in ἐποιησάμεν in the same connexion, although Dr. Plooij builds a similar argument upon the use of the tense in ἐνέμεινεν in Acts xxviii. 30 to prove that St. Paul had completed the two years in his hired dwelling at that point and had been moved elsewhere into more rigorous confinement. The combined effect of the two prefaces is, however, to show conclusively that we are not dealing with two parts of one single document, composed at one and the same time, but with two books, each complete in itself and written and published at different times. Dr. Plooij's theory that the Lucan writings as a whole were intended as a historical and legal defence of St. Paul for the information of the Emperor's assessors at the trial must, therefore, be pronounced untenable.

But although both the Gospel and the Acts cannot be pressed into service here there still remains the possibility that the Acts alone may have been destined to serve this purpose, as has been maintained by Blass and Rackham. We will, therefore, proceed to examine the narrower issue. Now in order to render this possible in the case of the Acts two conditions must be fulfilled.

(1) It must have been written before the trial, and *a fortiori* before the death of St. Paul.

The question of the date of the Acts was considered in detail by the present writer in the Expositor for March,

1914,[1] where it was shown that Harnack's arguments in favour of a date for the composition of the book previous to the death of St. Paul were most precarious and in no wise established the theory which he set out to prove in his volume on *The Date of the Synoptic Gospels and the Acts*; and it is, therefore, unnecessary to go over the ground again. I would only emphasise once again the fact that Harnack's own definition of the purpose of the Acts as destined "to describe the progress of the Gospel across the world from Jerusalem to Rome" fully explains the method of its composition and its apparently abrupt ending. When that object was achieved with the arrival of the Gospel at Rome in the person of its greatest representative the historian's purpose had reached its appointed end, and the second Lucan book reaches its climax in that event just as surely as the first comes to its crowning point with the Ascension of our Lord. It is only necessary here, therefore, to reiterate the opinion expressed in my previous article, that the peculiar conclusion of the Acts does not imply that the book was written before the trial and death of the Apostle. It has always seemed to me that if the book was intended to trace the life and activity of St. Paul right up to his trial it must be pronounced most unsatisfactory from the historian's point of view. As a description of "the progress of the Gospel from Jerusalem to Rome" it is adequate and complete and comes to an end exactly at the right moment, but if it was meant to carry the story to the end of St. Paul's two years' imprisonment why is his work in the Imperial city treated with such scant courtesy as compared with the elaborate descriptions of his ministry in the great provincial centres, Antioch, Ephesus, and Corinth? That there was no lack of incident or of material of consuming interest to the historian of early Christianity

[1] See *Harnack on the date of the Synoptic Gospels and Acts.*

is amply proved by the contents of the Epistles of the Captivity, and more especially of The Epistle to the Philippians, and yet St. Luke gives us the narrative of one incident only at Rome, viz., the Apostle's reception by the Jews immediately after his arrival in the city, and closes the book with a description, couched in the most general terms, of his condition and surroundings during the remainder of his stay in Rome.

How are we to account for the palpable difference between his method of treating St. Paul's ministry at Rome and the detailed treatment his work in less important cities has received? The explanation is to my mind a simple one. He had brought the Apostle to Rome, and when he had reached this point his purpose was completed and anything beyond this was irrelevant and unnecessary. Nothing now remained but to round up his narrative and to bring it to a speedy conclusion. The closing paragraph may not display the Lucan style at its best and yet it is full of significance. The great Apostle of the Graeco-Roman world had reached the Imperial capital, and from that centre the Gospel which he preached was to radiate into every corner of that vast dominion "until the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of the Lord."

(2) The second condition that must be fulfilled, if the theory that the Acts was written for the purpose of providing a historical, legal defence of St. Paul is to stand, is that the Apostle must have been tried on the charge of having professed and promulgated the Christian religion. To no other charge can the Acts be considered a relevant defence. From beginning to end the writer has but one object in view, to present to the world a careful, accurate, and authentic history of the character of the Christian religion and of the growth of the Christian Church from the day which saw its birth as a conscious entity to the moment

when it stood forth in Rome as a claimant for the homage of the Empire. But all the evidence goes to prove that St. Paul was not tried on a purely religious issue. The charges which he had to face are definitely formulated more than once in the Acts. In the letter of Claudius Lysias to Felix he describes the prisoner as being "accused about questions of their law," i.e. the Jews' law (Acts xxiii. 29). These accusations are framed even more precisely in the speech of Tertullus at the hearing before Felix. "We have found this man a pestilent fellow and a mover of insurrection among all the Jews throughout the world, and a ring-leader of the sect of the Nazarenes, who moreover assayed to profane the temple" (Acts xxv. 6).

The testimony of Festus is again quite clear. "They brought no charge of such evil things as I supposed, but had certain questions against him of their own religion, and of one Jesus, who was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive" (Acts xxv. 26–27).

Now it is quite clear from the passages cited that while the Jews attempted to involve the Apostle in a crime based on his religious views and utterances the effort ended in absolute failure. The Roman officials attached no weight to this element in the charge and brushed it aside with the deepest contempt. The action of Gallio at Corinth and of the "town clerk" at Ephesus corresponds exactly with that of the other Roman authorities who were concerned in the various stages of St. Paul's trial. The religion which St. Paul preached was to them nothing more than a sectarian form or offshoot of Judaism, in which they took no interest and which they regarded as in no wise a serious offence against the laws of the Empire. The dangerous element in the charges brought against the Apostle was that of being a turbulent fellow who stirred up strife and sedition in the principal cities of the provinces and thus offended against

the Roman's strict idea of law and order and became a menace to the peace of the Empire. There is not a particle of evidence that the preaching of Christianity, as such, was *as yet* regarded by any Roman official as a crime against the Empire, or that any defence such as the Acts would constitute was in any way called for.

Again, we can form a fairly accurate idea of the kind of *apologia* that St. Luke thought suitable to meet the charges which St. Paul had to face by studying the speeches which the Apostle is represented as having delivered in his own defence, as they are found incorporated in the Acts. If they are approximately correct transcriptions of historical Pauline defences, as I believe them to be, they would have exercised considerable influence upon St. Luke if he were ever called upon to frame a defence of the Apostle. If, on the other hand, these speeches are only Lucan compositions, representing what the author thought St. Paul ought to have said on these occasions, which is the view of many critics, they then give us the exact form which a Lucan *apologia* would take. Now when we examine the trial speeches of St. Paul we are at once struck by the fact that in every case they are almost exclusively concerned with his own life, first as a Jew and afterwards as a Christian, and that there is a conspicuous absence of any attempt to introduce irrelevant matter or anything like a general defence of Christianity. This is true of every speech, whether delivered before Jews or before Roman provincial authorities. In only one instance do we find a slight tendency to diverge from the direct path, viz., in the speech before Herod Agrippa, where such topics as the general resurrection and the death and resurrection of Christ are glanced at, and in this case the historian is careful to explain that St. Paul's procedure was due to Agrippa's acquaintance with, and interest in such

questions. St. Paul was charged, not with being a Christian, but with stirring up tumult and insurrection, and his defence was, in every instance, framed to rebut this accusation. Now compare the Acts with its endless ramifications, its detailed history of the primitive Church at Jerusalem and of its extension to the provinces by the labours of St. Peter and St. Philip, its account of the Judaistic controversy, with one of the Pauline speeches, and we at once realise the immense gap that separates it from what St. Luke evidently regarded as a valid and adequate defence of St. Paul. That St. Luke in writing the Acts had an apologetic motive is, I think, quite clear from the character of the book. I agree with every word that Dr. Plooij writes concerning the Roman sympathies of the author of the Acts, and his admiration of Roman justice. The whole trend of the narrative is to define the friendly relations which existed between the Christian religion in the person of its greatest and most renowned exponent and the Empire as represented by the Imperial officials of the provinces, and we note particularly the anxiety displayed by the historian to make it clear how absolute was the acquittal of the Apostle in those stages of the trial which preceded his appearances before his Imperial tribunal at Rome, how out of three Roman officials, two, viz. Claudius Lysias and Festus, had declared his innocence while a third had shown him considerable favour. Nor need we quarrel with the emphasis put by Dr. Plooij on the last paragraph of the Acts where St. Luke describes in one comprehensive and significant word ἀκωλύτως the character of the Roman policy towards Christianity as illustrated by the attitude of the Roman officials towards St. Paul in Rome itself.

But the Acts speaks of a later period than the time when Christianity was not yet regarded as a menace to the Empire, of a period when "the Name" was in itself a crime, and

when Christians were proscribed, hunted out, and hounded to their deaths simply because they were Christians, and apart from any other misdemeanour. It speaks of a time of a great persecution, when the heart of one who, a Roman himself, had been proud of Roman law and Roman justice, was now filled with fear and shame as he witnessed both these splendid qualities dragged in the dust and being made the instruments of an Emperor's cruel passions against the followers of Christ. I may here venture to quote a paragraph of Ramsay's in which he gives a striking description of the apologetic motive of the Acts. "It was an appeal to the truth of history against the immoral and ruinous policy of the reigning Emperor (Domitian): a temperate and solemn record by one who had played a great part in them of the real facts regarding the formation of the Church, its steady and unswerving loyalty in the past, its firm resolve to accept the facts of Imperial government, its friendly reception by many Romans, and its triumphant vindication in the first great trial at Rome." [1]

But even though this be granted the apologetic motive in the Acts is after all only secondary and not primary, and it seems to me that we are doing less than justice to St. Luke himself and to his noble compositions if we regard them as merely a defence, whether of St. Paul personally or of Christianity as a whole. The apologetic purpose was not the main impulse which governed the action of St. Luke. His real motive is clearly set forth in the prologue to the Gospel. He was impelled by the instinct of the true historian to convey accurate information and to preserve the remembrance of great deeds, but not for the mere benefit of an official, however exalted in rank, but for the edification and salvation of the great Graeco-Roman world with its manifold populations and interests. He had seen a vision

[1] Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 309.

which is apparent on every page that he wrote, a vision of the development of that movement which began in its humble surroundings at Bethlehem. He traces it through all the stages of its growth until it stands firmly established in the Imperial city itself, not yet actually in possession of the Empire, but full of the promise of its Imperial and world-wide inheritance in the future. The message of the Angel, "I bring you good tidings of great joy which shall be to all people" (St. Luke ii. 10) is a better description of the motive and scope of St. Luke's great work than any words we can invent, and I am of opinion that they contain a much nobler conception of the aim and purpose of the Lucan writings than the theory so ably put forth by Dr. Plooij.

MAURICE JONES.

AGAIN THE EPHESIAN IMPRISONMENT OF PAUL.

In the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, xxix. 2 (1910), pp. 181–189, Dr. Benjamin W. Robinson contributed an article suggested by his teacher Professor Deissmann of Berlin, entitled "An Ephesian Imprisonment of Paul." Deissmann holds Ephesus to be the place of writing of the four "Epistles of Captivity," Colossians, Ephesians, Philemon and Philippians.[1] On the basis of internal evidence drawn from these Epistles and of a local tradition of unknown age which designates a square tower on a small elevation to the west of the principal ruins of Ephesus "the prison of St. Paul," Dr. Robinson argues in favour of Deissmann's view, at least as regards the group Colossians–Ephesians–Philemon. He very kindly acknowledges a suggestion of my own (made in private consultation for the purpose of determining the true antiquity and value of the local tradition without prejudice on the main issue), that the *Acts of Paul and Thekla*, a second-century romance to which Ramsay attaches great historical value, and which at least shows acquaintance with geographical data of this region and period, Paul is represented as a prisoner at Ephesus.[2]

The question has been recently revived by Professor Kirsopp Lake, who contributes to The Expositor (VIII. 42, June 1914, pp. 481–493) an article entitled "The Critical Problems of the Epistle to the Philippians," in which he renews the arguments of Deissmann and Albertz for the derivation of Philippians also from an imprisonment

[1] See his *Licht vom Osten*, p. 171, (Engl. Transl. pp. 229–231), and *Paulus*, p. 11. In a note to the latter passage he refers to Dr. Robinson's article and to that of M. Albertz in the *Th. St. u. Kr.*, 1910, pp. 551 ff.

[2] In a footnote added to his article in the last Heft of the *Th. St. u. Kritiken* (1910) Albertz also makes reference to this evidence, of course quite independently, as the two articles must have appeared almost simultaneously.

of Paul at Ephesus. Of these scholars, Deissmann at least must be esteemed well qualified to judge of the archaeological evidence of the references in Philippians to τὸ πραιτώριον and to "Caesar's household," so long considered to establish beyond question Rome as the place of imprisonment whence the letter was sent. But to Deissmann, Albertz and Lake the references appear on the whole better fitted to Ephesus than to Rome. Lake, however, merely summarises on these points. He attaches more importance to literary relations, holding that, on the theory of its Ephesian origin, Philippians "was written at the same time, roughly speaking, as the Epistles to which it has the greatest resemblance," This is to him the great argument for its derivation from an Ephesian imprisonment; for it would be "written at the same place and the same time as the Epistle to the Corinthians, and we have all the time we need between it and the Epistle to the Colossians" (to account for the change of mental situation).

The present writer has expressed a judgment from which he is by no means inclined to recede on the precariousness of arguments for relative date based on mere resemblances of style between the Pauline Epistles. In the case of Romans and Galatians the conclusions of Lightfoot, though still decisive for Adeney, must be regarded to this extent as misleading.[1] Lake's argument for the closer relation of Philippians to Corinthians and Romans than to Ephesians and Colossians is more convincing than Lightfoot's in proportion as it rests on the presupposed environment and the mental situation to be read between the lines, rather than on mere resemblances of phraseology and course of thought. For phraseology and style are less unlikely to be reproduced after an interval, than the mental environment or situation. In point of fact it must be acknowledged a

[1] Bacon, *Commentary on Galatians*, Macmillan, 1909, pp. 26 f.

real exegetical difficulty that in Philippians iii. 2 ff. Paul should seem to be again (metaphorically) "fighting with beasts at Ephesus"; whereas all we can learn from the Travel document of Acts (taken in comparison with the group Philemon–Colossians–Ephesians) would seem to indicate that by the time of the Apostle's incarceration at Rome his great battle against the Judaisers had been already won. By the expressions of Philippians iii. 2–9, 18 f., compared with 2 Corinthians ii. 13–15, 21 f., Romans xvi. 17–20, and the like, we are driven to assume (not altogether probably) some unexpected recrudescence of the conflict with the Judaisers (for the terms are too harsh to seem reasonable in application to any other opponents), a rekindling of the extinguished flames on territory where it was least to be expected. This literary relation, it must be admitted, is something more than a mere resemblance in style and course of thought.

On the other hand neither Albertz nor Lake gives any consideration to the close literary relation between Philippians ii. 16–18 and 2 Timothy iv. 6–8, regarding which I wrote more than fourteen years ago:

> To the martyr also there sometimes comes an unexpected reprieve. Years after he may utter a second time his last farewells. But that which, under such circumstances, he will *not* do, is to return to his former leave-taking, and, with no reference to having used the figure before, borrow thence the phraseology for his parting legacy.

The sentence was written against the idea of separating by an interval of years between Philippians and Second Timothy—or rather between Philippians and those epistolary elements of 2 Timothy iv. 6–22 which are more generally admitted as authentic fragments, and which seem at least to presuppose the journey to Jerusalem of Acts xx, 22. If Philippians was written from an Ephesian imprisonment "at the same time as the (Second) Epistle to the Corin-

thians," we shall still be obliged to ask: What, then, of 2 Timothy iv. 6–8? Shall we reject entirely this most self-evidencing of all Pauline elements of the Pastoral Epistles? And, if not, shall we hold that Paul used twice over the sublime figure of his life-blood being "poured out a libation," once when, a prisoner at Ephesus, he despaired of life, having "sentence of death" in himself,[1] when the "sacrifice offered" was that of his Philippian converts, and a second time, years later, after release had come from the first imprisonment, and he was again a prisoner in Caesarea or Rome? We will readily admit that Paul might thus repeat himself, even at some cost of effectiveness in the second staging of his martyrdom; but the admission will inevitably tend to increase a certain general distrust of arguments based on mere literary relations.

Of course there are other alternatives than the admission or denial of an Ephesian origin for Philippians. Lake himself has very effectively restated the reasons for looking upon Philippians iii. 1–end as a separate letter, earlier than Philippians i. 1–2, 30. The two parts might be dated respectively iii. 1 ff. from Ephesus, and i. 1 ff. from Rome. Many reconstructions have also been attempted for the material of 2 Timothy iv. 6 ff. The net result, however, of such conjectural reconstruction is not satisfying. The arguments from internal evidence awaken our interest; but in the absence of specific reference elsewhere to an Ephesian imprisonment of Paul, they recall too easily the "stuff that dreams are made of."

It is for this reason that I venture once more to intervene in the discussion, offering this time, I trust, something more substantial than the legend of an Ephesian imprisonment in the *Acts of Paul and Thekla*. As between the disputants I am still unprepared to take sides, but it seems to me that

[1] 2 Cor. i. 8–10.

the argument should not proceed further without a wider basis. We should not be depending so largely on mere inferences from the text of the Epistles, when definite patristic testimony is available from a period so early as the first half of the second century.

Marcion was born at Sinope in Pontus little if any later than 100 A.D. He is apparently reported by Irenaeus to have had direct relations with Polycarp, and will at all events have had some knowledge of Asiatic tradition. He came to Rome about 135 to 140. Marcion, therefore, is a witness whose testimony should have value, especially on matters concerning Asia. Tertullian, it is true, pours contempt upon his opponent's attachment of the title "To the Laodiceans" to that Epistle of Paul which in all our MSS. bears the title "To the Ephesians," and in all but the earliest (א and B) is addressed in the salutation to "the saints which are in Ephesus." Tertullian himself seems to share the ignorance of our own earliest authorities regarding the real destination of the Epistle. For none of these seem to have had the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ in the salutation, though "To the Ephesians" may have been the title already current in his time, and even perhaps since the time of Ignatius[1] in orthodox circles. But Tertullian intimates that Marcion, in applying to the Epistle a title not derived from knowledge but from mere conjecture based on the reference in Colossians iv. 16, is giving himself airs as a "diligentissimus explorator." Whether the Epistle went without a title, or was called then, as now, "Ephesians," Marcion is not accused of altering the text but only of making baseless conjectures. He has made a discovery, forsooth, in the pursuit of his higher criticism.[2] Thus Tertullian sneers at Marcion's superior information about the provenance of one of Paul's Epistles.

[1] *Ad Ephes.* xii. 2. [2] *Adv. Marcionem*, v. 17

But Marcion's title receives far greater consideration from modern critics than from Tertullian. Harnack is one of many who believe that Marcion in employing it was using not mere personal conjecture, but early Asiatic tradition. Harnack is one of a smaller number who even regard the Asiatic tradition as correct, the hiatus in Ephesians i. 1 in our earliest texts after τοῖς οὖσιν,[1] which later authorities fill in with ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, having been caused by intentional deletion of ἐν Λαοδικείᾳ in the period when Laodicea had become a name of ignominy and odium among most Christians, as we see it in Revelation iii. 14–16.[2]

Without attempting to decide the question whether Marcion employed local tradition or simply his own untrammelled critical wits for this title for πρὸς Λαοδικείους, we can at least invoke the authority of all modern scholarship for the proposition that our so-called "Epistle to the Ephesians" was never written to Ephesus. If it has any claim at all to authenticity it was sent to some other Church than that which was the very headquarters of Paul's missionary activity. It was sent (if genuine), in conjunction with its twin sister, Colossians, to some group of Christians equally "unknown by face" to Paul in the same region, and therefore cannot stand in the way of Deissmann's theory of the derivation of the group from an imprisonment of Paul in Ephesus. "Ephesians" may have been written by Paul from Ephesus itself. However, that is not the main point.

It is but very recently that my attention was struck in reading over the well known "Monarchian Prologues"

[1] T. K. Abbott (Comm. on Eph. and Col. in *Intern. Crit. Comm.* 1897) denies any real hiatus. He thinks it possible to render "The saints who are also faithful." We must respectfully submit that this would require τοῖς καὶ πιστοῖς (without οὖσιν).

[2] See Harnack, "Die Adresse des Epheserbriefs des Paulus" in *Sitzungsberichte d. k. pr. Akad. d. Wiss.* xxxvii. (Ph. hist. Kl. July 21, 1910).

to the Epistles of Paul by what would seem to be a hitherto unobserved item of testimony, and one of first-rate importance on the question of the alleged Ephesian imprisonment. The Prologues are now generally accepted as derived (with alterations) from the Pauline canon of Marcion. On this point the reasoning of Corssen seems to be conclusive.[1] Naturally the prologue for Ephesians shows that it has been rewritten. It had to be adapted to orthodox tradition. It begins: *Ephesii* sunt Asiani, and ends: Has apostolus conlaudat scribens eis *ab urbe Roma* de carcere per Tychicum diaconum. The Italicised words represent of course the changes effected to adapt the prologue to the orthodox canon. The second sentence, "Has apostolus" etc., only differs by the substitution of "Tychicum diaconum" for "Ephaphroditum" from the corresponding statement of the next succeeding prologue, that of Philippians.[2] It is the next prologue which interests us. It attaches to Colossians, and exhibits features impossible to explain on any other view than that the prologues do go back to Marcionite tradition, and that the reviser has overlooked the ancient Marcionite phraseology. It begins with an unmistakable reference to the prologue for Ephesians, but refers to it as an Epistle to the *Laodiceans*:

Colossenses: et hi *sicut Laudicenses* sunt Asiani.

The unexpected reference *sicut Laudicenses* of course forms part of Corssen's convincing proof of the Marcionite origin of the prologues. But what more vitally concerns the theory of Deissmann, Albertz, Robinson and Lake is the closing phrase:

Ergo apostolus *jam ligatus* scribit eis *ab Epheso.*

[1] *Zts. f. ntl. W.* x. (1909), i. pp. 1–45.

[2] Has apostolus conlaudat scribens eis a Roma de carcere per Epaphroditum.

It makes the direct assertion (on what ground we know not), that Colossians was written "from Ephesus," where Paul was "already a prisoner."

B. W. Bacon.

THE JOURNEYS OF ST. PETER.

The Bampton Lectures for 1913—*The Church in Rome in the First Century*, by G. Edmundson—compel attention for the skill with which a number of hypotheses are presented and maintained. The most important part of the work deals with the movements of St. Peter. The difficulty for the reader is that one hypothesis, suggestion or possibility, is piled upon another, until it is doubtful how much has been proved, and how much is the creation of a skilful writer. I propose to give a brief sketch of Mr. Edmundson's theory, and then to discuss the evidence on which it rests.

The theory begins by recalling a "well-attested tradition" that the apostles had orders from our Lord to remain twelve years in Jerusalem, and then to scatter over the world. The twelve years were more than up when St. Peter was imprisoned at Passover time in A.D. 42; so that as soon as he was set at liberty he left the country, and arrived at Rome in the summer of the same year. St. Mark was with him during this first stay in Rome, and wrote his gospel then. They left Rome in the spring of 46, so that St. Peter would be in Jerusalem by Pentecost of 46 when Galatians ii. 1–10 tells us that Barnabas and Paul met him. From 47 to 54 A.D. St. Peter made Antioch his headquarters, thus giving rise to the tradition of a seven-years' episcopate of that city. Mr. Edmundson then puts the encounter of St. Peter and St. Paul at Antioch (Gal. ii. 11–14) in the year 49, before the Council of Jerusalem (Acts xv.), which took place in the same year. Late in A.D. 54 St. Peter and

St. Barnabas were at Corinth, and early in 55 until some time in 56 they were in Rome and Italy. St. Peter paid a third visit to Rome, 63 to 65 A.D.; and presumably in the interval between 56 and 63 came the journeys in Asia Minor to be inferred from the First Epistle of St. Peter, which was written in June of 65 A.D., shortly before his martyrdom; though some of the parts mentioned in that epistle may have been visited during the seven years at Antioch.

The first assertion is that there is a well-attested tradition that our Lord bade the apostles remain in Jerusalem for twelve years after the Ascension, and then to go further afield. There are two authorities for this tradition: Eusebius[1] quotes it from Apollonius, who said that he got it by tradition, and Clement of Alexandria[2] records it without giving his source of information. Strangely enough Mr. Edmundson thinks that the tradition is supported by Luke xxiv. 49, *ὑμεῖς δὲ καθίσατε ἐν τῇ πόλει ἕως οὗ ἐνδύσησθε ἐξ ὕψους δύναμιν* and by John xvi. 13. *ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ ἐκεῖνος τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας, ὁδηγήσει ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀλήθειαν πᾶσαν.* It is inconceivable that these texts refer to anything other than Pentecost and the gift of the Holy Spirit on that day; and it so, the first, by bidding the apostles remain in the city until Pentecost, sufficiently refutes the later tradition that they were told to remain twelve years. Anyhow it is certain that they did not actually stay in the city for twelve years, for St. Peter and St. John went to Samaria, and St. Peter went to Lydda, Joppa and Caesarea. Nor when the twelve years were up did all

[1] *Hist. Eccles.* v. 18: *ἔτι δὲ ὡς ἐκ παραδόσεως τὸν Σωτῆρά φησι προστεταχέναι τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀποστόλοις, ἐπὶ δώδεκα ἔτεσι μὴ χωρισθῆναι τῆς Ἱερουσαλήμ.* Edmundson by mistake, (p. 36 note), says that this comes from Jerome, *De Viris Illustribus*.

[2] *Stromateis* vi. 5: *Διὰ τοῦτό φησιν ὁ Πέτρος εἰρηκέναι τὸν Κύριον τοῖς ἀποστόλοις. Ἐὰν μὲν οὖν τις θελήσῃ τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ μετανοῆσαι, διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματός μου πιστεύειν ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν, ἀφεθήσονται αὐτῷ αἱ ἁμαρτίαι. Μετὰ δώδεκα ἔτη ἐξέλθετε εἰς τὸν κόσμον, μή τις εἴπῃ· Οὐκ ἠκούσαμεν.*

the apostles leave Jerusalem if, taking Mr. Edmundson's date, St. Peter was found in Jerusalem in 42 A.D., thirteen years after the Ascension.

But let us suppose that this tradition represents roughly what happened—that apart from any direct command from our Lord, the apostles did begin to go further afield about the year 41. Is it possible to agree with the next part of the theory that St. Peter went to Rome in A.D. 42? We shall come later to the evidence that St. Peter visited Rome; all we have now to consider is the evidence for a visit as early as 42. Jerome[1] says that St. Peter went to Rome in the second year of Claudius (i.e. A.D. 42), and was Bishop there until his martyrdom in the last year of Nero (i.e. 67 A.D.). Mr. Edmundson, it will be observed, accepts the first year, 42, but rejects the last, 67, and is also obliged to reject the statement that previous to 42 St. Peter had been Bishop of Antioch and had preached to the Dispersion. Eusebius provides evidence in two ways. On the one hand there are the references throughout the course of the Ecclesiastical History to St. Peter in Rome. The chief passages are given later: nowhere does he say in what year St. Peter went to Rome, nor in what year he was martyred. It is only stated that he went to Rome in the reign of Claudius (41–54 A.D.). On the other hand Eusebius also provides a Chronicle or Chronography, which is extant in Latin, Syriac and Armenian versions. Of the versions the Armenian differs somewhat from the other two, and Lightfoot has shown that the Armenian version has suffered from "the gradual accumulation of transcribers' errors in the course of trans-

[1] *De Viris Illustribus*, I.: Σίμων Πέτρος . . . μετὰ τὴν ἐπισκοπὴν τῆς Ἀντιοχέων ἐκκλησίας, καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα τῶν διασπαρέντων, καὶ ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς πιστευσάντων, ἐν Πόντῳ, Γαλατίᾳ, Καππαδοκίᾳ, Ἀσίᾳ καὶ Βιθυνίᾳ, τῷ δευτέρῳ Κλαυδίου ἔτει εἰς τὸ ἐκπολεμῆσαι Σίμωνα τὸν μάγον τῇ Ῥώμῃ ἐφίσταται, ἔνθα εἴκοσι πέντε ἐνιαυτοὺς τὸν θρόνον τῆς ἱεροσύνης κατέσχεν, ἕως τοῦ τελευταίου ἐνιαυτοῦ Νέρωνος, τουτέστι τοῦ τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτου, ἐφ' οὗ καὶ σταυρωθεὶς ἐμαρτύρησε, τὴν κεφαλὴν κατὰ γῆν ἔχων κ.τ.λ.

mission." [1] So that we may neglect the Armenian version in so far as it differs from the other two. The Latin and the Syriac versions both give 25 years for the episcopate of St. Peter. This no doubt represents what was stated in the original Greek. The Latin version gives the 25 years as starting in the second year of Claudius; apparently the Syriac does so too, but about that there is some doubt.[2] Both versions say that he went to Antioch two years before he went to Rome.[3] Lightfoot, who has studied this Chronicle in great detail, gives it as his judgment that "the years of Peter . . . were a matter of speculation rather than of tradition." [4] Now this Latin version was made by Jerome, so we can see that he learnt the twenty-five years' episcopate, which he mentions in *De Viris Illustribus*, from this Chronicle of Eusebius. Our next authority is the Liberian Catalogue. This dates from A.D. 354, but the earlier part of it comes from Hippolytus (circ. A.D. 230). It states [5]—

"Petrus, ann. xxv, mens. uno, d. viiii. Fuit temporibus Tiberii Caesaris et Gai et Tiberi Claudi et Neronis, a cons. Minuci et Longini usque Nerine et Vero. Passus autem cum Paulo die iii Kl. Iulias, cons. $\overline{ss}$. imperante Nerone."

Lightfoot says that "Minuci" is a corruption of "Vinicii," and "Nerine et Vero" should be "Nerone et Vetere." So that St. Peter's episcopate would be A.D. 30–35. Lightfoot does not suggest whore Hippolytus got the period 30–55 from, but he thinks that with regard to the part of the catalogue from Linus to Eleutherus, the western list on which it was based was the same as the eastern list used by Eusebius, with perhaps the exception of the form of the

[1] *Apostolic Fathers*, part I., vol. I., p. 245.
[2] Lightfoot, op. cit. p. 221.
[3] A. Schoene, *Eusebi Chron.*, ii. pp. 153, 211. Edmundson, p. 75 note, says incorrectly that he went to Rome in the second year of Claudius and to Antioch two years ater.
[4] Op. cit., p. 243.
[5] Lightfoot, op. cit. p. 253.

name Cletus or Anencletus.[1] One more authority for the twenty-five years' episcopate is the Liber Pontificalis. This in its earliest form we have in two recensions, the Felician and the Cononian. The Felician, which is the older, dates from about 530 A.D., and was based partly on the Liberian Catalogue, and partly on Papal Catalogues which were all founded on a common original presumably belonging to the age of Leo the Great (A.D. 440–461).[2] The two recensions are as follows:[3]—

Felician Recension. "Beatus Petrus, Antiochenus, filius Iohannis, provinciae Galileae, vico Bethsaida, frater Andreae et princeps apostolorum, primum sedit cathedra episcopatus in Antiochia annis x. Hic Petrus ingressus in urbe Roma Nerone Cesare ibique sedit cathedra episcopatus ann. xxv mens. ii. dies iii. Fuit temporibus Tiberii Cesaris et Gaii et Tiberii Claudi et Neronis. . . . Hic martyrio cum Paulo coronatur."

Cononian Recension. "Beatus Petrus, filius Iohannis, provinciae Galileae, vico Bethsaida, primum sedit cathedra episcopatus in Antiochia an. vii., deinde in Roma an. xxv. mens. ii. dies iii. Fuit temporibus Tyberii Caesaris et Gai et Tyberii Claudi et Neronis sub quo et passus."

The author of this Liber Pontificalis seems then to have copied two traditions without attempting to reconcile them, first that St. Peter went to Rome when Nero was Caesar,[4] secondly that he went to Rome in the days of Tiberius and stayed twenty-five years. This latter, as Duchesne has remarked,[5] is simply borrowed from the Liberian Catalogue, and so it also goes back to Hippolytus. The total evidence, then, for an early date for St. Peter's arrival at Rome reduces

[1] Op. cit. p. 275.

[2] Lightfoot, op. cit. p. 266.

[3] Duchesne, *Liber Pontificalis*, vol. i. p. 51.

[4] This tradition also appears in Lactantius (circ. 314), *De Mort. Pers.* 2: "Cumque jam Nero imperaret Petrus Romam advenit." The Acta Petri et Pauli also bring St. Peter to Rome in Nero's reign. Lipsius thought these Acta dated from the second century, but there are only very uncertain traces of them until the fifth century (Bardenhewer, *Patrologie*, p. 82).

[5] Op. cit. p. 118.

itself to Eusebius' Chronicle, which gives the year 42 (according to Lightfoot merely by guesswork), and the list of Hippolytus, which gives the impossible date 30. The latter tradition passed through the Liberian Catalogue into the Liber Pontificalis, but that work also preserves the tradition of a date not earlier than 54. A great deal of weight cannot be given to traditions coming with such dissonant voices, especially when the earliest form of the tradition, that of Hippolytus, gives the most impossible date.

But apart from the testimony of later writers, does the hypothesis of a visit to Rome in A.D. 42 agree with what we read in the New Testament? It was some few years later than this—Edmundson says A.D. 46—that St. Paul met St. Peter at Jerusalem as recorded in Galatians ii. 1–10. We may assume that St. Paul wrote that epistle near enough to the time of the event to record it fairly accurately. First he says that he set before those present the gospel which he was preaching among the Gentiles (ὃ *κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*) Galatians ii. 2, and then speaking of the chief Christians in Jerusalem he says (Gal. ii. 7), *ἰδόντες ὅτι πεπίστευμαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας καθὼς Πέτρος τῆς περιτομῆς*. There is only one possible conclusion to be drawn from these words—that St. Paul had been preaching to Gentiles, and that St. Peter had not, at least to any considerable extent. We need not stay now to ask whether St. Paul's work among Gentiles had been that of his first missionary journey, or whether it was merely during his stay at Tarsus. But the reference to St. Peter as entrusted with the gospel of the circumcision makes a three years' visit to Rome previous to this time possible only under one condition, viz., that it was a mission solely to the Jews in Rome. But we do not find any traces of a Christian congregation in Rome consisting solely of converted Jews; the people to whom St. Paul wrote his epistle were partly Jew and partly Gentile, as may be gathered

from the epistle itself.[1] As for the purely Jewish community, it was, even as late as A.D. 60, quite untouched by Christianity, for the only thing its chief men seemed to know about Christianity was that it was a sect everywhere spoken against.[2]

Most of the evidence with regard to an episcopate at Antioch we have already seen. Eusebius' Chronicle, Jerome and the Liber Pontificalis all put it before the Roman episcopate; but Eusebius gives its length as two years, the Liber Pontificalis as seven (or ten) years, and Jerome does not mention the length. Gregory the Great (end of sixth century) also gives the period as seven years.[3]

For the particular purpose in view at present, it does not matter whether the encounter of St. Peter and St. Paul in Antioch (Gal. ii. 11–14) preceded or followed the Council of Acts xv.

Several references in 1 Corinthians (i. 12, iii. 22, ix. 5, 6) suggest that Peter and Barnabas were known to the Christians in Corinth. 1 Corinthians was written in A.D. 55, so that St. Peter may have been in Corinth in 54 as Mr. Edmundson suggests, or perhaps earlier. That St. Peter went to Corinth is also borne out by later writers, e.g. Dionysius of Corinth.[4]

Mr. Edmundson now postulates a visit of St. Peter and St. Barnabas to Rome from 55 to 56, thus on the one hand fitting in a seven-years' episcopate at Antioch before ε visit to Rome as recorded in the Liber Pontificalis,[5] and on

[1] Sanday and Headlam, pp. xxxi.–xxxiv.; B. Weiss in Meyer's *Kommentar*, p. 20; Zahn, *Römerbrief*, pp. 18–20.

[2] Acts xxviii. 22.

[3] Ep. vii. 40: "Ipse [Petrus] firmavit sedem [Antiochenam] in qua septem annis, quamvis discessurus, sedit."

[4] Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* ii, 25: Ταῦτα καὶ ὑμεῖς διὰ τῆς τοσαύτης νουθεσίας, τὴν ἀπὸ Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου φυτείαν γενηθεῖσαν Ῥωμαίων τε καὶ Κορινθίων συνεκεράσατε. Καὶ γὰρ ἄμφω καὶ εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν Κόρινθον φοιτήσαντες ἡμᾶς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὁμόσε διδάξαντες, ἐμαρτύρησαν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρόν.

[5] Supra, p. 246.

the other hand agreeing approximately with the terminal date given by the Liberian Catalogue which gives his episcopate in Rome as A.D. 30 to 55.[1] Probably evidence treated in this way would not be given much weight if it stood alone, but it is said to be supported by a sentence of St. Paul's in Romans xv. 19–24. It cannot be denied that Sanday and Headlam took this text in an unnatural sense. The clear and obvious meaning is that some one else had been labouring in Rome, and for that reason St. Paul felt constrained not to go there. Who that some one was, can only be guessed, but as even Professor Kirsopp Lake says, "the question will always remain, why not St. Peter?"[2] But we have shown above that a visit of St. Peter as early as 42, if possible at all, could only have been to the Jews; and such a mission would certainly not have satisfied St. Paul as the founding of a Church. As to the later postulated visit of St. Peter to Rome 55–56, it is doubtful how much influence this would have had on St. Paul. For as early as the autumn of 55, when he wrote 1 Corinthians, St. Paul had made his plans up to the autumn of 56 or even the spring of 57,[3] though of course he may have made those plans having just heard that St. Peter had gone to Rome. But in any case this visit to Rome of 55 to 56 would be so recent when St. Paul wrote his epistle to Rome in 57, that he could scarcely say that by it he had been *many times* hindered from coming (ἐνεκοπτόμην τὰ πολλά).[4] Two possibilities remain, either that the founder of the Roman Church was some one other than St. Peter, or that St. Peter went there earlier than 55 to work among Jew and Gentile alike. Now the great difficulties in the way of supposing that he went to Rome in 42 make it worth while suggesting

[1] Supra, p. 245.
[2] *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 379.
[3] 1 Cor. xvi. 5, 6.
[4] Rom. xv. 22.

a visit later than 42, but before 55. Let us then suppose that on his escape from prison he went straight to Antioch, where he would be safe out of Herod's clutches. If then he spent the seven years in Antioch which one tradition attributes to him, from A.D. 42 to 49, he would be in Antioch in 49 when he encountered St. Paul,[1] and would be able easily to go to Jerusalem for the Council about the same time. People have often conjectured what St. Peter's side was in that encounter with St. Paul at Antioch, and have suggested that perhaps if we knew St. Peter's version of the story we should not think so badly of his dissimulation. It is much more likely that there was no other side ; that he had done wrong, and that he recognised it as soon as St. Paul rebuked him ; that true to his character, as represented in his Denial on the night before the Passion and as represented in the Quo Vadis legend, he repented at once ; that he determined to prove his repentance by devoting himself forthwith to the Gentiles. The most important centre yet unoccupied for him to go to was Rome. If the Council of Acts xv. took place after the dispute at Antioch, it adds an interesting touch, that St. Peter showed his repentance of his former action by first strongly supporting St. Paul's policy at the Council, and then going as soon as possible himself to the Gentiles. It was the year 49 in which Claudius had expelled the Jews from Rome,[2] but it would probably be impossible for St. Peter to sail till the spring of 50, when sailing recommenced, and it would take him some little time to get there, so that by then the edict may have been in abeyance. One thing is explained by this hypothesis that otherwise remains a hard puzzle, how St. Peter, who in A.D. 46, some time after the Ascension, was still only an apostle of the Jews,[3] appears a few years later as a founder of the chief of the Gentile Churches.

[1] Gal. ii. 11 sqq. [2] Suetonius, Claud. 25. [3] Gal. ii. 7, 9.

It will be well here to collect the evidence for St. Peter's having been in Rome, and having been one of the founders of the Church there. This is largely the same evidence as for his martyrdom, so that it will be convenient to take them together.

The earliest evidence is the reference in 1 Peter to Babylon as the place of writing. There is little doubt that Babylon was used here as in the Apocalypse and elsewhere as a synonym for Rome.

1 Peter v. 13: *ἀσπάζεται ὑμᾶς ἡ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι συνεκλεκτή.*

It is generally agreed that Clement of Rome wrote his epistle in the year 96. Edmundson thinks that it was written in A.D. 70, before he was Bishop. But in any case the evidence is early.

Clem. Rom. v. After quoting from the Old Testament various results arising from jealousy, he goes on—*ἀλλ' ἵνα τῶν ἀρχαίων ὑποδειγμάτων παυσώμεθα, ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐγγιστα γενομένους ἀθλητάς· λάβωμεν τῆς γενεᾶς ἡμῶν τὰ γενναῖα ὑποδείγματα. Διὰ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ δικαιότατοι στύλοι ἐδιώχθησαν καὶ ἕως θανάτου ἤθλησαν. Λάβωμεν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀποστόλους· Πέτρον, ὃς διὰ ζῆλον ἄδικον οὐχ ἕνα οὐδὲ δύο ἀλλὰ πλείονας ὑπήνεγκεν πόνους, καὶ οὕτω μαρτυρήσας ἐπορεύθη εἰς τὸν ὀφειλόμενον τόπον τῆς δόξης.*

The Ascension of Isaiah is a composite work of different dates. The section with which we are concerned is thought by Charles to be the "Testament of Hezekiah" and to date between 88 and 100 A.D. The reference to "one of the twelve apostles" seems certainly to refer to St. Peter, and the "murderer of his mother" is obviously Nero.[1]

Asc. Isa. iv. 2, 3: . . . *ἑ(ν εἴδει) ἀνθρώπου βασιλέως ἀνόμου μητραλῴου ὅστις αὐτὸς ὁ βασιλεὺς οὗτος τὴν φυτ(ε)ίαν ἣν φυτεύσουσιν οἱ δώδεκα ἀπόστολοι τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ διώξε(ι) καὶ (τ)ῶν δώδεκα (εἷς) ταῖς χερσὶν αὐτοῦ (π)αροδοθήσεται.*

Ignatius (A.D. 109), *Ad. Rom.* iv.: *οὐχ ὡς Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος διατάσσομαι ὑμῖν ἐκεῖνοι ἀπόστολοι . .*

Dionysius of Corinth (circ. 171 A.D.), Euseb. *H.E.* ii. 25. Quoted above on page 248.

Irenaeus (circ. 180), *Adv. Haer.* iii. 3, Euseb. *H.E.* v. 6: "maximae, et antiquissimae, et omnibus cognitae, a gloriosissimis duobus apostolis, Petro et Paulo, Romae fundatae et constitutae ecclesiae."

[1] See Charles ad loc., and Clemen in *Z. f. w. Th.* 1896.

θεμελιώσαντες οὖν καὶ οἰκοδομήσαντες οἱ μακάριοι ἀπόστολοι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, Λίνῳ τὴν τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς λειτουργίαν ἐνεχείρισαν.

Justin Martyr (150–155), *Apol.* i. 26 (Euseb. *H.E.* ii. 13): *Σίμωνα μέν τινα Σαμαρέα τὸν ἀπὸ κώμης λεγομένης Γίττων, ὃς ἐπὶ Κλαυδίου Καίσαρος διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐνεργούντων δαιμόνων τέχνης δυνάμεις ποιήσας μαγικὰς ἐν τῇ πόλει ὑμῶν τῇ βασιλίδι Ῥώμῃ θεὸς ἐνομίσθη, καὶ ἀνδριάντι παρ' ὑμῖν ὡς θεὸς τετίμηται, ὃς ἀνδριὰς ἀνεγήγερται ἐν τῷ Τίβερι ποταμῷ μεταξὺ τῶν δύο γεφυρῶν, ἔχων ἐπιγραφὴν Ῥωμαϊκὴν ταύτην* SIMONI DEO SANCTO.

The importance of this quotation will be seen from the next, which connects the coming of Simon Magus to Rome with that of St Peter. (Cf. also *Apol.* i. 56.)

Eusebius, *H.E.* ii. 14: *Οὐ μὴν εἰς μακρὸν αὐτῷ* (i.e. Simon Magus) *ταῦτα προυχώρει. Παραπόδας γοῦν ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς Κλαυδίου βασιλείας, ἡ πανάγαθος καὶ φιλανθρωποτάτη τῶν ὅλων Πρόνοια, τὸν καρτερὸν καὶ μέγαν τῶν ἀποστόλων, τὸν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τῶν λοιπῶν ἁπάντων προήγορον, Πέτρον, ἐπὶ τὴν Ῥώμην ὡς ἐπὶ τηλικοῦτον λυμεῶνα βίου χειραγωγεῖ.*

It will be seen that while there is abundant evidence that St. Peter went to Rome, helped to found the Church and was martyred there, the early evidence gives no exact indication of the date of his arrival. The same may also be said of recent archaeological researches in Rome, that they add weight to the testimony that St. Peter was present in Rome and was martyred there, but do not help in deciding dates. The last two references given above suggest some time in the reign of Claudius for St. Peter's arrival, and do not fix on the second year of Claudius as is done by Eusebius' Chronicle and Jerome. The later authorities, as we have seen, are in conflict with one another, and partly in conflict with the New Testament. Hence on grounds of post-biblical testimony, the date A.D. 50 which we have suggested is as likely a date as any other for St. Peter's first visit to Rome. It comes within the limits of Claudius' reign, which is perhaps to be inferred from Justin Martyr.

Where now are we to fit in the visit to Corinth? Quite likely he made it his principle, as St. Paul had done, not to interfere with other men's foundations. If so, we can understand that he might set out from Rome to visit Pontus and

Bithynia and those other parts of Asia Minor where St. Paul had not laboured. On his way he would naturally stop at Corinth, just as St. Paul intended to stop a little while in Rome on his way to Spain. The date when St. Peter passed through Corinth would have to be about 54, so that he would have left before 1 Corinthians was written. We have no means of telling exactly when St. Peter went to Rome for the last time, but taking provisionally the date given by Mr. Edmundson, 63, we should have to suppose that the years 54 to 63 were spent in Asia Minor or perhaps in part elsewhere.

The hypothesis here suggested depends on Romans xv. 19–24, referring to a stay of St. Peter in Rome before the time when that epistle was written. Such a visit does not conflict, like the proposal for a visit in A.D. 42, with what we read in the New Testament, and it gains some likelihood from the probability that he was in Corinth about A.D. 54. At the same time we must bear in mind the possibility that Romans xv. 19–24 may refer to some unknown Christian worker; and we must also remember that the earliest testimony, while strongly affirming the presence of St. Peter in Rome and his martyrdom there, gives no indication of the date of his first arrival in the imperial city.

LAURENCE E. BROWNE.

THE TRIAL-NARRATIVES BASED ON THE ORACLES.

THE statement of Papias that "Matthew collected the oracles in Hebrew" is famous and undisputed, but its importance has never been fully appreciated, and it has never been applied to the facts of the gospel-narrative. Lightfoot dated Papias 60–140 A.D. and the date may generally satisfy us, provided we do not insist that his literary activity was deferred till he was seventy years of age. When he says that "Matthew collected the oracles in Hebrew," it is usually agreed that he means in Aramaic.

What he meant by "the oracles" has been set forth by the present writer in *The Oracles in the New Testament* at some length, and he hopes to have shown that oracles are all those quotations of the Old Testament in the New Testament which were "precious words" because they were Messianic predictions, and bore, however remotely, on the Argument from Prophecy that Jesus was the Christ. Oracles, Logia, are precious words, and are not "Sayings of Jesus," as a class, although both Lightfoot and his antagonist in *Supernatural Religion* believed that they were. On this thesis I shall say no more at present because it demands a whole volume, except that, until it is admitted, exegesis can go no further. The most difficult and crucial passages of the New Testament cannot be understood or explained. Most of these involve the term *spirit*, and this cannot be understood until the Argument from Prophecy (Christ was to be such and such, Jesus was such and such; therefore Jesus is Christ) is seen to be the *articulis stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae* in the first Christian century. But though we leave aside the meaning of spirit for the present, it is possible to see the part which oracles have borne in

the construction of the Trial-narratives, of which no harmony has ever yet been discovered: indeed harmony recedes farther and farther away as study increases and commentaries multiply.

St. Paul, however, whose epistles contain hardly a trace of the Trial-narratives—though they were then in course of slow construction and must have existed in some fluid, inchoate state—has given us a clue when he wrote (1 Cor. xv.) of the gospel which he preached: "I delivered . . . that which I received by tradition, how that Christ died for our sins *according to the scriptures*, and that he was buried, and that he hath been raised on the third day *according to the scriptures*." The "scriptures" were the oracles, which were seen to be fulfilled. And out of the fulfilment the Trial-narratives were largely constructed: how largely they were built upon Jeremiah will now be shown.

The prophet Jeremiah being a type of the Lord, in his loneliness and aloofness, in his persecution, in his bearing the yoke, in his parables, it was found that his trial was fulfilled in that of the Lord. The two trials were obviously alike in three respects, the place, the judges, the verdict. To these fulfilments others were added as only less obvious. First, the place in Jerusalem was the temple. Next, the accusers resembled the false-prophets who accused Jeremiah. Thirdly, the accusations were identical, because Jesus had foretold the destruction of the temple in Jeremiah's language. Besides these six fulfilments others were discovered by the evangelists or their sources, such as the reaction in favour of the Accused, the replies of Jesus to His judges, and other incidents into which we shall now inquire, our basis being the Greek Bible not the Hebrew (Jer. xxvi., xxvii. = xxxiv., xxxv. in LXX).

The order of events is almost precisely that of the gospels:—

I. The accusation of having predicted the destruction.
II. The clamour for the death of the Accused.
III. The appeal to former preaching in public.
IV. The innocent blood.
V. The martyrdom for truth.
VI. The reaction in favour of acquittal.
VII. The despatch to the Idumæan.

Only the last two events are somewhat inverted in St. Luke's Gospel. And others, even more important, will follow after these.

(The words of Jeremiah (LXX) which are actually reproduced in the Gospels are here marked by italics.)

Jer. xxvi. 3 ff. And it came to pass when J. had ceased speaking all that the Lord commanded him to speak unto all the people,	[(Matt.) And it came to pass when Jesus had finished all these words].
that *the priests and the false-*prophets *and* all *the people*	(Mark) The chief *priests and the* scribes *and the elders.* (Luke) The c.p. *and the* captains of the temple *and the e.* (Luke) The presbytery of *the people,* both c.p. and scribes.
seized him, saying,	(Mark, Matt.) to *seize* me. (Luke, John) *seized* Jesus.
Thou shalt surely *die,*	(Mark) to put him to *death.*
for thou hast *prophesied* in the name of the Lord,	(Mark) *Prophesy.*
saying, This *house* shall be like Shiloh,	(Mark) bare *false*-witness . . . I will destroy this temple.
and this city shall be *desolate* without an inhabitant.	(Luke, Matt.) Your *house* is left unto you [*desolate*].
And all *the people* were gathered together against J. in the house of the Lord.	(Matt.) Then were gathered together the c.p. and the elders of *the people* . . . to kill him.

[The words of Matthew xxvi. 1 conclude the fifth *pereq* or group of sayings, the four others being similarly concluded (vii. 28, xi. 1, xiii. 53, xix. 1). It is, however, probable that Matthew intended the discourses to reach their

climax in the final scenes. For he hastens to add that "there were gathered together the chief priests and the elders of the people . . . to kill him": which is nearly what Jeremiah says.]

The first point, however, of undoubted resemblance is the threefold denomination of the enemies of Jesus (Mark viii. 31, xi. 27, xiv. 43, 53, xv. 1) compared with the threefold description in Jeremiah. The phrase in Mark is first used at the first intimation of the Passion. And its meaning overlaps, for many priests were elders and many scribes were elders. The parallel phrase in Luke, though different, is also threefold, *captains of the temple* taking the place of *scribes*. But Luke (xxii. 66) has another strange threefold denomination, *there assembled the presbytery of the people*, both *chief priests* and *scribes*, and led Him away into their *council* (Sanhedrin). "The three component parts of the sanhedrin met" (Plummer) "and led Jesus away into their sanhedrin." This is almost inconceivable. Perhaps origination in Jeremiah xxvi. may explain it. Luke's *chief priests* are the *priests*, the *presbytery of the people* stands for *the people*, and the *scribes* for the *false-prophets*. The scribes were the established teachers, prophets were specially sent teachers. *He taught them with authority and not as the scribes*. In later times *false-prophet* and *false-teacher* were nearly synonymous (2 Pet. ii. 1).

The second point is *they seized* (συνέλαβον, in all four accounts) Jesus, as they seized Jeremiah.

The third point is that the captors are intent upon the death of the victim.

The fourth point is that while Jeremiah uses the composite word *false-prophet*, Mark uses a similar composite verb *to false-witness* twice, and Matthew the substantive. (These are not in LXX.)

The fifth point is that Jeremiah's prediction of the

destruction of the temple had been repeated by Jesus (Jer. xxii. 5, John ii. 19, Mark xiii. 2). In fact it is clear that the false-witnesses of Mark xiv. 58 made a true allegation as regards the words used by Jesus. On this point a good deal more might be written.

II.

Jer. xxvi. 10. And *the princes* of Judah heard this word and came up from *the* king's *house* unto the house of the Lord, and sat down in the entry of the new gate of the Lord. Then spake the priests and the false prophets unto the princes and to all *the people,*	(Luke) Pilate called together the chief *priests* and *the princes* and *the people.* (Luke) And they led him into *the* high priest's *house.*
saying, *Judgment of death* for this man, for he hath prophesied against this city,	(Luke) unto *judgment of death.* (Mark, Matt.) He is guilty *of death.*
as ye have heard with your ears.	Behold, *ye have heard* the blasphemy. (Luke) from his mouth.

The sixth point is that the princes of Judah, a most natural expression in Jeremiah, is repeated by Luke in an unintelligible connexion. Here is another threefold formula, but what does it mean? The chief priests were themselves the *princes* (*rulers*) of the people. There is no parallel in the whole New Testament to such an unqualified class-name as *the princes*. The qualified expressions, *their rulers, your rulers, rulers of the people* (Acts iv. 5, 8; Luke xxiv. 20) are not parallel. Josephus' rule is that *rulers* may stand for *chief priests*, but *rulers and chief priests* is an expression not to be used (Schürer, *H. J. P.* § 23, 3. E. T., p. 178). The explanation must be sought in Jeremiah xxvi., where the parts played by the several classes of men concerned are shifted within a few verses. First, the priests, the false-prophets and the people say that he

must die. Then the priests and the false-prophets say to the princes and the people that he must die. Then *the princes and the people* say that he must not die. After this some of the elders speak to all the assembly of the people, and quote the precedent of Micah, to show that he must not die. Finally he is saved by Ahikam, son of Josiah's minister, from death at the hands of the people. And perhaps the most remarkable feature of the whole story is the dissent of some of the elders (ἄνδρες τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τῆς γῆς) from the policy of the main body. This dissent is reproduced, as we shall see, in Joseph of Arimathea (Luke). What now concerns us is that Pilate desires (in Luke, but this hardly appears in Mark) to spare the life of Jesus. Luke saw in Jeremiah xxvi. that *the princes* and *the people* urged that Jeremiah must not die. This suggested that these two classes were Pilate's natural allies. To them he makes Pilate resort (Luke xxiii. 13). The high priests he is obliged of course to summon : but *the princes and the people* are summoned in Luke because of the important function that they performed in Jeremiah.

The point becomes clearer if we observe the attitude of *the people* in the gospels. At first the multitude is neutral, wanting the release of some prisoner as the custom was, but the priests incited it to ask for Barabbas, and the words *rather release* seem to imply that there had been a preference for Jesus (Mark xv. 11). In Luke *the crowds* have no cry of their own, for the long and definite sentence in xxiii. 5 can only be spoken by the priests. Even if *they cried out together* (παμπληθεί xxiii. 18) seems the *vox populi, the multitude* (τὸ πλῆθος xxiii. 1) has been already used of the 71 Sanhedrists. The people is priest-ridden. Only Acts iii. 13 ff. makes the people responsible, while even there *your rulers* are mentioned. St. John, with Acts before him, follows Luke's Gospel in not defining the action of the crowd.

But he makes *the Jews* responsible, and in John xviii. 31 *the Jews* are distinctly the Sanhedrin and not the crowd. And in John xix. 6, 15 it is the high priests and the underlings who shout *Crucify*. On the whole, then, Luke and John tend to exonerate the people, and thus even more than Mark and Matthew to accord with Jeremiah xxvi.

The seventh and eighth points are particularly clear: *He is guilty of death* and *ye have heard* are given in almost the same words in Jeremiah and in Mark. In Luke *from his mouth* represents *with your ears* in Jeremiah.

III.

In the appeal to former public preaching we have the supplementation by John only:—

Jer. xxvi. 12. Then spake J. unto the princes and to all the people, saying, The Lord sent me to prophesy against *this house* and against this city all the words that *ye have heard . . . ib.* 7, *in the house of* the Lord.

John xviii. 20. I have spoken openly to the world: I ever taught in synagogue *and in the temple* where all the Jews come together. . . . Ask *them that heard* what I spake unto them.

The ninth point of correspondence is plain: the previous speaking was in the temple. The tenth point is the appeal to the words that *ye have heard*. *The world* in St. John usually means the Jewish world (Dr. Drummond, *Fourth Gospel*, 358 n.).

IV.

The eleventh and twelfth points of correspondence are found in the supplementation of Matthew:—

Jer. xxvi. 15. But know ye for certain that if ye put me to death, ye bring *innocent blood* upon *yourselves and upon* this city and the inhabitants thereof.

Matt. xxvii. 3. I betrayed *innocent blood*. Ib. 24 f. I am innocent of this blood . . . His *blood* be *on us and on* our children.

Here we have no words put into our Lord's mouth. Although *innocent blood* occurs often in the Old Testament,

probably Matthew had Jeremiah xxvi. in view in describing the end of Judas. Certainly Matt. xxvii. 3 and 24 find a connecting link in Jer. xxvi. 15,

V.

The thirteenth point is more than possible, concerning the martyrdom for truth.

Jer. xxxi. 15. For in *truth* hath the Lord *sent me* to speak unto you in your ears all these words.	John xviii. 37. I have come into the world that I may bear witness unto the *truth*.

Much depends upon the emphasis thrown upon *in truth* (ἐν ἀληθείᾳ). The words might express nothing more than asseveration, but they may on the other hand be construed with *to speak unto you*, and there is no doubt which of the two constructions would be preferred by St. John, who mentions *the truth* twenty-four times, and would seize upon his favourite words *sent me* of the mission of the Son (seventeen times).

VI.

Jer. xxvi. 6. Then said the princes and all the people *unto the priests and the* false-prophets, *This man is not worthy of death.* . . .	(Luke) Pilate said unto the chief priests and the crowds, I find no fault in *this man* . . . and behold nothing worthy *of death* hath been done by him. (John) I find no crime in him.
Then rose up certain men of the *elders of the* land and spake to all the *synagogue of the people.*	(Matt.) *elders of the* people. (Luke) a councillor who had not consented . . . John xviii. 20 in *synagogue.*

The reaction in Jeremiah is headed by the *princes* (*rulers*) and the people, in Mark by Pilate whom Roman readers of Mark understood to be the *ruler*. Still it must be admitted that in Mark the point of this reaction is blunt, and is first sharpened in Luke, and then in John, where Pilate's vacillation is most marked.

The fourteenth point is that the declaration is made in

almost identical words in Jeremiah and in Luke, *This man* is not worthy *of death*. And here we note that Luke, as if to justify the plural, has introduced another *prince*, representing the power of Assyria,[1] Herod Antipas, as agreeing with Pilate, the power of Babylon, upon the innocence of the Accused. The other evangelists know nothing of this astounding occurrence.

The fifteenth point is that the real and genuine reaction, though ineffective, is led by *certain of the elders*. Luke is the first evangelist who definitely and clearly makes Joseph to be one. John adds Nicodemus to him in his previous dissent from the Pharisees among whom he was *a prince of the Jews* (vii. 50, iii. 1).

The sixteenth point is the use of *synagogue* to mean a public gathering. Since in John vi. 59, the only other use in John, *synagogue* has again no article, probably we ought to render, there as here, *in public as he taught in* Capernaum.

VII.

Jer. xxvii. 1. Make thee *bonds* (δεσμούς) and yokes (κλοιούς) and put them upon thy neck, and thou shalt *despatch* them unto him who is king of Idumea and king of Moab and king of the sons of Ammon and king of Tyre and king of Sidon by the hands of their (? his, *v. l.*) messengers that come to meet them (? him, *v. l.*) at Jerusalem to Zedekiah king of Judah.

(John) Annas *despatched* him *bound* (ἀπέστειλεν. . . δεδεμένον) unto Caiaphas.
(Mark) They *bound* him and delivered him to Pilate.
(Luke) Pilate sent him unto Herod.

This seventeenth parallel will doubtless appear at first to be so extremely forced as to be worthless. It is not placed here without some misgiving that the robust common sense of the modern reader may find it the limit of his toleration. Nevertheless a choice has to be made whether

[1] *See* Selwyn, *The Oracles in the New Testament*, chap. ii.

the despatch to Herod is historical or not. Is it one of those events which Luke says in his preface that he had followed up in their prophetic parallels accurately?[1] As he alone narrates it, our duty is to ascertain whether it has precisely this prophetic support. The opinion that it is a legendary accretion has recently been challenged in one of Mr. Streeter's able contributions to the Oxford *Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, on two grounds, (1) "because we can detect no apologetic motive for its growth; (2) because the statement (Luke xxiii. 12) so completely illuminates and is illuminated by certain facts elsewhere recorded." The second of these[2] can very well be true and yet, as to the first, it is possible to detect an apologetic motive if there is a fulfilment of prophecy: for it was just in the region of fulfilment that the *apologia* of the Christian faith in the first century stood or fell. The evangelist saw the fulfilment himself and hoped that his reader, his Theophilus, would come to see it. In this light it is no more far-fetched and fantastical than many other passages. For instance, to construe *the sure mercies of David* (Isa. lv. 3; Acts xiii. 34) into a prediction of the Resurrection of Christ is to the modern mind rather strange, and yet we know that the Apostles did so. Let us therefore bear in mind the possibly prophetic character of the Herodian incident.[3]

The prophet Jeremiah being ordered to make bonds and put them upon his neck is once more the type of the bound Jesus. As he was in weeping over Jerusalem, in foretelling

[1] *Oracles*, pp. 82 ff.

[2] Mutual whitewashing of Herod and Pilate—needed by Herod for having killed the popular John the Baptist, by Pilate for massacring the Galileans who were "of Herod's jurisdiction" (Luke xii.).

[3] An objection may be raised that Jer. xxvii. deals with a later reign than Jer. xxvi., that of Zedekiah. Yet LXX, which we follow throughout, makes no distinction, while the Hebrew, followed by Aquila (120 A.D.?) dates it, along with Jer. xxvi., of Jehoiakim.

its destruction, in his frequent use of parable, so he was in being bound as a prisoner of his own will: he was a type of voluntary obedience, though in Jeremiah xxvii. 1 the bondage is itself figurative. This fact involves no undue strain upon our imagination. The strain commences when we try to understand how the prophet was to despatch the bonds and pillories to the kings, or the king, and how they would be received.

But in LXX the action is simplified. For *the king of Idumea* has (in the reading of A, Q) the article prefixed, the other *kings* have not, though the preposition is prefixed to each. The article requires us to translate as above, *to him who is king of* Idumea, Moab, Ammon, Tyre and Sidon. Now in 30 A.D. and till 39 the tetrarchy of Antipas included the *sons of Ammon*. Moab, though not included in it, was commanded by his strong fortress of Machærus on its northern frontier. But Idumea was identified, for literary purposes at least, with the Idumean sovereign Herod Antipas. And though Tyre and Sidon were outside Galilee the other portion of Antipas's tetrarchy, they were dependent upon it for their prosperity, as Luke shewed (Acts xii. 20). Therefore there were no kings of all these places in the time of Antipas but himself. It follows that a Greek reader of Jeremiah xxvii. 1 was compelled to construe it as above, and a Christian prophet to identify *the king* with Antipas, to whom alone the bonds and yokes were to be despatched.

It is possible that *bonds* (δεσμούς) was understood by Mark to be *bondsmen* (δεσμίους), because the two words were frequently[1] interchanged by the error of copyists or readers in the first Christian centuries. This brings us still nearer to the representative Bondsman.

In whatever way they were sent by Jeremiah "by the

[1] Proofs are found in the variant readings of Zech. ix. 11, 12, Heb. x. 34, Acts xvi. 25.

hands of the envoys who came to meet him (the text is here confused) at Jerusalem," his Antitype could only send them to Herod by wearing them on His own body. In the ordinary Roman way He was bound when sent by Pilate, though by a horrible jest on Herod's part He was sent (ἀνέπεμψεν in both cases) by him to Pilate arrayed in fine apparel. The atrocious practical joke was that the Idumean king, having received from Pilate, whom he hated, a poor bundle of bonds, returned the prisoner disguised as a king in some disused court garment. The jest was the occasion of the two enemies becoming friends.

There is a slight approximation in Luke xxiii. 7, *being himself in Jerusalem in these days*, to Jeremiah xxvii. 1, *that come to meet him at Jerusalem*. In fact the only words of the sentence that refuse any visible fulfilment are *Zedekiah* and *Judah*.

That the incident is omitted by Mark and Matthew and pointedly by John—or rather they attribute the clothing in purple to Pilate's soldiers—does not forbid its being connected with Jeremiah xxvi., which all four evangelists employed. The three saw that it was not in Jeremiah xxvi., even if they saw it in Jeremiah xxvii. : on the other hand, they had not the special source of information which Luke had in connexion with the Herodian family. Supposing that Philip at Cæsarea had some rudimentary account or even rumour of it, this may have been used to *follow along* (as he and Luke would think) with the oracle.

Perhaps, too, the narrative is due to another consideration. Before Luke's Gospel St. Paul had been sent by a later Roman procurator to a later Herod (Acts xxv. 21 ἀναπέμψω). The disciple could not be greater than his Lord. (Compare also Acts xviii. 15 of Gallio's attitude with John xviii. 31 of Pilate's.)

Apart, however, from such a speculation let us see

whether the Herodian story was not based upon another oracle. The climax of it is that *Herod and Pilate were made* friends that day. Now in Acts iv. the thanksgiving of the disciples quotes Psalm ii., "Why do *the heathen* rage and *the peoples* imagine vain things? The kings of the earth stood by, and *the princes were brought together* (*συνήχθησαν*) against the Lord and against his Christ." And it proceeds to explain, "For there were *brought together* in truth in this city against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou anointedst, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with *the heathen* and *the peoples* of Israel, to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel foreordained to take place." (*Hand* here must be *spirit*, as so often, for the hand performs but cannot foreordain.)

What is the meaning of the explanation? First, we note that in Psalm ii. by itself *the peoples* meant the enemies of Israel, *the heathen* being its parallel. But in Acts iv. this plural is made by a most daring application to mean the tribes of Israel itself, which was always hitherto the singular because privileged *people*. The oracle therefore has been strained in order to express two combinations, that of Herod and Pilate, and that of Gentiles and Jews, against Christ. But our present point is that *Herod and Pilate* were *brought together*. Now the meaning of *brought together* as *reconciling* is irreproachable in Greek. It was therefore fair, so far, for Luke to apply the Psalm thus—if only Herod and Pilate were *the kings* reconciled. The oracle, then, is clearly one source of his information, while their previous enmity was a matter of current knowledge.

But how was the reconciliation effected? For we began by observing that Luke represented the reaction of Pilate *the prince* in favour of the Accused by ranking Herod along with him. Is he consistent with himself in carrying out this purpose?

The late Dr. Verrall in his stimulating essay[1] undertook to show that the Herod interview was credible and harmonious provided we do not admit the mockery by Herod of the Accused. Unfortunately, the condition remains unfulfilled. To take ἐμπαίξας only of jesting is not adequate: nor does he make good this point. *Mockery* alone is adequate, as the concordances to both Testaments abundantly show. But the particular oracle on which this *mockery* is based is—

Psalm xxxviii. 7, "My soul is full of *mockeries*."

If this observation appears to be unwarranted, let the context of this Psalm be observed. The reader's attention has been drawn to it by St. John quoting it in his description of that agony of the Lord which he has substituted for Gethsemane.

Psalm xxxviii. 10, "*My soul is troubled*" (John xii. 27).

In fact the rest of the Psalm is as closely fulfilled in the incidents of the Trials as Psalm xxii. is in those of the Crucifixion.

Ib. 11, "They that were nearest to me *stood afar off*." (So did Peter follow Jesus *afar off*. So did all His acquaintance *stand afar off*.)

Ib. 12, "They that *sought* my life forced me away, and they that *sought* mischief for me spake vanities. . . ." (So the sanhedrin *sought* witness to put Him to death, and found it not.)

Ib. 13, "Like one that is dumb, who openeth not his mouth." (So was Jesus silent before the high priest.)

Ib. 14, "And hath not reproofs in his mouth." (So was He silent before Pilate (Mark), before Herod (Luke).

Ib. 16, "When my feet were shaken they blustered against me." ("Behold how many things they accuse thee of.")

Ib. 17, "I was ready to be scourged." (So Mark xv. 15,

[1] *J. T. S.* x. 321, and *The Bacchants*, etc.

Luke xxiii. 22, "I will chastise him and release him.")

Ib. 18, "I declare my iniquity, and will bethink me of my sin." (So, "If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil . . . I have spoken openly" (John).

Ib. 19, "They that hate me wrongfully are multiplied." (So, "If the world hateth me . . .")

Ib. 20, "They that returned me evil for good slanderously accused me." Luke applies this in saying "there *stood* (*ib.* 11 'drew near and *stood* against me,' also Ps. xxxv. 11, 'unjust witnesses *stood up* and questioned me') the high priests and the scribes hotly accusing him." And this is what leads up to the *mockery* of Herod.

But while Luke uses so freely the phraseology of Psalm xxxviii. he easily passes to that of—

Psalm xxii. 6. A shame of man and *made a cipher* of the people (ἐξουθένημα).[1]

As Verrall showed—though he had not Psalm xxii. in view—the R.V. *set him at naught* (ἐξουθενήσας) is incorrect. The verb of the evangelist is drawn from the psalmist's noun. Thus Luke has assigned to the Herodian narrative the robing, some "hot" accusations, the silence (here is a great contrast to Mark and Matthew), and this *mockery*, though he has previously described the Jewish *mockery* (ἐνέπαιζον xxii. 63), where it means anything but the friendly jesting which Verrall wishes to make it mean in Herod. Instead, therefore, of supposing with Loisy a "document which Luke knew and used," we only presuppose the oracles mentioned above. A "Herod-document" may simply be represented by the notes and the memory of Philip of Cæsarea as a student of the oracles. Since ἐξουθενήσας implies utter scorn and hatred, so ἐμπαίξας in the same line means the same.

[1] Since "Barnabas" (date 75 A.D.) uses ἐξουθενήσαμεν (ch. vii.) of the Crucifixion, the above statement is fully borne out.

I cannot therefore follow my revered former instructor in mitigating the action of Herod to infinity. If Herod was "discharging him as innocent," having "questioned him at much length," not unkindly, not judicially, but as "delighted in the celebrated wonder-worker," while "his hopes of a performance preoccupied him, it appears, completely," why did not Jesus answer Herod anything? To refuse a word in answer to the long speeches (λόγοις ἱκανοῖς) of this powerful prince and despot was certainly to irritate him. He, however, mildly presents the poor prisoner with such clothing which "the prince himself puts on"—a mark of honour that Verrall thinks was not ironical.[1]

Nor can I agree that "the refusal of the magician to respond to his advances, though it could not please, must stimulate his curiosity, and might naturally increase his respect." How could Herod sit there while the Jewish authorities stood and watched him rebuffed?

Another fact to which Verrall hardly allowed enough importance is that Luke alone has reported the alleged previous enmity of Herod (xiii. 31, "some Pharisees tell him . . . Herod wisheth to slay thee"). He says, "It is mentioned for the sake of the answer"; "whether it is true, whether authorised, whether believed—all is uncertain." The fact, however, of its presence can only imply that Herod was a supposed deadly foe and prepare us for his unchanged enmity. Luke's omission of "the Herodians" in Mark viii. 15, xii. 13 proves nothing. From Mark xii. 13 he has omitted "the Pharisees."

Nor is the subsequent history of the *bright raiment*, which Verrall pursues, recorded in particular by Luke. At the Crucifixion he quotes Psalm xxii. 18 without changing a

[1] But Verrall presses the active voice of περιβαλών unduly, failing to see that it is used of *clothing oneself* in Ezek. xvi. 18, while Ezek. xviii. 7, 16 also support the middle sense. He overlooked LXX.

word and without an observation. It is only St. John who enlarges upon the lottery, and St. John ignored the Herod-interview. He, too, quotes and works upon Psalm xxii., but instead of referring to the *bright raiment* of Luke, he introduces quite a new idea when he makes the seamless robe to be that of Jesus the High Priest (Exod. xxviii. 4, 27, *χιτῶνα, ποδήρη ὅλον*). Thus no further light is thrown upon the Herodian action.

The position, then, is this : Pilate, who as one of *the princes* (Jer. xxvi.) had led the reaction in favour of Jesus, eventually by his weakness and gross injustice, on which Luke particularly dwells, *delivers him to their will.* Herod joined Pilate in the reaction so far as to be *brought together with Him*, yet he had *scorned* Him and *mocked* Him—and what besides ? He " gets up a charade," says Verrall with some irony. But that is just what he did : he left it to Pilate to guess what he thought. Verrall's own interpretation is open to the objection of being prosaic—as if Herod said, " Hand me yonder woollen garment : I will clothe the worthy man myself." The costume was his letter of reply to Pilate and he might take it either way—' I think better of Him than you do,' or more probably ' I appreciate the joke of one more prince of the Jews.' He makes no positive attempt to save Jesus. But since Luke aims at the two objects, of uniting Him to Pilate in the favourable reaction (Jer., Luke), and also in the final responsibility for the death (Ps. ii., Acts iv.), what was he to do with the robing but leave it as an enigma ?

The reader must not be left, however, without an absolute proof that Luke in the Trial-narrative was deeply imbued with Jeremiah xxvi. The proof is in the sentence (Luke xxii. 54), *Συλλαβόντες δὲ αὐτὸν ἤγαγον καὶ εἰσήγαγον εἰς . . .* " *And they seized him* and led him and led him *into the high priest's* house. The E.V. has

changed the second *and led him* into *and brought him* in order to screen the clumsiness, but this is bad translation. Of course we ask, How can Luke, a good scholar, have been so clumsy? Some editors will not believe it. Blass is one who omits the second *and led him* with D etc. But the external evidence is overwhelming that Luke wrote it, and the internal evidence overwhelming that he did not write this jingling repetition.[1] The collision of evidence is severe.

One glance at the oracle, and the confidence of our internal evidence vanishes. There, in Jeremiah xxvi. 23 (text of A, which nearly always represents the text which our Lord and the apostles used: see *Oracles in N.T.*, p. 76, etc.) is the phrase almost word for word: *καὶ συνελάβοσαν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξήγαγον αὐτὸν ἐκεῖθεν καὶ εἰσήγαγον αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα* (it will be shown elsewhere that *king* was a term applicable to the high priest). In fact, what Luke would never have written by himself he was willing to write from the oracle. Even *the men* (*who held him*, xxii. 63) is *the men* of Jeremiah xxvi. 22: *men* is superfluous. The *πρὸς*, *before*, is actually preserved in Mark, Matthew, John. And this indicates that all four evangelists interpreted *the king* in the sense then current, of the high priest. But instead of *before* (Mark), Luke wrote *to the dwelling of*; because apparently he reasoned back to Jeremiah xxxi. 10, *the king's house*, i.e. the high priest's house. This verse, Luke xxii. 54, is the origin of the whole opinion that Jesus was tried or heard in a dwelling-house. It will be shown elsewhere, on the contrary, that the trial was in the temple.

This is the eighteenth parallel between Jeremiah xxvi. and the Trial-narratives. There are several more parallels to follow—some still more remarkable.

E. C. Selwyn.

[1] Eur. *Bac.* 1065 is irrelevant here.

LITERARY ILLUSTRATIONS OF AMOS.

i. 1. *The words of Amos, who was among the herdmen of Tekoa.*

"I, first a rustic, a fugitive, unlearned, indeed, not knowing how to provide for the future . . . after I had come to Ireland, I daily used to feed cattle, and I prayed frequently during the day; the love of God and the fear of Him increased more and more, and faith became stronger, and the spirit was stirred."—St. Patrick.

i. 9. *Thus saith the Lord: For three transgressions of Tyre, yea for four, I will not turn away the punishment thereof: because they delivered up the whole people to Edom, and remembered not the brotherly covenant.*

"One branch of business there was—and a lucrative one it must have been—which did tempt the Tyrian merchants occasionally to overstep their natural boundaries by land. They were slave traders, and they did not disdain, on occasion, to traffic in the persons of their nearest neighbours and their best friends."—R. Bosworth Smith, "Carthage" (ch. i.).

"By some means or other, the whole world almost is run into the extremes of insensibility towards the distresses of their fellow-creatures."—Bishop Butler.

i. 11. *He did pursue his brother with the sword, and did cast off all pity, and his anger did tear continually, and he kept his wrath for ever.*

"The sweeping fierceness which his soul betrayed,
The skill with which he wielded his keen blade,
Where had his arm unwarlike caught that art?
Where had that fierceness grown upon his heart?
For it was not the blind capricious rage
A word can kindle and a word assuage:

But the deep working of a soul unmix'd
With aught of pity where its wrath had fixed."
—Byron, "Lara" (vii.).

ii. 1. *He burned the bones of the king of Edom into lime.*

"To burn the bones of the king of Edom for lime seems no irrational ferity; but to drink of the ashes of dead relations, a passionate prodigality."—Sir Thomas Browne, *Urn Burial.*

ii. 8. *In the house of their God they drink the wine of such as have been fined.*

Contrast the regulation of Pope Gregory I. (Church's *Miscellaneous Essays*, pp. 234 f.), forbidding the Church's officers "to receive anything except cheap and trifling gifts of food . . . Fees of all kinds are to be discouraged; where there is a fair reason for them, they are at any rate not to come into the accounts of the Church: 'for we will not that the purse of the Church be defiled by discreditable gains.'"

ii. 11–12. *And I raised up of your sons for prophets . . . but ye commanded the prophets, saying, Prophesy not.*

"Where shall a teacher look, in days like these,
For ears and hearts that he can hope to please?
Look to the poor—the simple and the plain
Will hear perhaps thy salutary strain:
Alas, not so! the poorest of the flock
Are proud, and set their faces as a rock:
Denied that earthly opulence they choose,
God's better gift they scoff at and refuse.
The rich, the product of a nobler stem,
Are more intelligent at least—try them.
O vain inquiry! they without remorse
Are altogether gone a devious course;

Where beckoning pleasure leads them, wildly stray,
Have burst the bonds and cast the yoke away."
COWPER, "Expostulation."

ii. 13. *Behold, I am pressed under you, as a cart is pressed that is full of sheaves.*

Gregory the Great, in his comments on the book of Job (xxxii.), explains this rustic simile as an instance of the divine condescension. "When God says by the prophet, 'Behold, I will groan over you, as a cart creaks under a load of hay,' since the life of the carnal is hay (as it is written, *all flesh is hay*), the Lord declares that in enduring the life of the carnal He carries hay like a cart, and to creak under the weight of the hay is for him to bear, with murmuring, the burden and iniquities of sinners."

iii. 2. *You only have I known of all the families of the earth: therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities.*

"As God was not the natural father of the race, He was not to be conceived—so Amos, the inspired herdsman of Tekoa, already taught—as their unconditional patron and partisan; but His favour for them was bound up with the moral relation of *their* will to His. If Israel was privileged to hear the voice of God, it had upon it the weight of a greater responsibility, which must bring with it a greater punishment for failure. 'You only have I known of all the families of the earth, *therefore* I will punish you for all your iniquities.'"—EDWARD CAIRD, *The Evolution of Religion*, i. 392.

iii. 7–8. *Surely the Lord God will do nothing, but he revealeth his secret unto his servants the prophets.*

The lion hath roared, who will not fear?
The Lord God hath spoken, who can but prophesy?

Compare John Knox's plea for his counsels and warnings. "My assurances are not the mervalles of Merlin, nor yet

the dark sentences of prophane prophesies; but the plane treuth of Godis word, the invincibill justice of the everlasting God, and the ordinarie cours of his punishmentis and plagis frome the beginning are my assurance and groundis. Godis word threatneth destructioun to all inobedient; his immutabill justice maun requyre the same; the ordinar punishments and plaguis schawis exempillis. What man then can ceis to prophesie?"

"With the utmost largeness of allowance for the difficulty of deciding in special cases," George Eliot once wrote to Mr. J. W. Cross, "it must remain true that the highest lot is to have definite beliefs about which you feel that necessity is laid upon you to declare them, as something better which you are bound to try and give to those who have the worse."

"Duties are not voluntary. Duty and will are even contradictory terms."—BURKE.

iii. 10. *They know not to do right, saith the Lord, who store up violence and robbery in their palaces.*

"The endurance of the inequalities of life by the poor is the marvel of human society. When the people complain, said Mirabeau, the people are always right. The popular cause has been the cause of the labourer struggling for a right to live and breathe and think as a man. Aristocracies fight for wealth and power, wealth which they waste upon luxury, and power which they abuse for their own interests."—FROUDE'S *Cæsar* (ch. viii.).

iii. 12. *The children of Israal that dwell in Samaria in the corner of a bed, and in Damascus in a couch.*

"Every enjoyment, over-indulged in, impoverishes us spiritually to the same extent; I can understand how it might be said, 'That arm-chair has kept part of my soul in its cushions.'"—VINET.

iv. 1–2. *Hear ye this word, ye kine of Bashan, which oppress the poor, which crush the needy, which say unto their*

lords, Bring and let us drink. The Lord God hath sworn by his holiness that, lo, the days shall come upon you, that they shall take you away with hooks.

"When a man comes to look into it, he sees that it is just here, in these enchanted palaces, that the danger and the disease of modern society lies. He cannot help feeling that these who live here are really, as William Morris calls them, the *dangerous classes*—not the poor, half-starved wretches, puny and stunted in person, and empty in purse, who, mad with rage, are belched forth in their thousands and hundreds of thousands from the slums of our great cities—not these, terrible as they are, are the real danger . . . That our wealthy houses are founded on the spoliation of the poor, vitiates all the life that goes on within them. Somehow or other it searches through and degrades the art, manners, dress, good taste, of the inmates. While there is time, and before the day of reckoning comes—before the fountains of the great deep are broken up in our vast cities, and chaos terrible ensues—let us hope that some, at least, of these classes will awaken from the fatal slumber which enthrals them—a true awakening, no mere uneasy stretching and turning to sleep again."—EDWARD CARPENTER, *England's Ideal*, pp. 166 f.

iv. 4–5. *At Gilgal multiply transgressions, and bring your sacrifices every morning . . . for this liketh you, O ye children of Israel.*

"I do not find the religions of men at this moment very creditable to them, but either childish and insignificant, or unmanly and effeminating. The fatal trait is the divorce between religion and morality. Here are know-nothing religions, of churches that proscribe intellect; scortatory religions; . . . and, even in the decent populations, idolatries wherein the whiteness of the ritual covers scarlet indulgences."—EMERSON (on "Worship").

iv. 9–11. *I have smitten you with blasting and mildew : . . . yet have ye not returned unto me, saith the Lord. I have sent among you the pestilence after the manner of Egypt . . . yet have ye not returned unto me, saith the Lord. I have overthrown some among you, as when God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah, and ye were as a brand plucked out of the burning : yet have ye not returned unto me, saith the Lord.*

"Events are written lessons, glaring in huge hieroglyphic picture-writing that all may read and know them: the terror and horror they inspire is but the note of preparation for the truth they are to teach ; a mere waste of terror if that be not learned."—CARLYLE, *Chartism* (ch. vi.).

> "It was His heavenly art
> Kindly to cross you
> In your mistaken love ;
> That, at the next remove
> Thence, He might toss you
> And strike your troubled heart
> Home to Himself."
>
> —CRASHAW.

iv. 13. *For, lo, he that formeth the mountains and createth the wind and declareth unto man what is his thought, that maketh the morning darkness and treadeth upon the high places of the earth, The Lord, The God of hosts, is his name.*

"To the shepherd Amos, the mountain winds and the midnight stars are no study in themselves, but a fleeting glimpse of the Eternal power: 'Lo, he that formeth the mountains and createth the wind and declareth unto man what is his thought, that maketh the morning darkness and treadeth upon the high places of the earth, The Lord, The God of hosts, is his name.' It is not easy to conceive a

sublimer characteristic of the Hebrew poetry than this, that it treats all creation as a mere shadow; and finds the essence of its beauty, as well as the sustaining power of its life, in the spiritual world."—R. H. HUTTON, *Literary Essays*, pp. 270–271.

"Amos and Isaiah do not deal in ideas. Their strength lies in love and hatred, in the keenness and depth of their division between right and wrong. They repeat the work of God the Creator: chaotic sameness becomes diverse; the heavenly firmament mounts on high; there is light and there is darkness."—W. HALE WHITE, *More Pages from a Journal* (pp. 260–261).

v. 6. *Seek ye the Lord, and ye shall live: lest he break out like fire in the house of Joseph, and it devour and there be none to quench it in Bethel.*

"Cost what it may, reigns of terror, horrors of French Revolution or what else, we have to return to truth. Here is a Truth, as I said: a Truth clad in hell-fire, since they would not but have it so."—CARLYLE, *Heroes* (lecture vi.).

v. 7. *Ye who turn judgment to wormwood, and cast down righteousness to the earth.*

"First, for the Causes or Parties that sue. There be (saith the Scripture) that turne Judgement into Wormewood; and surely, there be also, that turne it into Vinegar: For Injustice maketh it Bitter and Delaies make it Soure."—BACON, *Essays* (on "Judicature").

v. 7–8. *Ye who turn judgement to wormwood, and cast down righteousness to the earth, seek him that maketh the Pleiades and Orion, and turneth the shadow of death into the morning, that maketh the day dark with night.*

"The worship of the idol is often more passionate than that of God. People prostrate themselves in ecstasy before the idol, and remain unmoved in the presence of a starry night. A starry night does not provoke hysterics. The

adoration of the veritably divine is calm."—W. HALE WHITE, *More Pages from a Journal* (p. 254).

"So far as the Jewish prophets made use of such astronomy as they had, they used it altogether in the sense in which the modern agnostics use their heliocentric astronomy—to impress upon man his utter insignificance in creation. Take the prophet Amos :—'Ye that turn judgment to wormwood, and cast down righteousness to the earth, seek him that maketh the Pleiades and Orion, and turneth the shadow of death into the morning, that maketh the day dark with night,'—a passage which seems a sort of anticipation of Wordsworth's apostrophe to Duty :—

'Thou canst preserve the stars from wrong,
And the most ancient heavens through Thee are fresh and strong.'

The prophets of Judæa certainly used astronomy, so far as they used it at all, entirely in the modern sense, to lower the pride of man."—R. H. HUTTON, *Contemporary Thought and Thinkers*, pp. 291–292.

"Is it conceivable that the God who made the Seven Stars and Orion, and who is without variableness or shadow of turning, played off caprices on the narrow sea-board of Asia Minor in the centuries before our era, which, having come to another mind, or being weary, He has ceased to enact, in modern days, cowed and outfaced by steam and penny newspapers reeled off without stopping? Is the Strength of Israel lying or repenting now the world has waxed older and wiser and more scientific, and is clothed in cloth, and builds magnificent club-rooms in Pall Mall, when His name goes for nothing?"—JAMES SMETHAM, *Letters* (p. 347).

v. 13. *Therefore the prudent shall keep silence in that time; for it is an evil time.*

At the close of his treatise on "The Spirit" (78), St. Basil

bewails the disorder and noise of the Church, and admits that he is tempted to hold his peace. "Since no human voice is strong enough to be heard in such a disturbance, I reckon silence more profitable than speech . . . I am restrained by the prophet's word, 'therefore the prudent shall keep silence in that time; for it is an evil time,' a time when some trip up their neighbours' heels, some stamp on a man when he is down, and others clap their hands for joy, but there is not one to feel for the fallen and hold out a helping hand."

> "Prudence hath her martyrs too,
> And wisdom dictates not to do,
> Till doing shall be not for naught."
>
> —Clough.

v. 14–15. *Seek good and not evil, that ye may live: and so the Lord, the God of hosts, shall be with you, as ye say. Hate the evil, and love the good.*

"Milton's nature," said Macaulay, "from the Parliament and from the court, from the conventicle and from the Gothic cloister, from the gloomy and sepulchral circles of the Roundheads, and from the Christmas revels of the hospitable cavalier, selected and drew to itself whatever was great and good, while it rejected all the base and pernicious ingredients by which these finer elements were defiled."

v. 15. *Hate the evil, and love the good, and establish judgment in the gate.*

"It is objected that their [the Hebrews'] conception of righteousness was a narrow and rigid one, centring mainly in what they called *judgment*: 'Hate the evil and love the good, and establish *judgment* in the gate!' so that 'evil,' for them, did not take in all faults whatever of heart and conduct, but meant chiefly oppression, graspingness, a violent, mendacious tongue, insolent and riotous excess.

True, their conception of righteousness *was* much of this kind, and it was narrow. But whoever sincerely attends to *conduct*, along however limited a line, is on his way to bring under the eye of conscience all conduct whatever; and already, in the Old Testament, the somewhat monotonous inculcation of the social virtues of judgment and justice is continually broken through by deeper movements of personal religion."—M. ARNOLD, *Literature and Dogma* (ch. i.).

v. 15. *It may be that the Lord of hosts will be gracious unto the remnant of Joseph.*

A certain rabbi Asi, in the third century A.D. (*Chagigah* 4b), "when he came upon this passage, wept. 'Hate the evil and love the good, and establish judgment in the gate; perhaps the Lord, the God of hosts, will be gracious.' All this, and—perhaps!"

v. 18–19. *Woe unto you that desire the day of the Lord! to what end is it for you? The day of the Lord is darkness, and not light. As if a man did flee from a lion, and a bear met him; or went into the house, and leaned his hand on the wall, and a serpent bit him.*

"A true pessimism, not as the last word of wisdom, but as an element of the true doctrine, is as much a moment in genuine spirituality as tragedy is a part of the fortune of true love. . . . Evil is not a dream, but a bitter truth, which we make spiritual by conquering it. And as for the day of the Lord, as for the moment when the divinely grave meaning, the genuine spirituality, of the world dawns upon man's comprehension, the first of the great prophets whose literary remains have come down to us from the days of ancient Israel fully expressed the essential fact concerning that experience when he said to the optimists of his time: 'Woe unto you that desire the day of the Lord! To what end is it for you? The day of the Lord is darkness and

not light, as if a man did flee from a lion, and a bear met him; or went into the house, and leaned his hand on the wall, and a serpent bit him.' "—PROFESSOR ROYCE, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 447–448.

vi. 1. *Woe to them that are at ease in Zion.*

"We find it written," says Carlyle in his essay on Sir Walter Scott, "'Woe to them that are at ease in Zion,' but surely it is a double woe to them that are at ease in Babel, in Domdaniel."

"Truly either reason mockes us, or it only aimeth at our contentment, and in fine, bends all her travell to make us live well, and as the holy Scripture saith, 'at our ease.' All the opinions of the world conclude, that pleasure is our end, howbeit they take divers meanes unto and for it, else would men reject them at their first coming."—MONTAIGNE, (Florio's version) I. xix.

vi. 3–6. *Ye that . . . lie upon beds of ivory, and stretch themselves upon their couches . . . that sing idle songs to the sound of the viol . . . that drink wine in bowls.*

In this class of evils, says Calvin (*Institutes*, bk. iii. ch. 19), "the sins of the present age are specially numerous. There is scarcely any one whose means allow him to live sumptuously, who does not delight in feasting and dress and the luxurious grandeur of his house, who does not wish to surpass his neighbour in every kind of delicacy. And all these things are defended under the excuse of Christian liberty. . . . Why is a woe pronounced on the rich who 'lie on beds of ivory and stretch themselves on their couches,' . . . 'and the harp and the viol, the tabret and pipe and wine are in their feasts'? Certainly, ivory and gold and riches are the good creatures of God, permitted, nay destined, for man's use by the providence of God; nor was it ever forbidden to laugh, or to be delighted with music or to drink wine. This is true, but when the means are supplied, to

roll and wallow in luxury, to intoxicate the mind and soul with present pleasures and ever to be on the hunt for future pleasures—this is very far from a legitimate use of God's gifts."

vi. 14. *Behold, I will raise up against you a nation, O house of Israel, saith the Lord, the God of hosts; and they shall afflict you.*

"The Vandal fleets ravaged and tormented the Mediterranean coasts, like those of the Haireddin Barbarossa and the Barbary rovers of later ages. 'Whither shall we sail?' asked Genseric's pilot. 'Sail to those with whom God is angry,' was the reply."—Dean Church, *Beginning of the Middle Ages* (p. 21).

vii. 10. *Then Amaziah, the priest of Bethel, sent to Jeroboam king of Israel, saying, Amos hath conspired against thee in the midst of the house of Israel: the land is not able to bear all his words.*

"Attack is the reaction. I never think I have hit hard unless it rebounds."—Dr. Johnson.

vii. 11. *For Amos thus saith, Jeroboam shall die by the sword, and Israel shall surely be led away captive out of their own land.*

"No joy of mine to invite the thunder down,
No pride, the uprising whirlwind to survey,
How gradual from the north, with hideous frown,
It veers in silence round the horizon grey,
And one by one sweeps the bright isles away,
Where fondly gazed the men of worldly peace,
Dreaming fair weather would outlast their day.
Now the big storm-drops fall, their dream must cease—
They know it well, and fain their ire would wreak
On the dread arm that wields the bolt; but He
Is out of reach, therefore on me they turn;—

On me, that am but voice, fading and weak,
A withered leaf, inscribed with Heaven's decree,
And blown where haply some in fear may learn."

—KEBLE.

"For the sixty years which lie between Elisha and Amos, we have no record of the religious condition of either Israel or Judah. . . . Then suddenly, amid the comparative prosperity of Jeroboam's reign, there sounds the warning voice of Amos, the shepherd-prophet. He stands as high above Elijah, as Elijah, in all probability, stood above Samuel."—C. G. MONTEFIORE, *Hibbert Lectures* (pp. 98–99).

vii. 12 f. *Amaziah said to Amos, O thou seer, go, flee thee away into the land of Judah, and there eat bread, and prophesy there: but prophesy not again any more at Bethel: for it is the king's chapel, and it is the king's court. Then answered Amos, and said to Amaziah, I was no prophet, neither was I a prophet's son; but I was an herdman, and a gatherer of sycamore fruit: and the Lord took me as I followed the flock, and the Lord said to me, Go, prophesy unto my people Israel.*

"I own, 'twas rash, and rather hardy,
That I, a simple countra bardie,
Shou'd meddle wi' a pack so sturdy,
Wha, if they ken me,
Can easy, wi' a single wordie
Lowse hell upon me.

But I gae mad at their grimaces,
Their sighin', cantin', grace-proud faces,
Their three-mile prayers, and hauf-mile graces,
Their raxin' conscience,
Whase greed, revenge, an' pride disgraces
Mair than their nonsense."

—BURNS.

Carlyle, says Dr. William Barry in *Heralds of Revolt* (pp. 72–73), "was nothing if not a religious teacher. His vocation, as he viewed it, is found in Amos: 'I was no prophet, neither was I a prophet's son; but I was an herdsman, and a gatherer of sycamore fruit. And the Lord took me as I followed the flock; and the Lord said to me, Go prophesy to my people Israel.' Like Amos, he beheld the burden of the nations, especially of that England which had overthrown Napoleon."

"In spite of all that was distasteful to him in some of its surroundings," says Mr. Thomas Hughes, "the Co-operative movement entirely approved itself to his conscience and judgment, and mastered him so that he was ready to risk whatever had to be risked in fighting its battle. Often in those days, seeing how loath Charles Kingsley was to take in hand much of the work that Parson Lot had to do, and how fearlessly and thoroughly he did it after all, one was reminded of the old Jewish prophets, such as Amos the herdsman of Tekoa,—'I was no prophet, neither was I a prophet's son; but I was an herdsman, and a gatherer of sycamore fruit; and the Lord took me as I followed the flock, and said to me, Go, prophesy unto my people Israel."

Jerome, in A.D. 385, writes thus to Marcella: "Amos is driven from Samaria. Why? Surely in this case, as in others, because he was a spiritual surgeon, who cut away the parts diseased by sin and urged men to repentance. . . . It is not surprising, then, that by exposing their faults I have offended many people."

viii. 4–5. *Hear this, O ye that would swallow up the needy, and cause the fear of the Lord to fail, saying, When will the new moon be gone, that we may sell corn? and the Sabbath, that we may set forth wheat.'*

"Yea, God, well counselled for our health,
Gave all this fleeting earthly wealth

A common heritage to all,
That men might feed them therewithal,
And clothe their limbs and shoe their feet,
And live a simple life and sweet.
But now so rageth greediness
That each desireth nothing less
Than all the world, and all his own;
And all for him, and him alone."

—William Morris.

viii. 7. *The Lord hath sworn, surely I will never forget any of their works.*

"The absolute justice of the system of things is as clear to me as any scientific fact. The gravitation of sin to sorrow is as certain as that of the earth to the sun, and more so—for experimental proof of the fact is within reach of us all—nay, is before us all in our own lives, if we had but the eyes to see it."—Huxley.

viii. 11–12. *Behold, the days come, saith the Lord God, that I will send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, not a thirst for water, but of hearing the words of the Lord; and they shall wander from sea to sea, and from the north even to the east, they shall run to and fro to seek the word of the Lord, and shall not find it.*

"Very likely there will come a day when there will be less religion than even now. For the religion of the Bible is so simple and powerful, that even those who make the Bible a thaumaturgy get hold of the religion, because they read the Bible; but, if men do not read the Bible, they cannot get hold of it. And then will be fulfilled the saying of the prophet Amos: 'Behold, the days come, saith the Eternal, that I will send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, not a thirst for water, but of hearing the words of the Eternal; and they shall wander from sea to sea, and from the

north even to the east, they shall run to and fro to seek the word of the Eternal, and shall not find it.' Nevertheless, as after this mournful prophecy the herdsman of Tekoah goes on to say: '*There shall yet not the least grain of Israel fall to the earth!*' To the Bible men will return; and why? Because they cannot do without it. Because happiness is our being's end and aim, and happiness belongs to righteousness, and righteousness is reached in the Bible. For this simple reason men will return to the Bible, first as a man who tried to give up food, thinking it was a vain thing, and he could do without it, would return to food." —MATTHEW ARNOLD, *Literature and Dogma* (ch. xi.).

ix. 4. *I will command the sword, and it shall slay them.*

"The only hope that now remains to us is that the sword of God may soon smite the earth."—SAVONAROLA (in 1493).

ix. 9. *For lo, I will command, and I will sift the house of Israel among all nations, like as corn is sifted in a sieve, yet shall not the least grain fall upon the earth.*

In *Verona* (pp. 124 f.) Ruskin, describing St. Benedict, declares, "the corn and the corn-sieve are alike sacred in his eyes. And once understanding that, and considering what part of the "library" of his day, the Bible of St. Jerome's giving, would either touch himself most closely, or would be looked to by others as most descriptive of him, you will feel that the especially agricultural prophecy of Amos would become the guide of Benedictine expectation." He then quotes ix. 9, 13–15, to illustrate his point.

ix. 11–12. *In that day will I raise up the tabernacle of David that is fallen . . . that they may possess the remnant of Edom, and of all the heathen, which are called by my name, saith the Lord that doeth this.*

"The Hebrew Amos, of the eighth century before Christ promises to his hearers a recovery from their ruin in which they *shall possess the remnant of Edom;* the Greek or Ara-

maic Amos of the Christian era, whose words St. James produces in the conference at Jerusalem, promises a recovery for Israel in which *the residue of men shall seek the Eternal*."—M. ARNOLD, *Literature and Dogma* (ch. i.).

ix. 14. *And I will bring again the captivity of my people of Israel . . . and they shall plant vineyards, and drink the wine thereof; they shall also make gardens, and eat the fruit of them.*

"Art, religion, and morality, and, we need hardly add, science, grow up and take form in society, and the essence or ground-plan of society lies in its economical arrangements. The lawgivers of old Israel saw clearly that in them is the root of the matter for morals and religion. The modern spiritualist laughs at the ancient believer, whose god gave him corn and wine, and sat him down under his own vine and fig-tree. But we may spiritualize our God over-much. God is not merely the guardian or the rewarder of the narrowly moral law. The real moral law of God is the law of all life."—PROF. WILLIAM WALLACE, *Lectures and Essays*, p. 167.

JAMES MOFFATT.

PAUL'S FIRST LETTER TO THE CORINTHIANS.

Ch. i. 1. *Paul, through God's will and calling an apostle of Christ Jesus,*[1] *and brother Sosthenes—*

To the church of God which is found in Corinth, men sanctified in Christ Jesus, saints of God's calling, with all those who in any place invoke the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, their Lord and ours: grace be to you, and peace, from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.

The Thanksgiving.

v. 4. I never fail to thank my God on your account for the grace of God given you in Christ Jesus, as I see how every way you were enriched in Him—endowed with every kind of utterance and of knowledge, in keeping with the firm establishment amongst you of the testimony concerning Christ, so that you come short in no gift of grace, while you eagerly await the unveiling of our Lord Jesus Christ, who verily will establish you to the end, setting you beyond reproof in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ.[2] Faithful is God, by whose command you were called to enter the fellowship of His Son Jesus Christ.

Divisions in the Church.

v. 10. But I appeal to you, brothers, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, all of you to say the same thing and not to have divisions amongst you, but that you be brought to perfect agreement in the same mind and the same judgment. For I have been informed about you, my brothers,

[1] Or, "Jesus Christ." [2] Or, "our Lord Jesus."

by Chloë's people, that there are strifes amongst you: I mean this, that you are saying severally, "I'm for Paul," "I for Apollos," "I for Kephas," and "I for Christ!" Has Christ been parcelled out?[1] Was Paul crucified for you? or is it Paul's name unto which you were baptized? I thank God, I baptized none of you except Crispus and Gaius—I would not have any one say that you were baptized unto *my* name—yes, and I baptized the household of Stephanas; beyond these, I scarcely think I baptized any one else. For it was not to baptize that Christ sent me out, but to preach the Good News; and to do this without wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be robbed of its power.

The Folly of the Gospel.

v. 18. For the word of the cross to the perishing is folly, while to the saved—to ourselves—it is God's power! For it is written:—

> "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise,
> And the understanding of the men of understanding I will frustrate."

What has become of the wise man, of the Scribe, of the disputant of our age? has not God turned to folly the world's wisdom? For since in the ordering of God's wisdom the world through its wisdom failed to know God, it pleased God well through "the folly" of our proclamation to save believers; since Jews, to be sure, demand miracles and Greeks are in search of wisdom, but we proclaim a Christ crucified—to Jews in sooth a scandal and to Greeks a folly, but to the called of God, Jews and Greeks alike, a Christ who is God's power and God's wisdom. Because God's "foolishness" (as they deem it) is wiser than men and God's "weakness" is stronger than men!

[1] Or, "Christ has been parcelled out!"

God's weak things.

v. 26. Look, for instance, at the fact of God's calling *you*, my brothers—not many of you wise (as the world judges), not many strong, not many high-born; nay, but God chose out the world's foolish things on purpose to put to shame its wise; and the weak things of the world did God choose, that He might put to shame the things of strength; and the base-born things of the world, and things made of no account, God has chosen—the things which are not, that He might abolish the things which are, that so no flesh might vaunt itself before God. But His offspring you are in Christ Jesus, who became a God-given wisdom for us,—yea, both righteousness and sanctification, and redemption; that so it might be as it is written,—

"Let him that boasteth, boast himself in the Lord!"

The manner of Paul's preaching.

Ch. ii. 1. And for myself, when I came to you, brothers, it was not as one eminent in speech or wisdom that I came proclaiming the testimony [1] of God; for I did not think fit to know anything amongst you except Jesus Christ,—and Him as crucified! And I appeared before you in weakness and in fear and in great trembling; and my word and proclamation was delivered in no persuasive words of wisdom, but with a demonstration of spirit and power, so that your faith should not rest on men's wisdom but on God's power.

God's hidden wisdom.

v. 6. Yet there is a wisdom we talk amongst ripe men, a wisdom, however, that does not belong to this age,[2] nor to the rulers of this age who are coming to nought. Nay, it

[1] Possibly, "the mystery of God," as in some ancient copies; comp. Col. i. 27, ii. 2 (R.V.). But this would be to anticipate verse 7.

[2] "Age" must be understood in a comprehensive sense, as a *world-period.*

is God's wisdom, conveyed in a mystery that we utter, the deep-hidden wisdom which God foreordained before the ages to be our glory, the wisdom which none of the rulers of this age has known; for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory. But, as it is written, there are

"Things which eye saw not and ear heard not,
And which never dawned on the mind of man,
Whatsoever things God hath prepared for those that love Him";

yet to us God has revealed them through the Spirit.

Spiritual discernment.

v. 10*b*. For the Spirit searches all things, even the deeps of God. For amongst men, who knows the things of the man except the man's spirit within him? In like fashion, of the things of God none has knowledge except God's Spirit. Now we received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit of God, that we may understand God's gifts of grace to us. These things indeed we utter, not in words taught by human wisdom but in words taught by the Spirit, matching the spiritual with the spiritual.[1] On the other hand, a natural man [2] does not accept the things of God's Spirit, for they are folly to him; and he cannot apprehend them, because they answer only to a spiritual test. But the spiritual man is trier of everything, while he is subject to trial by none. For "who has known the mind of the Lord, that he shall instruct *Him*?" We, however, possess the mind of Christ.

[1] I.e. *thought and phrase, matter and form;* or, "combining spiritual things with spiritual"; or, "interpreting spiritual things to spiritual men." Or, with another reading of the Greek, "spiritually combining" (or "interpreting) spiritual things."

[2] Greek *psychikos*, "a man of (mere) soul" untouched by "the Spirit" of God. This is synonymous with "the man of flesh," the "carnal" man, of iii. 2, 4; only, the term represents the unrenewed man at his best, in his full natural capacity; comp. xv. 44–46, and note.

Milk and Meat.

Ch. iii. 1. And for my part, brothers, I could not speak to you as I might to men of the Spirit, but only as to men of flesh, to babes in Christ. It was milk I gave you to drink, not meat, for not yet were you equal to it; nay, up to this very time you are unable for solid food, for you are still carnal. For where there is amongst you envying and strife, are you not carnal, and do you not walk in the way of men? For where one is saying "I'm for Paul," while another says "I'm for Apollos," are you not just *human*?

God's co-operating workmen.

v. 5. What, then, is Apollos? and what, pray, is Paul? They are ministers through whom you came to believe, ministers serving each of them according to the Lord's gift to him.

I planted, Apollos watered;
But God made the plant to grow:
So neither the planter counts for anything, nor the waterer,
But only the giver of the increase,—*God!*

The planter, moreover, and the waterer are as one; yet each will receive his distinct wages proportioned to his labour. For we are together God's workmen: God's tilth, God's building, are ye.

The One Foundation and the final test.

v. 10. According to the grace of God that was given me, like a wise master-builder I laid a foundation, and another man is building upon it; but let each take heed how he builds thereupon. For as to the foundation, none can lay down any other beyond that already laid, which is *Jesus Christ.* Now if any one is building on to that foundation work of gold, silver, precious stones, or of wood, hay, straw, each man's work will be brought to light; for the Day will disclose it, because in fire the revelation comes.

And as to each man's work, the fire will test it, proving of what sort it is: whosesoever work abides which he built on to the foundation, he will get his wages; whosesoever work shall be consumed, he will suffer forfeit; yet he will personally be saved, as one escaping through fire! Don't you know that you are God's *temple*, and the Spirit of God dwells within you? If any one destroys God's temple, God will destroy him; for the temple of God is holy,—and this is what you are.

The wealth of the saints.

v. 18. Let no one delude himself: if any one thinks to be wise among you, let him become a fool in this world,[1] that he may be wise; for the wisdom of this world is folly with God. For it is written, "He that catcheth the wise in their craftiness"; and again, "The Lord knoweth the reasonings of the wise, how futile they are!" And so let no one glory in men. For all things are yours, whether it be Paul or Apollos or Kephas; whether the world, or life, or death; whether it be things present or to come—all are yours; but you are Christ's, while Christ is God's.

The trial of ministers.

Ch. iv. 1. In this way should men estimate us—namely, as servants of Christ and stewards of God's mysteries. In such case the one thing looked for—in stewards, I mean—is that one be found faithful. Now for me, personally, it is a matter of small concern to be called in question by you or by a human day of judgment; nay, I do not even try myself. For I am not aware of anything against myself; yet not on this ground am I justified, but it is the Lord who tries me. Therefore don't be judging anything before the

[1] Or "age"; see note to ii. 6. The sentence may also be rendered, "thinks to be wise amongst you in respect to this age, let him become a fool that he may be wise."

time,—not until the Lord comes, who will both light up the hidden things of darkness and lay bare the counsels of men's hearts; and then each will have from God his due praise.

Corinthian pride.

v. 6. Now these reflexions, brothers, I have applied to the case of myself and Apollos for your benefit, that in our example you may learn the rule, "Not a step beyond the line of Scripture," so that you may cease to indulge pride on behalf of one against the other of your leaders. For who makes you superior? What, pray, have you that you did not receive? but if in truth you received it, why boast as though you had not received it?—So soon, it seems, you have had your fill; so soon you grew rich, you came to royal estate, when we had left you! Ay, I would that you had come to your kingdom, that we might share it with you!

The Apostles' low estate.

v. 9. For methinks God has set us the Apostles at the end of the show,[1] as men doomed to death: we have become a spectacle for the world, for angels and men! We are fools on Christ's behalf—you are prudent in Christ; we are weak—you are strong; you glorious—we dishonoured. Up to this very hour indeed we suffer hunger and thirst, and are ill-clad, and exposed to blows, and wander homeless, and labour hard working with our own hands. We meet reviling with blessing, persecution with endurance, slander with entreaty. We have become as the scapegoats of the world, the rinsings of everything; and are so to this hour!

Fatherly rights and discipline.

v. 14. Not by way of shaming you do I write these things, but as my beloved children admonishing you. For

[1] On days of public festival criminals were often exhibited in this way; and their execution, regarded as a *piaculum* or propitiatory sacrifice, crowned the shows of the feast.

though you should have ten thousand tutors in Christ, you have not many *fathers*; for in Christ Jesus, through the Good News, it was I that begat you! I entreat you, therefore, be my imitators. For this reason I have sent you Timothy, who is my child beloved and faithful in the Lord, who will remind you how I keep Christ's ways, in accordance with my teaching everywhere in every Church. Some, however, are filled with conceit under the idea that I am not coming to visit you myself; but I shall come to you speedily, if the Lord will, and I shall take cognisance not of the talk of those conceited men but of their *power*. For not in word does God's kingdom stand, but in power.—What would you have? am I to come to you with a rod, or in love and in the spirit of meekness?

The case of incest.

Ch. v. 1. There is actually fornication heard of amongst you, and fornication such as there is not even amongst the Gentiles—namely, for one to have his father's wife! And are you filled with pride; and have you not rather mourned over it, seeking that the man be put away from your midst who perpetrated this deed? For my own part—while absent in the body yet present in spirit—I have already passed sentence, as though present, on him who has thus wrought this deed: that in the name of the Lord [1] Jesus, when you are assembled and my spirit with you attended by the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, you *deliver this sort of man to Satan* for the destruction of his flesh, so that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord.[2]

Riddance of the old leaven.

v. 6. Your boast is not right; don't you know that a little leaven leavens the whole kneading? Cleanse out the old leaven that you may be a new kneading, as suits your

[1] "Our Lord Jesus," in some good copies. [2] Or, "the Lord Jesus."

" unleavened " character. Christ has been slain as our Paschal Lamb : let us accordingly keep the feast,[1] not with old leaven nor with leaven of badness and wickedness, but with " unleavened bread " of sincerity and truth.

Excommunication of the immoral.

v. 9. I wrote to you in the former letter forbidding you to associate with fornicators, not meaning, absolutely, with the fornicators of this world, or its over-reachers and plunderers, or idolaters ; for if that were so, you would be obliged to go out of the world ! But I do write forbidding you to associate with any one bearing the name of " brother " who is either a fornicator or an over-reacher or an idolater or a reviler or a drunkard or a plunderer : with such a one you must not even eat. For what business have I to judge those who are outside ?—Are you not the judges of those within the Church ? but those outside God will judge. —" Remove the wicked person from your company."

Litigation amongst Christians.

Ch. vi. 1. Dares any one of you with a case against his neighbour go to law before the unrighteous, and will he not bring it before the saints ? You know, do you not, that the saints will judge the world ! and if the world is judged in your court, are you unworthy of sitting in judgment on trifling matters ? Don't you know that we shall judge angels ? much more, surely, things of this life ! Well then, as for secular tribunals,[2] if you have men of no account in the Church, set these on the bench ![3]—to your shame I

[1] The time of Passover (Easter) is approaching ; comp. xvi. 8.

[2] Or, " if you have trials in secular matters " ; this is the common rendering, but is unsatisfactory on several accounts.

[3] Or, " do you set these on the bench ? " The imperatival rendering better suits Paul's ironical tone, and accords with the fact that the Corinthian Church is *failing* to settle at home the secular disputes among its members.

say this. Is it so that there is not found amongst you one wise man who will be able to arbitrate between his brethren? nay, but brother goes to law with brother, and that before the unbelievers?

God's judgment upon wrong-doers.

v. 7. Indeed then, it is already an unmistakable defeat[1] for you that you have lawsuits with one another. Why do you not rather submit to wrong? why not rather let yourselves be robbed?—Nay, but you commit wrong and robbery, and this upon your brothers! Surely you must know that wrong-doers will not inherit God's kingdom.—Be not deluded: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor the voluptuous, nor sodomites, nor thieves, nor overreachers, no drunkards, no revilers, no plunderers will inherit God's kingdom. And these things some of you were; but you washed yourselves, you were sanctified, were justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit of our God.

Limits on the lawful.

v. 12. "All things are lawful for me," you say: yes, but not all things are profitable. "All things are in my power"; but I will not be brought into the power of anything. Foods are for the stomach and the stomach for its foods, though God will do away both with it and them: but *the body* is not meant for fornication but for the Lord, and the Lord for the body; and God both raised up the Lord, and us He will raise up from death through His power.

Bodily sanctity.

v. 15. Don't you know that your bodies are limbs of Christ? should I then take Christ's limbs from Him and

[1] The Greek noun, meaning radically "a being-worsted," was in technical use to denote a *non-suit*, the failure of a legal plea. The connexion imports this meaning here. As much as to say, "You are beaten before you go into court, by the very fact that you have such quarrels!"

make them limbs of a harlot ? the thought is monstrous ! You know, I daresay, that he who is knit to the harlot is one body with her ; "for the twain," the saying goes, "shall be made one flesh" : but he who is knit to the Lord is one spirit with Him.—Flee fornication. Any other act of sin a man may commit lies outside his body ; but the fornicator sins against his own body. Don't you know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God, and that you are not your own ? —for you were purchased, at a price !—Glorify God verily in your body.

Questions about marriage.

Ch. vii. 1. But coming to the questions on which you wrote to me :—

It is right for one to abstain from marriage ; but because of the prevalent fornications let each have his own wife, and every woman her own husband. To his wife let the husband render the debt of marriage ; the wife also, on equal terms, to the husband. The wife has not dominion over her own person, but the husband : and correspondingly, the husband has not dominion over his own person, but the wife. Do not deprive one another—unless perchance by agreement, on occasion, that you may get leisure for prayer and again be together—lest Satan should be tempting you because of your want of continence. I say this by way of concession, not injunction ; though I could wish that all men were in this respect just like myself ; but each has a special grace-gift from God, one man in this direction and another in that.

Advice to the single and married.

v. 8. To the unmarried, however, and to widows I say, that it is right for them if they remain as indeed I am myself ; but if they are wanting in continence, let them marry ;

for it is better to marry than to burn. But to those who have married I give charge—or rather the Lord, not I—that the wife is not to part from the husband (if, however, a separation should take place, let her remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband), and the husband is not to dismiss the wife.

The case of the Christian married to an unbeliever.

v. 12. As for the other cases, I declare (here the Lord has not spoken): If any brother has a wife who is not a believer and she is satisfied to live with him, let him not dismss her; and the wife who has a husband not a believer and he is satisfied to live with her, let her not dismiss her husband; for the non-believing husband has become a holy person in relation to his wife, and the non-believing wife has become a holy person in relation to the Christian brother; since otherwise your children would be unholy, but in point of fact they are holy! If, however, the non-believer is for separation, so let it be: the brother or the sister is under no bonds in such circumstances. But God has called us [1] to live in peace; for how do you know, O wife, that you will not save your husband? or how do you know, O husband, that you will not save your wife? [2]

Contentment with one's state in life.

v. 17. Only, let each pursue his course in the path the Lord has assigned, the state in which God has called him; and thus I give order throughout the Churches. Was any one called to salvation as a circumcised man? let him not have the mark obliterated; has any one been called when

[1] Or, "you": the reading is doubtful.

[2] The Greek form of question is ambiguous; the words may be read, "How do you know . . . that you will save?" etc. On this rendering, the "peace" in question is to come by parting; on the rendering preferred, it is to be preserved by continued union.

in uncircumcision? let him not be circumcised. Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing; but keeping God's commands is everything. Whatever the vocation in which God's call found him, in this let a man abide: were you called when in slavery?—don't let it trouble you (for all that, if indeed you have the opportunity of liberation, avail yourself of it[1]); for the slave who was called by the Lord's authority is the Lord's freedman; no less, the freeman in virtue of his calling is Christ's slave. With a price you were bought: no longer let yourselves be slaves of men.—In the state wherein each was called, brothers, in this let him abide before God.

Deprecation of marriage.

v. 25. Further, as to your maiden daughters: I have no specific command of the Lord; but I give my opinion, as one who has received mercy from the Lord enabling him to be faithful. I think therefore this to be the right course, in view of the present straits: it is right, I say, for one to remain as he is. Are you bound to a wife?—do not seek release: are you loosed from the bond?—do not seek a wife; if, however, you should marry, you have not sinned; and if the maiden should marry, she has not sinned. But those who do so will find affliction prepared for their flesh; and I would spare you this.

The passing world.

v. 29. But this I do say, brothers, the time is cut short; so that for the future indeed those who have wives may be as though without them, and those who weep as though they wept not and those who rejoice as though they were

[1] The above translation makes the acceptance of proffered freedom an exception to the principle laid down in *vv.* 20 and 24. The opposite rendering, conforming the case to that rule, is also tenable: "But even if you might be set free, prefer to make the best of your condition." The Greek is curiously elliptical.

not rejoicing, and those who buy as though they did not possess and those who use the world as men not exploiting it; for the fashion of this world is passing away.

The entanglements of marriage.

v. 32. Besides, I want you to be free from anxiety. The unmarried man is anxious about the things of the Lord, as to how he may please the Lord; but he that has married is anxious about the things of the world, considering how he may please his wife,—so he is divided.[1] Also the unmarried woman, and the maiden, is anxious about the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in her body and her spirit; but she that has married is anxious about the things of the world, thinking how she may please her husband. Now I say this looking to your own advantage,—not to entangle you, but with a view to what is seemly and what promotes your waiting on the Lord without distraction.

Reasons for and against marriage.

v. 36. But if any one thinks that he would be acting unhandsomely by the maiden in his charge should she pass the flower of youth, and some obligation rests upon him in the case, let him act on his own will—he does not sin: let the parties marry. But the guardian who stands firm in his purpose, where he is under no constraint but has a right to form his own resolution, and who has come in his own mind to this decision—namely, to keep the maiden at his disposal unwedded—will do well in thus acting. So that indeed he who gives the maiden in his charge to a husband does well, while he who declines will do better!—A wife

[1] The Greek text and construction are somewhat uncertain here. This verb may be connected with the following sentence, giving the sense: "There is a difference between the wife and the maiden"; then "the unmarried (woman)" remains alone as the subject of the following predicate, "is anxious." The previous verb is the same that was used in i. 13, and scarcely suggests the idea of "difference."

remains bound for so long time as her husband lives; but if the husband "fall asleep," she is free to be married to whom she will, so it be in the Lord. But she is more blessed if she remain in her present state, according to my judgment; and I suppose too that I have an inspiration of God.

Bearings of the question of the Idolothyta.

Ch. viii. 1. Now about the meats of the idol-sacrifices. "We know," say you, because "we all have knowledge." [1] Knowledge puffs up; it is love that builds up. If any one thinks there is anything he really *knows*, he has known nothing yet as he ought to know; but if any one loves God, that man is known indeed by Him.—As to the eating, then, of meat used in idol-sacrifices: "We know," as you say, "that there is no idol in the world," and "that there is no other God but one"; for indeed if there are so-called gods, whether in heaven or on earth—as indeed there are many "gods" and many "lords"—yet for us

> "There is one God, the Father,
> Of whom are all things, and we for Him;
> And one Lord, Jesus Christ,
> Through whom are all things, and we through Him." [2]

Consideration for weak consciences.

v. 7. Still, it is not every one who has this knowledge; but some through their previous habituation to the idol eat the thing as though belonging to the idol-sacrifice; and their conscience, being weak, receives a stain. Yet meat will

[1] The Apostle probably takes the claim to "knowledge" from the mouth of the Corinthians; comp. *vv.* 9, 10, also i. 5, iii. 18, iv. 10. For similar allusions, reflecting the expressions of the Church-letter recently sent to him (vii. 1, etc.), see *vv.* 4–6, vi. 12, x. 23, xi. 2. The common rendering, "We know that we all have knowledge," gives a somewhat pointless tautology.

[2] These lines may be borrowed from some early Confession of Faith recited in the Church, which the Corinthians had quoted in their letter to St. Paul. For similar allusions, see Eph. iv. 4 ff., 1 Tim. iii. 16.

not be the ground of our presenting to God; for neither are we any worse off by refusing to eat, nor any better off by partaking of the food in question. Beware, however, lest in some way this "right" of yours becomes a stumbling-block to the weak. For if any such man should see you, who have "knowledge," at table in an idol's house, will not his conscience he "edified" (as you put it), so that he is led, while he is weak, to eat of the idol's meats? Your knowledge, to be sure, is bringing ruin on him through his weakness—on the brother for whose sake Christ died! But when you sin thus against your brothers and give a blow to their conscience in its weakness, you sin *against Christ.* —Wherefore verily if what I eat is stumbling my brother, never again to the end of my days will I eat flesh, for fear I should stumble my brother.

Paul's official rights.

Ch. ix. 1. Am I not a free man? am I not an apostle? have I not seen Jesus our Lord? are not you my work in the Lord?—If to others I am no apostle, anyhow I am so to you; for you are in the Lord the seal of my apostleship: this is my defence to those who call me in question.[1]—Is it that we have no right to maintenance? no right to take a sister about with us as wife, as indeed the rest of the apostles do, and the brothers of the Lord, and Kephas? or I alone and Barnabas—have we not a right to dispense with manual labour? Who ever goes on a campaign at his own charges? who plants a vineyard and does not eat of its fruit? or who shepherds a flock and does not feed on the milk of the flock? —Am I putting the case on grounds of human practice, or does not even the Law say the same? Yes, in the law of

[1] Or the "defence" is put forward in the questions which follow, on which construction the *colon* after "apostleship" and the *full stop* after "question" must change places.

Moses it is written, "Thou shalt not muzzle a threshing ox": is it just for the oxen that God is concerned, or does He say this altogether on our account?—Yes, on our account it was written that the plougher ought to have hope in his ploughing, and the thresher a hope of sharing in the produce.

Paul forgoes his claims.

v. 11. If we sowed on you the things of the Spirit, is it much to ask that we shall reap from you the needed carnal things? if others share in this claim upon you, is it not ours in the first place? But we have forborne to use this right; nay, we endure anything rather than put a hindrance in the way of the Good News of Christ.—Don't you know that those employed in the sacred offices eat the produce of the temple, and those who wait upon the altar have their portion with the altar? so in truth did the Lord ordain that those who preach the Good News should live of the Good News. Personally, however, I have enforced none of these rights.

The wages he insists upon.

v. 15*b*. Nor have I written this intending that it should take effect in my own case; for it were well for me rather to die than——[1] no one shall make void my boast! For if I am a preacher of the Good News, I have nothing to boast of in that; for necessity lies upon me—yea, it is woe to me if I cease to preach! For if I am carrying on this work at my own will, I have a claim to reward; but if by constraint, it is a stewardship with which I have been entrusted.—What then is my reward? It is that in preaching the Good News

[1] An instance of *aposiopesis*. The writer's pen, or his voice in dictation, is arrested by violent emotion; he breaks off his sentence and finishes with a protestation, "No one," etc. But his meaning is perfectly plain.

I shall offer it free of cost; so that (you see) I must not exploit my right in the Good News.

Paul's policy of accommodation.

v. 19. For, free as I am from all, I made myself slave to all, that I might win the larger gains for Christ. So I became to the Jews as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to those under the law as one of themselves—though I am not personally under the law—that I might gain those under law; to those without the law as in their position—though I am not without law toward God, but within the law of Christ—that I might gain those without the law; I became weak to the weak, that I might gain the weak: to all men I have become all things, that in all ways I might save some of them. But everything I do is for the sake of the Good News, that I may share with others in its benefits.

Self-discipline the way to success.

v. 24. You know, to be sure, that those who run in the stadium *all* run, but *one* gets the prize: so run that you may win! Now every man who contends in the games is temperate in every point—they, that they may get a perishing, but we an imperishable wreath. For myself, therefore, it is thus that I run,—in no aimless fashion! so do I ply my fists, not like one who smites the air! But I beat my body heavily and hold it in slavery, lest perchance after being herald of the course [1] to others, I prove reprobate myself.

The sad example of ancient Israel.

Ch. x. 1. For I would have you bear in mind, brothers, that our fathers all were under "the cloud" and all passed through "the sea," and all received baptism unto Moses

[1] The *kerux* of the Greek games declared the lists open and invited competitors. "Reprobate," or "rejected" (*adokimos*), is another technical term of the Games, signifying a disqualified candidate.

in the cloud and in the sea, and they all ate the same [1] spiritual food and all drank the same spiritual drink—for it was from a spiritual rock attending them that they drank (that rock was the Christ); yet with the greater part of them God was not well pleased, for they were "laid low in the desert." Now these were events exemplary for us,[2] to deter us from "lusting after" evil things as they verily did; neither be idolaters, as some of them became,—as indeed it is written: "The people sat down to eat and drink, and rose up to sport!" nor let us commit fornication, as some of them did, and they fell, twenty-three thousand of them in a single day; nor let us try the Lord too far, as some of them tried Him, and were destroyed by the serpents; nor murmur ye, as some of them murmured, and they perished at the hand of the destroyer. But this course of things befell them by way of example; and the story was written to admonish us, upon whom the ends of the ages have devolved.

God's providence in man's temptations.

v. 12. So then he who thinks that he stands, must take heed lest he fall. No temptation has overtaken you beyond human measure: God moreover is faithful, who will not let you be tempted above your power; but He will furnish along with each temptation also the means of escape, that you may be able to endure.—Wherefore indeed I entreat you, my beloved, flee from idolatry.

The bond of the Christian Sacrament.

v. 15. I speak as to men of sense; judge yourselves of what I say. The cup of blessing, over which we give blessing, is it not a communion in the blood of Christ? the loaf which we break, is it not a communion in the body of

[1] In some ancient MSS., "a spiritual food."

[2] Or, "in these experiences they became examples of our case."

Christ? Seeing there is one loaf, we the many are one body,[1] for we all partake from the one loaf.—For look at Israel after the flesh: are not those who eat the sacrifices communicants of the altar? What then do I affirm?—that an idol-sacrifice is anything, or an idol anything real? No, but I say that in the sacrifices they offer, "to *demons*, not to God, they make sacrifice." Now I would not have you made communicants of demons: you cannot drink the Lord's cup along with the cup of demons; you cannot partake at once of the Lord's table and the table of demons! Or do we mean to "provoke the Lord's jealousy?" are we stronger than He?

The Idolothyta as a case of conscience.

v. 23. "All things are lawful," say you? Yes, but not all things are profitable. "All things are lawful"; but not all things are edifying: let no one seek his own advantage, but that of his fellow. Anything that is on sale in the meat-market eat, making no question of it on grounds of conscience; for "the earth is the Lord's, and its fulness." If some one of the non-believers invites you to dinner and you are minded to go, eat whatever is set before you, raising no question on grounds of conscience. But should some person say to you, "This is meat of the sacrifice," cease eating of it for the sake of your informant and for conscience' sake—not your own conscience, I mean, but that of the other man. For what is gained by bringing my liberty under the censure of an alien conscience; and if I with gratitude

[1] Or, "Seeing that we the many are one bread (loaf), one body," etc.; the sentence is thus construed as a single clause, giving proof of the "communion" assumed in the foregoing question. But that such "communion" exists is surely self-evident, and the writer proceeds to illustrate it by pointing to the "one loaf," broken by the administrator's hands, which serves as the symbol of the "one body" to which all the communicants belong.

partake, what is the use of my being slandered for that over which I give God thanks ? [1]

The two sovereign motives.

v. 31. Whether then it be a matter of eating or drinking, or whatever else you are doing, do everything with a view to God's glory. Behave without offence both to Jews and Greeks, and to the Church of God, even as I too endeavour to please in all things all men, not seeking my own profit but that of the many, aiming at their salvation. Be imitators of me, even as I am of Christ.

Masculine headship.

Ch. xi. 2. Now I praise you, brothers, for that "in everything" you "are mindful of me and hold fast the traditions" [2] as I delivered them to you. But I would have you know that every *man* has Christ for his head, while man is head of woman and God is head of Christ. Every man when he prays or prophesies with a covering on his head, puts to shame his Head ; while every woman when she prays or prophesies with head uncovered, puts to shame her own head, for she is one and the same thing with the shaven woman.[3] For if a woman is unveiled, let her also crop her hair ; but if it is disgraceful for a woman to crop her hair or to be shaven, let her wear the veil.

The meaning of the veil.

v. 7. For a man, to be sure, ought not to veil his head, since he is the image and glory of God ; but the woman is

[1] These questions enforce the abstinence just recommended. St. Paul is not uselessly complaining of undeserved censure, but advising his readers to guard against reproach and not to expose their liberty to any avoidable condemnation.

[2] The words in *quotes* are borrowed, as one imagines, from the letter of the Corinthians to St. Paul. See note on viii. 1 ; and by contrast, *vv.* 17, 22.

[3] Slave-women had their heads shaven, and sometimes adulteresses for a punishment.

man's glory. For man is not derived from woman, but woman from man; for indeed man was not created for the woman's sake, but woman for the man's sake. For this reason the woman is bound to wear the sign of authority upon her head, having regard to the angels. However, neither is woman severed from man, nor man from woman, in the Lord; for even as the woman has her being from the man, so the man also by means of the woman; but the whole order of life is from God.—Let your own common-sense decide: is it seemly for a woman to pray to God unveiled? [1] On the other hand, does not nature itself teach you that while, in a man's case, if he wear long hair it is a dishonour to him, if a woman have long hair it is a glory to her? for her hair has been given to serve for a cloak.—But if any one presumes to be contentious on the point, let me say that neither we nor the Churches of God have any such custom as that in question.

Abuse of the Church Supper.

v. 17. Now in giving you this further charge I do not praise you, for it is not for the better but for the worse that you meet together. For, to begin with, when you assemble in church, I hear that divisions are found amongst you; and to some extent I believe it. For indeed there are bound to be parties amongst you, serving to test and bring to light the worthy in your community.—Consequently, when you hold your meeting, it is not possible to eat the Lord's Supper [2]; for when the meal begins, each is eager to get at his own supper, and one man is hungering while another is drunken!—Pray, have you not houses where

[1] The Apostle is thinking of participation in *public* prayer, answering some question raised by the Corinthian Church. Only in this case could the question of decorum arise.

[2] Or, "it is no case of eating the Lord's Supper,"—"your feast is no eating of the *Lord's* Supper."

you may eat and drink ? or is it that you despise the Church of God, and cast shame on the poor ? What am I to say to you ? should I praise you ?—In this matter I am far from praising you !

The instituting of the Lord's Supper.

v. 23. For I received in charge from the Lord the account which in turn I delivered to you : that the Lord Jesus, in the night on which He was betrayed, took a loaf of bread [1] and broke it, after giving thanks, with the words, " This is My body, which is for you : do this in remembrance of Me." In like manner He took the cup also, after they had supped, saying, " This cup is the 'new covenant' made in My 'blood' : this do, as often as you drink it, for remembrance of Me." For as often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, you proclaim the death of the Lord, until He come. So that whoever eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord unworthily, will be guilty of wrong done to the body and the blood of the Lord.

The guard against desecration.

v. 28. But let a man on each occasion put himself to proof, and so let him eat of the bread and drink of the cup ; for he that eats and drinks, eats and drinks a judgment on himself when he does not discern " the body." Because of this offence many amongst you are ill and infirm, and not a few sleep in death ! But if we discerned ourselves, we should not come into judgment ; and when we suffer judgment we are chastened by the Lord, that we may not be condemned along with the world.—And so, my brothers, when you meet together for supper, wait for one another. If any one is hungry let him have a meal at home, that you may not come together for judgment.—As for the other matters, I will set them in order when I come.

[1] Same word as in x. 16, 17 : the thin flat cake of the Passover Bread.

The fundamental Creed.

Ch. xii. 1. Further, about spiritual gifts, brothers, I wish you to be informed. You know that when you were Gentiles,[1] you were carried away to the service of those dumb idols, as you might happen to be led. Wherefore I give you to know that no one speaking in the Spirit of God says, JESUS IS ANATHEMA; and no one can say, JESUS IS LORD, except in the power of the Holy Spirit.

The vast variety of the One Spirit's gifts.

v. 4. But grace-gifts are variously distributed, while there is the same Spirit; and services are variously allotted, with the same Lord; and activities are variously assigned, though it is the same God who works all things in all men. But to each his share is given in the manifestation of the Spirit for profitable use. For to one man through the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge in the measure determined by the same Spirit; to another, again, faith in virtue of the same Spirit, and to another grace-gifts of healing in the power of the one Spirit, and to another the exercise of miraculous powers; to another prophesying, to another faculties for the discerning of spirits; to yet another certain kinds of tongues, and to another the interpretation of tongues. Now all these the one and selfsame Spirit operates, distributing individually to each man as He chooses.

Many members in Christ: one body.

v. 12. For just as the body is one and has many members, yet all the members of the body, many as they are, constitute one body, so also it is with the Christ. For verily in

[1] A slight, and not improbable, emendation of the Greek text—ὅτι ποτέ for ὅτι ὅτε—gives the reading: "You know that once you were Gentiles, carried away to the service of those dumb idols," etc.; comp. Eph. ii. 11. This correction straightens out the Greek sentence.

one Spirit we all were baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, bondmen or freemen; and all of us were made to drink of one Spirit.

The members in mutual dependence.

v. 14. For in sooth the body is not one member, but many. Supposing the foot should say, "Because I am not a hand, I am not of the body," this does not put it outside of the body; and supposing the ear should say, "Because I am not an eye, I am not of the body," this does not put it outside of the body! If all the body were eye, what becomes of the hearing? if all were hearing, what about the smelling? But as things are, God has placed the members each of them severally within the body, as He willed: if all of them formed but a single member, where would be the body? It is just the many members that make the one body. And the eye cannot say to the hand, "I have no need of you"; or, again, the head to the feet, "I have no need of you!" Nay, those members of the body which seem to be naturally weaker are indispensable; and the parts of the body that we deem to be comparatively dishonourable, these we clothe with more abounding honour, and our unseemly parts have a more abundant seemliness, while our seemly parts have no need of this.—Yes, God has tempered the body together, assigning to the lacking part of it a more abundant honour, so that there may be no rent in the body, but the members may have the same solicitude one for the other: and if one member suffers, all the members suffer along with it, or if one member is glorified, all the members rejoice therewith.—Now you are a body of Christ, and members in your several capacity.

Co-ordination of gifts in the Church.

v. 28. And some indeed God appointed in the Church, first of all, as apostles; in the second rank, prophets; in

the third, teachers; then He has bestowed miraculous powers, then grace-gifts of healing; faculties for helping, for managing; various sorts of tongues. Are all apostles? all prophets? all teachers? do all possess miraculous powers? all grace-gifts of healing? do all speak with tongues? all interpret the tongues?—Now set your heart on the greater gifts of grace.

Love's primacy.

v. 31*b*. And beyond all this, I have a way to show you far surpassing!—Should I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, while I have not love, I have become resounding brass or a shrilling cymbal. And should I have the gift of prophecy and be acquainted with all mysteries and all knowledge, and should I have full faith so as to "remove mountains," while I have not love, I am nothing! And though I dole out all my goods, and though I yield my body consenting to be burned,[1] while I have not love, it profits me nothing!

Love is longsuffering; she showeth kindness;
Love feeleth no jealousy, maketh no display;
She hath no vain conceit, behaveth not unseemly;
She seeketh not her own,[2] is not stirred to bitterness;
She imputeth not evil, doth not rejoice at wrong but shareth the joy
of the truth.
All things she beareth; all she believeth;
All things she hopeth for, all she endureth:
Love never faileth!

The transient and the abiding.

v. 8*b*. But whether there are prophesyings,—they will be done away;[3] or "tongues,"—they will cease; or knowledge,—it will be done away. For our knowledge is piecemeal, our

[1] According to another ancient reading, καυχήσωμαι for καυθήσομαι, "that I may make a boast."

[2] There is some good evidence for the reading, "seeketh not what is not her own."

[3] Or, "prophecy,—it will be done away."

prophesying piecemeal; but when the perfect comes, the piecemeal will be done away with. When I was a babe, I talked, I felt, I reasoned like a babe; since I have become a man, I have put babyish things away. The fact is, we see things now by a mirror—a riddle confronts us; but then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know well, in the very fashion in which I have been known. Meanwhile there abide faith, hope, love—these three; and of these the greatest is love. Follow after love!

Comparison of Glossolalia and Prophecy.

Ch. xiv. 1*b*. Yet covet the spiritual gifts,—preferably, however, that you may prophesy. For he who speaks with "a tongue" does not speak to men but to God; for no one hears what he says, though with the spirit he is speaking mysteries; but he who prophesies, speaks to men words of edification and encouragement and consolation. The speaker with "a tongue" edifies himself, while the prophesier edifies a Church! I would have you all speak with "tongues," but I would rather that you prophesied. A greater man, moreover, is the prophesier than the speaker in "tongues,"—unless the latter interpret, that the Church may get edification.

The defects of the Glossolalia.

v. 6. At the present time, for instance, brothers, if I were to come to you speaking with "tongues," how should I benefit you unless I spoke to you either in the way of revelation or of knowledge, either in the shape of prophecy or of doctrine? In the case of lifeless things giving sound—the pipe, as it may be, or the harp—yet if the instrument fail to give a distinction in its notes, how will the tune that is piped or harped be recognised? If, to be sure, the trumpet give an unclear sound, who will prepare for battle?

Just so with yourselves, unless through "the tongue" you give a word of clear signification, how will the thing spoken be recognised?—why, you will be talking into the air!—There are, as it may hap, ever so many kinds of languages in the world, and none of them unexpressive. If, then, I am not acquainted with the meaning of the language, I shall be to the speaker a barbarian and the speaker a barbarian in relation to me. Exactly so with yourselves: since you are coveters of spiritual powers, seek that you may abound in them with a view to the edifying of the Church.

The place of the understanding in religion.

v. 13. And for this reason let the speaker with a "tongue" pray that he may interpret; for[1] if I pray in a "tongue," while my spirit is praying my understanding is unfruitful.—How then stands the case? I will pray with the spirit, but I will pray with the understanding too; I will sing with the spirit, but I will sing with the understanding too. Since if you should pronounce a blessing in spirit only, how is he who fills the place of the uninitiated to utter the "Amen" at your giving of thanks, when he knows not what you are saying? for you indeed give thanks excellently, but the other party is not edified.—I thank God, I speak with "tongues"[2] more than any of you; but in the church-assembly I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that I might inform others, than ten thousand words in a "tongue"!—Brothers, cease to be children in mind. Yes, in malice be mere babes; but in mind show yourselves grown men.

The contrasted effect of the two endowments.

v. 21. In the Law it is written: "By men of other tongues and by the lips of strangers I will speak to this

[1] "For" is doubtful in the Greek text. If it be omitted, put a *colon*, instead of *semi-colon*, after "interpret."

[2] Or, "with a tongue."

people, and not even so will they hearken to Me, saith the Lord" : "the tongues," it seems, serve for a sign, not to believers but to unbelievers, while prophecy is meant not for unbelievers but for believers. If accordingly the whole Church assembles at one place and its members should all be speaking with "tongues," and there come in strangers to the Gospel or unbelievers, will they not say, "You are mad!" But if all be prophesying and there should enter in some unbeliever or stranger, he is convicted by all, is searched by all, the secrets of his heart are made manifest; and so he will fall on his face and worship God, carrying away the report that verily God is among you!

Directions to speakers in church.

v. 26. What then do I suggest, brothers?—Whensoever you assemble, each has a psalm to give, a doctrine, a revelation, a "tongue," an interpretation: let all be directed to edification. And if any one speaks with a "tongue," let it be to the number of two or at most three, and in turn, and let one person interpret; but if no interpreter be present, let the speaker be silent in the assembly, and let him talk to himself and to God!—Let prophets, moreover, speak by twos or threes at each meeting, and let the other prophets discriminate the spirits. But if a revelation should come to another prophet as he sits, let the first speaker be silent. For you can all prophesy one by one, so that all may learn and all be encouraged. And the spirits of the prophets are in the control of the prophets; for God is not a God of disorder, but of peace.—And so it is in all the Churches of the saints.[1]

[1] *vv.* 32, 33*a* may be read as a parenthesis, "(For the spirits . . . of peace)"; then ver. 33*b*, respecting the custom of "the Churches," supplements ver. 31 and goes to regulate the manner of "prophesying." But ver. 33*b* may be attached to the following paragraph: "As in all the Churches of the saints, let the women," etc.

Women not to speak in church.

v. 34. Let women be silent in the assemblies, for it is not allowed them to speak; but they must abide in submission, as also says the Law. However, if there is anything they want to learn, let them inquire of their own husbands at home; for it is disgraceful for a woman to speak in the assembly.—You don't suppose that it is from *you* the word of God went forth, or that it has reached you and none besides!

The law of decorum.

v. 37. If any one thinks himself to be a prophet or a man of the Spirit, let him be well assured that the things I write to you are a command of the Lord: but if any one is ignorant of this, he is ignored![1]—And so, my brothers, covet the power to prophesy, and do not forbid speaking with "tongues." But in everything let your proceedings be seemly and orderly.

Paul's original message recalled.

Ch. xv. 1. Now I certify you, brothers, concerning the Good News which I proclaimed amongst you, and which you received and on which you stand and through which you are finding salvation: what[2] account, I ask, did I give you in telling the Good News?—if you are holding it fast?—unless you heedlessly believed?

Christ's post-resurrection appearances.

v. 3. Well, I delivered to you in chief—that which indeed I received—the fact that Christ died for our sins, according

[1] The reading "let him be ignored" has a strong, but inferior, attestation.

[2] In the usual rendering, the Greek interrogative is supposed to stand for the relative pronoun, the sentence it introduces thus becoming a further complement of the principal verb: "I certify you . . . concerning the account I gave you in telling," etc.

to the Scriptures; and that He was buried, and that He has been raised on the third day, according to the Scriptures. And that He appeared to Kephas, then to the Twelve; after this He made His conclusive appearance to above five hundred brethren, the greater part of whom remain alive until now, though some have "fallen asleep." After this He appeared to James; then to all the apostles. But last of all, as it were to "the abortion," [1] He appeared also to me.

God's grace in Paul.

v. 9. For I am the least of the apostles, who am not fit to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the Church of God. Yet by God's grace I am what I am; and His grace toward me has not proved vain; but I have abounded in labours beyond any of them—nay, not I, but the grace of God working with me. Whether then it was I or they, *so* we proclaim and *so* you believed.

The Gospel stands or falls with Christ's resurrection.

v. 12. But if Christ is proclaimed to the effect that He is risen from the dead, how is it that amongst you some are saying, "There is no resurrection of the dead"?—But if there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ been raised; and if Christ has not been raised, void then is our message, void also is your [2] faith; and beside that, we are found to be false witnesses concerning God, inasmuch as we bore witness to God's discredit that He raised up the Christ, whom He did not raise if in truth, as they maintain, the dead are not raised. For if the dead are not raised, neither has Christ been raised; and if Christ has not been raised, your faith is to no purpose,—you are still in your

[1] Possibly this was a nickname given to St. Paul, from his dwarfed and stunted appearance (see 2 Cor. x. 1, 10). If so, he adopts it, with specific application to the untimeliness of his birth into the Christian life.

[2] "Our," in some first-rate MSS.

sins. In that case too those that "fell asleep" in Christ have perished! If in this life we have built our hope on Christ with nought beyond, none are to be pitied like us!

The risen Christ and His people.

v. 20. But as things are, Christ is risen from the dead, the firstfruit of "those that sleep." For since through man comes death, through man comes also the resurrection of the dead; for just as in the Adam all die, even so in the Christ all will be made alive. But each in his proper order—the firstfruit Christ; thereafter, at His coming, Christ's people.

The consummation.

v. 24. Then the end: when He delivers up the kingdom to God—that is, the Father—when He shall have abolished every princedom and every authority and potentate; for He is bound to reign, until He has "put" all "the enemies beneath His feet." Death is abolished last of the enemies! —For "all things" did God "put in subjection beneath Christ's feet." (Now when He says, "All things" have been put in subjection, manifestly that means, Except the one who made them subject to Him.) But when all things have been made subject to Him, then the Son Himself too will be subjected to Him who made all things subject to that Son, to the end that God may be all in all!

Effects of doubt as to the Resurrection.

v. 29. Otherwise, what will they do who are baptized for the sake of [1] the dead, if absolutely the dead do not rise? why indeed do they get baptized for them? Why do we ourselves too stand every hour in jeopardy? I am a-dying

[1] Or, "on behalf of": this obscure passage is often assumed to refer to the supposed *vicarious baptism* of the living on behalf of deceased kindred or friends, dying unbaptized. A simpler explanation is found in the frequency with which Christian vows were undertaken at the entreaty of dying Christians endeared to the survivors.

every day—yes, brothers, I protest it by the glorying over you which I have in Christ Jesus! If with human hopes I fought the wild beasts at Ephesus, what profit could I look for?—If the dead are not raised up, then "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die!"[1] Be in no delusion: "Ill company doth mar good manners."[2] Rouse up to soberness like righteous men, and cease from sin; for some of you are without the knowledge of God—to your shame I speak thus.

Nature's parable.

v. 35. But some one will be saying, "How are the dead raised? with what sort of body moreover do they come?—Foolish man! the seed you sow yourself is not brought to life unless it dies; in what you sow you do not sow the body which is to be, but mere grain—of wheat perchance, or of some of the other grains; but God gives it a body as He has determined, and to each of the seeds a body proper to itself.

Range and variousness of bodily form.

v. 39. All flesh is not the same kind of flesh; but there is one sort of flesh that belongs to men, another to cattle, another to birds, another to fishes. And there are heavenly bodies and earthly bodies; but the glory of the heavenly bodies is of one sort, and the glory of the earthly of another. One glory there is of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars—for star differs from[3] star in glory. So indeed it is with the resurrection of the dead: the sowing is in corruption, the raising in incorruption; the

[1] Or the *if* clause may be construed with the foregoing sentence: "What profit for me, if the dead are not raised?"—"Let us eat and drink," etc., was a current maxim expressing the Pagan despair of a life beyond the grave. Inscriptions to this effect are common on Greek tombs of the period.

[2] A line from the well-known Greek poet Menander.

[3] Or, "surpasses."

sowing is in weakness, the raising in power; a natural[1] body is sown, a spiritual body is raised up.—If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body.

The two Adams.

v. 45. To this effect it is written: the first "man"—that is, Adam—"was made to be a living soul"; the last Adam to be a life-giving spirit! However the spiritual man does not come first, but the natural,[1] and thereafter the spiritual. The first "man" is "earth-born, pertaining to the dust"; the Second Man is heaven-born. As the Dust-born was, so the dust-born in their turn; and as the Heavenly Man, so likewise are the heavenly; and even as we have worn the image of the Dust-born, let us also take for our wear the image of the Heavenly!

Transformation necessary and certain.

v. 50. Now this I affirm, brothers: Flesh and blood cannot inherit God's kingdom, nor does corruption inherit incorruption. Behold, I tell you a mystery! we shall not all sleep in death, but we shall all be transformed—instantly, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the Trumpeter will sound, and the dead will be raised free from corruption, and we shall be transformed. For this corruptible nature must needs put on incorruption, and this mortal nature must put on immortality.

The coming victory.

v. 54. But when this corruptible nature has put on incorruption and this mortal nature has put on immortality, then will come to pass the word that is written, "Death hath been swallowed up in victory!"

[1] *Psychikos* (*psyche*)—rendered "natural", by contrast with "spiritual," as in ii. 14 (see note)—is literally "pertaining to the soul," "psychical"; comp. ver. 45, "Adam . . . a living *soul* . . . Christ a life-giving *spirit*." The term applies to man at his best and fullest, short of the possession of God's Holy Spirit.

"Where, O death, is thy victory?
Where, O death, is thy sting?"
Now the sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law;
But to God be thanks who giveth us the victory,
Through our Lord Jesus Christ!"

And so, my brothers beloved, show yourselves stedfast, immovable, abounding in the work of the Lord at all times, as you know that your labour, wrought in the Lord, is not in vain.

Arrangements for completing the collection.

Ch. xvi. 1. One thing more—about the collection made for the saints. Just as I gave order to the Churches of Galatia, so also do you proceed: on the first day of the week let each of you at home put by in store whatever his prosperity from time to time[1] may yield, so that when I come, collections may not be going on then. And when I arrive, whomsoever you may approve by your letters,[2] those persons I will send to convey your bounty to Jerusalem; and should it be worth while for me to go on the errand as well, they shall travel with me.

Paul's intended visit to Corinth.

v. 5. But I will come to visit you when I have finished my tour in Macedonia—for I am going through Macedonia —and it may be I shall make some stay with you, or even spend the winter, so that you may speed me on the next stage of my journeyings. For I do not want to see you just now in passing; indeed, I hope to remain some length of time with you, if the Lord permit. But I shall stay on in Ephesus until Pentecost; for a door wide and effectual is open before me, with many standing in the way.

The coming of Timothy and of Apollos.

v. 10. But if Timothy should come, take care that he

[1] Or, according to another reading, simply "may yield."
[2] Or, "I will send with letters."

meet you in no fear; for he is doing the work of the Lord, even as I am myself: therefore let no one treat him lightly. But send him onward in peace, that he may come to join me, for along with the brethren [1] I am waiting for him.—But as to brother Apollos, I earnestly besought him to come to visit you with the other brethren, and it was altogether against his will to do so at present; however he will come when he finds a convenient time.

Exhortation.

v. 13. Keep watch, stand fast in the faith; play the man, be mighty! All your doings, let them be done in love.

Commendations.

v. 14. Now, I entreat you, brothers—you know that the household of Stephanas is the firstfruit of Achaia, and they have enlisted themselves in the service of the saints—to be on your part submissive to men like these, and to every one who shares our work and labour.—I rejoice too in having Stephanas here, and Fortunatus and Achaicus, because they have supplied the lack of your company; for they have refreshed my spirit—and yours in doing so.[2] Recognise, therefore, the worth of such people as these.

Greetings to the Corinthians.

v. 19. The Churches of Asia salute you. Aquila salutes you earnestly in the Lord, and Prisca, with the Church assembled at their house. The whole of the brethren salute you.—Salute one another with a holy kiss.

The salutation, written with my own hand, of PAUL.

Conclusion.

v. 22. If any one does not love the Lord, let him be *anathema!—Marán athá!* [3]

[1] These are probably "the brethren" from Corinth (*vv.* 15–18) now in Ephesus, who will return home so soon as Timothy rejoins his leader.

[2] Or, "as they refreshed yours."

[3] "Our Lord cometh": an Aramaic (Syrian) phrase, like *Abba*, which

The grace of the Lord Jesus be with you. My love be with you all, in Christ Jesus.

GEORGE G. FINDLAY.

THE PREACHING OF JESUS AND THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST.

WE are frequently referred to the words of Christ as forming the preacher's warrant, and often indeed as forming his model. But if we aim at a precise meaning here, it should be remembered that preaching took hold of the Church, less from the injunction, or the example even, of Christ than from the native action of the Gospel itself. "It pleased God so to reveal His Son in me that I might preach Him." It may be useful, therefore, to discuss in what sense our Lord as preacher bears on our preaching to-day.

Christianity makes its appeal to the world as the religion of redemption. What does that mean when we interrogate our terms, and seek positive ideas?

Let us begin by recognising that a religion of rescue is one thing, a religion of redemption is another. The dull man, or the savage, believes in a religion of rescue. His God helps him from time to time, extricates him from this peril, or leads him to that success. And it is only from time to time of need or of precaution that he turns to his God. But a religion of redemption bears not upon junctures but upon life, on the soul itself. And life is not atomistic. It is a moral personal unity. The soul is one. And therefore if we come to a critical affair at all, it is not a series of crises but one great crisis, now less acutely felt, now more.

served as a watchword—possibly, on occasion, a password—in the Apostolic Church. It occurs, similarly used, in the earliest Post-apostolic Christian writing, the *Didaché* or *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*.

The peril is a tissue, or rather a drama, of perils woven into life as one whole. And the Enemy is not many but one, as the Soul is one, and its Saviour. It is one vast moral issue that is at stake. It means the gain or loss of the Soul. And so great, so complete, is the unity, that the crisis involves not the visible world alone, but also the world unseen. It involves God and His help. And the help of God, bearing as it does on the whole soul's fate, is more than help, it is salvation. It is redemption. It is thus that even Buddhism construes religion. And so far Christianity and Buddhism stand together in isolation amid the faiths of the world.

But beyond this point they part. Christianity is not a religion of Redemption only, but also of Reconciliation. Any idea of Reconciliation in Buddhism is but the reconciliation of man to his fate. But reconciliation to a fate is no more than resignation. Redemption becomes, then, the self-elevation of the Soul above the suffering of life by a subjective process all on one side. It is a process of internalisation, of sinking into our self. It is self-salvation. It is not redemption by a reconciling person into communion with himself. And it is self-salvation from the innate woe of life. Now in Christianity also we are helpless—the more helpless the more we turn our gaze inward; but we are saved by a power from without, and only by that power. We are saved, moreover, not from life's innate woe, nor only from an alien evil, but from one which is moral in its kind. It is a guilty paralysis of will. Our foe is one that we discover in command of our commanding self whenever we set about escape from our alien ill. It is something that impairs the very will by which we should escape from the tangle of sorrow. It destroys our power of uniting with any helper. The reconciliation we need is not with our dismal fate (which means with our distraught selves).

but with a saving God. And our redemption is not from something which crushes our happiness, but from something which loads our conscience and mars our perfection. The fruit of our redemption is an ethical reconciliation in a free conscience, and not an eudaemonist reconciliation in a free development. It is a free soul and not a free career.

Let us be more explicit still. To Christian faith the pain of our case is not merely the misery of moral impotence, nor the chagrin of perpetual failure. These still leave us with a feeling more like mortification than repentance—mortification in the presence of our ideal self rather than repentance in the sight of God, a loss of self-respect rather than of sonship. We suffer in our moral self-esteem, not because of our wound to the Holy. But to Christian faith the sting in sin is its wound to God, its stain to holiness. To many a Christian man the first torment after his lapse is not fear nor remorse. It is nothing so selfish. It is a passion of grief for the wound he has dealt to the holiness of God, and to the Christ he has crucified afresh. There is shame indeed for himself, but still more there is grief for another. There is of course the crushing loss of self-respect, the blow to his own satisfaction with his faith—he thought he was such a promising Christian too; but far more poignant is the grief that he has struck his God, denied his Saviour, pierced Him anew, and undone His Cross. To Christian faith this is the sting of sin—the sense of having struck in the face God's holy love. It is the sense of not merely denying Him but denying ourselves to Him; the sense of robbing Him not of His honour but of our worship, our souls, our faith; the sense of loss, damage, and grief to Him. We have soiled *His* purity, despised *His* love, and crossed *His* will. Our self-humiliation is less than our sense of having humiliated Him, and put the cross on Him again. Hence the reconciliation we need (when we take faith's

word for what we need) is not a reconciliation either with our own self-respect or with our neighbour, but with God and His holy love. The peace we need is not calm, but it is the restoration of confidence, the renewal of personal relations, of communion with our Holy Father. Christian peace is not the saint's calm, but the son's confidence when, perhaps, we are anything but calm. And reconciliation is not lying on Jesus' breast, as the unpleasant phrase sometimes is, but possessing the fruit of Christ in the confidence of faith, the destruction of guilt, the fellowship restored. Troubled we may be, but sure; with a deeper repentance, but one due to a deeper faith; and we may be pressed with care, but we rest secure in Him who careth for us.

Christianity, then, has made its great appeal to the world as a religion of such redemption and reconciliation, of redemption from guilt once for all, and reconciliation with God for ever. And both centre not in Christ merely, but in the Cross of Christ.

There is no doubt about this for the apostles. But question has been raised if it was so with Christ Himself. His references to the cross are few; and fewer still those that connect it with redemption. As a preacher He had far more to say about the Kingdom than the Cross. And as a personality His witness, it is said, was wholly to the Father and not to Himself. He was no part of His own gospel, so far as His preaching went. So it is urged. And the contention means, of course, that there is a great gulf between the preaching of Christ and that of His apostles—especially Paul.

This raises a twofold question.

1. Is Christ a preacher for us in the same sense as He was for His own generation?

2. In so far as He was a preacher at all, did He preach the gospel?

In this article I will deal with the first question only.

1. The issue raised by it is one of great moment for our whole construction of Christ's life-work. In what He said to the Jews round Him had He any direct or conscious reference to a remote posterity? Was He speaking to a real public, or, over their heads, to far later ages?

There can be little doubt about the answer, surely. There is no sign that He was talking over the heads of the people round Him in order to reach us through the reporters. He never made His disciples His reporters in the sense of taking His words down or memorising them for a distant future. He never examined them to see if they had got them correctly. It is now freely recognised that He regarded the mission of His life as confined to Israel—at least till near its close. The Gentiles did not enter into His direct concern while He was dealing with His nation by parable or miracle. Allusions to their reception of these but point His rebukes to Israel for its rejection of Himself; and miracles to Gentiles did not flow, but were wrung from Him. In so far as He was preacher and teacher, in so far as the influence of His historic personality went, He was a prophet to Israel alone. He met His people with a *bona fide* call, and not one perfunctory and useless, whose failure was foregone. It was a call, at first hopeful, to the greatest decision and the deepest repentance to which that people had ever been summoned by all the prophetic line. It was not impossible that He should have been heard, though (by the indentification of Israel with Pharisaism, as of Catholicism with Curialism) it soon grew improbable. He took His mission to Israel with entire seriousness. With all His heart He taught not only the lost sheep, but at first the national soul. But without the effect He sought. He failed with His public. And it was His failure as prophet that extorted His resources as Redeemer. The Kingdom,

His great theme, could only be established in His Cross. It was His desertion as preacher that cast Him on His greatest work of becoming the preacher's Gospel. It was His ill-success with Israel that turned Him to a world commensurate with the super-national greatness of His soul. And the Cross, which seemed to His own at first but as a martyrdom, became His one grand work. Israel's martyr became the world's Saviour. When the Cross was forced upon Him (at whatever point this came home) it broke open as the world-cross. It was and is the universal element in Christianity, as the conscience it saved is in Humanity. And when the agony seized Him, its immediate grief was the grief of the spiritual patriot at the loss and guilt of His land. It was His poignant insight into the doom which His very Grace had brought to His own through its refusal. If His deepest woe was His sympathy with the holy Grace of God in its wound, perhaps His nearest was the fearful judgment which seemed to Him the one result of His life to His own; whom yet He had not come to judge with wrath but to save with all the love of His divine heart.

The staple of His preaching appealed directly to Israel alone, without *arrière pensée*. He was not consciously using an Israel hopeless from the first as a mere sounding-board to reach the world. Israel was not His mere audience for posterity. His conceptual world was that of Israel. It was God's old controversy with Israel that He entered, Israel's historic mission and problem. He did not speak the language nor seek the ideals of pagan culture. He did not make any overtures or concessions to it. His teaching took up the Jewish tradition. His parables are couched in the social dialect of His land and age, however universal the idea they enclose. He does not boggle about economic situations which His gospel has now antiquated. "Can I not do what I will with My own?" His words are not

discourses so much as demands or appeals illustrated in the current national vein of the *Maschal*. We do not, and could not, use that style with His effect. We follow His model in this regard sparingly. Our sermons need not deal in illustration to the extent His did, or, if we illustrate, we use the apologue less. He took that form because it was the form of His people. The oriental has always used some form of apologue to a degree foreign to the West. Had Jesus been born in Greece He would have used dialectic or oratory as naturally as He used parable. And had He been a Latin He might have been as periodic as Cicero. The style of His preaching reflected the form and pressure of His place. His economic system, for instance, is patriarchal. He contemplates neither Roman law, nor modern conditions, nor the social results of His own Gospel. He was not a social reformer. He used the relations He found without criticising them. In 'The Labourers in the Vineyard' (as I have said) He has no hesitation in using existing, but antiquated, not to say arbitrary, social relations to symbolise the equal dependence of all men on God's free Grace. So with the Dishonest Steward. There is no hint anywhere that He was dissatisfied with the social relations current, or aimed at subverting them. Social inequalities do not seem to have greatly troubled Him, and He did not contemplate adjusting them in a new programme. He was more anxious about the effect of wealth on its possessor than on the community or on the classes below. He was engrossed with His relation to Israel, and Israel's to its holy God; and He dealt in the only language Israel could understand. His life-work, as distinct from His death (shall we say His professional work?) had no conscious address to the Gentiles. When He treated them as He treated Israel it was with a struggle. I am thinking, of course, of the way He was overborne by the Syrophœnician or the Centurion.

And just as little did He deliberately address Himself to posterity. He was not dictating *mémoires pour servir*. He knew He would survive and rule in a community, but (or, therefore) we find no provision or precaution for the survival of His discourses. The new junctures should be met by the new insight of the Spirit to the Church, and not by a preceptual use of His words. And Tolstoi is quite wrong, and all his kind are quite unhistoric. If Christ preach to us it is not as He preached to His contemporaries; it is in His Spirit. There is much for the most trained and skilful minds to discount and to adjust in applying to our conditions His treatment of His own. Not only was His *milieu* national, but His speech, like His miracles, was always "occasional," always *ad hoc* as well as *ad rem*. If it went to the eternal heart of the matter it also rose from the situation of the hour and addressed it. It is true He was not understood by His public, but that was not because He was reaching over His present public in the effort to touch another centuries away. Such at least is not the preaching style of the Synoptics. His ideas and calls were for immediate use, and they were clothed in current forms. His style had nothing archaic, His mind nothing cumbrous, His thoughts nothing dreamy. His obscurity was due to the obsession of His public by the God of the period and the prince of this world. His gospel was hidden not because men were dense, but because they were lost, because of *moral* and not mental stupidity, because of a religious obsession, because Israel had become orthodox and pharisee. His reading of the situation was absolutely relevant to it, and it was hidden only to religious dulness. As a preacher, He won His popularity by His style, and lost it by His meaning. As soon as He was understood He was deserted. As His invitation was a *bona fide* call, His rejection was a real rejection. It was not the public's neglect of a dreamer, it

was its repudiation of a realist who angered His time by touching its nerve. He stirred a resentment only too intelligent in all but moral insight. He did not simply trouble His enemies, He judged them ; and they knew it. What He presented to His day both in His word and person was what He presents to every age, a moral ultimatum. But yet it was not the same as He presents to us—by all the difference made by His death and what it implies once for all ; for His Cross can never be repeated. The Gospel comes to us in a form given it from its rejection by those to whom Christ first came. His preaching of His Kingdom to His public lacked that which is the staple of the Apostolic κήρυγμα and the marrow of ours—Himself in His death. But it was the preaching of one whose person was identical with His message, His religion with His revelation. The Kingdom He preached was His own reign. On the few occasions when He spoke of His suffering and death it was not to the public, it was but to His disciples, and perhaps to the inner circle only of those ; even to them only on the most agitated and exalted occasions, which broke the crust of His habitual reserve. We, on the contrary, hold up the Cross to all we meet as the whole gospel. For the whole Christ was in it and the whole Kingdom.

It is a mistake, therefore, to speak of Christ as the typical preacher unless we are careful what we mean by the gospel. Whatever He may have thought it expedient to preach about Himself, He has left us, by the very way He preached other things, nothing but Himself to preach. If He preached the Kingdom it was only as the King could whom we preach. We cannot read the kingdom except through the Cross and its royalty. If He preached the Father it was only as the Son could ; and the Son whose supreme revelation of the Father was His revelation of the Father's holiness on the Cross. Christ is Preacher, as He is Revealer, only in the

exercise of His task as Redeemer. His function was not to be the herald but the hero. His preaching days were to His consummate work of the Cross what the Baptist was to Himself—forerunners. He began by preparing men for the Kingdom, He ended by setting it up in Himself and His supreme deed. His great work at last was not to declare, nor even to offer, not to seek, but to achieve ; and to achieve for the most part in silence, even about the very Cross which came to fill all His concern and taxed all His will. He does not denounce sin, nor only convince us of it, but destroy it, condemn and execute it in the flesh. Nor does He proclaim righteousness ; He establishes it once for all. He is not witness but judge—not prophet, but King.

Christ began in the form of a prophet ; but He prophesied as one much more than a prophet, as only Messiah could. And He behaved as Messiah in a way that only the Son of God could. His Messiahship rested on His Sonship, not His Sonship on His Messiahship. He was not Son of God as Messiah. He was Messiah as being Son of God. He preached not in an interpretive way but in a creative way. He did not simply proclaim and expound the Kingdom of God, like a prophet ; nor did He simply put Himself at the head of His Kingdom, like a Messiah. He did what none of the Messiahs could do, what they failed because they could not do—he created the men that composed the Kingdom. He gave men power from the endless resource of power He felt in Himself. Nothing is so striking in Mark as His early consciousness of superhuman power. His every act of power was but an expression of His soul's power. Thus His words were more than words. They were deeds. When Jeremiah says the ordinance of nature might fail, but the purpose of God could never fail, he was speaking on a very different level from Christ when He said, " Heaven and earth may pass away, but My words shall never pass away."

Christ did not mean that though He perished truth was so. He meant that if worlds crashed they would collide at the word of Him whose words in their ears were even then works in their Soul. Every word He spoke becomes in this respect a function of the Cross He achieved. We can see that now in the Spirit. While He was but a preacher He yet preached as Redeemer. When He spoke of the Kingdom of Heaven in parables He was making the Kingdom. He was not uttering a doctrine, nor even making a claim. His word only escapes being a new law by being a gospel, a new power. He was exerting His creative power. He did not simply call to repentance : He created repentance. He gave it. He called to repentance in the giving spirit of His habitual love. He demanded much, but only because He gave much more. He baptized with the Holy Ghost. Do not think of the Holy Ghost as genial light, but as mighty power, almighty, creative power. He spoke from reserves of such power. He was Himself the energy in His own words, the effective thing, the creative thing. His sense of Himself was always a sense of power, and of outgoing power to bless men's needs, not of absorbent power to exploit their powers. His every word was a work. His loving was always a doing, never an enjoying ; so that when He exchanged preaching for doing and the parable for the Cross He was but changing the form of what He had been doing all along. He taught and He died as the New Creator, however veiled at first that consciousness was.

P. T. Forsyth.

THE STYLE OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

I.

1. In the pages which follow, I shall try to show that the style of St. Mark [1] is of a well-defined character which is maintained throughout the second Gospel. In the next place it will appear that the style of the third Gospel diverges from that of the second in certain well marked directions. In the third place these divergences are such as characterise the modification of an already existing tradition. To some extent the style of St. Matthew is parallel with that of St. Luke. Hence we are enabled to draw two important conclusions; on the one hand we gain a further confirmation of the view by which Mark is regarded as a primary source of Luke and Matthew; on the other hand, we learn something of the literary standpoint from which Luke worked over his material.

2. But before we begin to compare the style of the synoptic Gospels, we must revise our notions of Greek grammar. I have shown elsewhere [2] that the logical judgment with subject and predicate is inadequate to represent the more primitive types of sentence. We find on reconsideration that the vocative and the imperative in combination make up a type of sentence which is familiar enough, although it is not recognized in the traditional grammar. For example, the Aramaic utterances of Jesus, which Mark reports, are imperatives with vocatives: *talitha koumi; Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani; ephphatha.* The Lord's Prayer is wholly composed of such sentences. Since the vocative and the imperative are largely employed during action, I have ventured to denote this form of sentence by the term *active.*

[1] I cannot therefore agree entirely with Dr. Moffatt, *Introduction to N.T. Literature*[2], 237, in his suggestive characterisation of St. Mark.

[2] *Classical Rev.*, Feb. 1915, pp. 12 ff.

3. If we denote by the term *logical* the sentence which contains a subject and predicate in the nominative case and the indicative mood, we may roughly distinguish the style of Mark as inclining to the active sentence, from the style of Luke, which inclines to the logical sentence. Now it will appear from our analysis that while the active sentence is transformed frequently into the logical sentence, the opposite process rarely, if ever, occurs. Consequently, since the differences which Luke presents when compared with Mark are almost without exception directed towards a more formal and logical style, we may reject the notion that Mark copied Luke. On the other hand, there are many cases where Luke agrees verbatim with Mark except in a single word or so, and in such a case Luke inserts a grammatical form of the types we shall be led to expect from him. The suggestion is very near to hand that Luke is adapting the words of another writer to his own standards.

4. It is scarcely less important for our argument, if we take the alternative case of Luke and Mark dealing independently with the same facts but in their respective manners. To me, indeed, it is impossible to account for the resemblances of the two writers except by the hypothesis of Luke copying Mark. Yet I do not postulate this copying as a foundation for my argument. I am content to compare the styles of the two writers without first deciding the question of their priority.

5. But the very terms of my comparison almost beg the question. I find that the style of Mark is closely related to *oral* language, whereas the style of Luke is avowedly related to *written* language. The evidence for this statement will be set forth in detail in the sequel. And therefore —if we may anticipate our conclusion—this characteristic of Mark leaves him nearer the *oral tradition* than Luke or —as we shall have reason to see—even Matthew. The

effect of Mark's style upon my own mind is poignant beyond any other old Christian writing. Paul occasionally in his self-revelation reaches the level of Mark, and to Paul we may add the cries and pæans of the author of the Apocalypse, wrenched from him by the πειρασμός through which he with the whole Church was passing. It is the extraordinary merit of Mark that his style fits the primitive Christian experience like an old glove, and that he furnishes a standard by which we may measure the utterances of other Christian writers.

Turning aside for the moment to the general history of Greek literature, I find that Mark holds for my argument a position of great importance. He furnishes the most cogent evidence for the principles which I have endeavoured elsewhere to formulate for the study of language.[1]

II.

6. We may group the characteristics of Mark's style under three heads :—

(*a*) Constructions appropriate to oral language present in Mark avoided by Luke.

(*b*) Constructions appropriate to written and formal language found in Luke and absent from Mark.

(*c*) Further peculiarities of Mark.

7. The first characteristic of Mark to be noticed is the quotation of the Aramaic words actually employed by Jesus. Reference has already been made to the nature of these quotations.[2]

Along with this goes the mention of special names such as *Golgotha* xv. 22; Matt. xxvii. 33. Luke omits *Golgotha*, but gives the translation (Luke xxiii. 33). Compare

[1] *Classical Review, loc. cit.* The reader will pardon the confidence with which I speak. Scholars whose opinion is more authoritative than my own, approve the tendency of my suggestions.

[2] *Supra*, § 2.

Luke's substitution of *ἀληθῶς* (xxi. 3) with Mark's *ἀμήν* (xii. 43).

Mark's use of vernacular phrases is avoided, or silently corrected, by Luke. Mark uses *ὕπαγε*, *κραβαττόν* (ii. 8 ff.). In the corresponding passage of Luke we find *πορεύου*, *κλινίδιον*. Another emphatic contrast appears where Luke uses Attic forms *τρῆμα* and *βελόνη* for Mark's vernacular *τρυμαλία* and *ραφίς* (x. 25). Or, take another passage, Mark xii. 14; we find *βλέπεις εἰς πρόσωπον* and *κῆνσον*, but Luke prefers *λαμβάνεις πρόσωπον* and *φόρον*. Perhaps the most unconventional phrase in Mark is *φέρω* in the sense of "lead" (xi. 2, 7). Matthew and Luke substitute *ἄγω*. But neither Matthew nor Luke dare alter the Lord's Prayer, and the unclassical *εἰσενέγκῃς* still remains to justify Mark's use of *φέρω*.

This comparison will help to justify us in saying that Mark is the least affected of all the writers of the New Testament. Common words like *φέρω*, *λέγω*, *παρακαλῶ*, *φωνῶ*, *χείρ* occur frequently. But he has no instances, I think, of *δικαιοσύνη*, *ἀδικία*, *ἄδικος*, *μακάριος*, *ἀγαθός*. *Δίκαιος* occurs twice only. His vocabulary of emotion, however, is much in evidence: *ἀγαπῶ*, *ἀγανακτῶ*, *ἐκθαμβοῦμαι*, *ἐπιτιμῶ*, *θαμβοῦμαι*, *φοβοῦμαι*.[1] *Θαμβοῦμαι* occurs thrice in Mark but never in Luke. On the other hand, *θαμβος* occurs twice in Luke but never in Mark. Mark's preference for the verb over the noun is strikingly shown by his avoidance of *ἀγάπη*, combined with a relatively frequent use of *ἀγαπῶ*.

Now the inclination towards the abstract noun corresponds with Luke's general literary method. On the other hand, Mark's use of the verb arises from a real difference of attitude towards the events which he relates. This attitude may be described as that of an *active* temperament.[2]

[1] *Infra*, § 13. [2] *Classical Review*, 1915, p. 14.

The evidence for this statement will become clear as we proceed to analyse the grammatical constructions which Mark prefers. Incidentally we can understand why Mark, with his active sympathies, dwells upon the example of Jesus rather than upon His teaching. On the other hand Luke, who is in comparison *contemplative*, dwells upon the teaching of Jesus, and tries to bring it into connexion with the incidents of the career of Jesus. Perhaps the most instructive difference is in the use of λόγος. Luke (xxiv. 19, Acts vii. 22) contrasts λόγος and ἔργον—a proceeding most alien to the Semitic mind, but congenial to the Greek. Λόγος for Luke tends to mean mere *statement*. In Mark it never excludes the meaning *command*.

8. Mark prefers those constructions which are nearest to spoken language: direct speech for indirect, and—connected with this—interrogative rather than relative forms; particular details rather than abstract and general statements; parataxis rather than syntaxis; active rather than passive verbs. The total effect of these constructions is better understood as we compare them with the corresponding constructions of Luke.

The following examples illustrate Mark's use of direct speech as opposed to Luke's use of indirect speech. Ἔλεγεν γὰρ αὐτῷ, ἔξελθε τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀκάθαρτον (Mark v. 8); παρήγγελλεν γὰρ τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἀκαθάρτῳ ἐξελθεῖν (Luke viii. 29). Both Matthew and Mark employ the direct speech for Peter's famous declaration, σύ εἶ ὁ Χριστός, but Luke, for the sake of grammatical symmetry, carries on the accusative, τὸν Χριστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ (Mark viii. 29, Matt. xvi. 16, Luke ix. 20). In the story of the poor widow (Mark xii. 41), there is the same difference, as also in the approach to the temple (Mark xiii. 1). In all these cases Luke recasts his narrative into the traditional form of Greek historical narrative. But it is with a certain loss

of vividness. Mark is more dramatic, nearer the oral tradition. It is incredible that Mark should have extracted his direct speech from Luke's reported speech; it is almost certain that Luke had before him the actual words as we find them in Mark.

9. I select some more subtle pieces of evidence. Mark uses the interrogative to introduce a dependent statement, where Luke uses the relative. *Οὐδέποτε ἀνέγνωτε τί ἐποίησεν Δαυείδ*; (Mark ii. 25); *ὃ ἐποίησεν* (Luke vi. 3). Compare *ἴδε πόσα σου κατηγοροῦσιν*; (Mark xv. 4). Take the narrative of the burial *ἐθεώρουν ποῦ τεθεῖται* (Mark xv. 47); *ἐθεάσαντο . . . ὡς ἐτέθη τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ* (Luke xxiii. 55). Luke is the careful writer following the written language rather than the spoken language. (Incidentally we may note that his additions or alterations are made not only for grammatical and historical, but for doctrinal considerations. His phrase *τὸ σῶμα* guards against the notion that the spirit of Jesus was placed in the tomb.)

10. Oral language prefers *co-ordinate* constructions rather than subordinate constructions: *ἥψατο αὐτοῦ καὶ λέγει* (Mark i. 41); *ἥψατο αὐτοῦ λέγων* (Luke v. 13); *ἀπήγαγον . . . καὶ συνκαλοῦσιν* (Mark xv. 16); *παραλαβόντες . . . συνήγαγον* (Matt. xxvii. 27).

11. Oral language prefers the active voice to the passive. Mark uses one passive form (x. 33, 34) to four in Luke xviii. 32, referring to the same context. Compare Mark xiii. 12 and Luke xxi. 16; Mark xiii. 20 and Matthew xxiv. 22. Mark gives the active imperative in direct speech *σταύρωσον* (xv. 14); Luke gives a passive infinitive in reported speech *σταυρωθῆναι* (xxiii. 23).

Since the passive more approaches the noun or adjective (compare the use of the passive participle in Latin and English), we may insert here some cases where Mark prefers a verbal or active form to the nominal form. *ὁ σπείρων*

τὸν λόγον σπείρει (Mark iv. 14); ὁ σπόρος ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ (Luke viii. 11). How the narrative suffers under Luke's hands! τίς σοι ἔδωκεν; (Mark xi. 28); τίς ἐστιν ὁ δοῦς; (Luke xx. 2).

12. Oral, as contrasted with written language, prefers the particular to the general, detail—even if it is superfluous—to an abstract exposition. An excellent example of Luke's method is seen in viii. 18. For Mark's βλέπετε τί ἀκούετε he has βλέπετε πῶς ἀκούετε. He substitutes the generic construction ὃς ἄν with the subjunctive for Mark's ὅς with the indicative, and refines upon Mark's objective phrase ὃ ἔχει, with the more subtle ὃ δοκεῖ ἔχειν (Mark iv. 24, 25). Again, Mark has the plural ἐδίδασκεν ἐν παραβολαῖς (iv. 2); Luke has the singular διὰ παραβολῆς, I think with an abstract meaning (viii. 4).

Hence when Luke retells the story of Gethsemane, his narrative suffers in interest if we compare it with that of Mark. Luke xxii. 18 omits the vivid phrase about drinking the new wine (Mark xiv. 25); he omits the name Gethsemane (xxii. 40; cf. Mark xiv. 32); he records πατέρ, where Mark has ἀββὰ ὁ πατήρ (Mark xiv. 36, Luke xx. 42). Now it is possible that Luke had another tradition before him; but the differences which we have traced are explicable in the light of Luke's method.

13. We have found that Luke's attitude towards Mark is not simply that of correcting an artless narrative, but of transforming it into a definite literary form. Hence we have by implication dealt with the second part of our task, namely, the enumeration of constructions preferred by Luke and avoided by Mark.

We shall enter further into Luke's mind, if we consider his antipathy to the Jewish people whom he associates with their leaders in the killing of Jesus; οἱ πρῶτοι τοῦ λαοῦ (xix. 47), τὸ πρεσβυτήριον τοῦ λαοῦ (xx. 66). The very

frequency of Luke's use of the term λαός is suggestive. A lover of the people or a man of the people talks of them as men. Mark uses ἄνθρωπος nearly twenty times as often as λαός; in Luke the proportion sinks to three times as many. Shelley rarely speaks of the "people"; of "men" he speaks often. Shakspere and Milton are on the side of Shelley and St. Mark. Strangely enough, St. Paul sides with St. Mark against St. Luke. There is a real difference of temperament between the two writers. Luke is a thinker under the influence of general ideas. Mark is an enthusiast who responds to emotion, *supra*, § 7.

But although Luke suffers, as far as style goes, by comparison with Mark, he is probably more susceptible to the claims of historical method. There was a love of the wonderful in Mark with which Luke did not sympathise. Our Lord speaks to the wind, and Mark gives the exact words (iv. 39), Luke omits them (viii. 24). Mark estimates the value of the nard at three hundred pence (xiv. 5), Luke omits this exaggeration. Who will not side with Luke in these two cases? Mark's vivid personification of the spirit of dumbness (ix. 20) is similarly toned down by Luke ix. 42.

14. The "three hundred" pence raise an important question in the account of the precious ointment. Have we here an echo of the Latin use of three hundred to express an indefinitely large number? This is possible but not certain, because a similar use of this number is found in the Old Testament. There is another phrase with a Latin sound, τὸ ἱκανὸν ποιῆσαι, satisfacere (xv. 15); compare λαβόντες τὸ ἱκανόν, satis accipere (Acts xvii. 9). If we add these two cases to the other and more certain Latin usages found in St. Mark, we can understand and perhaps accept the tradition that St. Mark wrote his Gospel in a Latin-speaking community. Curiously enough, the Roman Church

retained the use of Greek till a date well on in the third century. Hence we are driven to think rather of a Christian community like that of Carthage, where Greek was less used than Latin. It is dangerous, however, to follow up these speculations beyond the limits of verified tradition. What is certain is that the African version of the Gospels was current before the Greek text was fixed. It is possible, therefore, that the Latin version may have affected the text of St. Mark. Yet the method we have followed forbids us to see many variations from the original tradition.

15. It may have seemed that in praising the style of St. Mark, St. Luke has been unjustly estimated. There is one feature, however, in our Lord's teaching for which Luke is our best witness, while Mark is almost silent. I refer to the urbanity of Jesus. FRANK GRANGER.

"THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT."[1]

WHEN one thinks of the mass of writing dealing with the Sermon on the Mount, from Tyndale's "Exposicion" downwards, two things are borne in upon one. The first is the hopelessness of attempting to say anything on such a well-worn theme that has not been said before; and the second is, that any paper under such a heading cannot touch upon more than one very small part of the whole.

In spite, however, of all that has been thought and said, one way of looking at the Sermon has perhaps not been allotted the weight which is its due, that, namely, which would take it to be a picture of what, in the fancy of its Author, the true state or country should be, or should aim at being. If this view of the matter be right, then the Sermon will fall into the same group, among what has come

[1] A paper read before the Glasgow University Society for New Testament Study.

down to us of Hebrew thinking, as the last nine chapters of Ezekiel's prophecy, or the last two chapters of the book of Revelation, or the *Republic* of Plato, Campanella's *City of the Sun*, or the *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More. But whether this be so or no, it is clear that the only way to understand the thoughts and wishes of Jesus is to get at the true meaning of His words, as they are handed down to us in the four Gospels, and especially of those passages in the first and third Gospels which make up what is usually known as the Sermon on the Mount. In the case of the latter, the second and fourth Gospels cause little difficulty, whether we consider Mark as the earliest of the first three, or, as used to be held and as will, no doubt, be held again, as made up out of the other two. The Sermon, strictly speaking, is found in the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters of Matthew, but verses the same, or nearly the same, are found in Luke vi. 20–49, xi. 1–4, and 9–13, xii. 22–31, and elsewhere. In the present paper it is taken for granted that these latter passages make up Luke's report of the Sermon. On comparing these verses in Luke with the similar verses in Matthew, the question at once arises: Are these reports meant to give us word for word what Jesus said; or are they mere free summaries and renderings, such as those of the interpreters of Nehemiah, who "gave the sense" only (Neh. viii. 8)? If they are meant to be word for word, why do we find such striking variations as "give good things to them that ask Him" in Matthew (vii. 11) and "give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him" in Luke (xi. 13), or "Enter ye in at the strait gate" in Matthew (vii. 13), and "Strive to enter in at the strait gate" in Luke (xiii. 24)? On the other hand, if the evangelists aimed only at "giving the sense," why do we find such remarkable agreement in the reports, as, for instance, "Ask and it shall be given you. . . . For every one that

asketh receiveth," and so on (Matt. vii. 7 f., Luke xi. 9 f., and in many other places)?

On the face of it, it is most natural to think of those who first set down the sayings and doings of Jesus, as aiming at giving, and as believing that they were giving, their readers His own words; just as the pious Muslim would travel over the whole known world to gather, wherever a memory of them remained, the very words of the founder of his faith. But, however this may be in regard to other sayings of our Lord, there is one passage in which it must hold good. What is known as "the Lord's prayer" is of the nature of a liturgy or common prayer, and was to serve as a model for the worship of the followers of Jesus. It must, therefore, have been learned by heart with even greater care than the rest of the words of Jesus; and as it became a form to be used in worship, it would be known to every one. It becomes, therefore, all the more difficult to account for the variations which are found in the second half of the prayer as recorded by Luke and by Matthew (vi. 9 ff., Luke xi. 2 ff.). The weightiest of these variations (apart from the doxology which is added in Matthew) is in the fifth petition, which in Matthew takes the form of "Forgive us our debts" (*ὀφειλήματα*), but in Luke of "Forgive us our sins" (*ἁμαρτίας*). The reconciliation of the two reports is no doubt to be sought in the Aramaic or Hebrew word *chobh*, which has both senses. In the Old Testament it is found only twice, the noun in Ezekiel xviii. 7, "and hath restored to the *debtor* his pledge," where the Greek renders it by *ὀφείλων*, and the verb in Daniel i. 10, "then shall ye make me endanger my head to the king," or literally, "make me guilty as to my head." In later Hebrew *chubh* is the common word for a "debt," and "*chayyabh*" for a "debtor"; but in the Aramaic version of Onkelos, which is as near as we can get to the

vulgar language spoken in Palestine in the time of Jesus, the word is regularly used to translate the Hebrew words meaning "to sin." It seems clear, therefore, that the word "debts" in Matthew and the word "sins" in Luke are nothing but alternative renderings of a common Aramaic original. The remaining variations in the two versions of the Lord's Prayer may be similarly accounted for, with the exception of the doxology. After all it has to be remembered that the variations are more a matter of words than of sense.

Turning now to the Beatitudes, one is at once struck by the difference between the two reports of the opening verse. Luke has "Happy are the poor" for Matthew's "Happy are the poor in spirit." It seems to be more than a mere coincidence that the Hebrew words *'anavim*, "meek" or "poor in spirit," and *'aniyim*, "poor," are constantly confused with one another in the Hebrew Bible, the one being read (*kre*) when the other was written (*kthibh*). The alternative is put in the margin of the Revised English Version. But, once more, the discrepancy is largely one of language, for, as the wise David Kimchi (on Ps. ix. 12 [13] etc.) remarks, when commenting on one of these passages, the poor in spirit and the poor will always be more or less the same people.

A good example of how far the lesser variations in the reports of the four evangelists are from being original, is to be found in such a sentence as that in Matthew vii. 23, "Depart from Me, ye that work iniquity," answering to Luke xiii. 27. Here every important word differs in the two reports. For "depart" Matthew has ἀποχωρεῖτε, Luke ἀπόστητε; for "ye that work" Matthew has the participle ἐργαζόμενοι, Luke the noun ἐργάται; for "iniquity" Matthew has ἀνομίαν, Luke ἀδικίας; and Luke inserts "all" before "workmen of iniquity." But Mat-

thew's phrase ἐργαζόμενοι τὴν ἀνομίαν is the usual rendering of the Greek translators of the familiar Hebrew *po'ale aven* in the Psalms. Sometimes, however, instead of ἀνομία, they use ἀδικία, as in Luke (Ps. lxiv. 2, ci. 8). The noun ἐργάτης does not happen to be used in the Greek version of the Hebrew Bible, but it is only a closer rendering of the Hebrew phrase than that in Matthew. The verb ἀποχωρεῖν occurs only once in the Old Testament, namely in Jeremiah xxvi. (xlvi.) 5, where it answers to the Hebrew *sug*, "to depart," generally, "backwards"; and this verb is also rendered by ἀφιστάναι in Isaiah lix. 13, 14, and elsewhere. As for Luke's insertion of the word "all," the Greek translators have a way of inserting this word before this phrase, even when it is not found in the Hebrew (Ps. xxxvi. 13, etc.). In this, and in almost every case, the variant reports by Matthew and Luke of the Sermon on the Mount seem to be nothing but alternative Greek renderings of a common Hebrew or Aramaic original.

It may be as well here to give some other cases in which variant Greek renderings in the Gospels go back to the same Hebrew or Aramaic original, or one nearly the same:—

In Matthew we have (v. 15): "Nor do men light a lamp and put it under a measure." One parallel in Luke (xi. 33) has "into a secret place or under a measure"; another (viii. 16) has "covereth it with a vessel or putteth it under a bed." Mark (iv. 21) seems to combine two of these sources and reads, "to put it under a measure or under a bed." It seems possible to explain two of these terms—the measure and the bed—as due to a confusion in sound between the Hebrew words *middah* and *mittah*. Or, if we suppose Mark to be the oldest report, then there would be a play intended upon these two words.

Another example occurs in the same verse, in which Matthew has "and it shines for all who are in the house,'

but Luke, "that those who come in may see the light." The word for "to shine" (λάμπειν) and the word for "light" (φέγγος) are both used by the Greek translators of the Hebrew Bible to render the Hebrew root *nagah* (Prov. iv. 18; Isa. ix. 2 [1], etc.)—a comparatively rare word. There is considerable resemblance also between the Hebrew words for "house" (*beth*, or in its later contracted form *bê*) and for "to come in" (*bô*), which might, through a failure of either eye or ear, be answerable for the divergence between the two reports in the rest of the verse.

Luke xii. 58 seems to contain one or more *plays* upon words, for the phrase "lest he hale thee to the judge" turned back into Hebrew would run *pen yishtoph-khâ el-hash-shophet* (cf. Dan. xi. 10, 26), for the word used is κατασύρειν: in Matthew (v. 25) it is the colourless παραδίδοναι.

We find a colourless expression in Matthew again in vi. 26, "Look at the fowl of heaven," answering to Luke's pictorial "Think of the crows." The difference is perhaps due to confusion between the Hebrew or Aramaic *'oph* and *'orebh*. In the same verse for Luke's "which have neither storehouse nor barn," Matthew has the less poetical "which do not gather into barns." Here again Matthew seems to have taken the rare Hebrew word *asam* (Deut. xxviii. 8; Prov. iii. 10), "a grain store," for the common verb *asaf*, "to gather."

In Luke xi. 11, 12 (Matt. vii. 9, 10), which speaks of a father giving his son a stone instead of bread, and a serpent for a fish, one expects not only some likeness between the members of each pair, but a similarity in the sound of the names. None, however, is apparently to be found, unless it be that the word ἄρτος (a wheaten loaf) is sometimes used in connexion with the unleavened cakes (*matstsah*), and λίθος is used of the standing pillar (*matstsevah*). The verse of the egg and the scorpion is peculiar to Luke. He would use scorpions in his practice as a physician.

Frequently, when Matthew and Luke vary in some detail which does not affect the sense, the phrase used by Matthew is better Hebrew, and that used by Luke better Greek. Thus Matthew's "fowls of heaven" (vi. 26), "lilies of the field" (vi. 28), "grass of the field" (vi. 30), are specifically Hebrew, as contrasted with Luke's "crows" (xii 24), "lilies" (xii. 27), "grass in the field" (xii. 28); though the last phrase brings Matthew on to the rocks, as we have to take the following σήμερον ὄντα in the sense of "which to-day is," instead of "is in the field."

It is well known that the phrase "kingdom of heaven" is used only by Matthew, the others using, as Matthew himself does, the alternative "Kingdom of God." The answer to this riddle lies in the use in post-Biblical Hebrew of "Heaven" for "God." Thus in the Mishna tractate usually known as "The Sayings of the Fathers," the saying ascribed to Antigonus of Socho, who probably lived before the Christian era, is "Be not like slaves who serve their master with a view to a reward, but be like slaves who serve their master not with a view to a reward, and let the fear of *heaven* be upon you." This use of the word continued down to the middle ages, and continues still, just as with us. Matthew, as usual, sticks close to the Hebrew idiom.

In support of the belief of Beza (d. 1605) and Cocceius (which is not held by Dalman) that the term "son of man" was used in Aramaic instead of the pronoun of the first person, we have in Luke vi. 22 "for the sake of the son of man," but in Matthew (v. 11) "for the sake of *Me*." The usage is doubtful, and we should have expected Matthew to preserve the Aramaic form. Cf. Matthew viii. 20, etc.

Hebrew has no auxiliary verbs, and so the imperfect tense must often be rendered by "may," "can," or "must" as well as by "shall" and "will," "used to," and so forth. This no doubt explains those cases in which we have, for

example, "Or how wilt thou say (ἐρεῖς) to thy brother" in Matthew (vii. 4), and in Luke (vi. 42) "how canst thou say" (δύνασαι λέγειν). Both are equally allowable translations of a Hebrew or Aramaic imperfect; and in point of fact the Greek translators of the Hebrew Bible frequently insert the word "can"; for example, in Job vii. 20, "What shall I be able to do?" for "What shall I do?" of the English version. Similarly x. 15, xxxv. 6 (5).

In Matthew vi. 24 "no man (οὐδείς) can serve two masters," etc., we have an instance of a passage which agrees word for word and letter for letter with the corresponding passage in Luke (xvi. 13), except for the fact that Luke inserts the word οἰκέτης (domestic) after οὐδείς.

The insertion is not explicable from the Greek, but the reason for it, or for its omission, if genuine, in Matthew, is self-evident from the Hebrew which would run לא יעבד עבד.

There are one or two phrases used in the Sermon on the Mount which are taken from the Hebrew Bible, but which have not perhaps been noticed. In Luke vi. 48, "and when the flood arose" (πλημμύρας δὲ γενομένης) comes from Job xl. 18 (23); in Luke vi. 45 "out of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaks" is from Eccelesiastes ii. 15, ὁ ἄφρων ἐκ περισσεύματος λαλεῖ—perhaps a unique citation in the New Testament: the "mote" which is in the brother's eye (τὸ κάρφος) is the word used for the leaf with which the dove returned to the ark (Gen. viii. 11); the phrase "children of the Highest," used in Luke vi. 35, comes from Psalm lxxxii. (Greek lxxxi.) 6; the "smiting upon the cheek" mentioned in Matthew v. 39 (ὅστις σε ῥαπίσει ἐπὶ τὴν δεξιάν σου σιαγόνα) is perhaps not to be taken literally. David Kimchi, conmenting on Psalm iii. 7 (Hebrew 8), remarks that a blow on the cheek is the most insulting kind of blow—"the blow of contempt." In any case there seems to be a reference to Hosea xi. 4, where the Greek text uses

the same terms: "I will be to them as one that giveth a box upon their cheeks."

Plays upon words are a feature of Hebrew as of other early literatures, and in Hebrew there is as little objection to using the same word over again as in English. A number of plays upon words in what would be the Aramaic original of the Gospels are given by Mrs. Lewis.[1] Other possible examples are the following. In Luke vi. 40 (Matt. x. 24), "The disciple is not above his master," the words for "disciple" and "master" would probably be different parts of the same root (cf. Prov. ii. 17). In Matthew vii. 27, the rivers and winds "beat upon that house, and it fell, and great was the fall of it," the words for "beat upon" and "fall" would probably be from the same root (*nagaf*). In Luke xii. 58, 59 (answering to Matt. v. 25) "when thou goest with thine adversary . . . give diligence that thou mayest be delivered from him," "goest" and "be delivered" were possibly the same word in the Aramaic original (namely *halakh*; cf. Exod. xiv. 21, 1 Kings xxii. 1). The suggestion made at the beginning that the Sermon is an outline sketch of an ideal republic is perhaps borne out by the passages referring to trade and commerce. In Luke vi. 30, "Of him that taketh thy things ask them not again," the verb "to ask again" (ἀπαιτεῖν) is used to render the Hebrew word *nagas* in Deuteronomy xv. 2, 3. When the seventh year of release came round the Israelite creditor was forbidden to *exact* his claims from his fellow-Israelite or from a proselyte. The word is a technical legal or commercial term. Cf. Isaiah ix. 4 (3), xiv. 4; also Nehemiah v. 7, where the Hebrew word is *nasha*, "to be a creditor." This, however, is one of those words of common life on which light is best sought in the papyri.[2] These show that the

[1] "A Translation of the Four Gospels from the Syriac of the Sinaitic Palimpsest."

[2] See *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*, illustrated from the

verb means to demand payment of taxes or other debts. Similarly in v. 34, "If ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive *back*, what thank have ye?" "Lend," δανείζειν, answers to the Hebrew *lava*, to lend as a commercial transaction (Deut. xxviii. 12, 44; Neh. v. 4, etc.), or to *'abhat*, to give on pledge (Deut. xv. 6, 8). For the uses of ἀπολαμβάνειν, "to receive back," see the *Vocabulary* cited just above. In the ideal republic, then, debts are not collected when they fall due: there is one continuous seventh year of release. In other words, the commercial and business relations of men are to be the same as the relations of personal friendship.

Luke is generally considered to be more material, and Matthew more spiritual. This comes out especially in the beatitudes, in which for Luke's "poor," "hunger," Matthew has "poor in spirit" and "hunger after righteousness." But the rule does not always hold good. In regard to almsgiving the difference between the two evangelists is that whereas Luke enjoins the giving of alms (xi. 41, xii. 33), in Matthew it is taken for granted and only the *method* of giving dealt with (vi. 1, 2, 4). It is possible that the fifth beatitude, "Blessed are the merciful," μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες· ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται, should be rendered, "Blessed are they who give alms, for they shall be given alms." Even interpreted literally, there is no more objection to this than to "Give and it shall be given unto you" (Luke vi. 38). There is no special word for "alms" in the Hebrew Bible, but to the Pharisees almsgiving came to form such a large part of religion that the Hebrew word for "righteousness" came to be used for "almsgiving." Already the LXX knew to render *tsedhaka* by ἐλεημοσύνη. In the phrase in

papyri and other non-literary sources, by J. H. Moulton and George Milligan, *sub voc.* This work was reviewed in THE EXPOSITOR for February 1915.

Matthew v. 20, "Except your righteousness exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees," the word "righteousness," δικαιοσύνη, goes back to a Hebrew *tsedhaka*, or its Aramaic equivalent, and the question is whether we should render it by "righteousness" or by "almsgiving." Either translation is quite legitimate, and the decision must rest upon the answer to the question, which is Jesus more likely to have meant? When we think of the large place which poverty holds in the ideal of Jesus, the latter is perhaps the more likely to have been meant.

But while there are many variations in the Gospels, and especially in the Sermon on the Mount, which appear to be nothing more than alternative and equally good renderings of an Aramaic original, it must be acknowledged that there are many which cannot be so explained. Matthew concludes the first part of the Sermon with "Be ye therefore perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect." For perfect, τέλειοι, Luke has merciful, οἰκτίρμονες. There is no Aramaic word which answers to both of these. The difference must be due to failure of memory or some other cause. For Matthew's "Take no thought, saying, What shall we eat, or, What shall we drink, or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed," Luke has "And seek not ye what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink, *neither be ye of doubtful mind*." It does not seem to be possible to reduce the two concluding clauses to a common Aramaic source. The phrase used by Luke—καὶ μὴ μετεωρίζεσθε—appears to be the more, and that of Matthew—ἢ τί περιβαλώμεθα—the less original. It is, however, just possible that the variation is due to a confusion between *kasa*, to which περιβάλλειν regularly corresponds, and *nasa*, which is sometimes translated by μετεωρίζειν.

When one considers what store the pious oriental sets upon the possession of the very words of the founder of his

faith, it seems certain that the authors of the four Gospels believed they were reporting the exact words of Jesus; and when we remember how everything that is in writing is also usually committed to memory, the presumption is that in the four Gospels we do have to a very large extent His very words. It becomes necessary, then, to account for the many variations which appear in the duplicate reports. In the process of translating these narratives and speeches back into Hebrew or Aramaic—for the difference between them is not very great—many of these variations disappear. In this paper it has been taken for granted that Jesus delivered His message in the language most familiar to the common people of His day, as well as to the religious and patriotic party.

If it be asked whether this Aramaic source was written or oral, the answer must be that it was probably both. At the death of Mohammed his utterances were found written down upon palm leaves and sheep bones as well as in the breasts of men, and we may be very sure that after the death of Jesus His disciples would lose no time in committing His words to writing in the language in which they were uttered; and if committed to writing they would also be committed to memory.

It is often noted that the oldest sources for the life of Jesus are to be found not in the Gospels but in the Epistles of St. Paul. But if it is found that the varying reports of the Gospel represent a common Aramaic source, such a source would become our oldest authority—older than the Epistles.

T. H. Weir.

*ST. PAUL'S VOYAGE AND SHIPWRECK.**

Acts XXVII.

A New Translation.

1 When it was decided that we should sail † for Italy, Paul, along with some other prisoners, was put under the charge of a centurion—his name was Julius—of the Augustan Cohort.

2 So, going on board a ship belonging to Adramyttium, bound for the ports along the coast of Asia,‡ we put to sea. We had with us Aristarchus the || Macedonian, of Thessalonica. 3 The next day we put in at Sidon, and Julius treated Paul with consideration, allowing him to visit his friends and receive their attentions.

4 Putting to sea again we made a course to leeward of Cyprus,§ in consequence of unfavourable winds.¶ 5 Then,

* The Translator has made a close study of this voyage from the nautical point of view. In the final revision of his rendering he has had the advantage of consulting a retired Naval officer, Commander Berkeley St. G. Deane, who had had the experience—so rapid has been the evolution of the Navy—of following St. Paul's track, for a portion at least of the voyage, under sail. The admirable monograph of "Smith of Jordanhill," and the MS. of Admiral Penrose, so far as made available by Conybeare and Howson, have of course been freely used.

† On the grammar of ἐκρίθη τοῦ ἀποπλεῖν, see Winer-Moulton xliv. (p. 410), and J. H. Moulton, *Prolegomena*, 216 f.

‡ The Province of Asia, according to Luke's regular usage.

|| The grammar admits of either "a" or "the," but Aristarchus was a well-known Christian and has been previously mentioned in Acts (xix. 29, xx. 4); cf. Col. iv. 10, Philem. 24. The apparently abrupt mention of him is probably intended to explain who the "we" were—not to account for the destination of the ship, as the A.V. rendering suggests.

§ This must mean to the N. of Cyprus, as it is implied that it was not their direct course. See next note.

¶ The prevailing winds in summer in the Levant are northwesterly, which would be directly contrary on a straight course from Sidon to Myra. Near the coast of Asia Minor there is a chance of favourable land winds, and there is also a current which sets westward.

having run across the gulf * between Cilicia and Pamphylia, we arrived at Myra in Lycia.

6 And the centurion finding there an Alexandrian ship sailing for Italy, put us on board. 7 After working slowly to windward † for many days and with difficulty drawing abreast of Cnidus, finding that the wind would not permit us to hold our course further ‡ we ran down to the leeward of Crete, rounding Cape Salmone, 8 and, beating up with difficulty along the coast, we reached a place called Fair Havens, not far from which was the town of Lasaea.

9 When a considerable time had elapsed and navigation had now become hazardous because even the Fast was now over, 10 Paul offered a suggestion saying, "Friends, I judge that our voyage (if we continue it) will be attended by violent weather and much loss not only in respect of the ship and cargo, but of our lives also." 11 But the centurion gave more weight to the opinions of the ship-master and

* The *διαπλεύσαντες* probably implies that at this point a favourable shift of wind enabled them to make a straight course across a stretch of open water (*πέλαγος*) instead of hugging the shores of the bight.

† Lit. having "slow-sailed" (not "sailed slowly"). A compound of this kind is apt to have a more technical sense than the words of which it is composed used separately, and to "slow-sail" (*βραδυπλοέω*) can hardly mean anything else than to work to windward by tacking. Experts estimate that a ship such as St. Paul's could not sail nearer the wind than about seven points (eight points being a right angle).

‡ We have seen that the wind was probably about N.W. during most of this coasting voyage. The further course would still be west, or a little to the south of west. But it is not necessary to suppose that the wind backed much further to the westward, for the general conditions now became more unfavourable. For a ship like St. Paul's the most favourable conditions for working to windward are a rather strong wind with a fairly smooth sea; conditions realised when under the partial shelter of the land with a strong wind blowing. At this point they lost the shelter of the coast, and, with the consequently rougher sea, could probably not stand near enough the wind to make appreciable headway on either tack. That the wind had not changed much is shown (unless, of course, as is possible, it changed again!) by the fact that when they gained the shelter of Crete they were again able to work to the westward. One gets the impression, too, that the run down to Crete was easy, as it would be with a N.W. wind, a point abaft the beam.

the super-cargo than to what Paul said. [12] Moreover, as the harbour was ill-adapted for wintering in, the majority were in favour of putting to sea, in the hope of reaching Phenice, to winter there—a harbour of Crete which looks * north-east and south-east. [13] So when a moderate south wind sprung up, thinking they could make sure of attaining their purpose, they set sail, and coasted along the shores of Crete, close in. [14] Before long, however, there struck down upon them from the land a hurricane wind known as Euraquilo. [15] The vessel was swept out of her course and unable to stand up to the wind, so we let her fall off † and drove before it. [16] And running under the lee of an island named Cauda we with great difficulty ‡ got the boat alongside; [17] and after we had hauled it on board we frapped || the ship with supporting cables. And fearing to be cast upon the Syrtis quicksands they shortened sail § and [lying to] drifted. [18] But, making very heavy weather of it, the next day they began to jettison cargo. [19] And the following day ¶ we

* Taking κατὰ as "down along" (the south-west and north-west winds). So Alford and Smith independently. Conybeare and Howson arrive at the same result by supposing that the sailor speaks of a harbour as looking the way he looks when entering it. Lutro, the probable site of Phenice, does face N.E. and S.E., and in spite of this wide exposure is considered a safe harbour.

† ἐπιδόντες, surrendering the ship (to the wind). As she had hitherto been trying to work to windward this involved letting her "fall off," i.e. ceasing to point at an acute angle to the wind, and instead pointing away from it. The wind, which drove them down to Cauda and threatened to drive them on the Syrtis, must have been about E.N.E.

‡ The difficulty would be to get it alongside without its being stove in against the ship.

|| This operation, which consists in passing a cable round the ship several times and heaving it taut, has been practised in comparatively modern times. The object is to ease the strain and prevent the timbers "working" and the seams opening.

§ Following Smith, who seems very sound from the nautical point of view here. "Lowering the gear" does not necessarily mean stripping her to bare poles as the A.V. rendering suggests.

¶ It seems almost necessary to read the first person here. What αὐτόχειρες means with the third person I do not know. (? That they did it themselves without waiting for the sea to do it for them ?).

threw overboard the spare gear of the vessel with our own hands. [20] And when neither sun nor stars had been visible for many days, and the storm continued unabated, all hope of being saved was now * slipping away from us. [21] And after we had been a long time without a meal † Paul rose up to speak ‡ and addressed them thus: "You would have done well, friends, to have listened to me and not sailed from Crete, and then you would have avoided this violent storm and the loss it will cause you. [22] And now (in the present perils) ‖ my counsel to you is to keep up heart, for there will be no loss of life among you whatever, but loss only of the ship. [23] For there stood by me last night, from § the God to whom I belong and whom I worship, an angel who said to me, [24] 'Paul, have no fear; it is needful for thee to appear before Caesar: and behold, God has given thee for a boon (the lives of) all thy shipmates.' [25] Therefore keep up your hearts, my friends, for I believe that it will be as God has told me. [26] We shall certainly be cast upon some island."

[27] And when the fourteenth night of our tossing about in Adria had come, ¶ the sailors judged that we were nearing land. [28] And sounding, they got twenty fathoms, and waiting a little and sounding again they got fifteen fathoms; [29] and fearing that we might be cast upon rocks,

* Slipping—suggested by the imperf.

† It is not necessary to suppose absolute fasting from religious motives. The mere difficulty of preparing food, and the water-damaged condition of what there was, would cause "considerable abstinence."

‡ This passage shows what a conventional phrase "standing up in the midst" is, meaning no more than "began to speak publicly."

‖ Suggested by *τανῦν*. He has given advice once before, he now, in present circumstances, gives advice again.

§ The "from" is justified, not by the genitive in itself, which is doubtless a real possessive, but by the emphatic position of *τοῦ θεοῦ*, which is rather obscured by rendering "an angel of God," etc.

¶ There is no difficulty about Adria including the sea south of Italy. Pausanias speaks of the straits of Messina as connecting the Tyrrhene with the Adriatic sea.

they dropped four anchors from the stern, and prayed for daylight. 30 But when the sailors made an attempt to abandon the ship and had lowered the boat, on the pretext of carrying out anchors from the bow, 31 Paul said to the centurion and the soldiers, "Unless these men stay by the ship, you have no chance of escape." 32 Then the soldiers cut the falls * of the boat and set her adrift. 33 In the interval before daylight, Paul urged them all to take some food, saying, "This is now the fourteenth day that in your anxiety you have gone fasting, taking nothing to sustain you,† 34 and therefore I urge you to take food, for this will conduce to your safety. For not a hair of your heads shall perish." 35 Having spoken thus and taken a loaf into his hands, he gave thanks to God in the presence of them all, and broke it and began to eat. 36 And they were all cheered, and took some food themselves. 37 We were in all two hundred and seventy-six souls on board. 38 And when they had taken a good meal they lightened the ship by throwing out the wheat into the sea. 39 When day came, they did not recognise the land, but they made out a bay with a strand, on which they made up their minds, if possible, to beach the ship. 40 And, cutting (the cables), they left the anchors in the sea, at the same time unlashing ‡ the steering paddles;

* The ropes by which the boat is lowered.

† See note on *v.* 21.

‡ The A.V. here obscures the meaning. By "loosing the rudder bands" the English reader would naturally understand that they abandoned all effort to control the vessel, leaving the "rudder" hanging loose, so to speak. The very opposite is the case. The long steering-oars, which projected through port-holes on each side of the ship at the stern, would be hauled in-board when anchored, to prevent fouling the cables or dashing against the sides. Now, when about to get under way, the lashings, by which the steering oars were secured in-board, would be cast off and they would be thrust out through the port-holes. Luke's "at the same time" is a very accurate touch, for this operation had to be done at the earliest possible moment, to secure control of the vessel, and yet it could not be done till the cables were cut, on account of the risk of fouling them.

and hoisting the foresail to the wind they were making * or the beach, [41] but chancing on a sand-spit † they ran the vessel upon it, and the bow, having taken the ground heavily, became immovably fixed, while the stern began to break up under the battering of the waves. [42] The soldiers had a mind to kill the prisoners, lest any of them should jump overboard and so escape. [43] But the centurion, desiring to save Paul's life, put a stop to this project, and gave orders that those who could swim should throw themselves first into the sea and make for shore, [44] and the rest, either on planks or some of the wreckage from the ship. And in this way they all got safely to shore.

W. MONTGOMERY.

JUDAS MACCABAEUS AND PRAYERS FOR THE DEAD.

THE name of Judas Maccabaeus is associated with prayers for the dead in a single passage in the Second Book of Maccabees (2 Macc. xii. 39–44). In order to examine the passage it will be necessary to quote it in full.

2 MACCABEES xii. 39–44.

39. On the day following the troops of Judas, with no loss of time, came to take up the bodies of them that had fallen and to bring them back to be with their kinsmen in the sepulchres of their fathers. 40. But under the garments of each of the dead they found amulets of the idols of Jamnia

* This is the natural sense of the imperf., followed by the antithetic δέ and the aorist, as Page notes.

† The τόπος διθάλασσος "place of two seas" can, according to Greek usage, mean either a strait or an isthmus. A passage in which such places are described as a danger to navigation suggests that the latter usage may have been extended to include spits of land, with their extensions below the water, viz., banks. The A.V. rendering "a place where two seas met" suggests a spot rendered dangerous by the meeting of currents, and (so understood) is not justified by the Greek.

which the law forbids the Jews to have aught to do with : and it became clear to all that it was for this cause that they had fallen. 41. All therefore, blessing the judgments of the Lord, the righteous Judge, who maketh manifest the things that are hid, 42. betook themselves unto supplication, *beseeching that the sin committed might be wholly blotted out.* And the noble Judas exhorted the multitude to keep themselves from sin forsomuch as they had seen before their eyes what things had come to pass because of the sin of them that had fallen.

43. And when he had made a collection man by man to the sum of two thousand drachmas of silver, *he sent unto Jerusalem to offer a sacrifice for sin,* doing therein right well and honourably, in that he took thought for a resurrection. 44. For if he were not expecting that they that had fallen would rise again, it were superfluous and idle to pray for the dead. (And if he did it having regard to an honourable and appropriate memorial of gratitude for them that fall asleep in godliness, holy and godly was the thought.) Wherefore he made propitiation for them that had died, that they might be released from their sin.

In considering this passage, it is important to remember that 2 Maccabees is the work of a Pharisee who, as he himself tells us, " assayed to abridge in one work " the five books of Jason of Cyrene (2 Macc. ii. 23). As the Pharisaic epitomist was himself in all probability an Alexandrian [1] 2 Maccabees must be regarded as a thoroughly Egyptian book.

The passage before us reads quite smoothly till we come to verse 44, and then we get a surprising comment, " For if he were not expecting that they that had fallen would rise again, it were superfluous and idle to pray for the dead. (And if he did it having regard to an honourable and appro-

[1] See Dr. Moffatt in Dr. Charles' *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha,* vol. i. p. 128.

priate memorial of gratitude for them that fall asleep in godliness, holy and godly was the thought.)" The epitomist is evidently uneasy with regard to the account of Judas' doings which he found in his source. He is uncertain how far he can approve prayers and sacrifice for the dead, but he takes refuge in the thought that at least they prove that Judas believed in the resurrection of the dead. Moreover if Judas meant his sacrifice to be a kind of "memorial of gratitude"[1]—as no doubt he did—that was a holy and godly thought. And so the epitomist overcomes his hesitation and follows his source closely. It would seem that with ὅθεν he resumes what must be practically a quotation from the older writer. Thus we may with confidence attribute verses 39–44, with the exception of two sentences in *v.* 44 (44 a and b, "For if he were not expecting . . . holy and godly was the thought"), to Jason of Cyrene.

But we may submit these verses (*vv.* 39–43, together with the last clause of *v.* 44, to a further analysis. We observe that the narrative merges into commentary in the last clause of *v.* 43, "doing therein right well and honourably in that he took thought for a resurrection. Wherefore he made propitiation for them that had died that they might be released from their sin!" (44c).

The historical information Jason has to give us, that is to say, stops with the sentence "he sent unto Jerusalem to offer a sacrifice for sin." Thus the events which are recorded, apart from Jason's own interpretation of them, appear to be three:

(1) All having found out the sin of their dead brethren betook themselves unto supplication, ἀξιώσαντες τὸ γεγονὸς ἁμάρτημα τελείως ἐξαλειφθῆναι.

[1] "Of them that fall asleep in godliness," an expression which obviously did not apply to the case in point—to such an expedient was the epitomist driven in order to justify the action of his hero Judas!

(2) Judas took advantage of the occasion to exhort the multitude "to keep themselves from sin, forsomuch as they had seen before their eyes what things had come to pass because of the sin of them that had fallen."

(3) Judas having made a collection of two thousand drachmas *ἀπέστειλεν εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα προσαγαγεῖν περὶ ἁμαρτίας θυσίαν.*

Judas' exhortation suggests that his chief concern was with the survivors of his army rather than with the dead. What then is the motive of the prayers and the sacrifice?

It is clear that the sacrifice took the form of a sin-offering (*περὶ ἁμαρτίας θυσίαν*).

Now a sin-offering was appropriate under two circumstances and two only.[1]

(1) For religious purifications, e.g., after contact with a dead body.

(2) For ignorant or inadvertent transgressions.

Sin-offerings were never supposed to avail for wilful wrongdoing. So far as the dead men themselves were concerned their sin had been a wilful one. Thus the sin-offering cannot be regarded as having application to them. But Judas and his men felt themselves involved in the sin of their brethren. The army had sinned, but so far as the survivors were concerned it had been an inadvertent transgression. It was therefore proper to offer on their behalf a sin-offering, because of their "sin of ignorance."

The prayers were directed to the same purpose. The soldiers prayed not that their dead comrades might be forgiven, but "that the sin committed might be wholly blotted out," that is to say that it might not be visited upon the army or allowed to affect the fortunes of the nation.

Thus neither prayer nor sacrifice was originally on behalf of the dead themselves. The idea of intercession and pro-

[1] See Prof. G. F. Moore, art. "Sacrifice," *Encycl. Biblica*, col. 4204.

pitiation for the dead was read into the facts by Jason of Cyrene and his interpretation was accepted, though not wholly and not without hesitation, by the Pharisaic epitomist.

The interpretation strongly reflects Egyptian influence. For 5,000 years [1] as the history of the *Book of the Dead* shows, activities of the living, and particularly the recital of prayers,[2] on behalf of the dead had formed an important part of the native Egyptian cult.

Jews like Jason of Cyrene were affected—and especially in this particular—by the atmosphere in which they lived, though in stricter and more orthodox circles like that of the Pharisaic epitomist the effect was reduced to a minimum.

The result of our inquiry, therefore, has been (1) to show that 2 Maccabees gives us no trustworthy evidence for the existence of the custom of praying for the dead in Palestine in the time of the Maccabees; and (2) to suggest that the appearance of the custom in such a developed form in Egyptian Judaism at the end of the second century [3] B.C. is due to native Egyptian influence.[4]

J. W. Hunkin.

A NEW DOCUMENT ON CHRISTIAN MONACHISM.

I.

Foreword.

In ancient times there were mystical thinkers who taught that the best way for rational creatures to fulfil their obliga-

[1] Dr. E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Book of the Dead*, vol. i., Introduction, p. l. [2] Ibid. p. lxxxv.

[3] Which may be taken approximately as the date of Jason of Cyrene. (See Dr. Moffatt, op. cit. p. 128.)

[4] After the above article was in type the attention of the writer was called to a chapter in Dr. C. H. H. Wright's book, "*The Intermediate State and Prayers for the Dead*, examined in the light of Scripture, and of Ancient Jewish and Christian Literature," pp. 28 ff., where a rather similar view of this passage in 2 Macc. is expressed.

tions towards their Creator was to make a complete self-sacrifice and abnegation of all worldly possessions. In obedience to this conception, which, in certain cases, is surely not wholly blamable, many people thought it necessary to inflict wilfully on their bodies some kind of hardships commonly called, in monastic circles, by the name of "mortifications."[5] In later generations, the Christian holders of these views could easily justify their conduct by certain instances of the Old Testament impregnated with the general Oriental theory of holiness, which consists in fasting and meditating in lonely places. The New Testament also was skilfully handled, to make it clear that such practices were more than useful. To lay stress on this theme is as unnecessary as to emphasise a fact which is a well-known commonplace of human history.

In the middle of the second century the Mesopotamian writer Tatian, by openly adopting Encratite ideas, showed that a mystic doctrine was not even very far from the Gnostic aberrations of the first centuries of our era. In the third century this kind of mysticism, which was very often confined to individuals, began to acquire a wider area; and Eusebius, in commenting on Pss. 67 and 83 remarks that many of these ascetics existed before his time as *μοναχοί*, but still without any social organisation. These "monks" as we may broadly style them, were represented in Syriac-speaking communities by what were called "Bnai Ḳiâma," *sons of engagement*, and the Aramaean historians of that period noticed that this kind of asceticism had extended even to women, "Bnath Ḳiâma."

No noticeable improvement and no essential changes are reported to have affected this kind of life till after the Nicene Council. At this period, the era of the great persecutions having at last reached its end by the Christian attitude of Constantine, many an ascetic thought that the best way

to fulfil the Evangelical precept "Be ye perfect, as your Father in Heaven is perfect" was that of completely leaving the world. The deserts of Egypt, Abyssinia and Coele-Syria swarmed with huts containing each a "solitary" who believed human society no more worthy of his attention. This movement is one of the most attractive features in the history of the Church at that golden age of its evolution. The *Vita Antonii* of Athanasius and the writings of Jerome and Cassianus have made many names familiar even to the greatest Puritans of our days. The detached solitarism of former ages was replaced in this movement by "Cenobitism," i.e., a gathering of two or more solitaries under special rules and conditions, which the zeal of an Anthony, a Pacomius, an Arsenius and a Macarius could furnish orally to new recruits.

So far as we are aware, beside some homiletic discourses of Christian Fathers, no complete treatise on Monasticism has come down to us from that period. We know the history of the greatest solitaries of the fourth century, but we can learn very little about the method of their teaching. Happily Syriac Literature, which in the last few years has proved an inexhaustible mine for Christian subjects, is able to throw great rays of light on this point, and to show that the more Eastern monasteries are searched by scholars, the better their labours are rewarded. Having had the good fortune, during my travels in the East, to find a torn manuscript of the seventh or eighth century, which can fill an undesirable gap in the history of the evolution of the Christian life of that early time, I think it my duty to say something about this discovery, which will perhaps excite the curiosity of some historians of the first ages of Christianity.

The man who forms the subject of the present study is not absolutely unknown. He has been highly praised by

St. Jerome; he brought up, in the true Christian faith, St. Epiphanius, the famous heresiographer, and he is mentioned more than once in some Syriac writings on mysticism. But despite his world-wide fame, owing to the meagre historical information about his personality, his name is now known only to a few specialists. The fact that his works were considered to be irreparably lost may also account for the lack of any historical sketch narrating his exploits and acknowledging the great influence that he exercised over the leading authorities of his time. On the other hand, his works having seen the light in the middle of the fourth century, can safely be taken as of first-rate importance for the study of Christian monachism. They may be considered also as the first books ever written on monachism in general and cenobitism in particular. With them one is able to study more deeply and more accurately a psychological phenomenon which is unique in the history of the human mind, and which in many respects is a strong witness to the spiritual vigour munificently imparted to his followers by the divine Founder of Christianity.

The man of whom we write was called Gregory of Cyprus. Born in Ethiopia, he undertook many journeys to Palestine, to Syria, to the trans-Euphratic provinces, and finally settled in the island of Cyprus. Though writing in Syriac, he had received a good Hellenic culture. The proof of this is constantly found in his style, which, though pure and archaic, differs in many respects from that used by Ephrem and Aphrahaṭ, men who lived far from a Greek atmosphere and whose literary compositions do not betray any sensible trace of Hellenism.

II.

Gregory and his Works.

Gregory was born in Ethiopia at the beginning of the fourth century and possibly about 310 A.D. This date is

rendered acceptable by the general events of his literary career on which we will dwell in the following pages. He calls himself Ethiopian, and leaves no room for the hypothesis of some Orientalists, who under the influence of the famous *Book of Chastity* written in the ninth century by Isho'denaḥ of Basrah,[1] pretend that he was born in Persia.[2] On this point he writes as follows :

" By my family I am from those who transgress the commandments, and by my race I am from the people of Kūsh blackened by their sins."

That Gregory was not a white man of Persian extraction is suggested by another passage of his book where he orders his monks to look at his black face, in an interpellation made to himself by himself :

" O ignorant man who hast acquired wisdom, thy face seems to be coloured with a varnish which is not like ours and which is amazing to our sight."

Here a serious question arises : The *Book of Chastity* seems to convey the impression that Gregory was a fellow disciple of Eugenius, the father of Eastern monachism. As this question can by no means be discussed at length within the narrow limits of this article, we will content ourselves with the simple remark : if the historicity of Eugenius or Awgin, or the reality of his existence, be an established fact, as against a very able critic [3] we believe it to be, his compatriot Gregory would have gone with him to the mountain of Izla, in Western Assyria ; and if this last point may be fully elucidated, the migration of Gregory with his master Eugenius ought to be assigned to the year A.D. 338.

Some years later we find Gregory in Palestine. His

[1] *Book of Chastity*, edit. Chabot, No. 12 ; and edit. Bedjan, p. 345.
[2] Ita R. Duval, *Littérature Syriaque*, pp. 222-223, with all the modern historians.
[3] J. Labourt, *Le Christianisme dans l'Empire Perse*, p. 302, sqq.

presence in that country is attested by a letter of St. Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis, to John, Patriarch of Antioch, which St. Jerome has fortunately preserved in an important passage, from which we cite the following lines : [1]

" Sed et illud vehementer admiratus, quod meis locutus es clericis, asserens te, *per sanctum presbyterum et abbatem monachorum Gregorium,* mandasse mihi ne quemquam ordinarem, et ego hoc pollicitus sim. . . ."

It seems that John had forbidden Epiphanius to confer any ecclesiastical ordination, and had notified his prohibition in a letter confided to Gregory ; but Epiphanius, either because he had not received this missive in due time, or because he had not understood it adequately, had promoted Paulinianus, brother of Jerome, to sacerdotal ordination. Whatever the cause of this misunderstanding might be, we must be grateful to the prolific pen of the illustrious father of the Church for having unveiled for us a historical stage in the life of Gregory, and most of all for having been the first to bear witness to the sanctity and the just reputation of a man who, at all events, ought to be better known in the historical development of monasticism in the Greco-Roman world.

Gregory went from Palestine to the island of Cyprus, in which he spent a great part of his life and where he wrote a book, in the form of epistles, on different points of spirituality. In his works, we read frequently the following sentence at the beginning of a chapter : " Discourse of Saint Gregory, the monk of the island of Cyprus." Moreover, addressing his two favourite disciples, Theodore and Epiphanius, mentioned above, he says :

" I am obliged to offer you many thanks for the love that you showed towards me ; because when *I entered this island,* both of you, after the Archbishop, were the first to offer me great honours and to follow me."

[1] Quoted in Assemani, op. infra cit.

It will be easily understood from this quotation that Epiphanius was the disciple of Gregory ; and this is not a despicable item in the enumeration of the glorious titles to be awarded to a man whose only defect is that the injury of time has destroyed his claims with posterity.—Our Saint seems to have passed the rest of his life in his island, where he died about 390.[1]

The preceding sketch of the history of our Saint seems to be well established historically. The following details found in the *Book of Chastity* do not appear to exceed the limits of possibility. We are told (*a*) that Gregory made his studies in Edessa, under a certain master called Moses ; (*b*) that he paid two visits to Western Assyria, the first of which must have taken place after he had finished his studies, and the second would occur after his stay in the island of Cyprus. This second visit does not seem to have been very long, since he apparently died a few days after his arrival in the mountain of Izla. Finally, the short notice of the *Book of Chastity* would have us believe that our Saint became a gardener when he entered Cyprus. The only proof of this assertion that we were able to find in his writings is that when intending to make more palpable an abstract subject of monastic life, he sometimes takes topics of horticulture as illustrations.

Gregory is the author of two distinct works on the monastic life, so strangely rooted in the heart of every good Christian of the fourth century and onwards. The first is a long book on asceticism, divided into ten chapters of unequal length, and the second is written in the form of letters addressed to his friends or pupils, especially to SS. Epiphanius and Theodore. These letters are not, therefore, chapters of his book on monasticism, as R. Duval and other critics assert. Gregory himself settles this question in the following manner :

[1] Cf. Assemani, *Bibliot. Orient.* I. 191.

"We have neither the intention to enter here into different orders of theories, nor to show the combats and the vicissitudes which accompany them, because we have dealt with all these in many places of the first chapters of this book and also in the *other Book of Letters*."

The book of Gregory is composed very often in the form of questions and answers. One or many of his disciples, not understanding thoroughly a tangled point of spirituality, ask their master to explain it to them in a clearer manner. The master, yielding to their entreatics, expounds the current subject in new sentences, without excluding, however, a second and sometimes a third question on the part of his disciples. This dialogue form of a treatise was much in use in the early times, and being by its nature more suitable for the *mise en scène* of an event, it was considered very useful for didactic purposes. Syriac literature is not poor in this kind of writing; the book of Bardesanes "De Fato" is cast into this mould, in many epic poems of Narsai, called *Soghiathas*, and in some lyric compositions of Ephrem this phenomenon is given an unchallenged preference.

We can affirm with certitude that the literary career of Gregory extended between the years which separated the Council of Nicaea (325) from that of Constantinople (391), and we conjecture with probability that the *Book of Letters* has been written about 345 and that the long treatise on monastic life was finished before 362. The reasons why we think so may be summarised as follows:

(1) In the book of Gregory St. Epiphanius is presented as a young man, a simple novice, and surely not as a bishop. Now, since he illustrious heresiographer was elected to the see of Cyprus about 367, his master Gregory must have composed his book at least a few years before this date.

(2) Gregory does not know in his book another Council besides that of Nicaea, and some vivid sentences written

about it seem to suggest the idea that their author was not living very far from the year in which this gathering of bishops took place in the capital of Bithynia.

" Beware of the words of the Heretics and confess a true faith. . . . Build upon the holy foundations that our holy Fathers of Nicaea have laid, because it is they that opened the way of faith to all Christians."

By the sentence of Gregory that we quoted above, it is clear that the *Book of Letters* preceded that of the complete treatise on monasticism.

We think that we shall not be far from the truth if we try to maintain that Gregory wrote his book on the Eastern Mediterranean shores and probably on the mountain of Izla, before he started a new life in the island of Cyprus. Some of his phrases would lead us to think that at the moment of writing the author was staying in a country far from Cyprus : " A stranger brother, trustworthy about these divine deeds, spoke to me in the following manner : I was then in the island of Cyprus and I happened to go once to a town . . . "

On the other hand, the *Book of Letters* had certainly been composed when Gregory was living in one of the lauras of Cyprus. The citations from his book found in the preceding pages leave no room for doubt on this matter. This induces us not to reject completely the information of the *Book of Chastity*, where we are told that Gregory paid two visits to Mount Izla. In this case, he must have removed to his favourite island after the cession of Nisibis and its dependencies to Sapor II., by Jovian, in 363. He must have migrated with St. Ephrem and many notables of the city, preferring expatriation to the yoke of a pagan empire. In his work, the Roman soldier is the emblem of courage and discipline :

" As the intrepid Roman soldier begins the war with courage and all the ranks of the enemy dread him, so the demons etc. . . . "

This sentence would have been without object if the author were writing after the *débâcle* of the Roman legions conducted by Julian. Can we imagine such a bold statement made by an eyewitness of a defeat? It is for this reason that we stated above that the composition of our Archimandrite's book was finished about the year 362 in which massing of troops and different preparations for the deadly campaign were carried out on both sides with frantic zeal.

III.

Importance of Gregory's Works.

We deem that the works of Gregory, apart from a general interest to historical science, have a great intrinsic value for two principal reasons: (1) they constituted the bridge by means of which the dogma and discipline of the Greco-Roman world passed into Sassanide territory. (2) They initiated the autochthonous ascetics of the Persian empire to the more regular institutions of a Pacomian constitution.

We know how rudimentary was the dogmatism of the Persian Church at the beginning of the fourth century. Aphrahaṭ, answering the objections of the Jews concerning the Divinity of the Word, attempts with a meagre rabbinic exegesis to show that the name of "Son of God" is applied, in the Scriptures, to Moses and to some other just men, and that the expression "King of Kings" is addressed to Nebuchadnezzar; therefore, he infers, when these appellations are applied to the Christ, we must not attribute to them a preponderating importance. The Pneumatology of this celebrated writer and his Trinitarian doctrine are not more than a very imperfect sketch, though he was writing some fifteen years after the Council of Nicaea.[1]

[1] Cf. *Patrologia Syriaca*, vol. i, Coll. 785, 788, 807, etc., and all the XVIIIth Demonstration.

On the other hand, we see simple authors of stories of Martyrdom writing on these different subjects, forty years later on, in a perfect manner and with an ease of dogmatic expression worthy of the theologians of the twentieth century. What is the cause of this sudden change? It is noticeable that the same words, *quoad sensum*, as those used in the writings of Gregory, are put in the mouths of martyrs by the pious compilers of numerous passionaries which record the frightful trials undergone by Christian believers at the hands of unscrupulous Satraps. Is it then possible to suppose that this happy change in the phraseology of the old Patristics of Eastern provinces has been effected by the humble monks who for more than forty years had peopled the ridges of Izla? Here are some sentences which will show in how masterly a manner our Archimandrite could write on the Trinitarian dogma:

"There is one nature in God, one will, one power, one force, possessing, however, several operations, one lordship one kingship and one Divine essence. He who created, made and organised all beings is one, in a single, adorable and glorious Trinity; one in three: Father, Son and Holy Spirit; and three in one; a unique and essential Trinity. . . . The Gnostics have owned their defeat, and the searchers their incapacity. . . . They spoke of Him when studying the stars, but they did not comprehend Him; they sought for Him when discussing the first elements, but these did not show Him to them; they almost grasped Him therein, but they did not understand Him."

Another and not less important advantage is to be found in Gregory's works, viz., their paramount necessity for the study of Christian monasticism. In fact, we feel sometimes a certain difficulty in believing that he was writing in the middle of the fourth century when we think of the precise details and the exact counsels that he has trans-

mitted about the delicate ground of spirituality. The three successive lives of the pious soul, the Purgative, the Illuminative and the Unitive, exhibited in some compositions of the mystics of mediaeval ages, are laid down by our monk in the most unquestionable manner. On this matter, several of his sentences might have given rise to the recrudescence of mysticism which affected so strangely the Eastern Church, through which Islamic and Iranian Sufism acquired, at a later period, a more extended field of spiritual idealism.

Gregory mentions also the father, the director, the monitor almost in the same manner as that used in some monasteries of our own day. "The night of a monk," he says, "has three phases: the first phase is devoted to the rest of the body, the middle one to prayer, and the final one to Eucharist or thanksgiving." Gregory forbids the monks (*a*) to make a sordid bargain in selling or buying anything; (*b*) to appraise their manual work; (*c*) to discuss tangled questions concerning Christian belief; (*d*) to be peripatetic, a practice which was, it seems, beginning to infest many religious communities at that early stage of their existence. Here are a few sentences which will show more emphatically the kind of spirituality that he professed:

"A monk without occupation is an abundant source of spiritual damage, an asylum of all evil thoughts, and a rendezvous of tribulation and sadness. An humble monk is a fortress of bronze; and when trials come and strike him, he endures by the hope of Divine grace. A loquacious monk is a city without gates and bolts. A double-tongued monk troubles the peace of his brethren, and he is comparable to the man who pours out deadly poison to his friend in order to make away with him. Woe to the double-tongued monk because he is a disciple of Satan. . . .

"The spirit will never acquire science, will never have

joy, will never be judged worthy to contemplate the Holy Trinity unless it gives itself up to the work which follows the Purgative life. . . .

" The exercise of holy virtues purifies the hearts and enlightens the eyes of the spirit, but on condition that these virtues are practised gradually, each one at its due time. Let it be known that everything done at its time is profitable, and that everything done at an inopportune season is dangerous. It is good to make prostrations down to the ground, but it does not suit the infirm, the weak and old people to practise such exercises. Privation from everything is excellent and very profitable, but it is necessary that it should be guided by prudence. It is good to exercise oneself in virtues, but it is indispensable that we should follow in that the counsels of our holy fathers. Good habits are excellent, but only when accompanied by labours for the sake of God. Silence is good and very profitable, but its goodness increases when prayers are recited during its continuance without distraction. . . .

" No borders and no limits have been put for prayer ; likewise love has no measure and no weight. . . .

" Our holy fathers have told us on many occasions that a monk should not possess any money ; and I prescribe that it is really good for him to be deprived of everything, but it should be regulated according to the measure of his age, the weakness of his constitution, and the frequency of infirmities by which he is affected. . . .

" If a brother enters the cell of another brother, and utters words harsh to his heart and his ears, this brother should not let them lie down in his spirit, and let him not answer his brother by words likely to offend him ; but let him bear with him in the love of God. He may make an inclination before him and tell him with pain : ' Forgive me, father, I am unable to bear these words any more.' By this

means he will gain him without much hardship, and love will reign between them ; moreover, he will have shown him the truth of this monastic life, and he will have taught him with prudence in order that he also might have life in himself. . . ."

A third interest drawn from Gregory's works is Biblical. Our author, writing between Aphrahaṭ and Ephrem, must have a certain consideration when quoting the Scriptures. His accurate knowledge of the Bible is highly attested in the notice devoted to him in the *Book of Chastity*. A careful reading of his work will easily do full justice to Isho'denaḥ's statement. A critical *apparatus* on this subject has been written by Dr. Rendel Harris, and the reader interested in this kind of study will find in it, when it appears, all that is useful to know.

From this source, and from many others it becomes evident that the hypothesis of some modern scholars attributing the elaboration of the Syriac Pshitta of the New Testament to Rabbūla, bishop of Edessa (fifth century), has been greatly weakened. While a special study has been devoted to this important question, we may anticipate it by stating that we are unable to accept without serious modifications the theory that the New Testament Pshiṭta, as we have it to-day, has been prepared in its totality by, or under the auspices of, the above-mentioned Rabbūla, in spite of the very able critic who recently put forward this opinion.[1]

ALPHONSE MINGANA.

[1] We cannot conclude this article without inserting a remark which will perhaps interest a few specialists. In the British Museum there are some manuscripts of the kind of *Catenae Patrum* which contain extracts and quotations from the book on which we are writing. These manuscripts are those numbered DCCCXIX, 5 ; DCCCXXVI, 4 ; DCCCXXXIX, 3 ; DCCCLXXXIX, 6 ; DCCLII, 13 ; in Wright's catalogue.

LITERARY ILLUSTRATIONS OF PHILIPPIANS.

iv. 4. *Rejoice in the Lord alway : again I will say, rejoice.*

Izaak Walton prints a letter of George Herbert written to his mother when she was ill, which closes with these words : " To conclude, let me commend only one place more to you : Philipp. iv. 4. St. Paul saith there, ' Rejoice in the Lord always : and again I say, rejoice.' He doubles it to take away the scruple of those that might say, What, shall we rejoice in afflictions ? Yes, I say again, rejoice ; so that it is not left to us to rejoice, or not to rejoice ; but, whatever befalls us, we must always, at all times, rejoice in the Lord, who taketh care for us. And it follows in the next verses : ' Let your moderation appear to all men : the Lord is at hand : Be careful for nothing.' What can be said more comfortably ? Trouble not yourselves ; God is at hand, to deliver us from all, or in all."

" Never begin to look darkly at a subject, without checking yourself and saying, ' Is there not a bright side to this ? Has not God promised the bright side to me ? Is not my happiness in my own power ? Do I not know that I am ruining my mind and endangering the happiness of those I love—by looking at the dark side ? ' Make this your habit."—From an early letter of CHARLES KINGSLEY.

" The heart of God towards every man is such that, if the man knew it, he could not but rejoice in it ; for how else could it be life to him to know God ? What, then, is to make one rejoice in God ? A sight of God's heart as loving me, a knowledge of God's goodwill concerning me ? And how am I to get this sight and this knowledge ? Jesus Christ hath come forth from the bosom of the Father to show us the heart of God."—THOMAS ERSKINE of Linlathen (letter to M. Gaussen).

iv. 6–7. *Be careful for nothing : but in everything by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your requests be made known unto God. And the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds through Christ Jesus.*

"God teaches us by St. Paul to be (1) 'careful for nothing'; (2) to 'make our requests known to God in everything'; but he adds (3) 'with thanksgiving'; and then he promises (4) 'and the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, *shall* keep your hearts and minds.' St. Paul does not say it as a wish for them. It is an absolute promise. Do the one and God will do the other. All who have tried it have found it so. So many forget the 'with thanksgiving.' Take God at His word, and you will find it so."—PUSEY, *Spiritual Letters*, p. 13.

The peace of God which passeth all understanding.

"The consciousness
Of Whom they are, habitually infused
Through every image and through every thought,
And all affections by communion raised
From earth to heaven, from human to divine. . .
Hence, amid ills that vex and wrongs that crush
Our hearts—if here the words of Holy Writ
May with fit reverence be applied—that peace
Which passeth understanding, that repose
In moral judgments which from this pure source
Must come, or will by man be sought in vain."
—WORDSWORTH, *The Prelude* (Conclusion).

In a letter (1874) to his wife upon Schumann, Sidney Lanier writes: "His sympathies were not *big* enough, he did not go through the awful struggle of genius, and lash and storm and beat about until his soul was grown large enough to embrace the whole of life and the all of things,

that is, large enough to appreciate (if even without understanding) the magnificent designs of God, and tall enough to stand in the trough of the awful cross-waves of circumstance and look over their heights along the whole sea of God's manifold acts, and deep enough to admit the peace that passeth understanding."

"The peace of God, which passes all understanding, which baffles analysis, which has an infinitude of depth about it. As you cannot understand remote stars, nor the overhanging vault which you cannot at all explore, but can only feel as you feel your life, so you cannot touch this peace of God with your understanding. It lies round you like an atmosphere. It dwells in you like a fragrance."—

JAMES SMETHAM, *Letters*, p. 81.

iv. 8. *Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things.*

"What a history that is in the Thomas à Kempis book! The scheme of that book carried out would make the world the most wretched, useless, dreary, doting place of sojourn —there would be no manhood, no love, no tender tie of mother and child, no use of intellect, no trade or science, a set of selfish beings crawling about avoiding one another and howling a perpetual *miserere*."—THACKERAY (letter to Mr. and Mrs. Brookfield).

"'Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are nobly serious, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are of good report'—that is the history of Turgot's administration."—MATTHEW ARNOLD, "Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist."

"We plead guilty to an inveterate and, it may be, not

altogether rational antipathy to Mr. Maclise's pictures. As vinegar to the teeth, as smoke to the eyes, or as the setting of a saw to the ears, so are any productions of his pencil we have met with to our æsthetic senses. We get no pleasure from them except that of hearty anger and strong contrast. Their hot, garish colour—the chalky dry skin of his women—the grinning leathern faces of his men—and the entire absence of toning—are as offensive to our eyesight as the heartlessness, the grimace, the want of all naturalness in expression and feeling, in his human beings, are to our moral taste. . . . Mr. Maclise may find a list of subjects more grateful to the moral sense, more for his own good and that of his spectators, and certainly not less fitted to bring into full play all the best powers of his mind, and all the craft of his hand, in Philippians iv. 8."—Dr. John Brown in *Horae Subsecivae* ("Notes on Art").

> "To have to do with nothing but the true,
> The good, the eternal—and these, not alone
> In the main current of the general life,
> But small experiences of every day,
> Concerns of the particular hearth and home;
> To learn not only by a comet's rush
> But a rose's birth—not by the grandeur, God—
> But the comfort, Christ."
>
> —Browning, "Ring and the Book" (vi.).

In his autobiography Benjamin Franklin describes the disappointment with which he listened for five successive Sundays to the Presbyterian minister in Philadelphia, the aim of whose sermons seemed "to be rather to make us good Presbyterians than good citizens. At length he took for his text that verse of the fourth chapter to the Philippians, 'Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely, or of good report, if there be any

virtue or any praise, think on these things.' And I imagined, on such a text, we could not miss of having some morality. But he confined himself to five points only, as meant by the apostle: 1. Keeping holy the Sabbath day. 2. Being diligent in reading the holy Scriptures. 3. Attending duly the public worship. 4. Partaking of the Sacrament. 5. Paying a due respect to God's ministers. These might be all good things; but, as they were not the kind of good things that I expected from that text, I despaired of ever meeting with them from any other, was disgusted, and attended his preaching no more."

Think on these things.

In human life, said Matthew Arnold, "to see true and to verify is not difficult; the difficult thing is to care and to attend."

iv. 9. *These things do.*

"Disbelief in Christianity is not so much to be dreaded as its acceptance with a complete denial of it in society and politics."—MARK RUTHERFORD.

iv. 11. *I have learned, in whatsoever state I am, therein to be content.*

"Many things to-day have taught me lessons of wisdom. I have seen the hawthorns covering themselves with blossom, and the whole valley springing up afresh under the breath of the spring. I have been the spectator of faults of conduct on the part of old men who will not grow old, and whose heart is in rebellion against the natural law. I have watched the working of marriage in its frivolous and commonplace forms, and listened to trivial preaching. I have been a witness of griefs without hope, and of loneliness that claimed one's pity. I have listened to pleasantries on the subject of madness, and to the merry songs of the birds. And everything had the same message for me: Place yourself once

more in harmony with the universal law; accept the will of God; make a religious use of life; work while it is yet day; be at once serious and cheerful; know how to repeat with the apostle, 'I have learned in whatsoever state I am therewith to be content.'"—AMIEL.

"Another voice I heard: 'For I have learned in whatsoever state I am therewith to be content; I know both how to abound and to suffer need; I can do all things through Him that strengtheneth me.' There is a soldier of the heavenly camp, not dust as we are! (But remember that we are dust, O Lord, and that Thou hast made man of dust, who was lost and is found.) Nor could even he do this in his own strength—for he was of the same dust—he whom I loved so, for speaking thus by Thine inspiration, 'I can do all things,' he said, 'through Him that strengtheneth me.' Strengthen me that I may be able for it; grant what Thou commandest and command what Thou wilt."—AUGUSTINE, *Confessions* (x. 31).

"It is not necessary for me to '*learn* to be content.' I have been imbued with that lesson without effort. Life presents to me, as yet, her more cheering aspects."—CHANNING (in a letter).

iv. 22. *All the saints salute you, especially they that are of Cæsar's household.*

"Court-virtues bear, like gems, the highest rate,
Born where Heav'ns influence scarce can penetrate."
—POPE, *Moral Essays*, i. 141–142.

"What though he summon me
Back to his palace,
I cannot fall
To the level of princes."
—CHOU YOUAN (fourth century B.C.) in *A Lute of Jade*.

JAMES MOFFATT.

INTERPRETATIONS OF JEWISH SACRIFICE.

JEWISH sacrificial customs raise many questions: where, how and why did the Jews offer sacrifice? Where and how they sacrificed are questions of practice or fact: why they sacrificed is a question of theory. The questions of practice are mostly modern questions which scarcely could, and actually did not, present themselves as problems needing solution so long as Jewish sacrifice was still a living system. The one question of practice that alone, as far as we know, ever assumed importance, was the question, Where? In Jerusalem or in Samaria? But this was a question between two different communities, and no such question had any place within either community. To the Jew it was certain that on Mount Sion men ought to worship God, to the Samaritan that he should do so on Mount Gerizim. As to the manner of sacrifice questions arose at most in reference to insignificant details; and to Jew and Samaritan alike the "how" of sacrifice was a matter of well-established tradition.

But these questions, which to the Jews themselves, if they had ever consciously raised them, would have seemed so simple, have become burning questions among modern students of Scripture. Did the Jews, let us say, in the time of our Lord, really sacrifice where and as their ancestors had always done? Had it, for example, always held good that in Jerusalem only men ought to sacrifice? Or, had the practice of the ancestors of these later Jews once been such that the particular form of the notorious dispute

between Jerusalem and Gerizim could never have arisen between even the most loyal and pious of the earlier inhabitants of Jerusalem and Samaria respectively? This and other such questions are questions of fact which the study of history has forced to the front. And they coalesce into this single fundamental question: Had the institution of sacrifice among the Hebrews between the time of Moses and the destruction of the temple in 70 A.D. a history, or had it not? Did it undergo radical changes, or did it not? If it did undergo changes, when and why did these changes occur?

The answer, which with growing unanimity modern scholars have given to this question, is that the institution had a history, that during the period named it underwent certain radical changes, and that one result of these changes is that the question "Where?" cannot now receive a single and simple answer, since the answer which would be true for part of the period would be false for another part of it. In the latter part of the period the loyal Jew knew no other place of sacrifice than Jerusalem, but his ancestors who were equally loyal had known and used many places for sacrifice, including the spot which the later Jew fiercely scorned and his Samaritan contemporary devotedly loved.

That sacrificial worship was contralised in Jerusalem in and from the seventh century B.C. is one of the broadest facts in the history of the Jewish institution; and also one of the clearest in spite of a certain recrudescence or continuance of attempts to explain it away or to obscure it. But naturally enough many of the questions of fact or practice still remain far from clear owing to the relative meagreness of historical records. For example, as far back as we can trace the practice of sacrifice, we find the distinction between the burnt or whole-offering, the עולה or כליל, which was

wholly consumed on the altar, and the זבח or peace-offering, as our English version commonly calls it, of which particular portions only were burnt on the altar, while the rest was consumed at a sacrificial meal by the person who offered it and by his friends. But are the sin-offering (חטאת) and the guilt-offering (אשם), which play so large a part in the Priestly Code but so small and doubtful a part in the early literature, coeval with these two? If not, are we to regard them as differentiations that developed within the broad class of burnt-offerings? And if so, when did the differentiation take place? *How* ancient are the Jewish sin-offerings and guilt-offerings? To these questions answers have been attempted, but no one would maintain that the answers are so precise, or so well-grounded, as the answer to the question, Where? Those who are agreed that sacrifice, which had previously been permitted in many places, was from the seventh century onward confined to Jerusalem differ as to the degree of probability with which it can be asserted that sin-offering and guilt-offering formed no part of ancient Hebrew varieties of sacrifice, or as to the approximate date at which they developed into distinct types.

It is to be taken as established, then, that Jewish sacrificial custom had a history, that it underwent certain radical changes, and that the character and age of some of these can be determined; but at the same time much remains uncertain and undetermined. Thus, many problems which present themselves to the modern investigator in connexion even with the *practice* of Jewish sacrifice remain unsolved, or incompletely solved.

When we turn from the practice to the theory of sacrifice, from questions of where and how to the question of why, to questions of cause and questions of purpose, we are on ground that attracted ancient, as it has increasingly attracted modern, inquirers; and with some preliminary

survey of some representative answers given to this question the remainder of the present article will be concerned.

The theory of sacrifice is concerned with a general question and with a series of special questions. Why did the Jews, why do men offer sacrifices? That is the general question, though whether it is susceptible of a single answer is itself a question of no small importance. Why did the Jews sacrifice in such and such particular ways? Why did they employ this or that material, or scrupulously avoid this or that other material in their sacrifices? Why did they burn some of their sacrifices wholly, and others only partially? Why was the remainder of some sacrifices that were but partially burnt consumed exclusively by the priests, of others largely by the person who presented the sacrifice and by his friends? These are illustrations of the special questions.

I shall merely premise here, leaving the point for fuller discussion in the next article, that in the Old Testament itself we find two theories of Jewish sacrifice; one theory, if we may so term what is but tacit and is never expressed, regards Jewish sacrifice as immediately connected with sacrifice in pre-Jewish or pre-historic times; and of the reason for the general prevalence of sacrifice in all periods and among all peoples it has nothing to say. The other theory attributes Jewish—of non-Jewish sacrifice it has nothing to say—to direct commands of God given through Moses: the Jews sacrificed, just indeed as they maintained many other customs, because God commanded them so to do: that seemed a sufficient, and indeed a complete, answer to the "why" of sacrifice. This theory finds even more rigid formulation in some of the Palestinian Rabbis, of whom it may suffice to cite Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who lived in the latter half of the first century A.D.: his theory is given in the following story which occurs in *Pesikta di R. Kahana*,

40a :—"A certain pagan once said to Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, The rites (מלייא) you perform seem to be a kind of magic (כשפים). You bring a cow, kill it, burn it, pound it, and take the ashes, and when any of you is unclean by reason of contact with the dead you sprinkle him therewith two or three times and say to him, Thou art clean. Yoḥanan said to the pagan: Has an evil spirit (רוח תזזית) never entered into thee (lit. this man). He answered, No. But have you never, said Yoḥanan, seen any other man into whom an evil spirit had entered? Certainly, replied the pagan. And what is done in such a case? asked Yoḥanan. The pagan replied, They bring roots and fumigate him with them and pour water over him, and the spirit takes flight. Yoḥanan said, Should not thy ears hear what thine own lips speak? So *this* spirit is a spirit of uncleanness, as it is written, The (false) prophets and the spirit of uncleanness will I cause to pass away from thy land. The man rendered unclean by the dead is sprinkled with the water of uncleanness, and the spirit takes flight. After the pagan had gone away, his disciples said to Yoḥanan, You have refuted him with a straw, but what is your explanation to us (לנו מה אתה משיב). He said to them: By your life! Neither doth the dead render unclean, nor water clean: but the ritual (הוא) is a decree (גזרת) of the king of the king of kings; the Holy One, blessed be He, said, I have ordained an ordinance; I have decreed a decree: no man is allowed to transgress my decree; it is written (at the beginning of the law of the red cow in Num. xix.), This is the ordinance of the law; and that is sufficient reason for performing the ritual."

The earliest Jewish thinker and interpreter to discuss the "why" of sacrifice more elaborately is Philo. He too finds the reason for Jewish sacrifices in a divine command or series of commands; the actual ritual of sacrifice for

him, too, rests on the spoken ordinance or command of God.[1] But he also (1) goes behind the question of Jewish sacrifices to consider the fundamental causes of sacrifices among mankind in general; and (2) pursues his investigations into the specific reasons for the customs enjoined upon the Jews.

As to the first of these two points, Jewish sacrifices fall, according to Philo, into three great classes termed respectively the whole burnt-offering, the peace-offering, and the sin-offering.[2] And these three distinctions correspond, he says, to three primary purposes of sacrifice as they were conceived by primeval man: "For if one will investigate accurately the reasons (*τὰς αἰτίας*) for which it seemed good to the first man (*τοῖς πρώτοις ἀνθρώποις*) to have recourse to sacrifice alike for thanksgiving and entreaty (*ἐπὶ τὰς διὰ θυσιῶν εὐχαριστίας ὁμοῦ καὶ λιτὰς ἐλθεῖν*) he will find the chief reasons to be two in number: (1) (the desire to pay) honour to God, a reason which is, apart from any other, on its own account alone, so to speak, both necessary and honourable; and (2) the advantage which accrues to those who sacrifice: and this advantage is in turn twofold, consisting either of a participation in blessings (*ἀγαθῶν*), or a release from ills."[3] Philo then goes on to say that the Jewish law enjoins the burnt-offering as a means of honouring God without ulterior motive, the peace-offering as a means of acknowledging benefits received, and the sin-offering as a means of obtaining release from ills.

Homage, thanksgiving, propitiation—these three purposes of sacrifice in general are thus recognised by Philo as

[1] Ταῦτα *μὲν ἡ ρητὴ πρόσταξις περιέχει*: *De Spec. Leg.* i. 5, ed. Cohn, § 200 = M. 241. Cp. also: Ἃ *μὲν οὖν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν νομοθετεῖται κατὰ προστάξεις καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεις*: *ib.* i. 8, ed. Cohn, § 299 = M. 257.

[2] *τὸ μὲν ὁλόκαυτον καλεῖ, τὸ δὲ σωτήριον, τὸ δὲ περὶ ἁμαρτίας*: *ib.* i. 4, ed. Cohn, § 194.

[3] *Ib.* i. 4, Cohn, § 195.

primary; and in one or other or in some combination of these many subsequent thinkers have sought the origin of sacrifice, not merely as a Jewish, but as in antiquity an almost universal practice.

It will be sufficient simply to illustrate here by one or two examples how Philo deals with the reasons for the details of Jewish sacrifice. The fact that these details are matter of divine ordinance does not withdraw them from investigation; God commands, but it is legitimate to ask why He commands thus in particular. In speaking of the peace-offering, for example, Philo remarks: "I have often been in doubt why forsooth (τί δήποτε) the law selects as the ἀπαρχαὶ of animals slain for sacrifice (i.e., as the parts to be burnt on the altar), the lobe of the liver, the kidneys and the fat, and not rather the heart or the brain, though the dominant (element) resides in one or other of these two last-named parts. And not a few others who study the holy scriptures with the mind rather than (merely) with the eyes will, I suppose, seek an explanation of the same point: if, then, on inquiry they discover a more probable reason they will benefit us as well as themselves; if not, let them judge whether that which we have thought out is probable." [1] I will not here cite the rather elaborate explanation which he then proceeds to offer; but on account of its intrinsic interest in view of subsequent investigation, I will cite as an example of his method the reasons he gives for the command that the flesh of the peace-offering must be eaten on the first and second day only, nothing being allowed to remain for consumption on the third day. We find three reasons:—

(1) That meat rapidly putrefies, and that those who offer sacrifices should take care to see that their offerings do not suffer deterioration from lapse of time.

[1] *Ib.* i. 7, Cohn, §§ 217 f.

(2) That it is fitting that the sacrificial meat should be freely set before all who need it; "for the sacred victim (τὸ ἱερεῖον) is no longer the property of him who sacrifices it, but of him to whom it is sacrificed: and he, being beneficent and bounteous, makes the whole company of those who offer the sacrifice common of the altar and table companions one of another,[1] enjoining them at the same time, however, not to consider themselves as entertaining in their own homes; for they are (merely) stewards of a feast, not hosts, the host being he to whom the provision for the feast happens to belong, which (provision) it is not lawful (for those who sacrifice) to hide away, because they incline to niggardliness rather than to philanthropy."[2]

Philo is here trembling on the edge of that theory of sacrifice as communion which has played so large a part in modern investigations; but he does not actually, I think, regard communion *with God* as being mediated even by the special type of sacrifice with which alone he is here dealing.

(3) Yet a third reason is given: the two days correspond to the two parts in man, the soul and the body; on the first day with the eating of the sacrificial flesh was to be associated the remembrance of spiritual welfare, on the second day the remembrance of bodily welfare.

The third reason brings us to the final observation that needs to be made at this point on Philo's interpretation of sacrifice. He may trace back Jewish sacrifice to universal human feelings towards the divine, he may regard all its details as resting on the direct command of God, but at once the explanation and the justification of Jewish sacrificial customs lie for him in what they signify: they are symbols. The customs are enjoined in spoken commands;

[1] κοινωνὸν ἀπέφηνε τοῦ βωμοῦ καὶ ὁμοτράπεξον τὸ συμπόσιον τῶν τὴν θυσίαν ἐπιτελούντων.

[2] *Ib.* i 8, Cohn, § 221.

but the things commanded to be done signify more than the mere customs in themselves: the spoken commands are manifest symbols of what is unknown and unseen.[1] The altar flame is the symbol of thanksgiving,[2] and the custom which the law enjoins of keeping the altar-flame constantly burning signifies the constant need for gratitude for the constantly renewed and never-ending mercies of God. The commandment that sacrifices offered to God should be of perfect and flawless animals might seem sufficiently explained by its natural fitness: as a matter of fact, however, the real reason for it lies in its symbolic significance: it is not the victim, but the person who offers it whom God really desires to be flawless. He commands one thing, He desires by symbols to teach (*ἀναδιδάξαι διὰ συμβόλων*) another[3]; for as Philo puts it elsewhere, God regards not the victims as really constituting the sacrifice, but the mind and will of the person who sacrifices.[4]

It is not my present purpose even in outline to indicate, or discuss, the sacrificial ideas or theories of the New Testament; but there is one New Testament writing which must be briefly referred to. A theory of the Jewish sacrificial system clearly underlies the Epistle to the Hebrews, though the writer nowhere approaches even the degree of systematic attempt to explain the details of that system which we find in Philo. In common with Philo he finds whatever of value that system possessed for him not in the sacrificial customs themselves, but in what they signified. As Philo regards the actual command to offer flawless victims a matter relatively indifferent as compared with the need that the

[1] *Σύμβολα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ λεχθέντα φανερὰ ἀδήλων καὶ ἀφανῶν*; *ib.* i. 5, Cohn, § 200.

[2] *τὸ σύμβολον τῆς εὐχαριστίας*: *De Sacrificantibus*, c. 5, ed. Cohn, § 285 = M. 254. Cp. c. 7, Cohn, §§ 296–298.

[3] *De Spec. Leg.*, i. 2, ed. Cohn, § 167.

[4] *De Sacrificantibus*, c. 6, Cohn, § 290.

offerer should himself be morally flawless, so, but even more directly, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews challenges the reality of morally redemptive virtue in the sacrifices demanded by the law: it is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins (x. 4). The sacrifices, like the law of which they form a part, are to be explained, not by what they themselves achieve, which is little enough, but by what they prefigure; they are a shadow of the good things to come (x. 1). They cannot perfect them that present them, but by their obvious inability to do this they point forward to the one sacrifice which was yet to be offered, and, being offered, at once to explain and for ever after render unnecessary the sacrifices that had been offered.

Philo and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews agree, then, in finding a symbolic interpretation, and so far a justification or explanation, of the Jewish sacrificial system: but, whereas with Philo the symbolism is pre-eminently didactic, and the symbols suggest moral truths, with the author of Hebrews the symbolism is vaticinative, and the symbols are of things yet to come in this world, even if at the same time shadows of eternal realities that have always existed in the heavenly world.

The two points of view which have now been indicated largely dominated subsequent thinking and writing for many centuries. We may pass to examine some very different attempts to explain the why of sacrifice.

What neither Philo nor the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews succeeded in doing, and indeed scarcely attempted to do, was to shew why the particular details of sacrificial custom were peculiarly fitted to enforce the teaching supposed to be conveyed by them. On the other hand, it is obvious that Philo is relatively indifferent to the sacrifices in themselves: what is essential is the teaching they convey. Granted the

teaching could be ensured in some other way, the sacrifices might easily have dropped out of his religion altogether. What is essential is that men should approach God in a flawless state; granted this truth is held and realised, the need for the presentation of flawless animals ceases. All unwittingly, as we can see, Philo was by his symbolism preparing for the catastrophe to his nation which occurred a generation later, and which involved the actual cessation of sacrifice. Since what the sacrifices symbolised was the really essential thing, the remembrance of the system was for all practical purposes as effective as the actual continuance of it; for, at all events by the vast numbers of the Jews of the Dispersion, the symbols were very rarely seen, even while they continued to be set forth in Jerusalem. So, again, the Epistle to the Hebrews provided a rationale of a system that had already ceased to exist, and had thus, in fact, proved itself to be non-essential.

It was not a great step from this relative indifference to actual sacrifices to a more or less positive disregard for, not to say condemnation of, them. Such an attitude we find alike in some of the Christian Fathers and in some of the mediaeval Jewish scholars.[1] In the judgment of such writers, the Jewish sacrificial system was not a glorious gift of God, nor was it intended to shadow forth future things or to inculcate moral precepts. Moreover, it did not rest on any absolute command of God; it merely existed by the permission of God, and as a concession by Him to the weakness of His people; it was a remnant of idolatry which with some necessary modifications was suffered to continue for a season. Consequently, the fundamental reason of Jewish sacrifice was to be found, not in the mind of God, but in the mind or nature of man; the Jewish customs were closely

[1] A good collection of relevant passages is to be found in J. Spencer's *De Legibus Hebraeorum Ritualibus*, Lib. iii. cap. 1, sect. ii.

related to heathen sacrificial custom, and both were to be explained fundamentally in the same way. God having regard for human weakness, which clings to the practices to which it has been accustomed, allowed the customs to continue even among His chosen people, merely transferring the object toward which they were directed : sacrifice was no longer to be offered to idols, but to Himself.[1]

The position just indicated is the starting point of the first great modern discussion of the origin of sacrifice. John Spencer, in his dissertation on the reason and origin of sacrifice among the Jews, starts, indeed, with the assumption of a primitive revelation, but for the particular discussion that assumption is of little moment ; for he held that under the influence of Egypt the primitive revelation had passed almost as completely from the minds of the Hebrews as from those of the pagans. Hence his explanation of sacrifice : it was the purpose of God to lead the Hebrews back again to the home and to the religion of their ancestors,

[1] "On considering the divine acts, or the processes of Nature, we get an insight into the prudence and wisdom of God as displayed in the creation of animals, with the gradual development of the movements of their limbs and the relative positions of the latter, and we perceive also His wisdom and plan in the successive and gradual development of the whole condition of each individual. . . . Many precepts in the Law are the result of a similar course adopted by the supreme Being. It is, namely, impossible to go suddenly from one extreme to the other : it is therefore according to the nature of man impossible for him suddenly to discontinue everything to which he has been accustomed. Now God sent Moses to make [the Israelites] a kingdom of priests and a holy nation by means of the knowledge of God. But the custom which was in those days general among all men and the general mode in which the Israelites were brought up, consisted in sacrificing animals in those temples which contained images. . . . It was in accordance with the wisdom and plan of God, as displayed in the whole creation, that He did not command us to give up and to discontinue all these manners of service. For this reason God allowed these kinds of service to continue ; He transferred to His service that which had formerly served as a worship of created beings, and of things imaginary and unreal, and commanded us to serve Him in the same manner."—Maimonides, *Moreh Nebuchim* ("Guide of the Perplexed,"), part iii. ch. 32, Friedländer's Translation, ed. 2, pp. 322, 3.

but in both cases He found it necessary to do so not directly, but circuitously. The worst customs of the heathen God, indeed, at once forbade to His people under pain of death. Those, however, which were in themselves indifferent, but could not have been at once removed without giving great offence to the people, He took over into His own religion. He forbade His people, for example, to drink blood like the Gentiles for the purpose of establishing a connexion between themselves and demons; and, in order to get the blood safely disposed of, He provided that it should be poured out at the base of the altar.[1] Again, the Gentiles had offered at the altar almost all species of animals, and almost everything else that was of use to themselves. God concedes to His people that they shall continue to offer animals, but limits the animals that might be offered to the three kinds—oxen, sheep, and goats; the reasons given for the limitation are three in number—(1) That, as being most frequently offered by the Gentiles to their gods, it was more essential that God should vindicate His right to these particular species; (2) that the patriarchs had limited their sacrifices to these species; and (3) that, as domestic animals, they were always ready at hand for use.[2] Whether in assigning these reasons for the divine *concessions* to human weakness Spencer is happier than his predecessors in finding reasons for what were taken by them to be divine *commands* or prescriptions, may be left an open question. The two outstanding merits of Spencer's contribution are these: (1) that he carried the question of the "why" of Jewish custom back into the wider field of human custom whence, with or without modification, they were derived; and (2) that he detected the power of reaction of one religion against

[1] J. Spencer, *De Legibus Hebraeorum ritualibus*, Lib. i. cap. viii. sect. 1 (ed. Camb. 1727, vol. i. p. 145).

[2] *Ib.*, Lib. iii. cap. ii. sect. ii. (ed. Camb. 1727, vol. ii. p. 755 f.).

another, the most sacred rite of one religion becoming often the pre-eminently forbidden rite of another. To cite the words of the most distinguished and influential of modern students of the same subject: "Spencer's Latin work on the ritual laws of the Hebrews may justly be said to have laid the foundation of the science of Comparative Religion, and in its special subject, in spite of certain defects that it could hardly have avoided at the time when it was composed, still remains by far the most important book on the religious antiquities of the Hebrews." [1]

I pass to another work. In 1837 Bähr published the first, and in 1839 the second volume of his *Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus*. In spite of the title which might seem to indicate a simple return to the Philonean type of theories of sacrifice, Bähr does not neglect the study of rites corresponding to Hebrew rites in other religions; on the other hand, he explicitly lays down that an exceedingly important help for the understanding of the Mosaic cultus is to be found in the modern investigations into the religions of heathen antiquity (i. 7); and if Bähr's work had ceased to possess any other value, it might still serve as a useful compendium of earlier literature on the relation of Hebrew cultus to the cultus of other religions.

As a matter of fact, Bähr's comparative studies helped him greatly in the negative aim of his work, which was to get rid of the weight of the then prevalent typology: this aimed, as he puts it (i. 17), at discovering in all, even of the least, details of Hebrew cultus references to Jesus Christ incarnate, to His history, or to that of the community which He founded. Over against this aim, he sets his own, which is to shew how the sensuous ("der im Sinnlichen sich bewegende") Mosaic cultus is a figurative presentation, *not* immediately of the Christian religion or of Christian history,

[1] W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, p. vi.

but of the Mosaic religion, and, therefore, because the Mosaic religion contained within itself the kernel ("Keim") of the Christian religion, of certain basal truths of the Christian religion also.

In sum, then, Bähr claims three things: (1) that the cultus including the sacrificial system is symbolic; (2) that the religion thus symbolised contains the kernel or germ of the Christian religion; (3) that the cultus described in the Pentateuch is of one age, created by a single mind, imbued throughout with a *consistent* symbolism.

How do these several positions stand in the light of subsequent thought and investigation? It may be said briefly that while the third has been rendered untenable, the first two have been fundamentally strengthened.

Not many, if any, modern Christian theologians would allow that the older typology against which Bähr polemised possessed any further element of truth than that the Mosaic religion contained the germ or kernel of the Christian religion; on the other hand, the strong hold which, in the interval, the conception of a progressive Revelation has obtained greatly strengthens the positive side of Bähr's position, and few theologians would challenge the claim that the earlier religion did contain the germ of the Christian religion.

Another of Bähr's positions has been, if anything, strengthened by the study of anthropology and comparative religion. For, certainly, these studies have predisposed us to reject, no less vigorously than he (i. p. vi.), such examples of rationalistic explanations as that the only reason for the sacrificial use of incense was to keep off the flies that crowded over the sacrificial flesh. And they have still further justified his claim that the Hebrew religious rites would indeed be unique, if none of them had any symbolic significance. "Religious rites," says the distinguished anthropologist and author of

Primitive Culture, "fall into two divisions . . . in part they are expressive and symbolic performances, the dramatic utterance of religious thought, the gesture-language of theology." [1]

But unless Biblical scholarship during the past century has been on an altogether false track, Bähr's work was vitiated by his assumption of the Mosaic origin of the entire ritual system of the Jews and his attempt in consequence to find in that system in its entirety and in all its details symbols of the truths of the Mosaic religion. No doubt an exclusive regard for purely literary criticism might still admit a simple transference of Bähr's interpretation to a later age; he regarded Leviticus and the related parts of the Pentateuch as the work of Moses, and so described the unity of the cultus and the religion it symbolised as Mosaic. The demands of a merely literary criticism which finds in Leviticus the work of post-exilic Judaism might be satisfied by terming the unity of the cultus and the religion it symbolises post-exilic, and we might even seem to have in Ezekiel the single mind that gave symbolic expression to the truths of this later religion. But every close investigation of the facts leads to the conviction that, while the Priestly Code is post-exilic literature, the cultus which it describes is by no means in its entirety a product of the same age. And we may say, whatever the age of the cultus as a completed whole, details of it are more ancient. It follows that the *original* purpose of all the individual rites ought not to be sought in the religion of a single individual or of a single age, be that age Mosaic, or post-exilic, or any other.

On the other hand, the study of anthropology and of Comparative Religion has lent powerful support to a judgment of de Wette's, which Bähr (i. 21) criticised, and has proportionately weakened Bähr's own position. "Not

[1] E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*,[3] ii. 362.

everything," in the cultus, said de Wette, "is symbolic; much served merely for pomp and the support of the hierarchy: *much was merely traditional, and had lost its original significance.*" To which, may we not add, that much, in the course of Jewish history, assumed a significance which it had not originally possessed. I will once again cite Sir E. B. Tylor to shew the conclusions, or, to put it more neutrally, the point of view reached in the wider field of anthropology: "Some religious ceremonies are marvels of permanence, holding substantially the same form and meaning through age after age, and far beyond the range of historic record. On the other hand, the signification of ceremonies is not to be rashly decided on by mere inspection. In the long and varied course in which religion has adapted itself to new intellectual and moral conditions, one of the most marked processes has affected time-honoured religious customs, whose form has been faithfully and even servilely kept up while their nature has often undergone transformation. In the religions of the great nations, the natural difficulty of following these changes has been added to by the sacerdotal tendency to ignore and obliterate traces of the inevitable change of religion from age to age, and to convert into mysteries ancient rites whose real barbaric meaning is too far out of harmony with the spirit of a later time" (*Primitive Culture*[3], ii. 363).

The most fruitful study of Jewish sacrificial custom has in recent times moved along the lines of anthropological and comparative research; such study has traced, sometimes very speculatively, sometimes with greater probability, the Jewish rites back to ideas prevalent outside of the Jewish world and before the time of Moses; and the centre of interest in Jewish ritual has shifted, perhaps unduly shifted, from the ideas which the Jews attached to their rites to the ideas which in a pre-Jewish stage of human history gave them

birth. In some cases the two sets of ideas may be identical; in others they certainly are not; and where they are not identical it is no less important to determine, if we can, the later as well as the earlier idea. It is valuable to discover the etymology of a word; it is equally important to know its actual meaning. This may, at some later period in the history of the word, be something very different from the original meaning. And, similarly, investigation into the religious ideas out of which Hebrew rites sprang cannot take the place of investigation into the religious ideas, or the religious attitude, which maintained them in being. Both of these lines of investigation lead frequently into uncertain fields; each enjoys an advantage over the other, counterbalanced by a disadvantage. The inquiry into the original meaning of the rites is assisted by comparative study, but lacks the light cast by contemporary written documents; the inquiry into the meaning of, or the attitude adopted towards, the rites in later times derives less benefit from comparative study, but can be followed in the light of contemporary documents, which reveal the dominant ideas of their age. It is true that these documents actually say far less than could be wished on the rationale of sacrifice; but where we fail to obtain direct light, we may yet surely, in the light of the general character of the religion as revealed in those documents, lay down this principle: the more barbaric, or more savage, the creative idea can be shewn to be, the less probable is it that that same idea was the cause of the persistence of the rite in Judaism, which, as a religion, is far removed from the barbaric and the savage; given an idea out of harmony with the later Jewish religion as the cause of the *origin* of a rite, we must seek the cause of the *maintenance* of the rite either in new ideas read into the rite, or in that conservative attitude, so characteristic of religion, which finds in mere antiquity and long tradition a reason for main-

taining what once has been, even though its meaning may have been lost.[1]

It is a fact that the Priestly Code supplies singularly little direct explanation either of sacrifice in general or of the many detailed rites which it prescribes. But this by no means necessarily implies that to the author, or authors, of the Code the system and its parts were entirely meaningless. On the other hand, even if we went to the opposite extreme, and argued that nothing was merely traditional, but that everything must have had a meaning at the time when the Code was written, it is certain that such meanings did not in all cases maintain themselves as generally understood and generally accepted interpretations. It is sufficient to recall the passage which has been already cited from Philo; to the authors of the Priestly Code the selection in particular of the lobe of the liver, the kidneys and the fat for burning on the altar may have symbolised some living religious truth; but, even if so, it had ceased to possess this significance for the contemporaries of Philo; for them it had become meaningless; its significance had ceased to be a matter of tradition; it had become a matter of speculation. Philo was ready to offer a tentative interpretation, but, at the same time that he offers it, he invites others to offer a better, if they can.

The ideas that gave birth to Hebrew sacrifice, the ideas which were associated with sacrifice by the community for whom the Priestly Code was framed, the ideas which Philo attached to it were all different; and of the three sets of ideas the last only were ever expounded; the others are to be reached, if reached at all, only by inference. Yet it is only in proportion as we are able to infer the earlier sets of ideas, and clearly to distinguish them from one another and from the later and better known speculations, that we

[1] Cp. *The International Critical Commentary on Numbers*, pp. 47 f.

can adequately appreciate the place of sacrifice in Hebrew religion, or safely estimate and clearly understand the influence that alike the practice and the theory of Jewish sacrifice have exercised over Christian thought.

G. Buchanan Gray.

THE PREACHING OF JESUS AND THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST.

II

By the Gospel we may mean one of several things.

It may mean what Jesus said, the express message of Jesus as the greatest of the prophets. His work is then declaratory—with passion, compassion, conviction, and effect, but still declaratory or exhibitory. He could be thus the exemplary preacher, first in power, model in meekness, and standard in matter for all Christian time. The gnomic and pictorial style would then be our aim. And all testimony of Him, even the apostolic, we must trim to the type of such relics of His discourse as have reached us, or to such a way of handling life. The didactic parts of the Gospels would become the doctrinal test of the Epistles, and the face value of Christ's express witness to Himself the sole ground and measure of our faith in Him. And we have the situation created for the New Testament by Harnack's statement that Jesus did not preach Himself at all, but only the Father and the Kingdom. He is then the martyr of His teaching, and not the propitiation of His gospel.

If Harnack's position were true it would only indicate anew the occasional and gradual character of Christ's teaching. Throughout He preached the Father as only the Son could, the Kingdom as only the King could, the

prophetic word as only the creating Word could. But, for this function, and for the full revelation of either Father, or Kingdom, or Word, something more than a manner of teaching was required, as the event showed. He spoke during His life with a manner of authority that flowed from His person; but when He spoke to Paul, or John, and inspired them after His death, it was much more than manner. His teaching then had His finished work behind it, and all we mean by the Holy Ghost. The difficulty we have to face, if Christ was mainly a teacher, or even but a personal influence, is this—that, like prophetism altogether, He was a failure with those who came under Him at first hand. His personal influence through His doctrine averted neither His unpopularity, His desertion, nor His Cross. It did not prevent the people it was turned on from disowning Him, nor the disciples from leaving Him, nor the authorities from killing Him. Indeed it provoked all three. How then are we to expect another effect from it, taken alone, upon the world of posterity? It must become diluted by distance, and enfeebled accordingly. It reaches the world only as a record, and an ancient one, always growing in antiquity and losing in historic directness. We are ever farther removed from the active personality of the teacher and such good effect as it did have. Its power must leak in transmission and lose by distance. But as a matter of fact that has not been the action of Christ in the world. His power has grown with distance—the power even of His teaching. How is this? It was never the slow saturation of the public by those precepts or doctrines that gave them their present place. For as precepts especially they are but very partially honoured even by the Church, and in some cases frankly ignored. Besides, they were not used by those apostles who founded the Church—being replaced by their own advice as circumstances suggested.

The triumph of Christ's doctrines, so far as it has gone, has not been a posthumous redress due to men's tardy awakening to the value of a neglected genius. For they were not, like the light of genius, flashes of fresh interpretation of life which experience gradually caught and verified, but they went in the face of the natural life, and mortified it, and crucified it. It was not reflection on Christ's teaching, and it was not the *desiderium tam cari capitis*, that restored the disciples to their spiritual loyalty, and raised it once and for all to apostolic faith.

What was it that produced the change? Some answers would remove the stress from the teaching, and place it upon the personality. In His cross He is then the protagonist of man's tragic fate, but not the propitiation of man's guilty soul. The change in the disciples was produced by a revisit, actual or believed, from His immortal and insuperable person. Ever since Schleiermacher the person of Christ has been placed in front of His teaching, the revelation in Himself has cast the true light upon all His words, and we have come to realise the autobiography in them. And no doubt that has been a great move in the right direction, and it was long overdue when it was made. And, as I have hinted, it supplies an expansion and corrective to Harnack's startling theme. But even if we take it so, if we recognise the effect of Christ's personal reappearance after death, is that sufficient explanation of the immense and permanent change in the apostles' faith and action? Was it the re-emergence of Christ's personality as invincible to death, was it the mere indomitable persistence of His vital principle, the quenchlessness of His Spirit that raised them to a point from which they never looked back? Did He not Himself deny the possibility that true faith should be produced by a *revenant*—to say nothing of forgiveness for cowardly treason? "If they believe not Moses and

the prophets, neither will they believe if one rose from the dead." Was the whole soul and world of the apostles changed, was the Church set up, by the rehabilitation of the Master after an interval of arrest caused by a premature and unfortunate death, which merely retarded His Messianic schemes and delayed the winning of the campaign by the loss of an early battle? Was the Church founded upon the resurrection merely as a resurrection? Did the Church rise upon the rising of an inextinguishable personality, which there emerged from the grave as if it had been no more than a tunnel or a retreat? Was it His mere experience and survival of death, was it an enlarged pertinacity of person, that turned the historic Jesus into the Church's Christ? Did He just emerge faithful and purified, in His grand degree, from the fire we must all pass through? Had He gone there just "to prove His Soul"? Was that the impression? Or did He not rather return from the fire, not as one who had only passed through it, but as one who had extinguished the flames—their more than conqueror, their destroyer? Did he not stand on the earth which He revisited with the old moral world under His feet, with a new moral world achieved in the crisis of all His soul, and realised in His unearthly power, reign, and joy? Did He not now face mankind full of the Eternity He had won for them, the spiritual stability that nothing possible could now overthrow, and the moral, the holy power that nothing could at last withstand?

Surely the crucial effect of the Resurrection was its evidence, not of an unimpaired spiritual vitality, not of the passing of an eclipse, but of an objective achievement for human destiny *in Christ's death*, a final business done with the God Who engrossed Him in His death, the knot of a whole world loosed, the world-foe vanquished for ever, the final and absolute conquest won, the everlasting Salvation brought

in. The Cross was the work that Christ did, the Resurrection was the work that God, well pleased for ever, did upon Him in its wake. God raised Him up when He had overcome the world for good and all. The Resurrection was not so much the finished work, but God's seal upon it. Historically it may have been the Resurrection that founded the Church, but it was the Cross that won the Resurrection by founding the New Covenant of the Gospel.

Such at least is the burthen of New Testament testimony. The Resurrection there is not merely the survival of Christ's personality (far less its mere reanimation); but it is the due divine seal upon a crucial moral achievement and a victory once for all, which drew upon the whole spiritual resources of that unique personality in an act correspondingly great and final, and which gave it not only complete expression, but practical effect as decisive for the whole spiritual world of man's relations with God. As in the Cross we have Christ's great and final act upon God, so in the Resurrection we have God's great and final act on Christ. I would press the great difference between the Cross as the affecting expression in martyrdom of Christ's prophetic personality and the Cross as the purposed and final achievement of that world-person, as the practical effect it took for God and man. Or, taking the Cross as the completion of Christ's personality, I would distinguish between such completion, taken aesthetically, as the finest spectacle of self-realisation by sacrifice to man's tragic fate, and taken ethically, as the final moral act for man's conscience and history before God. The one idea is artistic, like so much of our modern religion, the other is dynamic and evangelical. The one is a moral marvel, the other a new creation. We have had much to say in the name of religion about developing to flower and fruit all that it is in us to be, realising ourselves, rounding the sphere of our personality, achieving

our soul, being true to ourselves, and so forth. That is all very well as a youthful and idealist way of beginning. But few have set to work on this seriously without finding out that we have little power in our personality, even when it is reinforced, to be anything to God's purpose, and that such a programme of life may be in the end more effective for the making of prigs than personalities. It is morally impossible that a real personality should be developed on any such self-centred lines, or made spherical or symmetrical by rotating on its own axis. To shrink your personality work at it; take yourself with absurd seriousness; sacrifice everything to self-realisation, self-expression. Do this and you will have produced the prig of culture, who is in some ways worse than the prig of piety. So also if you would lose holiness, work at it. Do everything, not because it is God's will, but because you have taken up sanctity as a profession—shall I say an ambition? Be more concerned to realise your own holiness than to understand God's. Study your soul freshly and your Bible conventionally. Cherish a warm piety and a poor creed. But if you really would save your soul, lose it. Seek truth first, and effect thereby. Beware of ethical self-seeking. To develop your personality forget it. Devote yourself not to it but to some real problem and work, some task which you will probably find to your hand. The great personalities have not laboured to express or realise themselves, but to do some real service to the world, and a service they did not pick and choose but found laid upon them. Their best work was "occasional"—i.e., in the way of concrete duty. They did not live for set speeches but for business affairs. They found their personality, their soul, in the work given them to do; given them because of that soul, indeed, but never effected by petting it. They found their personality by losing it, and came to themselves

by erasing themselves. Their ideal was not, "I must become this or that" or "I must produce my impression, and leave my mark," but "I must will, I must do, this or that obedience." To effect something is the way to become something.

So Christ's purpose, whether in His preaching or in His Cross, was not primarily to stamp His whole personality on the world in one careful, concentrated, and indelible expression of it, but to finish a work God gave Him to do; than which there is nothing more impressive for men. His purpose was, with all the might of His personality, to do a certain thing with God for the world. He was at the last preoccupied with God, which is the final way to command man. His engrossing work was not to leave an impression on the public; and His Gospel in the apostles was more than their witness to an impression on their experience. His work's total effect on the moral universe was something far greater than the impression he made even on the apostles. His object was to do something with God for the world, and only in that way to act on it. His preaching was not impressionist, it was evangelical, seeking to adjust the conscience more than to delight or even fortify the soul. His death effected something intimate for God and critical for the conscience with God, something which only *His* personality could do. But it could never do it by striving to achieve itself and stamp itself on time, but only by devoting itself utterly to the holy and redemptive Will of God for the hallowing of it, for its satisfaction. True, He was "priest for Himself." He maintained His own personal life with God in the offering of Himself for us. But He was not "priest of Himself," like the idol of a coterie. There is no sign at the end that Christ was either guided or sustained by thinking of the impression His death would make on the world, but only by concentrating on His offer-

ing of Himself to God. His way was the way of regeneration, not of religious impressionism. He did not rise above the fear of death by visions of the grand result of His work to men. He had no such visions. Had He had them there could have been no anguish for joy that man was reborn into the world. All would have been submerged in glory. He overcame by His perfect committal to the will of God amid the collapse of insight into its reason, by His perfect confession, amid actual sinful conditions, of the holiness of God, by His pleasing it, satisfying it, sanctifying it. Our salvation was built in an eclipse and rigged with curses dark; in losing the Father's face (but not the Father), He became a curse for us—in the true incarnation He became sin for us. His death was certainly service to man, but for Him it was an offering to God. It went round to man that way. It was with God alone He had then to do. His saving act was in yielding to the divine "must" more than to the human need. Nor can we say, even if we take His words alone, that the divine "must" arose simply out of God's merciful perception of human need; for Christ's obedience was, in His own mind, to a holy God and not simply a pitiful, it was to hallow His name, and not simply give His blessing. We need kindness oftener, but we need grace more. In His death He stood for the hallowing of God's name as He had stood all along, whether in His rebukes of the Pharisees or in the cleansing of the Temple. When He stood as prophet on the side of God against Judaism He was but doing, in one phase of it, what He did compendiously and essentially in His priestly death. He stood on God's side against men, even while He stood for them. He died before God and not before men. And it was God's judgment that slew Him more even than man's. He was directly serving God rather than man; and about the reaction on Himself and His sanctity he did not think

at all. If God in Christ was reconciling the world, Christ in God was reconciling God in a sense most real, however carefully we guard the phrase. He was not indeed procuring Grace, nor changing anger to love; but He was altering the relation *on both sides* (as personal relation must always be altered) by presenting the consummate oblation of that holy obedience wherein the Holy Father was always pleased, wherein, finding Himself, the Father always found a full complacency and complete satisfaction. "This is My beloved Son in whom I am well pleased." That contains the principle of the Christian doctrine of satisfaction, so lost in many forensic theologies. Would there be noticeable objection to the doctrine of satisfaction if it meant the joy and fulness in which one soul of infinitely holy love finds itself so perfectly and eternally in another that all men at last followed the spell?

Such is the apostolic gospel, the dominant note, the organising note, in the New Testament creed, in the *total* teaching of Christ. It was for the sake of this Gospel of God that the gospel of the apostles was preached, and the gospels themselves were written. We get the secret of the Evangelists in the writings of Paul that preceded them—to say nothing of Peter. There we find the Gospel of the Church which the gospels arose to edify and sustain. There we find the Gospel whose product the gospels were, the Gospel whose preaching made the Church that required the gospels for its use. These were not unchosen scraps of memorabilia, stray memoirs filed, flyleaves of episode or anecdote in the life of a spiritual hero. They crystallise on a message and a faith, as the great prominence of the passion shows, no less than the drift towards it. The apostles were not mere chroniclers. They were charged with a message rather than a memoir. And the evangelists, whoever they were, were apostles in function if not in

name. They had apostles behind them. And the message the apostles preached was not the Gospel Christ preached so much as the Gospel He was, and the Gospel He did when His preaching failed and ceased. The Gospel that made the Church was less what was said by Jesus than what was said about Him and about the Gospel He *did*. The gospel the apostles spoke was the fruit and echo of the Gospel He achieved. It was uttered, too, by men with whom His earthly teaching did not succeed, who had to be shocked into their spiritual senses once for all by the stroke of His death and the sting of His resurrection. And the front of the message was that He was delivered for our sins, in the deep sense in which the vision of the exilian prophet declared the Saviour must be. This made the preaching of the apostles differ from that of Jesus Himself. Preaching up to the Cross is one thing, and some are but at that disciple stage. Preaching down from it is another, and that is the work of an apostle. The Saviour belongs to neither category. He is not the preacher but the thing preached, the Gospel itself. The Cross, as the real act now complete at the moral centre of the spiritual world, made an essential difference in the historic situation of the soil, and in what was to be said to it. The apostles preached under a historic something which Christ only preached towards, which He preached with much reserve, almost reluctance, as strong men speak of their greatest sorrow or their greatest deed. The apostles had nothing else to manifest but what He often hid, and sometimes shunned. Even they were more solemn and less voluble about it than we are. They rejoiced in nothing but what had been His holy dread. And thus it can be more wrong than right to speak of Jesus as the model preacher, or to test the Gospel wholly by His express words to Israel, or even to His disciples.

Clearly I have been using the word Gospel at intervals

in two senses, and the ambiguity may easily create confusion. I have spoken of it as the apostolic message, and I have spoken of it as the redeeming act; now as the apostles' preaching about Christ, and now as God's saving action in Christ. The latter, of course, is the ultimate sense. The apostolic preaching was but man's gospel of God's. Man's gospel in word was the reverberation of God's Gospel in deed. It was the returning wave on earth's waters caused by the crisis on the eternal shore. It was God's Work returning on itself in a Word which it created, a Word which was also a work, as being a function of His Work. The one acted by inspiration, the other by creation. The one was inspired by what the other did. It is this greater and final sense of the word Gospel that restores it in its full sense to Jesus after all. What we have in the life of Jesus is not a witness of God, nor a creature of God, but the incarnate act of God. We have the very work of God's grace in the activity of Christ, a God of grace at work, and no mere testimony of it. We have God reconciling, not a reconciliation redolent of God. It is not the mere message of redemption, even from God's own throne, nor its echo in an apostle, nor the impression it made on the Church. Certainly it is not a theory of the message or of the deed; which Christ never uttered, nor even had. When we reach the reality it is the achievement of God Himself in the moral universe, and of God present not simply with Christ but in Him, not breathing in His personality, nor ministering to His Spirit, but living and acting in it, God living, dying, and redeeming in His Son. It is the word of Him whose Word is at once a person and a deed coextensive with that person. It is the revelation to us that the invitation is the Redemption itself, that the Cross is itself the call, that the call is the act, that the act is the new creation and not a preliminary of it, it-

self the saving of the world and not a mere postulate of it. Christ was the apostle and high priest of our calling in the sense that in Him God was His own apostle and preached in Christ's atoning act. God in Christ's Cross was His own priest. As Ritschl puts the offices, Christ as prophet and priest was so supreme, perfect, and final that He was also King, and embodied in His Redemption the holy Sovereignty of God. "Christ is present in the Sacrament not simply as person but as crucified and broken for our sins. Considered in the excellency of His person, He might be an object for the faith of angels; but as crucified He is fitted for sinners. And He becomes not an object of love for the excellency of His person, but of faith and confidence as a means and ordinance for the salvation of sinners." So Goodwin.

The Gospel, then, which is the power and standard behind every testimony of it, the Gospel as the apostles learned it from the whole Christ, is God's act of grace in Christ crucified (an act appreciable only by a responsive act of ours called faith) in which He set upon a new ground (which yet was eternal and from the beginning) not only man's whole relation to Himself, but also His own relation to man. This change is not a new affection in God; for the grace and mercy at the source of it are inseparable from His eternal changeless holiness, and even the Cross could not procure it. But it is a new relation and treatment on both sides; for you cannot treat your son in his self-alienation as you could treat him in his filial confidence, though you loved him no less. But in Christ man stands before a gracious God, and stands in alienation no more.

The redeeming and atoning act of God filled the whole personality of Christ, and covered His whole life. It was the principle of it, whatever the form it took in His consciousness or his situation for the moment. But in the act of the

Cross it had its consummate action, which gave value to all the rest, both prospectively and retrospectively. The purpose of that act was to reveal the holy love of God in the only way it could be revealed to sinful and hostile men—as in deadly, final, active, victorious collision with active sin, within one collective personality. This is to say, the Revelation of the Holy to us could only be Redemption. The eye to see it had to be created in us. Holiness could be revealed to sin only by an act of Redemption, by a Redemption whose principle consisted in that which active holiness always is as it is established—the reaction on sin, the judgment of sin and its destruction. For judgment was He come into the world. But, according to what has been said, it was a judgment whose condemnation meant sin's execution and destruction as the negative side of what sets up the holy reign. In Christ's Cross sin was executed in that God's holiness was established for ever.

But one of the cardinal Christian errors of the time is that the idea of judgment has almost disappeared from the current conception either of sin, sanctity, or gospel, in a way that it never did from even the preaching of Jesus. The gospel has ceased in many quarters to be an ethical, and therefore a social, Gospel at all on God's side. It has become on that side only sympathetic; and the ethic appears only in the human and individual results—consequently even there with quite inadequate power. We were told, and truly, that the forensic theories of the Cross were not ethical enough—though they were a great ethical advance on theories which preceded them about tricking or trading with the devil, or satisfying feudal honour. And we were told, with less truth, that the one ethical reform in interpreting our relations with God was to transfer grace from the courts to the family, from the imperial to the domestic, to discard every legal suggestion, and read every-

thing in the light of the Fatherhood, and mostly the Fatherhood to the single soul. This alone (it was said) was the burden of Christ's message. But in practice it came to mean substituting for the forensic idea a conception which was only affectional and not ethical, individual and not collective as the Redemption was. It was overlooked, in the reaction from judicial categories, that the Father of Christ is the Holy Father and the universal, that, while the forms of the jurist may pass, the living holiness is the one eternal and infrangible thing in the universe, with an inextinguishable claim, and a claim on the conscience of the whole race and its history. We cannot ethicise the relation to God till fatherhood itself is ethicised, and the name hallowed, the holiness met, on the absolute scale. For you do not introduce the moral element by merely introducing the paternal. You must take the holiness at least as seriously as the affection, and the world as seriously as the individual, if you are to do justice to the Fatherhood of God on the scale of affairs. And you cannot take in earnest this holiness without giving judgment, and a public judgment, its own place in the gospel act of the Cross. If we would but see that the real incarnation was not in Christ's being made flesh for us, but in His being made sin for us! I hope it is not too much to say that no one who has the due response to that truth in his religious experience can fail to discern its action in the Jesus of the gospels. And it may be among the moral fruits of the present calamity of war, and such a war, that the idea of collective judgment, of which Christ had so much to say, should return to a place nearer the centre of our religion, and to a vital function, indeed, in the Cross of our worship.

This place has not been given to judgment in the pseudo-liberal version of Christianity. And the omission not only places it in collision with the New Testament. It is a moral

defect at its core, which makes it often as ineffective for the world of adult or devilish sin, for spiritual wickedness in high places of the soul, as it is engaging for the young and the kind. The Cross, which is the source and centre, the principle and foundation, of the whole moral universe, has become but the apotheosis of noble self-sacrifice, the crisis of the tragedy in human fate, and the culmination of the native spirituality of man. It ceases to be the hallowing even in man's guilt of the holy love of God, the origin and focus of the Christian conscience and the creator of Christian ethic. It loses its prime reference to the holiness of God, and ceases thus to be chiefly an adjustment with the whole moral soul of things. It becomes æsthetic rather than moral, the centre of religious sentiment rather than of the world-conscience. Public and social morals especially are sentimentalised in a non-moral way, which is fruitful in due course of the immoral. The moral note of authority is lost, however a seemly and humane piety may gain. We are taught to think much of what was suffered on the Cross for our admiration, or our relief, and little of the judgment that fell upon our sin there. Salvation is not a decisive thing done for the world once for all in the Cross, but it becomes identified with our repeated forgiveness. It becomes individual only, and even atomic. And so forgiveness itself, with nothing to hold it up in the way of holiness, of moral seriousness absolute and universal, sinks to be merely amnesty on a wide and ready scale. It becomes a mere "making it up" with God on the private scale. There are even more sickly levels. And we shall not be able to keep Christianity or our preaching above them, we shall not do justice to the element of judgment in the preaching of Jesus, unless we are taught by the New Testament to find in the death of Christ the judgment of God on the world on a scale far vaster and more solemn than a European

war; unless we, therefore, find our one redemption in the effect of that death on a holy God rather than on poor man, and upon our sin more even than on our sympathies.

To restore to the Cross this focal and creative moral place in some high and final form is the main correction which the Christ-taught Church, by a positive and ample theology, must make to a liberal religion trying to ignore theology. It is to make Christianity a religion of real redemption and not mere illumination, real regeneration and not mere reformation, a religion of conscience and not mere conduct or sentiment. The more we dwell on the relation between God and man as a moral one, the more inadequate does a gospel of mere fatherhood become, however extensive or intimate we may conceive it to be. We want a conception of love less quantitative and more qualitative, with more stress on the holiness of it than on its intensity or range, if we are to be led by the thought of God that ruled the word of Jesus. It is not breadth but depth that is now the need. The modern demand that we moralise God is a sound one. But the more we moralise God's dealings with man the more firmly we must start from His holiness and its reaction against sin in judgment. The holy is the foundation of all religion. And we must recognise an eternal and fundamental movement in a holy God to judgment—not primarily a demand for suffering or for punishment, but for judgment, for the assertion of holy love in dark, mortal, and final conflict with sin. If this was not in the Cross of Christ then there is yet a fearful looking for it to come. "Either Christ or you must bear the weight of your sins and the curse due to them." For the holy law cannot be set aside even by the compassionate movements of God's own heart. The temper of the hour on the other hand is that no divine claim is so holy as pity, and no ill so great as human misery, that anything may be sacrificed to give course to

compassion, or anything done to shorten pain or avoid it.

The element of divine demand has much faded out of our Christianity before the element of humane blessing; which again does not echo the preaching of Jesus. Christ, it is said, came to be beneficent and not exigent; or to be exigent only on the haves, and beneficent to the have-nots. But Christianity can give to men only as it asks of them. (Why, even our autonomy means a *nomos* upon the *autos*.) Its law and its blessing are inseparable in the Cross as elsewhere. And the demand it sets up is as wide as its gift. *Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis.* But it does not save our person and then ask certain acts, or certain gifts in a secondary way, as acknowledgments or quit-rents. If its boon save the person it is the whole person it requires. The responsibility is as great as the gift. The love is itself the judgment. It is morally useless to ask Christian contributions where men do not contribute themselves; and they will not, they cannot, do that where they do not feel that their whole soul's blessed release came by an act which did full justice to the demand of God and His urgent Eternity. What saves them sanctifies the divine demand, it does not suspend it. It spreads it over the whole soul. Christ's preaching was very exigent, with the exigence of one who believed in the indivisible unity of the soul, in its single eye, and who claimed it all. But much in the tone of our public opinion on moral questions of public rank testifies to what we have lost by losing the sense of the moral objectivity and cruciality of the Cross, of its spiritual finality, its absolute judgment of sin, and its supreme offering to the infrangible holiness of God as the only radical way of dealing with the last need of men. Is any need of ours so great as our need of a justifier with God! But is this really a conviction of the Churches? At the present time (thank God!) personal relations are more kind than they have before been,

but they may be, perhaps, less sincere; and public policy in a nation is more pitiful but often less just; and therefore authority gradually subsides. There is less of the finer conscience in great matters—as indeed we should expect when the greatest matter of all—the Cross—ceases to appear great and fontal to the conscience, and is so only to the heart. Fraternity takes the place of the communion of saints, and patriotism of general justice. It is the age of Fatherhood in faith, yet children grow more independent and disobedient, even in Christian homes. I have often known the children of good Christian people to be as morally ruined by the laxity flowing from sentimental views of God's Fatherhood as any ever were by the stern old views of the Sovereignty. Gentlemanly form replaces moral dignity, and the free spending of money (with or without good taste) hushes question as to how it came. And heaven and hell dropping from practical faith as realities or motives—dropping from the place they had for Jesus, have become a kind of mythology in the Christian faith—in effect I mean, whether in creed or not.

Amid so much wreck in things around us it will not have been all loss if we recover from the preaching of Jesus some lost belief in the judgment of God as an integral element in His Redemption, and as a vital factor in the Gospel of Christ and the Cross of our Salvation.

P. T. Forsyth.

ACCIDENTAL DISARRANGEMENT IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

No careful reader of the Fourth Gospel can fail to be puzzled by the present order of its text in several important passages. The more closely he studies the problem, the less confident he becomes of any single solution of it. Some of the pheno-

mena may be due to careless copying, some to editorial work, and some to the original inconsecutiveness of the writer's thought. But there is one hypothesis which stands somewhat apart, both because it seems, at first sight, to be the only one which can account for the more remarkable phenomena, and because it involves a comparatively new and far-reaching method of investigation. This is the hypothesis of accidental disarrangement. It is with this alone that the present paper is concerned.

We must begin by stating the phenomena which suggest the theory of accidental disarrangement. Some of these are conveniently summarised in Mr. Lewis's *Disarrangements in the Fourth Gospel:* [1] others have suggested themselves to the writer independently.

(1) The sequence of thought in iii. 1–15 (the interview with Nicodemus), 16–21 (the first commentary on it), and 31–36 (a second commentary), is broken by 22–30, a narrative passage describing the relations between Jesus and the Baptist. At the same time a paragraph seems to have slipped out of the text between ii. 12 and 13, where the sudden transition from Capernaum to Jerusalem without the usual mention of Judæa is as awkward as the subsequent journey from Jerusalem to Judæa in iii. 22. If, however, we suppose that iii. 22–30 originally stood between ii. 12 and 13, both passages are remedied. The continuity of iii. 1–21 . . . 31–36 is restored, the journey (from Capernaum) to Judæa precedes the arrival at Jerusalem, and other improvements which need not be specified here are effected.

(2) It has long been recognised that chapter vi. ought to come before chapter v. The end of iv. leaves Jesus in Galilee; but v. 1 brings Him abruptly back to Jerusalem;

[1] Cambridge, 1910. Lewis bases his inquiry on that of Spitta in his *Zur Geschichte und Litteratur des Urchristentums.*

vi. 1 speaks of Him as starting on a journey from Galilee; and vii. 1 describes Him as beginning a ministry in Galilee, on the ground that He could no longer safely stay in Judæa. All these incoherences are removed, and other advantages gained, if vi. originally stood before v.

(3) The discourse attached to the healing of the impotent man in v. has really nothing to do with this particular miracle, and would be more appropriate (*v.* especially the emphasis on ζωοποιεῖν in v. 21, 25, 28) to the raising of Lazarus, which, as it stands, has no accompanying discourse. It is therefore possible that v. 19–47 is a case of disarrangement.

(4) The transposition of chapters v. and vi. brings vii. 1–14 into its proper setting. But the sequence of thought in these verses runs on into 25–36, and is interrupted by 15–24. Moreover, it is not natural that the people who in vii. 20 laugh at Jesus' idea that they wish to kill Him, should in vii. 25 say, "Is not this He whom they wish to kill?" There is, therefore, reason to suspect that vii. 15–24 originally stood before 1–14.

(5) The removal from the Gospel of the undoubted interpolation vii. 53–viii. 11 (the *pericope adulterae*) leaves viii. 12–20 in an awkward position after vii.; for the end of vii. is a climax, yet in viii. 12 we are back in the middle of an argument. If this paragraph has been displaced, its original position was probably at the beginning of vii., immediately after vii. 15–24, the passage which we last considered.

(6) The awkwardness of the transition from ix. 41 to x. 1, the appropriateness of x. 19–21 as the climax of ix., and the obvious beginning of a new episode in x. 22, suggest that x. 1–18 has been displaced. Perhaps it originally stood between x. 28 and 29. Perhaps it is more seriously astray, and belongs to the gap between xvi. 24–25, where a παροιμία (x. 6, xvi. 25) with an eschatological reference

(the true Shepherd contrasted with the false prophets, x. 8—there are also points of contact with xvii.) would be in place.

(7) The paragraph xii. 37–43, the Evangelist's summary of the ministry, clearly ought to follow 44–50, not precede it. It is very tempting to suppose that the original climax of xii. 37–43 was xx. 30–31, and that these two passages together formed the original conclusion of the Gospel.

(8) It is generally admitted that xiv. 30–31 marks the end of the Last Discourse, and should lead directly to xviii. 1 (although possibly xvii. may have stood between). It is possible, then, that xv.–xvi. have been displaced, and originally preceded xiv., room being found for them between xiii. 32 and 33, or thereabouts. On the other hand, xv.–xvi., and perhaps xvii., might be an expansion of the Last Discourse, added subsequently to xiv., without alteration of xiv. 30–31.

Such are some of the passages in the Gospel in which there seems to be sufficient reason for suspecting disarrangement. The disregard of logical or temporal sequence shown in some of these instances is too great to have been intended by the original author, or allowed to pass by a subsequent editor. On the other hand, the passages are generally too long to have been accidentally transposed (or first omitted and subsequently replaced) by a copyist. The displacement of such long passages can hardly have come about except by the accidental disarrangement of whole leaves in some parent-MS. of the present text.[1]

Let us see what this hypothesis involves, before going any further.

[1] For analogies in secular literature cp. Moffatt, *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, p. 39. The longest accidental omission which Professor Clark adduces is one of two columns of twenty lines each in a Latin codex of the seventh century (*Journal of Theological Studies*. Jan., 1915, p. 233).

(1) It means, first, that all extant forms of the text of the Fourth Gospel (for they show no substantial variations in order) are ultimately derived from the MS. which underwent this accidental disarrangement, viâ the derivative MSS. in which the disarrangement was perpetuated. There is an obvious analogy to this in the loss of the end of St. Mark's Gospel in all extant MSS.

(2) It means that this accident happened to a MS. in codex-form, because only so could whole leaves be displaced. The copyist of a papyrus roll might omit or displace a single column of uncials, but it would not be easy for him (except in the rare cases when several columns happened to begin with the same letters) to omit or displace more.

(3) Such accidental disarrangements could only affect whole leaves of the MS., i.e., all that was written on front and back of the page; and, unless the leaf happened to include the beginning or end of a book, it would be fully written. We should thus expect these accidental disarrangements to contain about the same amount of text in each case, or multiples of that amount—2 pages (1 leaf), 4, 6, 8, and so on. It follows equally that under no circumstances could a leaf and a half (i.e., two fronts and a back, or two backs and a front) or any multiple of this uneven unit be accidentally disarranged.

(4) It is well known, and can be verified by any one who cares to examine ancient MSS., that copyists observed great regularity as to the number of lines they wrote on each page of a MS., and the number of letters they wrote in each line; so that, if one can find evidence to reconstruct the original line-unit (average number of letters to the line) or column-unit (average number of letters to the column) underlying any part of a book, one can reasonably apply it to the rest.

(5) We do not know enough about MSS. of the age to which the early ancestor-MSS. of the Fourth Gospel must have belonged to say exactly what was the size of their column or line-units. But they must have been papyrus-MSS., and therefore too small to contain much more than the single Gospel. So we are justified in treating the Fourth Gospel as a separate problem, and need not concern ourselves with wider questions concerning an archetype of all the Gospels, or of the whole New Testament.

It is now becoming clear what is the special nature of the hypothesis of accidental disarrangement. It admits of something like mathematical treatment. If certain passages have been disarranged, they ought to correspond in size—viz., in the number of lines and letters they contain—to the leaves of the MS. in which the disarrangement took place. If we find that they do so, we are put in possession of a mathematical test by which to verify, or even to discover, other disarrangements. If, on the other hand, they show no numerical relationship, we shall be driven to try some other hypothesis to account for them.

Now it is often possible, by studying the omissions made by the scribe of a particular MS., to discover the line-unit, and even the column-unit, of the MS. which he was copying: because a copyist more easily omits a whole line, or (when misled by that recurrence of letters called homoioteleuton) a group of lines, than any irregular number of letters. Further, supposing that the study of the representative MSS. of a particular book reveals the same line-unit and column-unit, we can infer with fair certainty what was the form of the archetype from which all the extant MSS. are derived.

This method has recently been applied to the New Testa-

ment by Professor A. C. Clark,[1] and to the Fourth Gospel, in respect of one MS., by the Rev. H. S. Cronin.[2] Both investigators, working independently, and arguing from data which need not be reproduced here, but which seem to be beyond dispute, conclude that the present text of the Fourth Gospel has been copied from one which was written in lines of 10–12 letters.

What bearing has this conclusion upon the "accidental disarrangements" with which we are dealing?

(1) In the first place, although it provides a valuable test for short passages, its wider application is very limited. An absolute line-unit of 10 letters gives the multiples 20, 30, 40, etc. The interspaces between the multiples are so small that in long passages the margin of variations that one is bound to leave fills them up. An *average* unit of 10 letters, i.e., one which may in practice be 9, 10, or 11, is of course worse: if the least variation is allowed in the original unit, its multiples soon cover all the ground. It would seem, then, that long passages must be dealt with by some larger measure than the line-unit. This is admitted by Professor Clark.[3]

(2) The MS. with an average of 11 letters to the line was not the only ancestor of our text, even if it was that which left the deepest mark upon it. Professor Clark in three passages (pp. 26, 40, 54) suggests the presence of another unit, which we may put down as 15 letters to the line. If this unit be tested in the case of the "omissions" from which Professor Clark derives his 11 letter unit, it will be found to work quite as well as the latter.

(3) Our actual knowledge of second–third century MSS. (to which stage of the text the supposed archetype of the

[1] *The Primitive Text of the Gospels and Acts*. Oxford, 1914.
[2] *Journal of Theological Studies*, xiii. (1911–12), p. 563.
[3] *Journal of Theological Studies*, Jan., 1915.

Gospel must have belonged) shows that there were a few papyrus rolls with 10–11 letters to the line, but more with 15 and upwards: but there seems to be no evidence for the existence of papyrus *codices* with so short a line. Here are a few examples from the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, selected mainly for the smallness of their line and column-units.

Ox. Pap.	Subject.	MS.	Date.	Line-unit in Letters.	Lines to Column.	Column unit in Letters.
Vol. I. 1	Λόγια Ἰησοῦ	Pap. cod.	1st–2nd cents.	16	22	352
2	Matt. i.	Pap. cod.	3rd cent.	28–29	27+	770+
II. 208	John i. & xx.	Pap. cod.	3rd. cent.	24	24	576
IV. 655	Gospel	Pap. roll.	3rd cent.	14	21	294
666	Aristotle	Pap. roll.	2nd cent.	11½	24	276
VI. 847	John ii.	Vell. cod.	4th cent.	22	19	418
848	Rev. xvi.	Vell. cod.	5th cent.	12–13	17	200–220
885	Treatise on Divination	Pap. roll.	2nd–3rd cents.	12	31	372
VII. 1010	Ezra xvi.	Vell. cod.	4th cent.	10⅔	12	128
VIII. 1093	Demosthenes	Pap. roll.	2nd cent.	10⅔	27–31	280–330
IX. 1182	Demosthenes	Pap. roll.	2nd cent.	11	28	308
X. 1224	Uncanon. Gospel	Pap. cod.	4th cent.	22–24	20	440–480
1227	Matt. xii.	Pap. cod.	5th cent.	21	11–12	230–250
1229	James i.	Pap. cod.	4th cent.	19	26–27	494–513

Thus it appears that (so far as our evidence goes at present) the only examples of very short lines are in papyrus rolls of the second–third centuries on the one hand, and vellum codices of the fourth-fifth centuries on the other. The importance of this is that the accidental dis-

arrangements of the Fourth Gospel, *which can only have come about in the case of a codex form MS. of the second–third century*, probably do not belong to the same stage as Professor Clark's 11 letter line-unit. The latter may either go back to the time when the Fourth Gospel was written on a papyrus roll, or may be derived from a nearer ancestor of the vellum codex type. The former more probably belong to the intermediate stage, when the Gospel came to be written in a papyrus codex, and in longer lines (perhaps the 15-letter unit of which we have already found evidence).

In any case it appears that we shall not easily be able to deal with the longer omissions, still less with the large disarrangements, as multiples of the (necessarily small) line-unit. We must count the number of letters in them, and see whether there is any numerical relationship between them. If there is, we may be able to discover the column-unit of the archetype, and to establish an arithmetical test for all suspected cases of disarrangement.

Professor Clark, examining a number of the longer omissions (p. 60 f.) finds the following numerical correspondences: 2 of 94 letters, 1 each of 102 and 105, 2 of 130, 1 each of 165 and 166, 1 each of 152 and 156, 1 of 320 (twice 160, which is nearly the same as 165 and 166 above), 1 of 829 (five times 166, reproducing the same unit again), and 1 of 963 (three times 320 or six times 160 is 960). Here the recurrence of the unit 160–166 is certainly remarkable. "I cannot doubt," says Professor Clark, "that these numbers correspond to some division in the archetype of the Gospels" (p. 67). He proceeds to apply this unit to other passages, with the following results:—

The "shorter conclusion" of St. Mark	=161 letters
The "longer conclusion"	= 964 (160 × 6 = 960)
Luke xv. 17–xvi. 21 (p. 68)	=3212 (160 × 20 = 3200)

John vi.	=5540 ($168 \times 33 = 5544$)[1] (or $163 \times 34 = 5542$)
John. vii. 1–14	= 997 ($166 \times 6 = 996$)
vii. 15–24 (734)	=4372 ($168 \times 26 = 4368$)[1]
+v. (3638)	(or $162 \times 27 = 4374$)

We may remark, at this point, that the use of so small a column-unit as 160 involves certain inconveniences. In the case of Luke xv. 17 it is supposed that a copyist made an entry 20 columns or 10 leaves out of place. In John vi. he accidentally transposed a passage of 33 columns or $16\frac{1}{2}$ leaves. Even the small disarrangement of vii. 1–14 becomes a matter of 3 leaves.[2] These numbers are inconveniently large.

But let us see whether this unit of 160 explains the passages in the Fourth Gospel which, upon internal grounds, we thought most likely to have been accidentally disarranged.

They are as follows :[3]—

		Nearest multiple of 160–165.
(1) iii. 22–30	= 726	None near enough.
(2) vi.	=5540	$163 \times 34 = 5542$
(3) v. 19–47	=2248	$160 \times 14 = 2240$
(4) vii. 15–24	= 739	None near enough.
(5) viii. 12–20	= 736	None near enough.
(6) x. 1–18	=1467	$160 \times 9 = 1440$ (uneven multiple).
(7) xii. 37–43	= 588	None near enough.
(8) xv.–xvi.	=4675 (approx.)	$160 \times 29 = 4640$ (uneven multiple).

Now it cannot be said that, except in the cases numbered

[1] Why does Professor Clark adopt the former multiple ? The latter is in both cases nearer the 160 unit, and to the length of the passage : whilst in the case of John vi. it gives an even number of units, without which, as we have already seen, accidental disarrangement is impossible.

[2] Assuming (as the evidence suggests) that the archetype contained only one column to a page.

[3] (These figures are reckoned from Souter's edition of the R.V. Greek text. That for vi. is taken from Professor Clark. That for xv.-xvi. is arrived at by reckoning fifty letters for every line of the printed text—a method which will be found to work with surprising exactness in long passages.)

(2) and (3), the 160–165 unit works at all well, especially considering how much margin it allows compared to its size. We notice particularly that it quite fails to explain a group of shorter passages of about the same length, viz., (1), (4) and (5). If accidental disarrangement really took place, it is very difficult to suppose that in every case whole groups of pages were disarranged, and *never single leaves*. Without, therefore, denying the existence of an ancestor of the present text whose column-unit was 160–165, we may very well look for a larger unit, representing another stage of the text's ancestry, to explain the supposed disarrangements.

In an ingenious monograph published as a supplement to the *American Journal of Philology* No. 12 some years ago, under the title of *The New Testament Autographs*, Professor Rendel Harris endeavoured to reconstruct the paging of the archetypes from which the principal MSS. of the New Testament may be supposed to have been copied. He arrived at two units, which he calls the V-page (i.e. the archetypal page or column-unit lying behind the Codex Vaticanus), and the S-page (that lying behind the Codex-Sinaiticus). The size of the former he supposed to be about 220 letters; the latter was smaller, and therefore concerns us less.

The two applications of this unit which are of special interest are these:—

(1) 1 John = 1120 = 220 × 5 (1100)
(2) 2 John = 1100 = 220 × 5 (1100)
(Which suggests that the same MS. form underlies the Johannine Epistles as well as the Gospel.)
(3) John vii. 53–viii. 11 (the *pericope adulterae*) = 870[1] = 220 × 4 (880)

[1] This is the number of letters in the passage as Professor Harris writes it out (opp. p. x.): in the text he gives the number as 908: but this number he seems to get by ignoring the contractions (sixteen letters) and adding the title περὶ μοιχαλίδος περικοπὴ (twenty-two letters).

But the unit does not work in any of the cases of disarrangement in the Fourth Gospel, except perhaps that of chapter vi., where $220 \times 25 = 5500$, which is nearly 5540. We, must therefore look again for a larger and more satisfactory unit.

If we turn back to the figures already given for the passages which seem to have been disarranged (p. 430 above), such a unit at once suggests itself. The numbers are 726, 5540, 2248, 739, 736, 1467, 588, and 4675. Here it is obvious that 739 and 736 are practically identical; that 726 is only a few letters short of them; that 1467 is twice 733 (1466), and that 2248 is nearly 740×3 (2220). This is very remarkable. There is strong reason for regarding 735–740 as the unit for which we are looking.[1] It is a large number—larger than the average size of a column.[2] But let us suppose that it represents two columns or pages of 370 letters, i.e., the contents of a whole leaf. This at once gives a column-unit which agrees very well with our knowledge of 2nd–3rd century papyri (it would mean a column of 25 lines with nearly 15 letters in each line), and which puts the hypothesis of accidental disarrangement in its most attractive form; for nothing is so likely to be displaced as a single leaf of a MS. in codex form. This we suppose to have happened in the case of iii. 20–30, vii. 15–24, and viii. 12–20. In the case of x. 1–18 two leaves were displaced: in the case of v. 19–47, three.

Assuming 370 to be the column-unit, we see at once that

John. vi. $= 5540$ letters $= 370 \times 15$ (5550).

But this is an uneven number, viz., 7 leaves + 1 page, which could not have been displaced accidentally. Now there

[1] This is Lewis's unit, given in letters instead of lines. (Lewis, op. cit. p. 15.)

[2] The only precedent furnished by our list (p. 428 above) is Ox. Pap. i. 2, which has a column-unit of 770+.

are reasons for thinking that some interpolation has taken place in this chapter, so as to give a distinctly sacramental meaning to the discourse about the Bread of Life. This suspicion centres upon the passage beginning at *v.* 48, and attaches particularly to *vv.* 51b, 53–56, in which alone (and in contradiction to His use of the word *v.* 63) Jesus is made to speak of the Bread of Life as His σάρξ. These verses 51b, 53–56 contain 334 letters. Deducting them from the total 5540 we find that the chapter now =5206 letters, which =370 × 14 (5180), or just 7 leaves of the archetype.

There is another curious fact about vi. A careful study of the chapter raises a serious doubt whether there was originally any connexion between the miracle of feeding with which it begins and the discourse with which it continues. The transition of thought seems to come between *vv.* 27 and 28. The first part of the chapter, 1–27, contains 2237 letters, which is almost exactly 370 × 6 (2220).

Again, the passage xii. 37–43 as it stands =588 letters, which does not correspond to our unit. But we found reason to suppose, when we were discussing it, that it was originally completed by the two verses xx. 30–31. These verses contain 179 letters. Adding them together we get 588 × 179 = 767 − 1 leaf of the archetype—a remarkable confirmation of our previous results. (If xii. 37a really belongs to the preceding paragraph, the figures are 549+179 =728).

The only outstanding passage is xv.–xvi. =4675 letters (approx.). That this may bear some relation to our unit is suggested by the fact that 360 (instead of 370) × 13 =4680. But it is more likely that xv.–xvi., like xvii., was an early addition to the original Gospel, and never stood in any other position than that in which it is now. It is to be added that no unit which has hitherto been suggested accounts for the supposed displacement: and in any case

the passage is almost too long for such an accident to have happened to it.

Passing outside the Fourth Gospel to those books which of all the New Testament are most akin to it, we see at once that :—

1 John = 9275 (approx.) = 370 × 25 (9250)

2 John = 1120, 3 John = 1100 = 370 × 3 (1110)

Another very remarkable result : for it suggests that all the Johannine books may originally have circulated in a single volume, or have at least been derived from archetypes written in a uniform style.

But this is not all. Quite a number of passages in the Fourth Gospel, particularly in its earlier chapters, bear indications of this same unit. Thus the witness of the Baptist to Jesus, including the short passages apparently interpolated into the Prologue (i. 6–8, 15, 19–28, 29–34) = 1475 letters = 4 units (370 × 4 = 1480). The cleansing of the Temple (ii. 14–22, assuming 13 to be an editorial note) = 750 letters. This should perhaps be added to the list of disarrangements : but it is more likely that it was inserted intentionally in this position. This same incident, again, subdivides : for the " sign " of the destruction of the Temple (ii. 18–22), which in some ways seems so inappropriate here, = 372 letters, or exactly 1 unit. Again, of the two Galilean miracles, the miracle of Cana (ii. 1–11) = 807 letters, a little over two units ; and the healing of the nobleman's son (iv. 46–54) = 727. The *pericope adulterae* (vii. 53–viii. 11) = 832 (Clark 829, Harris 870). This should perhaps have been added to our list of "disarrangements " ; but it is difficult to suppose that the story formed part of the archetype of the Gospel, and it is possible that, falling out of position elsewhere, it was deliberately inserted by a scribe where it now stands. Other sense-paragraphs which nearly coincide with the

unit are i. 43–51, v. 10–18, viii. 21–30, xiii. 21–30, xx. 1–10, 11–18. Indeed, it appears that as many as 15 out of the 90 sense-paragraphs into which the text of the Gospel is divided in Souter's edition conform to this unit of size. This is a high proportion, and suggests that in the archetype some trouble was taken, perhaps for lectionary purposes, to make the sense-divisions of the Gospel correspond to the leaves of the MS.

It may not be amiss to point out at this stage that a similar preference for paragraphs of about 740 letters can be traced in other parts of the New Testament. In St. Mark (which generally falls into shorter paragraphs than the other Gospels) there are about 10 such paragraphs, of which the most interesting are iv. 1–9, the Parable of the Sower; viii. 1–8, the Feeding of the Four Thousand, which is generally regarded as a doublet of the Feeding of the Five Thousand; x. 1–12, the teaching about divorce; xi. 1–10, the Entry into Jerusalem; xii. 18–27, the Sadducees' question; and vi. 14–29 (a double paragraph), the death of John the Baptist.

In St. Matthew there are about twelve paragraphs of the same size, including the Beatitudes (v. 1–12); in St. Luke thirteen, including the Benedictus (i. 67–79), and the preaching of the Baptist (iii. 7–14); in Acts, eight, including the secondary account of the Pentecostal gift of tongues (ii. 5–13); in the Pauline Epistles, twenty; in St. James, two; and in the Apocalypse, one.

Paragraphs of this size are generally rare in short books: yet it is to be noticed that in 2 Timothy, which contains only nine paragraphs, three conform to this size.

In view of this evidence it can hardly be doubted that this unit of about 740 letters represents a convenient or conventional size of paragraph, to which the New Testament writers tended to conform. This may help to explain

the phenomena of the Fourth Gospel. But it is hardly a sufficient explanation, where (as we have seen) the 750 unit so often coincides with passages suspected of disarrangement on independent grounds.

One possibility has always to be remembered—that some of the disarrangements may have occurred at other stages in the ancestry of the text, and with a different unit. We may end by pointing out what may be evidence for such a unit.

The *pericope adulterae*, for which we could not quite account on the 740 basis, numbers 832 letters. The Prologue, without the interpolated verses 6–8, 15, numbers 831. This is remarkable. When we examine the Prologue in detail, we see that it falls into the following divisions :—

i. 1–5 = 208
6–8
7–14 = 426
15
16–18 = 197

Here 208 and 197 are almost the same, and 426 is about twice as long. Supposing that the Prologue originally occupied 4 columns of about 208 letters each, the interpolations may have slipped in from the margin at the foot of the first and third columns. Otherwise, it is hard to explain their position—especially that of 15.

Are there any other traces of this unit, 208–416—832 ? Yes, there are.

iii. 31–36 (which seems out of place where it stands) = 417
iv. (to which a *terminus ad quem* is given by the transposition of v. and vi.) = 4180 (208 × 20 = 4160)
vi. (without 51b, 53–56) = 5206 (208 × 25 = 5200)
x. 1–18 = 1467 (208 × 7 = 1456)

The last two figures show some coincidence between the higher multiples of 208 and of 370, our chosen unit. But

the 208 unit does not explain the other disarrangements. Unless the figures of the Prologue and the Pericope, 831 and 832, are a mere coincidence, 208 is a genuine unit. But it has not left such a mark on the text as the 370–740 unit. So far as our investigation goes, the latter alone makes any serious claim to explain the accidental disarrangements of the Fourth Gospel.

J. M. Thompson.

TERTULLIAN AND NON-RESISTANCE.

Tertullian is practically the first writer in the early church who deals in detail with the problems raised by the well-known passage in the Sermon on the Mount:

"Ye have heard that it was said, *An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth*: but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil: but

whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.

And if any man would go to law with thee and take away thy coat,

let him have thy cloak also.

And whosoever shall compel thee to go one mile,

go with him twain.

Give to him that asketh thee,

and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away."

He comes upon the problem at three different turns in his writings.

I.

The first discussion is in the tract on Patience.[1] Here he has to analyse the various causes of impatience, and among

[1] Patient endurance was one of the traits of the African temperament, in the ancient world.

these he puts provocation. "Should any one attempt to provoke you by a blow, you have the Lord's admonition: *to him who smites you on the face, turn the other cheek also.* Let his rascality be worn out by your patience, whatever the blow may be, though accompanied by pain and insult. You ruin that scoundrel all the worse by bearing with him; he gets a heavier stroke from the Lord; for he shall be beaten by Him for whose sake you bear with him" (*de Patientia*, viii.) When he goes on to speak of Christians being cursed and abused, he nerves them by recalling the example of Jesus, who refused to answer railing with railing. But he comes back before long to his original point, in a very striking passage. "Consider now the delight of patience." That delight is the exquisite pleasure of thwarting your opponent. He desires to gratify himself by provoking and paining you. "He injures you just in order to pain you, for the gain of the injurer lies in the pain of the injured person. Well, when you upset his gain by not being pained, he is bound to be pained himself in missing his gain, and so you come off not only unscathed but delighted, to boot, by the disappointment of your opponent. You are avenged by his pain. Such is the profit and the delight of patience."

Tertullian summons up quite a Stoic courage. He bids the Christian show a determined patience which, like a rock, will blunt any weapon hurled against it; nay, from which such weapons will recoil with disastrous effect upon the hand of the assailant. By this effect, he means the exasperation caused to the pagan who discovers that he cannot provoke and irritate the poor, patient Christian!

But in chapter x. of the same treatise he advances still further. The topic now is revenge as a form of impatience, not simply losing your temper, but planning how to turn the tables on your opponent. "Another primary incentive to impatience is the lust of revenge, which busies itself

either with glory or with malice. Now, glory is always an empty thing, and malice is invariably hateful to the Lord, never more so than when, under provocation, it arrogantly pursues its revenge and by retaliating doubles the evil already committed. In the eyes of Error, revenge seems a solace of pain; in the eyes of Truth, however, it is proved guilty of maliciousness. For what difference is there between him who provokes and him who is provoked, except that the former is shown to have done wrong first, the latter second? . . . No account is taken of order in evil deeds; difference of position in that order does not differentiate between actions whose common nature ranks them side by side. The same deed, the same requital from the Lord. That is why the command is absolute, that *evil is not to be rendered for evil*.[1] But how are we to keep this command, if in our *abhorring* of *evil* we do not *abhor* revenge?[2] And what honour are we to pay to the Lord God, if we take into our own hands the right of avenging ourselves? Corrupt as we are, mere earthen vessels, we are seriously offended with our own servants if they assume the right of retaliating on their fellow-servants. Whereas we approve of those who make us the sacrifice of being patient; not only do we approve their sense of their humble position as servants and their devotion to their masters' rights, but we let them have an ampler reparation than they would have claimed for themselves. Is there any risk of us missing such a reparation from a Lord[3] who is so just in His sentences and so powerful in executing them? Why do we believe He is a Judge, if he is not an Avenger as well? And this He promises us He will be, when He says: *Leave vengeance to me, I*

[1] Rom. xii. 17.

[2] Kroymann's insertion of "maleficii" clears up the lacuna in the text.

[3] "Dominus" here means both "Lord" and "master," like κύριος in Col. iv. 1.

will repay.[1] That is, let me [2] have your patience, and I will reward your patience."

II.

The second occasion furnished to Tertullian for handling this problem of ethics came in his controversy with the Marcionites. Naturally, one of the items in the Old Testament which they used as an effective argument was the *lex talionis*. How different from the gentle Jesus, they urged, was the deity who required an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth! Does not this prove conclusively that the God of Jesus is incompatible with the vengeful Creator-god of the Old Testament? Now, Tertullian's arguments are not always convincing, even when we are convinced that he is defending a right position; but his apologetic has the saving merit of facing the real difficulties. He is often ingenious in logic, but he is hardly ever evasive. Like Job's battle-horse, "he saith among the trumpets, Ha, ha." The more serious a difficulty is, the more he is put upon his mettle. In the eighteenth chapter of the second book *Aduersus Marcionem*, he rushes upon this problem of the *lex talionis* and its Marcionite interpretation. "Here [i.e., in Exodus xxi. 24] we have not the vestige of any permission for mutual injury; the object is to restrain violence altogether. As the people, in their utter obduracy and unbelief towards God, might consider it tedious, nay even incredible, to await from Him that vindication which was afterwards to be announced by the prophet—*Vengeance is mine, I will repay*—the idea was meantime to check the commission of wrong by the fear of instant retribution, and to prevent provocation by permitting retribution; thus knavish evil would be stopped, the initial wrong being prevented by the fear of

[1] Deut. xxxii. 35.

[2] Kroymann reads "tibi" for "mihi" (i.e., do you practise patience), but the sense is unaltered.

the second wrong which was permitted, the deterrent on the initial wrong preventing the second from being committed. Besides, this operated in another way. The fear of retaliation came home to men all the more, on account of the savour of hot passion which retaliation involves; nothing is more bitter than to suffer what you have made others suffer." Tertullian stops rather abruptly at this point. He goes off to discuss some other detailed objections of the Marcionites to the Mosaic legislation. But in the sixteenth chapter of the fourth book he returns to the charge during the discussion of the Sermon on the Mount. He has to show how the *lex talionis* can be reconciled to the non-resistance precepts of Jesus. The latter are quoted, of course, in their Lucan form, as Luke's was the gospel of the Marcionite churches; in Tertullian's version, the opening words ran,

Love your enemies and bless them that hate you,
And pray for them that calumniate you.

He begins by observing that this has been substantially enjoined in the Old Testament already, in Isaiah's words: *to those who hate you, say, you are our brothers* (lxvi. 5). This is one of his numerous misquotations. He was misled by the LXX, which ran: εἴπατε, ἀδελφοὶ ἡμῶν, τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ βδελυσσομένοις.. The original Hebrew has quite a different sense. Then he proceeds to meet the Marcionite argument that Jesus introduced a new ethical standard when He prohibited the reprisals allowed by the *lex talionis*, —and ordered that, instead of an eye for an eye, it was to be: "to him who smites us on the one check, offer the other also, and give up our cloak to him who takes away our coat." Tertullian insists that these orders are not out of keeping with the Old Testament. Think of Zechariah vii. 10: *let none of you remember the evil of his brother*, and viii. 17: *let none of you imagine evil in your heart against his*

neighbour. "He who inculcated the forgetfulness of an injury inculcated all the more the patient endurance of it. Also, when He says, *Vengeance is mine, I will repay*, He teaches a patience which waits for its revenge. Consequently, as it is impossible to believe that a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye (by way of requital for injury), should be demanded by the same God who forbids not simply reprisals but even revenge, even the imagination, the very recollection, of an injury, it must be equally clear in what sense He required an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; it was not to allow an injury to be repeated by way of retaliation—that was prohibited by the interdict on vengeance—but to check the initial injury by prohibiting it under penalty of retaliation, so that every man might abstain from committing the first injury when he saw that other people were permitted to inflict the second. For God knows how much more easy it is to have violence repressed by the prospect of (human) retaliation than by the promise of (divine) vengeance. Both considerations had to be adduced, however, in view of human nature and human faith, so that the man who had faith in God might expect vengeance from God, while the man who lacked faith might fear the laws of retaliation. Since it required an effort to grasp this intention of the law, Christ, as Lord of the sabbath, the law, and all the Father's regulations, made it quite clear and intelligible by ordering us to offer the other cheek to the smiter. He did this in order to extinguish all the more effectively those reprisals which the law had intended to thwart by means of retaliation and which prophecy [i.e., in the Isaiah and Zechariah passages] certainly had checked openly by prohibiting the recollection of injury and by referring vengeance to God. Thus, whatever fresh provision was introduced by Christ was not in contradiction to the command, but in support of it; he did not destroy the

moral order of the Creator." This is little more than a recapitulation of what he had already urged. But he proceeds to analyze the prohibition of retaliation in connexion with the moral order, and his proceeding is highly characteristic. So sweeping an injunction to patience as that issued by Jesus could not have been put in force except by a God who Himself undertakes vengeance on evil-doers and punishes those whom the injured are forbidden to resist. "Otherwise if such a burden of patience—to refrain from striking back, and actually to offer the other cheek: to refrain from answering curse by curse, and actually to bless: to refrain from retaining one's coat, and actually to give up one's cloak as well—if such a burden of patience is imposed on my shoulders by One who is not going to defend me, then he has bidden me be patient to no purpose, if He does not let me see that His command has any reward attached to it. By reward I mean some result of my patience, that is, vengeance. If he does not intend to take vengeance himself, he ought to have allowed me to take it; if he did not allow me to take it, he should take it himself, for it is in the interests of moral discipline that an injury should be avenged. It is by the fear of retribution that all wrongdoing is bridled; whereas, once you allow wrongdoing to range indiscriminately, it will seize the upper hand, pluck out both your eyes, knock out all your teeth, safe and secure in its impunity. But that," Tertullian adds, turning sarcastically to Marcion, "that is just the method of your very kind god, who is kind and nothing else, to inflict an injury on patience, to fling the doors open to violence, to leave the just unprotected, and the wicked unrestrained!"

III.

In the latter tract, *de fuga in persecutione* (xiii.) there is an incidental reference to another aspect of the same problem.

"I will *give to every one that asketh* from me. Yes, if the plea is charity, not if it is intimidation. Jesus says, *to him who asketh.* A man who intimidates does not ask. . . . He who comes not to be pitied but to be feared, does not look for alms." Similarly, he adds, "if a man demands my cloak forcibly, I will not only refuse it but ask back my coat also. Such regulations of the Lord are not to be interpreted indiscriminately: non in infinitum, nec ad omnia spectant." Otherwise, you might feel bound to give poison or steel to a would-be murderer. Jesus bade us give to every one who asked, but even He did not give a sign to those who asked that from Him.

There is a refreshing breath of sense and ethical sanity about Tertullian's general treatment of these sayings. What is most conspicuous is the strong moral instinct, which is the source of his strength as well as of his weakness as an interpreter of Christianity. It assumes legal forms, but at bottom it is a thorough conviction of the moral order of the universe, and one of his principal objections to Marcionitism was that it seemed to evaporate that moral order by interpreting the New Testament as the revelation of an easy-going deity who suspended or abrogated the eternal relations between wrong and punishment. This strong sense of moral equity often affects or deflects his interpretation of the New Testament. In the present case, it enables him to say much that is powerful upon the duty of non-retaliation, and also to offer his fellow-sufferers the following consolations under abuse and ill-treatment.

(i.) He steadily interprets the sayings of Jesus upon non-resistance in the light of the Old Testament word: *Vengeance is mine, I will repay.* This is, to some extent, Paul's method in Romans xii. 19–21, where he is careful to add that the divine vengeance on persecutors is not wholly eschatological; the ruler or magistrate *beareth not the sword in vain,*

for he is a minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him that doeth evil (xiii. 3–4). Tertullian, however, tends to lay more stress on the eschatological prospect of retribution.

(ii.) He also tells Christians that they not only can leave rascals safely to God, who will punish them smartly, but that they can enjoy the exquisite satisfaction of thwarting the enemy by their patience. That is, he adds a psychological consolation.[1]

(iii.) Finally, his strong sense of justice leads him to repudiate the idea that the sayings about giving are to be taken indiscriminately.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THOMAS KELLY CHEYNE.

ON the 16th of last February Professor Cheyne "passed to the land where faithful servants of Truth do not 'strive nor cry,' and where all problems are solved." The words which he used of Ewald, the prophet of his youth, may be applied to his own death. For the last seven years he had lived in retirement, disabled by bodily weakness, but intellectually as much alive as ever, and keenly interested in the movements and thought of the day; within a fortnight of the end he was contemplating an article on the modern social novel. How anxiously he followed the progress of the war may be judged from his last book, where he takes for his own and reprints the fine Message of the Society of Friends: "in time of war let all men of goodwill prepare for peace." And this he would do by the search for truth, one of the things, he maintains, which make for peace

[1] "To see an enemy humiliated gives a certain contentment, but this is jejune compared with the highly blent satisfaction of seeing him humiliated by your benevolent action or concession on his behalf. That is a sort of revenge which falls into the scale of virtue" (George Eliot, *The Mill on the Floss*, Book iii. ch. vii.).

among the nations. Faint yet pursuing, he acted upon his conviction, until the frail body could hold the unflagging spirit no longer. In *The Reconciliation of Races and Religions* (November, 1914), he does not shrink from giving a welcome to what he takes to be other manifestations of a Divine Incarnation outside Christianity; the failure of judgement is obvious enough; and yet his latest book falls into line with what had gone before. It is distinguished, like all his work, by qualities which are among the most valuable that any Biblical scholar can possess, a sympathy with spiritual ideas, a whole-hearted passion for truth at all costs, and a readiness to be always revising opinion in the light of new knowledge. No want of gratitude or reverence for his memory must be inferred if we allow at the same time that he possessed the defect of his qualities. The demand which he continuously made upon himself and others for "a more penetrating criticism, and a better regulated though not more intense divination,"[1] taking the watchwords from Niebuhr, carried him to extremes whither few could follow him, and did not always help the cause which he had at heart. The present writer recalls a conversation with Professor A. B. Davidson not long before his death, in which that truly great scholar declared that he had reached the point where he could not feel certain about any of the current views of the Old Testament. In a different sense Professor Cheyne could never rest satisfied with any position gained; but there was never the least hesitation in his attitude; he started off at once on the track of some new idea, with an imagination kindled by the summons to advance. "Speak unto the children of Israel, that they go forward" was a favourite text, often on his lips.

Even in the early days, as far back as 1869,[2] he chose a

[1] *Founders of O. T. Criticism*, 1893, p, 106.
[2] *Notes and Criticisms on the Hebr. Text of Isaiah.*

place in the van of progress, and appeared as the champion of a new spirit in Biblical exegesis. That position he guarded jealously against all comers. In looking through again the works of what may be called his "period of central power," from 1880 to 1899,[1] one sees afresh how far he was in advance of his day, and how often he turned out to be right, perhaps one ought to say, how often critical opinion came round to his view. It is worth while to give a few instances out of many that may be chosen. In his commentary on Isaiah, the two-volume edition of 1880–1882, he applies the new evidence which had come in from the Assyrian monuments to illustrate the history and ideas of the period, as against some influential German critics who disparaged the aid of archaeology in the work of exegesis, and as against popular writers in this country who disparaged criticism and imagined that archaeology would prove its death-blow. With remarkable insight Cheyne perceives the true bearing of archaeological evidence upon the Biblical narratives; he makes the fullest use of it, while recognising the limits of its application; he is absolutely free from the prejudices of the one party, and from the disproportioned estimate of the other.

Again, in an article which escaped notice abroad because it was buried in the pages of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, he maintained in 1881 not merely that Isaiah must be divided into two separate books, but that an analysis of the second part reveals unmistakeable signs of composite authorship. He did as much as any scholar in England to establish the former position, and the truth of the latter is now almost as generally accepted. His study of the Babylonian

[1] *The Prophecies of Isaiah*, 1880, 2nd edn. 1882; *Job and Solomon*, 1887; *The Book of Psalms*, 1888; *The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter*, 1891 (being the Bampton Lectures for 1889); *Introduction to the Book of Isaiah*, 1895; *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, 1898 (lectures delivered in America).

deluge-story in 1877, also in the *Encyclopaedia*, led him to perceive that the Jahvist's narrative in the early chapters of Genesis combines two different versions of the tradition. We are now familiar with the significance of the symbols J[1] and J[2]; but no one in England saw this before Cheyne.

When we turn to the Psalms, we still find him the most illuminating and satisfying of commentators. If the two volumes on Isaiah opened a new world to English students, the two volumes on the Psalms, the Commentary (1888) and the Bampton Lectures (1891), may be said to "have power To live, and act, and serve the future hour." As regards the Psalter, we will choose two subjects to illustrate the manner in which he led the way to views now widely held: the problem whether we can admit the presence of Maccabaean Psalms, and the interpretation of those Psalms which are generally called Messianic. The Bampton Lectures discussed the first problem very thoroughly, and succeeded in removing misconceptions, with the result that the unwillingness to date any Psalms so late as the Maccabaean period has by this time almost disappeared; as to the second, we have almost forgotten that it was Dr. Cheyne who first taught us to believe that the Psalmist, while describing a contemporary Jewish king, idealises his functions and office until he becomes the symbol of a king endowed with a more exalted office and functions of a wider range. The analysis of the different types of Messianic Psalms given in *Isaiah* vol. 2[1] still holds its place as a valuable introduction to a study of the subject. It is interesting to note that sixteen years ago Cheyne pleaded for a revision both of the text and of the use of the Prayer-book Psalter.[2] At last Convocation has taken up the task, and a revision is being considered at the present moment.

[1] *Prophecies of Isaiah*, ii., 5th edn. 1889, pp. 196–204.
[2] *The Christian Use of the Psalms*, 1899, pp. 15–34.

Once more, although there can be no doubt that Professor Cheyne pushed his North-Arabian theory to extravagant lengths, yet workers in the field of Israelite topography and tribal traditions, like Mr. Stanley A. Cook, have found elements in the theory which seem to lead in the right direction. It is becoming clear that the Israelite population of Southern Judah contained a large admixture of non-Israelite blood, drawn chiefly from the tribes that roamed the desert of N. Arabia, and that we must allow for an immigration of Hebrew families directly from the South, by way of Kadesh and Beer-sheba, independent of the more general immigration round by the East and across the Jordan.

The publication of the *Encyclopaedia Biblica* (1899–1903) divides Dr. Cheyne's second period from the first. That splendid effort of combined scholarship is dominated throughout by the mind of the principal editor. The aim of the work was to provide something more than a convenient storehouse of information, a stimulus, rather, to fresh investigation by opening up unexplored paths and making a free use of conjecture and suggestion ; and every student acknowledges that this aim has been achieved. It is more difficult to form an estimate of the books that followed. There are brilliant and original things to be noted in *Critica Biblica* (1904), still more perhaps in the *Traditions and Beliefs of Early Israel* (1907) ; but by this time Cheyne had persuaded himself that the traditional text of the Old Testament has undergone a deep and deliberate alteration, and that to recover its original state it needs a revision equally drastic. The evidence which he alleged for his textual theory admits of no verification ; there is no standard to which an appeal can be made except the critic's own opinion of what is probable. The unhappy result has been that his latest books have to some extent

obscured in people's minds the value of his earlier writings.

To do justice to Professor Cheyne as a teacher, we must not overlook a personal trait which was the outcome of a high sense of vocation. Most scholars prefer to let their writings speak for themselves; but he was fond of insisting upon the spirit in which he worked. "Nothing but the most *fearless* criticism, combined with the most genuine spiritual faith in God, and in His Son, and in the Holy Spirit, can be safe." [1] "To me at any rate the exercise of the critical faculty and the historic imagination has been as truly a religious work as joining in the worship of the sanctuary." [2] Some of us can remember the rather unkind raillery which greeted the self-revelations contained in the preface to the Bampton Lectures. How differently these transparent confidences of a rare and sensitive spirit have been appreciated by a sympathetic reader may be seen in a recent article by Professor Nairne, in which he remarks that it is always a hazardous enterprize for any man to tell the story of the growth of his own soul. "St. Augustine and a few others have won us by attempting it, and among those few is Cheyne." [3]

This biographical element runs through most of Professor Cheyne's work, and adds immensely to the interest of it. Moreover, he had the style which reveals the man. The work of his best period is marked by a literary charm and distinction which in itself is an education and a delight. He helped to set the standard of modern English rendering of the Bible. His great commentaries abound in illustrations from general literature, especially from Dante, introduced with the happiest effect. At the same time it must not be supposed that he was less concerned with exact scholarship.

[1] *Founders of O. T. Criticism*, p. 258.
[2] *Origin and Rel. Contents of the Psalter*, p. xxxiv.
[3] *The Challenge*, Feb. 26, 1915.

He declares, in fact, that his main interest lay in philology; the critical notes on Isaiah, the Psalms, and Job could only have been written by one who had laid a solid foundation of grammar and linguistic science.

There was a time when Cheyne stood "alone in Oxford and probably in the Anglican Church," as an advocate of critical theology and new methods of Biblical interpretation; indeed, he was always rather isolated, and lived in an inner circle of his own. It is not surprising, therefore, that he had to fight for his principles. In the face of much opposition, but encouraged also by the attention of intelligent lay people, he made the most of his opportunities at Rochester, where he was a Canon of the Cathedral in virtue of his office as Oriel Professor at Oxford, to popularise the results of the higher criticism.[1] He was never wanting in courage, and never concealed his point of view. Whether he always took the wisest course in commending his teaching may be open to question; he did not go out of his way to conciliate opinion except by his obvious sense of responsibility and spiritual fervour. But the English public sets a higher value upon the quality of judgement in a teacher of new views of religion than upon the boldness of the pioneer and the originality of genius. Cheyne had to suffer no doubt, but he did not suffer in vain. His courage in the days of conflict won for us the liberty which we now enjoy, and his high-toned advocacy has done much to keep Biblical studies religious, and to prove that the sacred interests of the Church have nothing to fear, but everything to gain, from a free and persevering investigation of the documents of the Faith.

G. A. Cooke.

[1] See the sermons published in *The Hallowing of Criticism*, 1888, and *Aids to the Devout Study of Criticism*, 1892.

EXPOSITORY NOTES.

1. Gen. iv. 7: "... *And if thou doest not well.* ..."

Cain, seeing that his offering was not accepted, "was very angry and his countenance fell. (6) And Jahve said unto Cain: Why art thou angry, and why is thy countenance fallen? ..." The sequel of the divine warning, in v. 7, is beset with difficulties. "Every attempt," says Skinner, "to extract a meaning from the *v.* is more or less a *tour de force*, and it is nearly certain that the obscurity is due to deep-rooted textual corruption. ..." The remark, however, does not apply properly to the first part of ver. 7. Here the obvious translation gives a satisfactory sense: "Shall there not, if thou doest well, be *lifting up*? ..." In connexion with the preceding remonstrance in ver. 6, these words may signify that Cain, if his conduct were righteous, would bear a bright countenance, the suggested conclusion being that his gloomy aspect is in consequence of his evil disposition. But the following sentences, in the present condition of the text, are the more perplexing, though the textual corruption, as the supposed cause of the obscurity, might possibly be a superficial one.

"... And if thou doest not well, *sin coucheth at the door*; and unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him." This may be considered a strictly literal translation. But:

1. If the warning thus expressed means anything, its meaning must be that sin, in case of Cain's not well-doing, will be "near at hand," "eager to spring upon and overpower" him (Driver). Would not that sound worse than tautology? One would rather have expected it said that, if Cain does not well, sin already is within and has overpowered him.

2. The second part of the divine warning in ver. 7 is not in keeping or harmony with the first one and with the context in general, in so far as ver. 7*a*, in accordance with 5–6, refers explicitly to Cain's downcast face, whereas ver. 7*b*, in its present form, is out of connexion with that prominent object of the whole passage.

3. If Cain does not well, "sin coucheth *at the door* (לַפֶּתַח) . . ." Why does not the text mention at the door *of whom or what* sin will be couching?

4. The feminine noun חטאת appears in our text treated as masculine, both in the form of the participle רֹבֵץ closely connected with it, and also in the suffixes of תְּשׁוּקָתוֹ and בּוֹ. That רֹבֵץ should be understood as a noun and predicate, I cannot admit.

A slight correction of the text, which would at once remove these four inconveniences, should, on account of that very fact, be held a most plausible one. Now that result will be reached if, instead of חַטָּאת רֹבֵץ, we read חֵטְא תִּרְבֵּץ . . ., taking the final ת of the noun as initial of the following verb. The meaning of the sentence will be: ". . . and if thou doest not well, *thou art couching at the door of sin*; . . ." The masculine חֵטְא would account for the suffixes in תְּשׁוּקָתוֹ and בּוֹ. Then לַפֶּתַח would be provided with its expected complement. The connexion with the main object of the passage would be restored, and harmony with the immediate context re-established, the sentence in ver. 7*b* stating explicitly the conclusion indirectly suggested in 7*a*: Cain's downcast countenance and sullenness are indicative of his state of bondage towards sin. And lastly sin is no more considered as being only "near at hand" in the case of Cain's not well-doing; it is the master at whose door Cain is crouching as the slave.

The parallelism of the final sentence of ver. 7 with Genesis

iii. 16*d* offers no real difficulty. We have to understand ver. 7*c* as a general principle or warning, implying perhaps a comparison with the relation between man and woman, and showing how Cain's condition is just the reverse of what it should be: "surely its (*the sin's*) desire is unto thee (=*sin is always lurking for an occasion to overpower thee*), but thou shouldest rule over it" (just as the man rules over the woman whose desire is unto him). The two parts of the sentence being equally introduced by ו, it might seem, from the ambiguity arising from the simplicity of construction of the Hebrew sentence, as if both were merely connected with the preceding sentence, and subordinated along with this to the conditional clause וְאִם לֹא תֵיטִיב. But this should not more be urged here than in many other instances; comp. Gesen.-Kautzsh, § 154. The two ו's have the effect of emphasising the adversative relation between the two parts of the sentence, as for instance in Genesis xliv. 22 (וְעָזַב אֶת־אָבִיו וָמֵת), or in Genesis xxxiii. 13 (. . . וְדָפָקוּם . . . וָמֵתוּ) they are to the effect of emphasising the conditional connexion.

2. Genesis xliv. 5: *divination cup?*

The steward whom Joseph sends in pursuit of the brothers is ordered to address them with the following reproof for their supposed theft of the cup: "Wherefore have ye rewarded evil for good?" הֲלוֹא זֶה אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁתֶּה אֲדֹנִי בּוֹ וְהוּא נַחֵשׁ יְנַחֵשׁ בּוֹ . . .

The versions and commentaries, old and new, all agree, as far as I am aware, (*a*) in interpreting the sentence here transcribed from the original text as pointing to aggravating circumstances of the theft, and (*b*) in putting on the second part of it the meaning that the cup was the one *whereby* Joseph practised divination. The passage is commonly quoted as a very striking illustration of the method of

divination called *hydromancy*. I venture to think, though this may seem extremely bold, that the passage does not in the least allude to *hydromancy* in particular, and that the cup is not conceived of as an " instrument " of divination.

That the cup was used by Joseph to drink in does not by itself appear as an aggravating circumstance of the theft; nor could the brothers be supposed to have known that that ordinary drinking cup of Pharaoh's minister had to serve also for higher special purposes. The construction of the sentence suggests something quite different from " aggravating circumstances " as being its proper object. Two statements are to be considered by the brothers, each of which refers to the cup in a markedly distinct way. In the first instance the subject is the cup itself: הֲלוֹא . . . זֶה; in the second the subject is the steward's master: . . . וְהוּא. And both subjects are put emphatically in relation one to another, at the beginning of both statements respectively, the construction implying almost the same meaning as the English phrase: *this* on the one hand . . ., and *he* on the other hand. The two closely connected statements evidently are to one and the same effect;—not to describe an aggravating circumstance, but *to explain how the steward's master had so quickly and with such a certainty become aware of the so-called theft committed by the brothers:* " . . . Is it not this which my master had to drink in, and would not he surely divine about it? . . ." On the one hand the master could not fail to miss his cup, and on the other he knew perfectly how to discover the thief.

The preposition in the second בּוֹ does not express the notion of instrumentality, but denotes the object of the action. Comp. the *Lexicon* of Brown-Driver-Briggs, *sub* בְּ, iv. e.

That the interpretation just proposed is the true one,

may be inferred, or receive further confirmation, from the comparison with ver. 15, where Joseph addresses the convicted brothers with the question: "What deed is this that ye have done? *wot ye not that such a man as I can certainly divine?*"

3. 1 Samuel x. 12: *And who is their father?* or: *his father?*

Saul, after he had been anointed by Samuel, was met by a company of prophets, ". . . and the spirit of God came upon him, and he prophesied among them. 11. And when all that knew him before time saw that he prophesied among the prophets, then the people said one to another: What is this that is come unto the son of Kish? Is Saul also among the prophets? 12. And one of the same place answered and said: *And who is their father* (וּמִי אֲבִיהֶם)? Therefore it became a proverb: Is Saul also among the prophets?"

The remark of the bystander, in ver. 12, cannot, we think, have been conceived by the author himself of the narrative as implying an excuse or a justification of Saul's behaviour, against the wondering witnesses, the meaning of the remark being: *But* who is *their* father?="is *their* father more likely than Kish to have had a son a prophet? . . ."[1] A defence of that kind, conveying the suggestion that there was no matter for surprise, would have been a most unsuitable premise to the conclusion: "Therefore (עַל־כֵּן) it became a proverb: Is Saul also among the prophets?" The object of ver. 12, in the author's mind, can have been no other than to state more precisely the motive for wonder, by pointing out how the question about Saul's being among the prophets was *insisted on* by one of the same place who asked about the father.

[1] Driver, *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel*, 2nd ed., p. 83.

According to the context the proper point of the proverb must have been closely connected with the purport of the hint concerning the father. Therefore it is of great importance, in order to determine the meaning of the proverb, that we should try further on to form a correct estimation of the text, and of the intended suggestion of the bystander, in ver. 12.

It has been maintained, notably by Kraetschmar in his pamphlet *Prophet und Seher* . . ., that the proverb was meant and used to express disapproval of the behaviour of one who mingles with people of lower condition, the only possible signification of the bystander's remark being that those prophets were persons of the basest extraction. How can it be that the son of the noble Kish associates himself with fellows whose fathers are not known?

But it seems quite impossible to admit the inference or the supposition that the prophets, even in particular those enthusiastic prophets of Saul's time, were an object of public contempt. How should we have to understand, if this had been the fact, that among the signs given by Samuel by which Saul was to recognise his actual election by God as king over his people was that of his meeting with the prophets and his joining their company? or that Samuel himself is reported (1 Sam. xix. 20, 24) as standing over them? These circumstances are incompatible with the view that association with the prophets was considered to be a dishonourable one, or with the assumption that such a view underlies the narrative in our passage.

The LXX and *Peshiṭta* versions suppose the reading, supported also by some Hebrew manuscripts, אביהו: "and who is *his* father?" the suffix referring to Saul himself. Since the reading אביהם is in unavoidable conflict either with the context or with historical circumstances, the question arises whether the reading אביהו or

אביו were not to be preferred as the primitive one? It would be indeed very easy to understand why "*his* father" should have been changed into "*their* father" by a copyist. How could "one of the same place" have asked who was *Saul's* father, since all the people knew that he was *the son of Kish*, that very circumstance being the cause of their wonder? For the same reason it would seem difficult to account for the change of "*their* father" into "*his* father." The copyist to whom the Massoretic reading most probably traces its origin may be supposed to have put on the bystander's remark the meaning of an excuse, according to the interpretation followed by Driver. But, as was to be expected from his interference, he thus brought into the text a disturbing element, since the suggestion attributed to the bystander would lose its point with regard to the origin of the proverb.

Let us now consider ver. 12 as it should be read according to LXX and Peshiṭta: "And one of the same place answered and said: And who is *his* father?" It cannot be supposed that the author of the narrative intended to make "one of the same place" simply ask *who* was Saul's father, since he states explicitly that Saul was known to all as the "son of Kish." But could not the question have referred to the *quality* or *social standing* of Saul's father? Neither is this likely. The meaning of the question could then hardly have been other than to suggest that Saul's family was not of sufficiently high rank to account for his daring to join the company of the prophets. Now, if Saul's birth was such as not to prevent him from being elected as king, why should or how could it have been felt as an obstacle to his appearing among the prophets, seeing that prophetic inspiration was not a matter of hereditary possession?

However, by the proposed explanations the possibilities

are not exhausted. The term אב, *father*, is used in Hebrew not only to signify the natural father, but also as an appellation of dignity and pre-eminence—more precisely of spiritual pre-eminence, as applied to the priest (Judges xvii. 10; xviii. 19) and to the prophet (2 Kings vi. 21; xiii. 14). Amongst the prophets themselves it may have been used to signify the relation of the chief or spiritual parent to the disciple, as we hear Elisha addressing Elijah with the title: "My father, my father . . ." (2 Kings ii. 12). In a more general way the master (2 Kings v. 13), the counsellor (Gen. xlv. 8), the king (1 Sam. xxiv. 12) are called אב, *father*.

Would not this observation furnish us with a convenient solution of the difficulty? While the people were asking in wonder: "Is Saul also among the prophets?" one of them insisting on the strangeness of his behaviour, expressed in plain terms what the others were thinking, and said: And who was his instructor, who is his patron, his *spiritual* parent or father? Saul was never trained to become a prophet; none is known to have prepared or introduced him to, or received him into, the corporation of the prophets; he cannot be one of its members!

The proverb, according to our interpretation, fitly served as a satirical censure of such as pretended to meddle with matters beyond their competence, or to figure in a society to which they did not belong.

A. Van Hoonacker.

THE DEN OF THIEVES.

Οὐ γέγραπται ὅτι ὁ οἶκός μου οἶκος προσευχῆς κληθήσεται πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν; ὑμεῖς δὲ πεποιήκατε αὐτὸν σπήλαιον λῃστῶν.

In these words St. Mark records one of the strongest condemnations Jesus ever passed upon contemporary Juda-

ism. As not infrequently when He referred to the Old Testament scriptures He used the words not so much in direct approval of the teaching they convey as in illustration of the failure of the Jews of His time to realise and fulfil the principles that underlay the books that they professed to hold as sacred. He did not claim that Judaism was perfect, on the contrary its completion was an essential part of His mission, but He did complain, and with some reason, that those whom He saw taking the highest places in the religious life of the people did not live up to the standard which was already set before them. And, rightly understood, His cleansing of the Temple and the criticism which He passed on the condition in which He found it form one of the most drastic sentences He ever passed on the contrast between the ideal of Judaism and the real thing which He found.

There are two separate passages in the prophets involved. The first is taken from Isaiah lvii. 7, and brings out two of the characteristic features of post-exilic Judaism, its universality and its exclusiveness. For the Jew had been taught to believe that his was the only true God for all men. Alone among the religions of the world, his could be described as a monotheism in the strictest sense. He had been taught that it was his God who was responsible for the whole of creation. Other faiths divided the work among a number of deities and ascribed different origins to a large number of natural objects. Thus the Greek held that the horse was the special creation of Poseidon and the olive of Athene, that the island of Delos had been drawn up from the sea by Zeus and that fire had been the peculiar gift of Prometheus. But the Jewish sacred books, as they were current in the time of Jesus, from their first lines onwards taught that there was only one creator for the whole of the universe. Not merely such nature-Psalms as

xxix. but more decisive passages like Psalm cxxxix. and the teaching of Deutero-Isaiah on the question of creation were familiar to the Jew of the time of Jesus. And he had a philosophy of history. The prophets had seen that the interrelations of men were not dependent on the whim or the conflict of whims of one or more celestial powers. Still less were they the mere chance outcome of human will or of blind circumstance or fate. Even when Israel suffered, she did so because it was her God who saw fit to punish her for her sin, and thereby to avenge some neglect of His law or enforce some disregarded moral lesson. He too had directed the great racial movements of the past. He had brought the Syrians from Qir, the Philistines from Crete. He had used Nineveh as His instrument till her pride and vainglory rendered her unfit for further service. He had directed the armies of Nebuchadrezzar, and guided him in time of uncertainty. He had stirred the heart of Cyrus to restore the penitent race to the home where a new opportunity was to be given to them of fulfilling their task in the regeneration of the world. The earlier monolatrous ideas according to which Yahweh was only one out of many gods of like nature and powers, were already weak before the exile, and had disappeared by the time of the restoration. To the Jew of the time of Jesus his God was not merely the supreme God, He was the only God, the one living and true God, and the deities of the other nations were little more than vain figments of the imagination or diabolical powers. It was his God alone whom the theology of the Jews required all men to acknowledge and worship if they would attain to true spiritual life.

With this claim to the universality of his religion went the claim to the exclusiveness of his race. The Jew believed that his people had been especially chosen to be the recipients of the manifestation of God and of the revelation

of His will. God had dealt and was dealing with other nations, but it was the Jew alone who could deal direct with Him. And from the time of the reform under Josiah there had been only one place in which God could rightly be served. He was to be found everywhere, it was true, but He had appointed one single spot on which to set His name, and nowhere else could sacrifice, the means of the highest communion, be offered to Him. It was in the rites and at the sanctuary of Judaism alone that acceptable service could be rendered to this God who claimed to be alone in the devotions of men. The rest of the world had many shrines, and one never need go far if one wished to offer incense to a false god; there was but one centre where the true God was willing to receive the gifts of His servants. And even though prayer was possible and easy in any place on earth—for God was everywhere—yet the devout Jew turned his face towards the Temple at Jerusalem when he desired to bow before his Maker.

All this is implied in the passage from Trito-Isaiah which Jesus quotes. It would seem to follow as a matter of course that a religion making the claims that Judaism made must be prepared to make arrangements for the inclusion of all men within its borders. And so the Temple was to be a house of prayer "for all nations." All were to find in it their spiritual home and to turn to it in worship. This Jesus emphasises. He says in effect, "You claim that here and here alone men ought to worship God. You pride yourselves on possessing the only road to salvation. You insist that the Gentiles need your God and must seek Him in this Temple. How have you made it available for them? What facilities have you offered to the world that they may come and worship in this house that is called by His name?" And the answer which He Himself gives to this question, an answer based on what He saw, is one

of the sternest that ever fell from His lips—"You have made it a den of thieves."

These words are taken from Jeremiah vii. 11, and in order rightly to understand them, it is necessary to turn back to the prophet who first uttered them. A century before the time of Jeremiah, Israel had been threatened with foreign invasion. Pekah and Rezin had designed to overthrow Jerusalem and divide the territory of Ahaz between them. To Isaiah had been given a message of encouragement and hope; Jerusalem would not be crushed, for it contained the Temple of Yahweh, and He would not see it destroyed. It is true that this was not the only message that Isaiah had to deliver to his people, and his contemporary Micah was even more impressive in his threats of destruction. But the promise given through Isaiah had been fulfilled, and Jerusalem had not fallen to the northern alliance. And it seems as if the seal were set on this element in the teaching of Isaiah, to the exclusion from the popular mind of his denunciations of wickedness, by the mysterious destruction of the army of Sennacherib in 701. During the next century the ethical implications of Isaiah's message had slipped out of sight, leaving only the theologico-political one—that Yahweh would at all costs defend His chosen city and sanctuary. And when Jeremiah and his fellows tried to bring the people back to righteousness and to God by threats of the doom which would fall upon them if they continued to be rebellious, they were met with a partial and distorted version of the teaching of Isaiah, and the parrot cry of "The Temple of Yahweh, the Temple of Yahweh, the Temple of Yahweh are these." That being so, men thought, no harm could possibly befall them. And Jeremiah's answer was this, "You call this the Temple of Yahweh, but you are using it as a den of thieves." That is to say, the Temple was to

them what the cave was to the brigands who made it their home. It was not the scene of their depredations. The picture called up is that of a cleft in the side of an almost inaccessible precipice. The only path leading to it is narrow, and the cave must be approached in single file. A handful of determined men can keep out a whole army in days when there are no explosives for use in warfare. The brigands go out and rob caravans or lay waste the fields, and then if they are pursued they take refuge in their cave. Soldiers cannot follow them with any hope of success, and in the cave they can find a safe shelter from justice. It is that which enables them to commit their crimes with impunity.[1] So the Israelites of Jeremiah's day thought that they could indulge in any form of wickedness they pleased, and then take shelter in the Temple, where they would be safe. So they would be "delivered to commit all these abominations." They looked to Yahweh to be their accomplice in crime, and they had to be told in no mild language what the real implication of their conduct was.

It is our knowledge of the Temple of Herod which enables us to see how apt this quotation was in the mouth of Jesus. The main sanctuary was a rectangular mass of buildings surrounded by a large irregular quadrilateral. This outer space was itself separated from the rest of the city by a wall, and formed the Outer Court. The name "Court of the Gentiles," generally applied to it in later times, is not found in either of our two principal authorities for the picture of the Temple, Josephus and the Mishna tract Middoth. But the name is not unsuitable, inasmuch as this was the only portion of the Temple area to which Gentiles were admitted. The sanctuary proper, with its various courts, stood near the western side of the Outer Court, and its greatest length was from west to east. It was

[1] Cf. Jos. xiv. 15, 4, 5.

raised above the level of the Outer Court and surrounded by a flight of fourteen steps by which the Jewish worshipper could pass from the Outer Court to the sacred enclosure. Round the bottom of these steps ran a balustrade, *τρύφακτον*. Upon this were placed at intervals notices engraved on stone tablets. One of these tablets was recovered by the French consul, M. Clermont-Ganneau, and bears the following inscription :—"*Μηδένα ἀλλογενῆ εἰσπορεύεσθαι ἐντὸς τοῦ περὶ τὸ ἱερον τρυφάκτου καὶ περιβόλου. ὃς δ' ἂν ληφθῃ, ἑαυτῷ αἴτιος ἔσται διὰ τὸ ἐξακολούθειν θάνατον.*"[1] In other words the Jew said to all the Gentile world, "You may come into the Outer Court, but no nearer. If you try to enter the Inner Court, or pass beyond this balustrade, you will immediately be put to death, and your blood be on your own head." Incidentally these facts help us to understand the point of the charge which was levelled against Paul when he was accused of having brought Titus into the Inner Court.

All this means that the Inner Court of the Temple was sanctuary for any Jew who had reason to fear the vengeance of a Gentile. If such a man wished to carry on his business, he could do it best in that Outer Court where all men were admitted, but which was within easy reach of the sacred enclosure. All analogy and experience tend to suggest that the Jews who thus made the Temple their business headquarters were hardly likely to be the best the nation could show. Men from all parts of the Roman Empire—for the Jews went everywhere and were hated everywhere—men who had made Smyrna and Ephesus, Athens and Corinth, Massilia and the great Spanish cities, Alexandria and Rome too hot to hold them,[2] might gather

[1] Cf. Armitage Robinson on *φραγμός*, Eph. ii. 12.

[2] Cf. Juster, *Les Juifs dans l'Empire Romain*, ch. xiv. App. Sec. 2, and the story told in Jos. *Ant.* xviii. 3. 5; for parallel cases of sanctuary in Greek temples, Tac. Arm. iii. 60.

in safety at the Temple and there carry on their international trade. If one of their victims from another part of the world ran them to earth or chanced on them by accident, it only needed a look, perhaps a blow, a few hasty steps and a leap over the balustrade, and the villain was in safety, and could turn back on his pursuer from the shelter of the sacred enclosure and heap upon him volumes of that abuse for which Semitic tongues, with their wealth of sibilants and gutturals, seem so peculiarly fitted—probably not without the further insult of spitting. Such a scene cannot have been infrequent in the time of Jesus, and it is at least possible that on that first evening, when He went in and looked round on the Temple, He saw more than one rascally Jew scuttling into safety behind the barrier. To Him as to no one else must have appealed the contrast between the ideals and possibilities of Judaism on the one hand and its actuality on the other. His quotation from Jeremiah is not a random use of words of condemnation which were familiar to his audience, still less an unpremeditated outburst of righteous anger. It strikes at the root of the whole position of Judaism in the world of His day. For He says in effect, "You Jews claim that yours is the one living and true God. You claim further that Jerusalem is the one city and the Temple the one spot where complete and satisfactory worship may be offered to Him by all nations. Yet what do you offer to the world as an aid to such worship? This—not merely a house of merchandise, a place consecrated to buying and selling and making money, but a collection of the moral dregs of your people, the very scum and offscourings of the nation, of scoundrels and cheats who find in their religion an impunity which will enable them to escape the penalties that are their due, and to continue once more their career of iniquity—a veritable brigands' den."

It would be well if Christianity could ask itself solemnly and seriously how far it is free from the condemnation which Jesus passed on the Judaism of His day. There may be a danger—happily it is less pressing than in an earlier generation—to see in the Christian message a means of escaping from punishment and committing with impunity sins which deserve the utmost penalties. Salvation may be interpreted as deliverance from the consequences of sin rather than from sin itself. And such an interpretation is little short of the worst possible blasphemy, for not merely does it run counter to all that we know of the moral teaching of Jesus, but its effect is to reduce the Cross itself to the level of a mere "den of thieves."

THEODORE H. ROBINSON.

THE GREEK AORIST

I. INTRODUCTION.—RENDERING OF AORISTS IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

THE subject as stated has the merit of brevity, but for the sake of precision we may expand it into the following: An Investigation into the Usage of the Greek Aorist in the New Testament, and its Proper Translation into English. If any one supposes that Greek scholarship is practically at one on this subject, and that hence there is no occasion for discussing it, a comparison of some of the leading translations of the New Testament should disabuse his mind of that error.

Professor Moulton has made such a comparison with regard to the usage of A.V. and R.V. in Matthew.[1] His figures show that in this Gospel A.V. has translated 106 ind. aorists by the English perfect, or in a few cases the present.

[1] *Proleg.*, page 137 ff.

The Revisers reduced this number to 65, translating 41 of the 106 verbs by the simple past. Moulton does not give us the total number of ind. aorists in Matthew, hence we have no means of knowing what *proportion* of them are rendered by the English perfect in each version.

In the search for further evidence, I have examined the Fourth Gospel[1] in A.V., R.V. and the translations of Weymouth and Moffatt, and give a tabulated statement of the results below. The Greek text used was Nestle's, and all the ind. aorists in the Gospel were taken into account excepting some half dozen used in unfulfilled conditions. The table gives the English tenses with which the aorist has been translated:

	A.V.	R.V.	Weymouth.	Moffatt.
Past	651	734	573	578
Perfect	100	37	94	108
Present	21	10	17	11
Pluper.	19	16	40	40
Circumlocution[2]. . .	9	3	76	63
Total	800	800	800	800

Now it is freely acknowledged that to draw sweeping conclusions from such figures as these would be hazardous. Nevertheless several observations may be safely made: (1) A large majority of the aorists are rendered by the English simple past in *all* the versions consulted. Weymouth has the smallest number, yet the proportion is nearly three-fourths. (2) Notwithstanding the fact just noted,

[1] This Gospel was chosen as being an *average* New Testament book—contents varied between narrative, discourses, etc.

[2] Weymouth and Moffatt invariably render the formula ἀπεκρίθη καὶ εἶπεν by one verb. The verb thus omitted I class with the free translations as "circumlocutions."

the English past cannot be regarded as a uniform or universal translation for the aorist indicative. Omitting the cases where they translate freely by a circumlocution, Weymouth renders the aorist by an English tense other than the simple past in 21 per cent. of the examples noted, Moffatt in 22 per cent., A.V. in 18 per cent., and R.V. in 8 per cent. (3) As was intimated at the outset, the renderings of the different versions vary from each other to such an extent as to show that the proper English rendering of the aorist is in many cases a matter of dispute. But the per cents. just quoted bring out a further interesting fact, namely that R.V. differs widely from A.V., which would not greatly surprise us, and that *the more recent translations of Weymouth and Moffatt tend to support A.V.* 21 per cent. and 22 per cent. do not differ greatly from 18 per cent., but the drop to 8 per cent. in R.V. is noteworthy. (4) This peculiarity of R.V. *suggests* as its possible explanation that the Revisers worked with this principle in mind: *The Greek Aorist = the English Past: translate it so whenever possible.* At first thought it may seem that the fact of 65 aorists in Matthew and 47 in John, rendered by the Revisers with the English perfect or present, at once refutes this hypothesis. Yet I do not think that such is the case. We must remember that the task assigned to the Revision Committee,[1] and their own avowed purpose in their work, was not to make an entirely new translation, but to revise the version of 1611. That meant in brief that they were to leave the old renderings unchanged unless there was an emphatic reason for changing them. And on the whole they were faithful to this trust. Of course the points of difference rather than those of identity strike the eye and ear—especially of one who for a lifetime has been accustomed to the familiar phraseology of A.V.; but he who sets himself to look for the identical

[1] See Preface to New Testament in (British) R.V.

renderings in the two versions will be surprised at how numerous—almost constant—they are.

Bearing this fact in mind, let us look again at the figures for the Fourth Gospel. We see that A.V. has 140 aorists translated by some other tense than the simple past (perfect, present or pluperfect) while R.V. has only 63. That means that in 77 cases out of 140—more than one half—the Revisers have considered it necessary to change the A.V. rendering of the aorist from some other tense to the simple past. Certainly they did this because they thought there was a reason for doing it—not from mere caprice. As for the cases where the perfect, etc., were retained they would either be regarded as exceptions to the application of the principle, or else conservatism prevented the making of any change. John iv. 18 might be taken as an illustration of the former: *πέντε γὰρ ἄνδρας ἔσχες*. R.V. "Thou *hast had* five husbands." Whatever view one might hold with regard to the proper force of the aorist tense, he would scarcely dispute that in this particular case the perfect is a better English rendering than the simple past. Cf. vii. 31 (*ἐποίησεν*), x. 32 (*ἔδειξα*), xii. 34 (*ἠκούσαμεν*), xviii. 35 (*ἐποίησας*). On the other hand it would seem that in viii. 29 the principle which guided the Revisers in most cases was overruled by conservatism: *καὶ ὁ πέμψας με μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἀφῆκέν με μόνον*. R.V. "And he that sent me is with me; he *hath* not *left* me alone." Cf. also i. 18, xii. 38, xiii. 14, xviii. 23. I do not mean to contend that the simple past would be better than the perfect in these cases, but simply that there was as much reason for changing to the past as in other cases where R.V. did make the change. Cf., e.g., John xiv. 26, R.V.: "He shall teach you all things and bring to your remembrance all that I *said* unto you" (A.V. "*have said*." Greek: *πάντα ἃ εἶπον ὑμῖν ἐγώ*). Yet in spite of examples like those quoted above, where the Revisers' render-

ings seem rather to have been dictated by a conservative adherence to A.V. or by a "sense of fitness" than to have been evolved from a definite principle, I still think that there is abundant evidence of their having had such a principle in mind.

Chapter xvii. of John's Gospel is worthy of special notice in this connexion. Of its thirty ind. aorists [1] A.V. translates only 8 with the simple past, 21 with the perfect, and 1 with the present. In R.V. the entire 30, without exception, are rendered by the English past. Here again we find both Weymouth and Moffatt supporting the older version. The former has 12 pasts, 17 perfects, and 1 present; the latter 9 pasts, 19 perfects, 1 present, and 1 circumlocution. This chapter is of particular interest for our purpose because, although not narrative, strictly speaking, it has yet a large number of aorists. In simple narrative an aorist is usually shown by its context to refer to a definite act at a definite time, and there is little room for doubt but that the English past is the proper translation (e.g. John xix. 1, *τότε οὖν ἔλαβεν ὁ Πειλᾶτος τὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ ἐμαστίγωσεν.* "Then Pilate therefore *took* Jesus and *scourged* him"). But in John xvii. the context does not at once settle the matter for the translator, hence here was a fine chance for the Revisers to bring their principle *Greek Aorist = English Past* into play. They did so consistently, as we have seen.

This much at least has been made evident, that of the four versions consulted R.V. displays the greatest eccentricity with regard to the translation of the aorist indicative. If only A.V. stood in opposition we would be inclined to say at once that the balance of probability was in favour of the later version. Doubtless, here as elsewhere, the better knowledge of Greek possessed by the Revisers had enabled

[1] In Nestle's text.

them to correct the loose renderings of A.V. and to give the aorist its true force. But the fact of such scholars as Weymouth and Moffatt—having the benefit of whatever advance in Greek scholarship has been made since the Revisers' time—opposing R.V. and going back more nearly to the renderings of 1611, rather tends to throw the weight of probability on the other side. In other words, the evidence is such as to suggest not only that the Revisers worked with a certain theory in mind, but also that their theory may have been an erroneous one.

II. The Dictum of Winer-Moulton.

It should be possible to test both these surmises by consulting the grammatical authority of the Revisers. Fortunately we are not left in doubt as to who was their leading authority. On this point it will suffice to quote from Bishop Ellicott,[1] the chairman of the (British) New Testament Company:

"The true though remote fountain head of Revision, and more particularly of the revision of the New Testament, must be regarded as the grammar written by a young academic teacher, George Benedict Winer, as far back as 1822, bearing the title of a *Grammar of the Language of the New Testament*. . . . It was to Winer that we were all indebted for that greater accuracy of interpretation of the Greek Testament which was recognised and welcomed by readers of the New Testament at the time I mention. . . . Besides their [the Revisers] general knowledge of Greek, which, in the case of the large majority was very great, their knowledge of New Testament Greek was distinctly influenced by the grammatical views of Professor Winer, of whose valuable grammar of the Greek Testament one of our

[1] *The Revised Version of the Holy Scripture*, London, 1901, pages 7 sq. 106 sq.

Company . . . had been a well-known and successful translator."

The reference at the close is of course to the translated and improved edition of Winer published by the Rev. W. F. Moulton in 1870. The date is significant—on the eve of the beginning of the Revision work. Throughout the years that the work was in progress Winer-Moulton was the standard grammar of the New Testament in the English language, hence it was natural that the Revisers should follow it closely, as Bishop Ellicott tells us they did.

I shall here quote from this grammar at some length, and with comments, in order to show, what seems to me clear, that its statements with regard to the force of the aorist and its proper translation are such as would tend to lead the Revisers to the adoption of an erroneous principle :

[1] "The New Testament grammars and expositors have been chargeable with the grossest mistakes in regard to the tenses of the verb. In general these are used in the New Testament exactly as in Greek writers. The aorist refers to the past simply (the simple occurrence of an event at some past time, considered as a momentary act) and is the ordinary tense of narration." With the first two sentences we have no fault to find (presumably he means *other* Greek writers), but the third sentence is scarcely accurate, to say the least. Outside the indicative mood the Greek tenses have very little to do with time,[2] and even in the indicative the time idea seems not always to be present. This illustrates a common misconception, which is at the root of much error. We try to make Greek tenses conform to English or German canons, which is impossible.[3] "Simple occurrence," again, is good, but "past time" and "momentary

[1] Winer-Moulton (Ed. of 1870) 330 ff.
[2] Moulton, *Prol.* 134 sq. ; Robertson (New York, 1914), 824 sq.
[3] Robertson, 821.

act " following rather spoil it. In the sentence *τεσσεράκοντα καὶ ἓξ ἔτεσιν οἰκοδομήθη ὁ νεὸς οὗτος* (John ii. 20) the aorist presents to us the building of the temple as a single concept, though it was a work that had extended over a period of forty-six years, but I fail to see any suggestion of a *momentary* act.[1] " Strictly and properly speaking, no one of these tenses can ever stand for another, as the commentators have in so many ways maintained. [This is quite true, but is not always consistently followed, as we shall see.] Where such an interchange seems to exist, either it exists in appearance only, there being in point of fact some assignable reason . . . why this tense is used and no other [I think this will cover the great majority of cases] ; or else it must be ascribed to a certain inexactness belonging to the popular language, through which the relation of time was not conceived and expressed with perfect precision." This latter explanation, I think, needs to be used with caution. I find first century (A.D.) papyri surprisingly accurate in their use of tenses—even documents that are quite illiterate in other respects. In any case what concerns us more particularly is to guard against inexactness in our own thinking when we try to make the Greek tenses correspond with those of our own language.

Further on we find Winer saying, " In narrative the aorist is used for the pluperfect,"—a rather striking contradiction of his own statement that one tense cannot stand for another. What he has reference to is such cases as John iv. 46, *ἦλθεν οὖν πάλιν εἰς τὴν Κανᾶ τῆς Γαλιλαίας ὅπου ἐποίησεν τὸ ὕδωρ οἶνον.* The English idiom here requires the pluperfect " *had* made," but the aorist is quite in accordance with Greek usage, and it is unkind to accuse the writer of the error of having used it " for the pluperfect."[2] Winer himself

[1] Burton more accurately applies this term " Momentary action " only to such aorists as *ἐξέψυξεν* (Acts v. 5), etc. (p. 19).

[2] Robertson, 829 sq.

states the matter clearly when he says, "The Greeks—who in such cases scarcely ever use the pluperfect—viewed the occurrence simply as a past event, not in its relation to another event also past."

The quotations from Winer thus far discussed have had only an indirect bearing on our inquiry. The aim has been to show that what he has to say about Greek tenses is frequently vitiated by the fact that the author was unconsciously thinking in terms of German or English grammar while writing about Greek. He is by no means alone among Greek grammarians in that respect: it is only because his happens to have been the grammar of the Revisers that we devote so much attention to it here. We pass on now to a dictum of Winer-Moulton which concerns us more directly. *There is no passage in which it can be certainly proved that the aorist stands for the perfect.*[1] Here again we are not disposed to criticise the statement if it be distinctly remembered that we are talking about the Greek perfect, not the English. But did the author keep this distinction clearly in mind? He proceeds to give examples: "Luke i. 1, ἐπειδήπερ πολλοὶ ἐπεχείρησεν . . . ἔδοξε κἀμοι is simple narration, *since many undertook, I too thought*, etc.; similarly in ii. 48, τέκνον, τί ἐποίησας . . . ἐζητοῦμέν σε." Some of us may still think that the English forms with "have" make a better rendering than the simple past in these examples. But let us yield this point for the moment: what then has been proven? That the verbs of these sentences—commonly translated by the English perfect—*should* be translated by the English past, that tense being the English equivalent of the Greek aorist. To prove what the dictum *ought* to mean—i.e., that the Greek aorist is not used instead of the *Greek* perfect—would require an altogether different line of evidence. It would be necessary

[1] Page 344.

to show that in any given case the idea of some effect of the action still existing was not in the writer's mind, for that is the essential idea in the Greek perfect.[1] To assume that the same idea always and necessarily underlies our English tense with the auxiliary " have " is gratuitous and, I believe, misleading.

But for our present purpose we need only note that Winer's[2] position is that no New Testament example can be cited where the Greek aorist is best translated by the English perfect. His statement might be interpreted otherwise, but we cannot well misjudge him when we take his words as he himself evidently understood them.

It is safe to say that no recent grammarian of the Greek language, nor any serious student of Greek, would take this extreme view. Winer's zeal in demonstrating that the Greek writers—even in the New Testament—did not loosely use the aorist for the perfect and the perfect for the aorist is most commendable. But unfortunately when he comes to the application of this important truth, he deduces from it that the Greek aorist is not to be translated by the English tense called the perfect, which is another matter entirely. We may again use John iv. 18 as an illustration : πέντε γὰρ ἄνδρας ἔσχες. Certainly the Greek perfect (ἔσχηκας) would be incorrect here, for it would imply that the woman *still* had the five husbands—at one and the same time. But in English the so-called perfect is undoubtedly the best rendering, for it best conveys the idea of the Greek—namely, that at certain undefined times in the past the woman had been married to five different men.

I believe that in the dictum quoted above we have the grammatical foundation, and explanation, of the peculiarity in the rendering of the aorist observed in R.V. The view

[1] *Prolegomena*, p. 141.
[2] i.e., the Winer-Moulton Grammar, and so elsewhere.

of Winer-Moulton was the view of the Revisers—namely, that the aorist was used by the New Testament writers with scrupulous exactness (which, generally speaking, is true), and that this exactness, as a rule, is to be reproduced in English by the simple past tense (which I fear is an unsafe principle to follow).

To be sure the Revisers did not try to apply their principle as strictly as their authority seems to have meant it—that fact must be borne in mind. E.g. in Luke i. 1—quoted by Winer as an illustration of his principle (see above)—R.V. translates with the English perfect. So also in four of the five other examples cited in that connexion.[1] Their conservatism—and even more their sound common sense—saved the Revisers in many individual cases from error which strict adherence to their principle would have led them into. But that they had such a principle constantly in mind seems to me to be a well-attested fact.

We have seen that their view of the aorist led the Revisers into a position which involves conflict not only with A.V. but also with one translator at least (Moffatt), who had the most advanced Greek scholarship of our own day at his command. We have seen also that this view had its grammatical source in a principle which, as understood, was unsound. We have seen that the Revisers themselves, in many cases, found the theory untenable, and that some of their renderings which commend themselves most to our judgment are those in which they followed their "sense of fitness" as the higher law. Therefore, while not forgetting that in John we found almost three-fourths of the ind. aorists rendered with the English past by the common consent of all the versions, we may yet safely infer that the equation *Greek Aorist* = *English Past* is not to be taken as a hard and fast principle of translation.

[1] Luke ii. 48, xiv. 18, 19, Phil. iii. 12, John xvii. 4.

III. The Principles of Weymouth.

What then *is* a safe working principle? Can we hope to find one, or must we trust entirely to our "sense of fitness"—a somewhat precarious guide? One noteworthy attempt has been made to answer this question. I refer to a pamphet *On the Rendering into English of the Greek Aorist and Perfect*, by Dr. Richard Francis Weymouth, originally published in the *Theological Monthly* for July and September, 1890. Dr. Weymouth goes to the heart of the subject by inquiring first into the true nature and force of the Greek aorist, and second into the true nature and force of the English tenses commonly used to translate it.[1] Thus he very properly lays emphasis on the fact that our problem is largely one of Comparative Grammar: we must not hastily assume that a given tense in one language is the equivalent of a given tense in another language—even though, as in the case of the perfect, they are designated by the same name.[2]

The aorist, he points out, is essentially an *indefinite tense*, as the very derivation of the word should teach us (from ἀόριστος). When the Greek writer wishes to emphasise the incompleteness of an action or state he uses the imperfect tense; if his desire is to call attention to the action as completed and linked in some way with the present, the perfect is the tense to which he turns. But supposing he cares nothing about either of these distinctions, his wish being only to speak of the event itself *as such*—then the aorist is his tense, for it has exactly that *indeterminate* force.[3] There is nothing particularly new or startling about this. Most of the grammars have said the same thing in one way or

[1] Page 16 sq. [2] Page 3.

[3] "Das Factum wurde einfach constatiert ohne Rücksicht auf Zeitdauer," Brugmann, 159. See Burton, *New Testament Moods and Tenses*, 16 sq. The verbs in John iv. 18, vii. 31, x. 32, xii. 34, xviii. 35—already quoted above—will serve as New Testament illustrations.

another, though some of them would seem to have forgotten it as soon as it was said. But a question arises here. If the aorist is an indefinite tense why is it that in the majority of cases we find it used in sentences where the action expressed is quite definite both as to time and state? (I open the Greek Testament at random and take Matthew v. 1 as an illustration: *Ἰδὼν δὲ τοὺς ὄχλους ἀνέβη εἰς τὸ ὄρος*, "And seeing the multitudes he *went up* into the mountain.") Weymouth's answer is to draw a distinction between *narrative* and *non-narrative* composition.[1] In narrative, he holds, the aorist is used when the time is defined; but "the definiteness is supplied by the notes of time that appear somewhere in the context." His position, then, may be briefly stated as follows: The action denoted by the aorist is definite in narrative, indefinite in non-narrative.

With regard to the English past tenses Weymouth's view is somewhat more revolutionary. English grammars frequently refer to our English simple past (preterite) tense as the "Indefinite Past,"[2] while Greek grammars *assume* the same thing when they refer to the aorist as an indefinite tense and treat the English past as its equivalent. In the Preface to the R.V. of the New Testament (III. 2) we find a reference to "the use of the indefinite past tense in Greek and English." The tenses referred to are the Greek aorist and the English past. In opposition to this, Weymouth insists that our English past is always and only and inherently a *definite* tense, and that our true past indefinite is the tense formed with the auxiliaries "has" and "have"—commonly called the perfect. He uses the following as illustrations: "Many a battle have I fought" (indef.); "I fought in three battles in that campaign" (def.); "I

[1] Page 14 sq.

[2] See e.g. Banks' *English Master* (1823), p. 64; A. M. Williams' *Eng. Gram. and Comp.* (1909), p. 92.

have built bridges of all kinds " (indef.); " I built two bridges in the course of that summer " (def.); " German I have learnt, but not Polish " (indef.), " I learnt Polish once, but soon forgot it " (def.). He denies that this definiteness of the English past comes from the context, as in the case of the Greek aorist. " If some old general says, ' I fought in three battles,' either the year or campaign referred to have been previously mentioned by the same or by another speaker, or we feel that the sentence is unfinished." [1]

Combining Weymouth's two conclusions, we have his rule of translation, which at first thought seems very simple: *Translate narrative aorists by the English past, aorists not in narrative by the English perfect.*[2]

FRANK EAKIN.

[1] See Burton, *Moods and Tenses*, pp. 23–30.

[2] Of course Weymouth, in common with other translators, makes use of the English present and pluperfect in some cases as a rendering for the aorist, but space forbids any discussion of these here.

(To be concluded.)

PAULINE LETTERS FROM AN EPHESIAN PRISON.

The present writer has a distinct recollection of having, many years ago, looked at an illustration in some book representing St. Paul's prison at Ephesus. Although unable to recall where the picture was seen, the memory of that tower upon a ridge thus designated persisted, and for a considerable time the feeling has remained that some of the problems of the apostle's life would be much simplified by the assumption of some period of durance in the capital of Asia.

Such an opinion, however, had to be held and taught with much diffidence, for in regard of direct evidence it is true enough to have to admit, as Sir W. M. Ramsay did (*DB*, i. 725), that "there is no record that St. Paul was imprisoned in Ephesus." One shrank from being "a voice crying in the wilderness" against the generally accepted view that the "Epistles of the Captivity" were written from Rome.

But now that a scholar like Deissmann (*Light from Ancient East*, 229 f.; *St. Paul*, 16, 18, 222) allows that some lightening of difficulties might be achieved by a reconsideration of the place of imprisonment whence some or all of these letters were issued, it may not be without usefulness to put before the readers of this magazine a general and tentative statement of the indirect evidence, which may indeed appear to be weak and uncertain piece by piece, but possesses a cumulative force which, taken as a whole, at least merits careful consideration.

It will be readily conceded that there are large gaps in

our knowledge both of the hardships and of the travels of the apostle of the Gentiles. The silences of Acts suggest this (xvi. 6 f., xix. 19 ff., etc.); so does the catalogue of untoward experiences, which includes frequent imprisonments, from St. Paul's own hand (2 Cor. xi. 23 ff.; cf. vi. 4 f.); so also his correspondence implies journeyings of which we have no record (Rom. xv. 19, 2 Cor. xi. 25 f., xiii. 1); and even the statement concerning the two years' use of the lecture-room of Tyrannus does not necessarily imply that he never left Ephesus by land or sea (Acts xix. 10). Besides, there are the difficulties arising from the allusions in the so-called Pastoral Epistles, should any portions thereof date from the period preceding the "two whole years" at Rome (Acts xxviii. 30).

The evidence of names of persons mentioned in the letters in question had better be taken, and this will be found to involve that of places also. For personal detail which may be helpful let us turn first to that most intimate and self-revealing of the Pauline letters, the Epistle to Philemon.

The writer is a prisoner (1), and the little note is usually supposed to have been sent from Rome to far-away Colossae. But if the runaway slave, *Onesimus*, who furnishes the occasion for and also the main topic of the letter, had been sought for by his master, he may be regarded as a "wanted" man; and although very lengthy journeys were planned out and executed by St. Paul, people are apt to assume too readily the ease with which the fugitive would reach the heart of the Empire without arrest, as if he had been a stowaway on an ocean cargo-boat from Liverpool in days gone by. Moreover, means and influence, at least in the slave world, would have to be presupposed for the success of so extensive a journey.

But why should we burden ourselves with these difficulties when Ephesus, the metropolis of Asia, a great trading port

with a large slave population, was within a few days' road travel, and possibly Onesimus had acquaintances there already. Perhaps he had been seized for debt (11, 18), and had undergone detention in the same prison as the apostle, for the latter says that he had begotten him in his bonds (10), and this would be a less likely occurrence under the freer conditions which obtained at Rome (Acts xxviii. 30 f.).

St. Paul, further, seems to have made himself responsible for the return of the " unprofitable " slave to his master (12), although he was desirous of retaining him for a personal minister (13). The whole of this brief note carries the implication that the episode would soon be closed (15), and the author's chivalrous offer to defray the loss incurred (18 f.) could shortly, if necessary, be made good. Indeed, St. Paul is so hopeful of speedy release that in a few days at any rate he expects to be himself a guest in his convert Philemon's house (19, 22).

Now it is very necessary to notice the names of those Christians who are associated with St. Paul in the closing salutation : Epaphras—he too is in prison likewise for the Gospel's sake (23), and Mark, Aristarchus, Demas, and Luke, who are " fellow-workers " (24); while Timothy " the brother " participates with the apostle in the opening greeting (1). It is, moreover, an accepted conclusion, and rightly so, that the messenger who bears this note is identical with the one who carries the letter to the church at Colossae wherein the home of Philemon was situated, and that is clearly Tychicus, the confidential friend who knew all St. Paul's affairs (iv. 7 f.); but he is accompanied by Onesimus, the slave who is returning home, now warmly commended, and who is also intimately acquainted with the apostle's recent experiences (9).

Of these Colossian Christians' " faith in Christ Jesus " and of their " love toward all the saints " (i. 4) St. Paul had

heard from reliable first-hand witnesses, above all from *Epaphras*, their fellow-townsman and evangelist, and their own messenger and minister to the apostle's needs (7 f.). And in his gratitude for their anxious service he prays for rich spiritual benediction upon his unseen and unknown benefactors who were zealous for his well-being (ii. 1), for whom in some manner that we cannot certainly define he had been undergoing acute sufferings and tribulations (*θλίψεων*, i. 24). These stedfast and solicitous but unmet friends are to pray for that more open intercourse which his speedy release would bring (iv. 3), and their fears will be allayed by the personal information to be gathered from Tychicus and Onesimus (7 ff.). There seems to be no hint here of a prolonged lapse of time—something like two months —before the comforting intelligence reaches them.

Now it is to be remarked that the salutations to a Christian community personally unvisited are naturally wider in scope than those to the individual recipient of the private note ; yet Aristarchus, comrade in captivity, and Mark—who requires further definition and commendation—send a message in the church-letter also (10). It might be supposed that Aristarchus was already at liberty when Philemon was penned, but there is no reason why he should be designated in exactly the same way, any more than Epaphras, in both writings. Another Jew of whom they may be presumed to have heard, or who had come across them in missionary travel, Jesus Justus, joins in the greeting of St. Paul's fellow-workers (11) ; while Epaphras, of course, their own special representative, sends prayerful salutation, because he is abiding with the apostle—for it is he who is termed " fellow-prisoner " to Philemon, his labour for the Gospel having brought him into conflict with the authorities—or at least residing in the city whence he writes, and receives high praise from the sender for his loving toil on behalf of the

Christians of the district Colossae—Laodicea—Hierapolis (12 f.). Ephesus would then appear to fit the circumstances much better than far-distant Rome in his case as well. Furthermore, Luke, so tenderly designated "the beloved physician," as if St. Paul had lately been in special need of his skill, and Demas, are names familiar not only to the comparatively rich member of the local church but also to the religious community as such (14). Frequent intercourse, too, is implied between the neighbouring house-churches of Laodicea and Colossae by the messages which are to be communicated from the one to the other, and by the interchange of letters which is bidden to be effected (15 f.). Unless these greetings constitute a postscript after some interval it is to be surmised from their form that the letter to that other unvisited church of the Lycus valley, Laodicea, had been already dictated.

Now it is an eminently workable hypothesis to assume—granting its authenticity—that what has long been called "Ephesians" is identical with this epistle to the Laodiceans. For it is of a more impersonal nature, and there is just that combination of likeness and difference between the two letters which would suggest the utility of interchange. Philemon of Colossae St. Paul knew, and that intimately; at Laodicea he had no personal friends, and therefore the letter to the house-church there contains no direct personal greetings. Even Timothy has no share in the salutation (Eph. i. 1), either because, as one deems the more likely, he was personally unknown to the addressees, or because he was absent from St. Paul's side at the time of writing, being engaged on one of his journeyings on the apostle's behalf. The writer's condition as a prisoner comes out more emphatically to these Laodiceans, which perhaps suits a prior place in the order of writing; and Tychicus would naturally visit them first. It is for Gentiles such as they that he is

" the prisoner of Christ Jesus " (iii. 1), and as " the prisoner in the Lord " he stimulates them to worthiness of life (iv. 1), while the gloom of his chamber of detention may have suggested the strong contrasts of light and darkness (v. 7 ff.), for he was " an ambassador with a " criminal's and not an official's " chain " (vi. 20). Here again it is Tychicus who will travel round with the personal intelligence to relieve as speedily as may be their expressed anxiety with regard to his state, and the terms suggest some specialness in the mission of " the beloved brother " to them (21 f.).

Next, it is expedient to learn from other sources in what localities these same persons, or any of them, were closely associated with St. Paul. The mention of *Luke*, the companion and medical adviser of the apostle (Philem. 24, Col. iv. 14), does not afford us any decisive information as to the place of writing, because we know him to have been with him on both sides of the Aegean and also in Rome, from the witness of the Acts. To the present writer the silence of this book as to the whereabouts of Luke during the period in question was for some time the most serious difficulty in the way of the Ephesian hypothesis, because he is generally supposed to have been stationed at Philippi at this time, until he rejoined St. Paul on the last voyage to Jerusalem (xx. 6); and, moreover, there is no " we " phrase connected with Asian events in the meanwhile. But there is nothing definite to afford grounds for asserting that Luke abode in Philippi only throughout the intervening years, and so could not participate in personal greetings to inland churches of Asia; and the absence of the first person plural is no real stumblingblock to the theory, because when the description of the episodes recorded in Acts is examined no occasion for its use seems to occur. One feels, further, that something more than the brief wait of the ship at Miletus lay behind

the unwillingness of the apostle to revisit the city of Artemis (xx. 16).

The silence of another author should have brief notice before passing on. Ignatius, in writing to the Ephesians, has a direct reference to St. Paul by name (xii. 2), but this does not mention any imprisonment there in so many words ; yet this *argumentum e silentio* cannot be said to exclude it, for the descriptive attributes applied to him are general, and the reference almost immediately follows an allusion to the writer's own fetters (xi. 2), and such might be endured in the " footsteps " of the blessed apostle as well as the final martyrdom at Rome (xii. 2).

But to return. The confidential messenger entrusted with the delivery of these letters, *Tychicus*, is a man of Ephesus, like Trophimus (Acts xxi. 29), or at the least an Asian also (xx. 4). The former is probable ; as, whatever the date of the allusion in the Pastorals, it is to Ephesus that he is sent (2 Tim. iv. 12) at a time when Trophimus was convalescent at Miletus near by (20). We are told, moreover, that Tychicus was a member of the party that preceded St. Paul from Macedonia, and awaited him at Troas ; and it is at least a permissible inference that he had accompanied the apostle from Corinth on this occasion, because it is generally supposed that he was one of the unnamed intermediaries between St. Paul at Ephesus and the Christian community of the Isthmian port, spoken of as associated with Titus on his eager yet delicate mission : either " the brother whose praise is in the gospel " (2 Cor. viii. 18), and appointed specially in connexion with the pecuniary contributions from Europe (19, although as early as Origen this was surmised to be Luke ; but he is not termed " brother " elsewhere), or else " our brother . . . many times proved earnest " and confident in the rehabilitating of the Corinthians (22). If the one be Tychicus, the other may well be

his fellow-countryman and other-time companion of travel, Trophimus. Thus, as is confirmed by the aforementioned reference in the Pastorals (2 Tim. iv. 12), he is closely associated with the Christian intercourse between Asia and Macedonia (or Achaia), and, to utilise the other allusion to him in those letters, Ephesus or Corinth is a more likely starting-point for the proposed mission to Crete than Rome (Tit. iii. 12). It would not therefore cause any surprise to find Tychicus at the apostle's disposal in Ephesus during his incarceration there.

Of those whose names occur in both letters addressed to Colossae *Mark* is the best-known figure: he is assuredly familiar by repute to the church there, and he is commended in order to ensure a welcome on his expected visit. Such "commands" regarding his reception inevitably remind us of the half-apologetic tone when Timothy is bidden to "take up" Mark, who is clearly working in association with him, possibly on the road of his travel towards his master, because "he is useful for ministering" (2 Tim. iv. 11). And this in turn recalls the Lucan phrase in Acts, "they had John to their minister"—as their attendant, ὑπηρέτην (xiii. 5); but, more important, it involves a sphere of work for Mark in the neighbourhood of Ephesus, which fits in well with the implication of the greetings to Colossae, and harmonises with the theory of the Asian capital as the locality of imprisonment and of the dictating of the aforesaid letters in which he is so mentioned. Furthermore, it is in Asia Minor that Mark is well known, according to the greeting in 1 Peter—the question of authorship aside—on the assumption of the correctness of the address (v. 13; i. 1). At that time he was associated with St. Peter in Rome, as tradition held, as his "interpreter," which tradition itself emanates from Asia (Papias, *ap.* Euseb. *H. E.* iii. 39).

Again, *Aristarchus*, definitely called συναιχμάλωτος in the

letter to Colossae (iv. 10), is known to the wealthy convert Philemon also (24). He was, according to the evidence of the Acts (xx. 4; xxvii. 2), a native of Thessalonica, and with Gaius, his fellow-countryman, was seized at the time of the turmoil at Ephesus in connexion with the silversmiths' riot (xix. 29). And the evident unfilled spaces in the story of the Acts here, together with the lack of preciseness of time-indication (19–23; xx. 1), leave plenty of room for an arrest and imprisonment of the leader, which it would have been no doubt impolitic for Luke to lay stress upon in the apologetic narrative dedicated to Theophilus. For a part of the period it is quite likely that apostle and disciple were in durance together, as also awhile was Epaphras (Col. iv. 10). Nevertheless we know that the Macedonian "companion in travel" was not only one of the representatives (with Secundus) of Thessalonica on the final journey to the Holy City (Acts xx. 4), but also that—whether he had returned in the meantime, an interval of over two years, or no—he is especially named by Luke as starting with them upon the Romeward voyage from Caesarea (xxvii. 2). Yet seeing that no further allusion is made to him, it is probably correct to infer that he was travelling to his native land and so did not trans-ship with St. Paul and the other prisoners to the Alexandrian corn-vessel sailing for Rome (6). Thus we possess the certain information that he was associated with the "collection" delegates, and was a travel-companion on the route Macedonia—Ephesus—Jerusalem. As there is no hint of any of his colleagues being imprisoned with St. Paul at Caesarea, all the indications appear to point to Ephesus as the most probable place in this case also.

Only a few words can be said about *Demas*, the "fellow-labourer" who joins in saluting both Philemon (24) and the Colossian church (iv. 14). He seems to have been a native of the same locality as Aristarchus; for in that refer-

ence in the Pastorals (2 Tim. iv. 10) which implies at the least a want of self-sacrifice and of co-operation with St. Paul's plans, whatever the exact date may be, he has gone to Thessalonica. Should the Demetrius who is strongly commended in 3 John (12) as if once out of favour be the same person, that would give him further association with Asia, but the name is not uncommon, and the years are too far apart for identification to be probable. Similar reasons, it may be remarked, hold good against identifying the Onesimus, in having whom as bishop the Ephesians, according to Ignatius (Eph. i. 3, etc.), are so greatly blessed, with the slave of the same name in the letters under discussion.

One more, *Timothy*, with whom Mark was closely associated in work in Asia, according to the allusion quoted above from the Pastorals (2 Tim. iv. 11), is obviously a familiar personage to the Colossian Christians, and is in close relationship with the apostle at the time of the mission of Tychicus bearing the letters, as the opening greetings testify (Col. i. 1 ; Philem. 1) : in each he is termed "the brother." But Ephesus is very intimately connected with the story of Timothy's movements, for after participating in evangelistic work with his spiritual father during the first long visit to Corinth, it is at the capital of the province of Asia that we find him as one of St. Paul's "ministers" (Acts xix. 22), when he is sent with Erastus on a mission in advance to Macedonia. This, if the loose chronological definition of Acts here be reliable, was some time before the meeting of the silversmiths' guild. With this information the testimony of 1 Corinthians agrees, for according to it, whether he had returned to Ephesus in the meanwhile or not, before the conclusion of the apostle's lengthy sojourn in the city Timothy proceeded to Corinth, and St. Paul was anxious about his reception there (xvi. 10 f.), while earlier in the

letter he had commended him in tender and affectionate terms as his ambassador and the remembrancer of his teaching (iv. 17). He looked to meet his helper again speedily, accompanied by the brethren and bringing pleasant tidings (xvi. 11), but in this he was disappointed. Although Timothy shares the salutation which opens our 2 Corinthians, it is Titus who seems to have been the trusted leader of a subsequent deputation, whose return was awaited during the profitably utilised delay at Troas (ii. 12 f.), but whose presence brought vast relief to the apostle when he had already arrived himself in Macedonia (vii. 6 f.), and some suppose that Timothy is the injured person referred to in veiled and forgiving terms a little later (12). If any further evidence be needed of the Ephesian centre of Timothy's toil on behalf of the Gospel, we are told that he was a member of the apostle's *entourage* when he crossed to Asia on the way to Jerusalem (Acts xx. 4 ff.), and we hear of him no more in the Lucan narrative : he probably remained in the Asian province. Moreover, at an earlier date, the first salutation to Ephesus in the brief note from Corinth (for such we believe it to be, Rom. xvi. 21) comes from him ; and 1 Timothy implies again a responsible sojourn of some extent at Ephesus, at a time when St. Paul was travelling into Macedonia (i. 3). The apostle links Timothy with himself in the greeting of his affectionate letter to the saints at Philippi (i. 1), and this would—on the currently accepted hypothesis of its place of writing—involve his joining St. Paul in Rome, at some period subsequent to the voyage thither described in Acts ; and, in the absence of other helpers, the apostle contemplates sending Timothy " shortly " or even " forthwith " to know their state, and hopes to follow " shortly " himself if all goes well (ii. 19 ff.). Lastly, relying on the personal touches in our 2 Timothy, it is to be inferred that the " beloved child " was summoned from Asia by St. Paul at Rome

(i. 17), during the imprisonment whose issue was not hopeful (iv. 9 ff.); and this stands apart from the question whether Philippians was written from the Imperial city or not.

One or two other figures that appear in the Pauline epistles may be summoned as silent witnesses to some grave crisis, involving imprisonment at the least, in the Asian metropolis.

We know that those loyal co-religionists and fellow-craftsmen, Prisca and Aquila, the tentmakers, who welcomed St. Paul at Corinth (Acts xviii. 2 f.), and supplied him with information concerning the Christians at Rome, were with the apostle at Ephesus when he wrote 1 Corinthians. They provided one of the house-churches in that great city, and were apparently the most conspicuous among the Christian workers there (xvi. 19). Further, we are enabled to infer from the short note of many salutations written from Corinth —possibly on a later visit which passages in 2 Corinthians, etc., seem to make feasible, if not necessary—that they had incurred terrible risks, even of life itself, for the apostle's sake, presumably in effecting his acquittal or escape at Ephesus (Rom. xvi. 4).

On St. Paul's own testimony he had, literally or figuratively, "fought with beasts" there (1 Cor. xv. 32), and had many opponents to contend with, even at a time when "a great door" was opened unto him (xvi. 9). The prolonged residence of these faithful and industrious Jews has also the support of the witness of the Acts. After a stay of considerably over a year and a half at Corinth (xviii. 11, 18), when St. Paul started for Syria, he took Prisca and Aquila with him, and left them at Ephesus, where they toiled for the cause all the time until his return on the so-called Third Journey. In the interval, Apollos, "mighty in the scriptures," was being specially trained by them before he passed

over to work in Corinth (26 ff.). Thus their influence in the capital was well established, and could be beneficially utilised on the apostle's behalf, as fellow-Jew and fellow-craftsman, when the period of stress for him in their city came about, whether that were after the extraordinary excitement which must have followed the exorcisms and the burning of the magical books (xix. 19), and had been fomented by the hostile Jews with whom the cleavage had occurred long before, a few months after his arrival, or else subsequently to the rising of the mob stimulated by the shrine-makers (41). Once again, considering that the autobiographical passage in 2 Timothy bears authenticity on its face, we learn therefrom that Prisca and Aquila are still domiciled at Ephesus, and still the chief personages of the Christian community, for to them is addressed the first salutation (iv. 19).

With regard to Apollos, mentioned above, we are aware that he had been stationed for some time at Ephesus, before taking up his eager work against the Jewish opponents in Corinth (Acts xviii. 27 f.); where indeed his repute came to be such that his name was attached to one of the religious factions through which the peace of the church there was broken (1 Cor. i. 12), although Christianity was well established in the Isthmian city by St. Paul, Silas and Timothy long before his arrival (iii. 6; cf. 2 Cor. i. 19, 1 Thess. i. 1, 2 Thess. i. 1); but he was back again and resident in Ephesus when 1 Corinthians was written, yet, although he too is affectionately termed "the brother" by St. Paul, it was evidently expedient in the present condition of the church in Achaia that he should await a more suitable opportunity for revisiting them (xvi. 12). In the epistle to Titus—all questions of date and place of writing left aside—Apollos is clearly engaged on some apostolic mission, with "Zenas the lawyer" (perhaps conveying the letter

also or else shortly to be expected in Crete), during the execution of which one summer the island is upon his line of route. This appears more likely than that he should be starting on an evangelising journey in Crete itself (Titus iii. 13). In the season of open sailing the island would only be a few days' voyage from Ephesus. Thus, if the question is asked, Why does not Apollos appear in the greetings to the Colossian district, if St. Paul wrote letters from an Ephesian prison, one might say: either he was absent from the capital of the province at Corinth or acting as the apostle's legate on some temporary mission of the nature implied in Titus, or else he was—coming as he did from Egypt and soon going to Greece—unknown to the Christians of the Lycus valley, and so naturally unmentioned.

Two other names appear for a moment on a page of the New Testament, in that same brief greeting from Corinth, in which Prisca and Aquila hold the foremost place. They are Andronicus and Junias, fellow-Tarsans perhaps, at least fellow-countrymen (*συγγενεῖς*) of the apostle; but more than that they have been fellow-prisoners with him (*συναιχμαλώτους*), Christians indeed before him, and withal distinguished among the apostles (Rom. xvi. 7). Was it when St. Paul was under detention in an Asian prison that they shared his condition, or were they comrades in his confinement on some other unrecorded occasion, known to the addressees, in Asia Minor?

There are, in addition, some expressions suggestive of imprisonment which occur in one of St. Paul's letters to Corinth, indited on the way through or across (cf. Rom. xv. 19) Macedonia. The Asian experience is here (2 Cor. i. 8) termed *θλῖψις*, and no issue but death seemed to be anticipated, and there were others apparently in the same grave peril—*αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ ἀπόκριμα τοῦ θανάτου ἐσχήκαμεν*—had not God rescued him and them alike.

This word ἐρύσατο too is noteworthy, because it is the term used for a critical situation on another occasion in the apostle's career when imprisonment is presupposed :—in that vivid transcript from experience, " I was delivered out of the mouth of the lion . . . the Lord will deliver me " (ἐρύσθην . . . ῥύσεται, 2 Tim. iv. 17 f.). Θλῖψις, moreover, is the very word utilised to describe the sufferings concerning which the Laodiceans—if that be the church addressed—are so extremely anxious (Eph. iii. 13) ; so it is to the Colossians, as previously noticed (i. 24). All these hints point to Asia, and thus to Ephesus, as the scene of grave sufferings and intense tribulation, the details of which would be conveyed orally by the accredited representatives of the apostle in each several case, and would therefore require no written record in the epistles. After such torture, mental as well as physical, St. Paul must have left Ephesus for Troas more or less broken. Titus, at last, brought about the much needed joyful reaction.

Besides the brief reference above, a few words should be added concerning Philippians, which letter is generally linked with Ephesians—Colossians—Philemon as emanating from the same captivity. The present writer has been in the habit of regarding those intimately connected letters as having been issued from Ephesus during a period of confinement there, while retaining the old view in respect of the epistle to the church at Philippi. Yet now that the use of specific terms like " Caesar's household " and " the praetorium," which seemed to mark out Rome, is realised as being possible elsewhere (cf. Deissmann, *Light from East*, 230), the locality of writing for that epistle of the captivity appears to be no more certainly that which is usually accepted. Assuredly Ephesus was much nearer at hand for these beloved converts' acts of grace, and troubles arising from the Jews had indeed been acute enough there

also to justify the severe language about them in this letter (iii. 2 ff.), while the doctrine of the exaltation of Christ over all other powers (ii. 9 ff.) awakens echoes of the thoughts in Ephesians—Colossians. Timothy, moreover, who is to be the apostle's special messenger (ii. 19 ff.), has been found, according to the testimony of the Corinthian correspondence, to be closely associated with him at Ephesus, just as in two of those letters which this paper is assuming to have been indited therefrom. And despite the χαρὰ of this epistle, the θλῖψις, noted as characteristic of the Asian experience, has been acute, and a "despairing of life" has been upon the writer (i. 20 ff.; cf. Rom. xvi. 4).

But this is a problem which demands further and detailed consideration; for should Philippians also come to be ascribed to the Ephesian period, it would mean that probably only portions of the so-called "pastoral" correspondence are all that we now possess from the apostle during his captivity in Rome.

So far we have only put under examination writings of the New Testament. But there is a witness for the imprisonment of St. Paul at Ephesus which cannot be lightly set aside, and that is the fragment of the Acts of Paul which is quoted commonly as part of the Acts of Paul and Thecla (cf. Robinson, *Journal of Biblical Literature*, xxix. part 2). The fact that this tradition from the Journeys of Paul, preserved by Nicephorus Callisti (*H.E.* ii. 25), and alluded to by implication in Hippolytus (*Comm. in Dan.*, iii. 29), relates episodes connected with an imprisonment at Ephesus, must be allowed weight, as being comparatively early evidence confirmatory of the indirect data which the New Testament itself supplies.

Briefly, the fragment—whose details display obvious similarities to the experience of Thecla at Iconium, and is probably from the same author—tells how the mob of the

Asian capital had St. Paul chained (cf. "Eph." vi. 20) and imprisoned, previous to being given to the lions (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 32). Two Ephesian ladies, who were disciples, came at night to be baptized, and the apostle, freed from his fetters by divine power, fulfilled their wish upon the seashore, returning to the prison undetected. The story continues by narrating how a gigantic lion and other beasts would not touch him, and how after a terrible hailstorm the governor of the city was converted and baptized. This episode is placed before St. Paul's departure for Macedonia and Achaia (Acts xix. 21; xx. 1). Now whatever may be the legendary accretions involved in this story, if it represents, as seems probable, a second-century tradition, it must be conceded that it does afford additional evidence for the historicity of an incarceration of the apostle in Ephesus, and that before the journey across Macedonia and the subsequent voyage past the city to Jerusalem for the last time.

The view set forth in this article, that there exists indirect testimony not to be hastily dismissed suggestive of an imprisonment at Ephesus, whence epistles of the captivity may be dated, will of course, if it finds favour, demand considerable rearrangement of St. Paul's literary activity. But account will have to be taken of it. Theories also concerning the Pastoral Epistles—or their genuine portions—will have to undergo readjustment. For instance, the mission of Titus, perhaps a visit of the apostle, to Crete (Tit. i. 5) might possibly have to be included in the period of the Ephesian activity, for in the open weather the island was within a few days' sail from the Asian port. And was 1 Timothy penned during that extended interval while the apostle was in Macedonia (i. 1) before the months at Corinth (Acts xx. 1 ff.), the "true child" rejoining his spiritual father previous to the final voyage eastward?

And so on. These, and others, are large questions, involving very delicate handling of probabilities deducible from very scanty material. But it is not to be doubted that some consensus of opinion on the subject will be arrived at among scholars in the near future.

EDWARD WILLIAM WINSTANLEY.

THE JOURNEYS OF ST. PETER.

A Reply.

The Rev. Laurence Browne begins an article in the March number of the Expositor, entitled, *The Journeys of St. Peter*, thus:—"The Bampton Lectures of 1913—*The Church in Rome in the First Century*, by G. Edmundson, compel attention by the skill with which a number of hypotheses are presented and maintained. The most important part of the work deals with the movements of St. Peter. The difficulty for the reader is that one hypothesis, suggestion or possibility is piled upon another, until it is doubtful how much has been proved and how much is the creation of a skilful writer." Mr. Browne, after these introductory sentences, then proceeds "to give a brief sketch of Mr. Edmundson's theory and to discuss the evidence on which it rests."

The above statement and the criticism that follows, call for a few words of explanation and reply.

Opinions may differ as to the relative importance of the many controversial questions with which I have attempted to grapple in these Lectures, but this I can confidently say, that in planning the scheme of the Lectures the last thirty-five years of the First Century occupied a more prominent place in my mind than the preceding thirty-five years, and they were certainly not written in any sense as a piece of special pleading on behalf of what may conveniently be called the Roman Petrine Tradition. Mr. Browne has been kind enough to speak of "the skill" with which certain hypotheses have been presented and maintained by me, but accuses me of piling hypothesis upon hypothesis. Such a statement does not correctly describe the method I have followed. Any skill I may have shown is not in clever

advocacy, but in arguing from a number of given premises to reasoned conclusions. As regards the Petrine Tradition with which Mr. Browne has entirely concerned himself, the task I set before myself was this. To take the various forms of the Tradition, as they have come down to us, to strip off remorselessly late and fictitious accretions, leaving only such residual facts as appear to have a definite historical basis, and then to proceed to co-ordinate and compare these facts with the known data furnished to us by the Acts of the Apostles, the Pauline Epistles, the secular historians of the period and the results of recent archaeological and epigraphic research, in order to see whether or no they can be made to fit in to the framework thus provided. If they do find their appropriate places in that framework, and not only so, but by their presence help us to have a clearer and better understanding of the relations to one another of those other facts, with which we are already acquainted, so as to reveal to us more of their inner meaning and significance, then what began by being an hypothesis may claim to be the solution of a problem that has been verified by results. The problems of history when treated scientifically have many points of analogy with those of applied mathematics. The hypothesis that the perturbations of the planet Uranus were caused by the attraction of an unknown body outside its orbit furnished the *data* for the mathematical calculations of Adams and Le Verrier, which fixed the position and the magnitude of the source of disturbance. They solved the problem theoretically, but their hypothesis became a demonstrated conclusion when the telescope of the observer discovered the actual planet Neptune shining in the heavens. As a parallel case may be mentioned the remarkable prediction of Sir W. R. Hamilton, likewise mathematically deduced from first principles, that, granting the hypothesis of the Undu-

latory Theory of Light, then a ray passing through a crystal should have a conical refraction. Thus a critical test was offered for the correctness or incorrectness of the hypothesis. Experiment verified the mathematician's prediction, and with it the soundness of the premises on which he had worked.

Those, who have made a special study of the *Acta Sanctorum* are only too well aware that the *Acts, Passions and Travels* we now possess are full of chronological errors, and contain numberless impossibilities and contradictions due to the later inventions and interpolations of hagiographers, careless or ignorant of history and anxious only to glorify the memory of the particular saint or martyr, in whom, for local or other reasons, they are interested. But as the learned author of *Les Actes des Martyrs, Supplément aux Acta Sincera de Dom Ruinart* (Edmond le Blant) rightly says, "these interpolations in my opinion ought not either to disconcert or to repel criticism. Under a layer of invention the original traits exist, and a great number of them appear on the very surface. One must extricate them patiently."[1] This is the method I have endeavoured to pursue in the case of the Roman Petrine Tradition, to which the above-quoted remarks peculiarly apply.

That St. Peter spent the last years of his life at Rome and that he was put to death there by crucifixion towards the end of Nero's reign, few would now deny. Very early evidence affirms it, and no Church or Christian writer in the East or the West, in Egypt or in Africa, attempted at any time to dispute the claim of the Imperial City to be in a special way the See of Peter, or to assert that Peter died or was buried elsewhere than at Rome. Moreover, Professor Lanciani states in language that could scarcely be stronger in his well-known work, *Pagan and Christian Rome*,

[1] Part ii. p. 87.

"I write about the monuments of Rome from a strictly archæological point of view, avoiding questions which pertain, or are supposed to pertain, to religious controversy. For the archæologist, the presence and the execution of SS. Peter and Paul in Rome are facts established beyond a shadow of doubt by purely monumental evidence."[1] So far, then, we are on sure ground. But such a final visit does not account for the tradition, so widely spread and generally accepted, that Peter was the founder and organiser of the early Christian Church in Rome and that his personal connexion with the Church was of long duration.

From the chief sources on which this Petrine Tradition rests—the works of Eusebius, St. Jerome's *de Viris Illustribus*, the Liberian Catalogue and the Liber Pontificalis, which themselves depend on earlier sources no longer existent—it is possible, I think, to extricate and disentangle certain *data* from the maze of chronological blundering in which they are imbedded, which appear to have upon them the stamp of authenticity. (1) we have the clear statement of St. Jerome, that St. Peter first visited Rome in the second year of Claudius, A.D. 42, to oppose Simon Magus. Eusebius also records that Peter went to Rome in the reign of Claudius to overthrow this same false teacher, whose success in gaining converts and disciples among the Roman populace in Claudius' days is attested by the very early witness of Justin Martyr, himself a native of the district of Samaria which was the home of the heresiarch. (2) We have early testimony that Peter was accompanied by John Mark, as his interpreter, and that it was at Rome that Mark wrote the Gospel called by his name, which embodied St. Peter's teaching. (3) The editor of the Liberian Catalogue (itself probably based upon the chronography of Hippolytus) seems to be quoting from some official record

[1] Page 125.

when he places a visit of St. Peter to Rome in the time of the Consuls, who held office in A.D. 55 and 56. (4) The "episcopate" of St. Peter is said to have lasted twenty-five years. Of this Duchesne, in his edition of the *Liber Pontificalis* declares, "As regards St. Peter, the figure of his twenty-five years is as well attested as the figures of his successors after Xystus I." (5) It is asserted that before he entered upon his "episcopacy" at Rome Peter had for seven years exercised the functions of an "episcopus" at Antioch.

With these *data* as my working hypothesis, forming as it were the postulates of a constructive historical problem, a scheme of St. Peter's life and labours has been set forth in my Lectures satisfying the tests and criteria to which I have already referred. It is not only consistent with the fragmentary outline of early Christian history, which we owe to the Acts of the Apostles and the autobiographic passages in the Pauline epistles, but it explains and elucidates much that was obscure and of doubtful interpretation. This assertion, of course, is open to criticism, and I may add criticism was both anticipated and hoped for. In the many reviews of the Lectures that have appeared there has, however, been a curious absence of any serious criticism calling for a reply. I have to thank, therefore, the Rev. Laurence Browne for pointing out what he considers to be the weak points in my version of St. Peter's missionary journeys and work at Rome.

Mr. Browne quarrels with what I have said as to the tradition of the sojourn of the twelve Apostles at Jerusalem for twelve years before they went forth to preach to the nations. This tradition, I may remark, has been described by Harnack, a severe critic of Christian legend, as "a very old and well attested tradition." [1] The authorities quoted

[1] *Constitution and Law of the Church*, p. 31.

in the footnote are quite correct, Jerome (*de Viris Illust.* xl.) in stating that Apollonius "learnt it from the ancients" was no doubt indebted to Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* v. 18, but it must be remembered that he was familiar with many of the earlier sources, now lost, which Eusebius used. Mr. Browne continues: "Strangely enough, Mr. Edmundson thinks the tradition is supported by Luke xxiv. 49 and by John xvi. 13. It is inconceivable that these texts refer to anything other than Pentecost and the gift of the Holy Spirit on that day; and if so, the first, by bidding the Apostles remain in the city till Pentecost, sufficiently refutes the later tradition that they were told to remain twelve years." [1] Now this is most unfairly stated. My words are [2] "It is scarcely possible that these personal disciples should not have been acting in strict accordance with their Master's last commands. Eventually they were to go forth upon a wider mission to the nations, but for awhile—an ancient tradition of considerable weight says definitely for twelve years—they were to abide at Jerusalem, and restrict themselves to proclaiming in its simplest form the message of the Gospel to the Palestinian Jews,[3] meanwhile resting upon the promise that in the future, whenever fresh calls should be made upon them, they should receive illumination and guidance from the Holy Spirit." The footnote says, "Compare St. Luke xxiv. 44–49, St. John xiv. 26; xvi. 13." My statement makes Jerusalem a mission centre for Palestine, not a place of confinement beyond whose walls the Apostles did not venture, and the comparison of that statement with the passages referred to in the footnote is not irrelevant. Reference is made to the whole passage St. Luke xxiv. 44–49, not *v.* 49 alone, and this passage is by many com-

[1] Expositor, March, p. 243.
[2] *B.L.*, pp. 35–6.
[3] "Make Jerusalem the centre of their missionary activity," *B.L.*, p. 43.

mentators held to be a summary of our Lord's instructions to His disciples during the forty days. The subjects of their preaching are authoritatively explained to them, and the exposition ends with the command that this preaching, though eventually intended for all nations, was to begin at Jerusalem. In so brief an epitome these words, in view of what actually occurred, are of great significance. Again, it should be noted that did we only possess the Synoptic Gospels, there would be no key to the meaning of our Lord's declaration in *v.* 49, "Behold, I send the promise of my Father upon you"; for its interpretation we have to turn to the Johannine record of the last discourse, and the references to St. John show, xiv. 26 and xvi. 13, that "the promise of the Father" was not restricted to the Pentecostal outpouring of the Holy Spirit only, but rather to the results that were to follow, in the continuous enlightenment and guidance that the Apostles would receive as to the time, the method and the manner in which they should carry out the great missionary task with which they had been entrusted.

The remark "nor when the twelve years were up did all the Apostles leave Jerusalem if, taking Mr. Edmundson's date, St. Peter was found in Jerusalem in A.D. 42, thirteen years after the Ascension," scarcely requires comment. The statement in the Lectures is: "Already before Herod Agrippa struck his blow the Twelve had begun to set out each one to his allotted sphere of evangelisation" (p. 43), i.e. after twelve years, but sometime before the thirteenth anniversary of the Ascension, the dispersion had already taken place. There is no hint in the Acts that the execution of James the son of Zebedee or the arrest of Peter took place at Jerusalem. The strong probability is against it, and the farewell words of Peter on leaving Mary's house preclude the supposition that any of the twelve were then in the city.

Mr. Browne's criticism of "the theory" set forth in the Bampton Lectures concerning St. Peter's later career and travels, and the counter-theory propounded by himself deserve closer attention. He writes (p. 244): "Jerome says that St. Peter went to Rome in the second year of Claudius (i.e. A.D. 42), and was Bishop there until his martyrdom in the last year of Nero (i.e. A.D. 67). Mr. Edmundson, it will be observed, accepts the first year, 42, but rejects the last, 67, and is also obliged to reject the statement that previous to 42 St. Peter had been Bishop of Antioch and had preached to the dispersion." For a detailed statement of my so-called "theory" I must refer to the Lectures themselves (*B. L.* iii.). The Petrine tradition has been handed down in various forms. The fact on which there is a general agreement is that St. Peter's episcopate lasted twenty-five years. Eusebius (*Eccles. Hist.*) and Jerome (*de Viris Illus.*) state that he went to Rome in the reign of Claudius to combat the heresies of Simon Magus, and Jerome gives the actual date—the 2nd year of Claudius—i.e. A.D. 42. The Chronicle of Eusebius, followed by Jerome (who translated it), places the martyrdom of the two Apostles in the fourteenth year of Nero, i.e., A.D. 67, but the Liberian Catalogue (354 A.D.) is the first document in which it is said that the martyrdoms took place on the same day. The words are—*passus autem cum Paulo die III. Kal. Julias Consul. ss. imperante Nerone.*[1] The Liberian Catalogue, however, while giving to Peter an episcopate of twenty-five years, makes him to have visited Rome in A.D. 55, and makes Linus his successor in the following year A.D. 56. The notice of St. Peter in the *Liber Pontificalis* is (according to Duchesne) largely borrowed from

[1] It is interesting to note that Jerome and Filocalus, the editor of the Liberian (sometimes named the Filocalian) Catalogue, were companions at the Court of Pope Damasus, A.D. 382–4.

St. Jerome (*de Viris Illust.*). In this notice it is stated that Peter came to Rome in the reign of Nero and after having held the episcopate at Antioch for seven years was afterwards Bishop at Rome for twenty-five years. The same tradition appears in Lactantius and in the legendary *Acta Petri et Pauli*. Irenæus tells us that the Apostles Peter and Paul entrusted the office of the episcopate to Linus; Eusebius (*Eccles. Hist.*) that "after the martyrdom of Paul and Peter Linus was the first to receive the episcopate at Rome." The Liberian Catalogue makes Linus to succeed in A.D. 56. The *Liber Pontificalis* contradicts itself. It fixes the martyrdom of Peter and Paul at thirty-eight years after the Passion, but it gives the date of the succession of Linus as A.D. 56. Moreover it also states that Peter ordained Linus and Cletus to act as bishops in his lifetime, while he was occupying himself with other matters, a statement that appears in Epiphanius and is probably derived by him from the memoirs of Hegesippus, who was in Rome about A.D. 160.

In the Bampton Lectures I have tried to show that these seemingly inconsistent statements are not really contradictory, but admit of a reasonable explanation. Ancient chroniclers and historians were never troubled about discrepancies between the authorities, written or traditional, from which they derived their information. The age of criticism was not yet. It probably never occurred to St. Jerome, when recording that St. Peter was bishop at Antioch and made extensive missionary journeys in various provinces of Asia Minor before A.D. 42, that such travels far afield were irreconcilable with the Lucan narrative in the Acts. But if Jerome with all his learning and his access to abundant sources (now lost to us), documentary, epigraphic and traditional, bearing on history of the early Church, was thus devoid of the critical faculty, how much

more the ordinary compilers of chronologies, episcopal lists, and still more of hagiographies.

The fact to which St. Jerome testifies, that St. Peter visited Rome in the second year of Claudius, has much corroborative evidence in its favour. The twenty-five years' episcopate, so strongly attested, necessitates a visit at the beginning of Claudius' reign. Jerome tells us (following Eusebius) that Peter went to oppose Simon Magus, and according to the witness of Justin Martyr, Irenæus and Eusebius the successful preaching of this heresiarch at Rome did take place in the time of Claudius Cæsar. If, as tradition says, St. Mark accompanied the Apostle as his interpreter and that he wrote his Gospel at Rome, this cannot have been later than the fifth decade of the first century, unless the equally strong tradition as to St. Mark's missionary labours at Alexandria during the sixth decade be abandoned. Moreover it is precisely at this date, A.D. 42, that St. Peter, hitherto the leading figure in St. Luke's narrative, vanishes (save for one momentary reappearance) from the Acts. From this date onwards, according to Jerome, the Apostle occupied the sacerdotal chair at Rome. Nevertheless finding himself confronted with the tradition of the Antiochean episcopate, and with the salutation to the *diaspora* in Asia Minor, with which St. Peter's first epistle opens, i.e., with a record of Petrine activities antecedent to the Petrine organisation of the Roman Church, Jerome had no hesitation in assigning them to the period preceding the second year of Claudius. If we now turn to the Liberian Catalogue we find ourselves dealing with a document probably based upon the last Chronicle of Hippolytus. The consular dates there given for St. Peter's visit to Rome (A.D. 55) and of Linus' succession to the episcopate (A.D. 56) may be taken as indicating an original derivation from some official record. But the Liberian Chronicler of A.D. 354,

whatever his sources, Hippolytean or otherwise, was a hopeless blunderer. His fixed data were the presence of Peter in Rome in A.D. 55, and the appointment of Linus to the office of *episcopus* in A.D. 56. At the same time he was evidently well acquainted with the generally received tradition of the Petrine episcopate of twenty-five years, of the martyrdom of SS. Peter and Paul on the same day (III. Kal. Julias), and of the succession of Linus to the episcopate after their deaths. He therefore boldly placed the death of the Apostles several years before St. Paul (according to the Acts) visited Rome at all. Nevertheless he seems to have been aware of the traditional date of their martyrdom, and of another current tradition which made Clement the immediate successor of St. Peter, for he fixes the death of Linus in A.D. 67, and the accession of Clement in A.D. 68. The difficulty of the twenty-five years' episcopate is surmounted by making it begin at the Ascension. Now the notice of St. Peter in the *Liber Pontificalis* combines in a curious way the Hieronymian and Liberian notices and helps to explain them. It borrows the language of Jerome but it makes St. Peter's episcopate of seven years at Antioch precede his visit to Rome in the days of Nero (i.e. A.D. 55). It further states that Peter in his lifetime ordained first Linus and Cletus, then Clement as *episcopi* (presbyter-bishops), in other words it records the creation of an administrative body for the overseership of the local Roman Church. Not till after Peter's death, and that of St. Paul, was one member of this presbyteral council chosen to be the presiding *episcopus*, and each one of these three, who owed, according to the *Liber Pontificalis*, their original ordination to St. Peter, acceded to the office in turn according to the oldest and most authentic lists that we possess, those of Irenæus and Hegesippus.[1]

[1] Probably, though the original is lost, the list of Hegesippus is preserved by Epiphanius. See Lawlor, *Eusebiana*, 73–94.

In the chronological table (Note A. Bampton Lectures) that I have drawn up all these events are made to follow in due sequence, and in the text I have shown (I believe conclusively) that the dates and incidents thus handed down by tradition fit in with and make clearer and more intelligible the facts recorded in the Acts and the autobiographical passages of the Pauline epistles. The chief items in this Chronological Table are as follows:

Imprisonment of St. Peter	Passover, A.D. 42.
St. Peter's first visit to Rome	Summer, A.D. 42.
Famine in Judæa	A.D. 45–46.
St. Peter with St. Mark leave Rome (possibly with alms)	A.D. 45.
St. Peter at Jerusalem	Spring, A.D. 46.
Barnabas and Saul bring alms from Antioch (Gal. ii. 1–10)	Pentecost, A.D. 46.
Barnabas and Saul with Mark sail from Antioch to Cyprus	Spring, A.D. 47.
St. Peter makes Antioch the centre of his missionary work	A.D. 47–54.
Barnabas and Saul return from first missionary journey	Autumn, A.D. 49.
Encounter of Peter and Paul at Antioch (Gal. ii. 11–14)	A.D. 49.
Jews expelled from Rome by Claudius	A.D. 49.
Paul starts from Antioch on second missionary journey with Silas	after Passover, A.D. 50.
Accession of Nero	October, A.D. 54.
St. Peter with Barnabas at Corinth	late A.D. 54.
St. Peter with Barnabas in Rome and Italy	early A.D. 55–A.D. 56.
St. Paul's first captivity in Rome	A.D. 60–A.D. 62.
St. Peter in Rome	A.D. 63–A.D. 65.
Great Fire of Rome	July, A.D. 64.
Neronian persecution of Christians	Spring, A.D. 65.
Martyrdom of St. Peter	Summer, A.D. 65.
Martyrdom of St. Paul	A.D. 67.

The evidence in favour of St. Peter's visit to Rome in A.D. 55–56 is cumulative. The Liberian Catalogue gives the name of the Consuls for these years (in a corrupt form), pointing to these dates being originally (as I have said)

derived from an official record. The statement that Linus became "bishop" in 56 is explicable by the supposition, supported by tradition, that Linus, Cletus and Clement were ordained "bishops"—i.e., presbyters with administrative powers of overseership—in Peter's lifetime. In the Catalogue of Elias of Nisibis, the notice of St. Peter describes exactly (according to my interpretation of the evidence of the Liberian Catalogue) what took place. *Simon Petrus, aedificata ecclesia in civitate Antiochia, Romam perrexit, ubi pariter aedificavit ecclesiam.*[1] Again, turning to the secular history of the period, Claudius expelled the Jews from Rome in A.D. 49. His death in October, A.D. 54, opened the succession to the Imperial throne of the youthful Nero, whose advisers, Seneca and Burrhus, at once adopted a conciliatory policy to the Jews. No time could have been more opportune for a visit of St. Peter to the scene of his former labours. The references to Cephas, and the party at Corinth that called itself by his name, in St. Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians, written probably in the early autumn of A.D. 55, testify to a residence of St. Peter in that Greek City. We may be sure that Peter did not go to Corinth to interfere with a Church which owed its existence to St. Paul's efforts, nor do we find St. Paul making any complaint about St. Peter's presence among his converts. A very satisfactory explanation is that Peter stopped at this natural halting place on his way to Rome waiting for the re-opening of navigation in the Spring of A.D. 55. He paid a passing visit to the scene of another man's labours, just as St. Paul proposed in his epistle to the Romans to pay a passing visit to the Capital on his way to Spain. In this Epistle, written from Corinth in the Spring of A.D. 57, Paul lays strong emphasis on the keen longing he had had for some time to visit a Church of whose well-established faith and world-wide

[1] Duchesne, *Lib. Pont.*, i. 41.

repute he speaks in the highest terms. He had however, he says, many times been hindered from visiting the Roman Christians through the rule that he had laid down for himself, and to which he firmly adhered, of not attempting " to build upon another man's foundation." Now this strong language of very high respect for the Roman Church and the reason given for the delay in carrying out his proposed and deeply longed-for visit are not only intelligible, but natural, if St. Paul knew that the founder of the Roman Church was himself present in its midst in the year A.D 55–56.

Mr. Browne accuses me of accepting the date A.D. 42 for St. Peter's first visit to Rome and the twenty-five years' episcopate, while I reject the traditional date of the Apostle's death, A.D. 67. My reasons for placing the martyrdom of St. Peter in the Summer of A.D. 65 are given in the Bampton Lectures, pp. 145–152, and the origin of the tradition or legend that the two Apostles were put to death on the same day, III. Kal. Jul. A.D. 67, is fully discussed in my Note E. pp. 259–272. If the traditional " episcopate " be held to begin at the time when, on the dispersion of the Twelve, he selected Rome as his special sphere of missionary work, sometime in A.D. 41, by Jewish reckoning its duration would be twenty-five years.[1]

The counter-theory proposed by Mr. Browne is plainly untenable, i.e., that Peter was at Antioch from A.D. 42–49, and that he went to Rome early in A.D. 50. To begin with tradition. The Antioch " episcopate " is accepted, but the far stronger tradition of an " episcopate " of twenty-five years at Rome is thrown to the winds. Surely the date A.D. 50 for a visit of St. Peter to Rome is on the face

[1] Both years 41 and 65 would be counted. Thus our Lord was said to have been three days in the tomb. The centurion Cornelius and his friends of the *Italian Cohort* may well have been the agents through whom Peter received the news of Simon Magus' activity in Rome and the invitation to go and oppose him.

of it impossible. In the Summer of A.D. 51 St. Paul found Aquila and Prisca in exile at Corinth because the Jews had been banished by Claudius from Rome in A.D. 49. When, further, we consider that the Claudian decree was (in all probability) caused by riotous attacks of fanatic Jews upon their Christian fellow-countrymen, the supposition that Peter, the Christian leader, and himself a Jew of the Jews, should have selected such a moment for preaching the Gospel at Rome, stands self-condemned. Again, if, as Mr. Browne suggests, Peter was at Antioch from A.D. 42–49, he must have been in close companionship with Barnabas and Saul during the time when alms were being collected for the relief of the famine in Judæa, at the time when Barnabas and Saul were sent with the alms to Jerusalem, and at the time when the Church of Antioch despatched Barnabas and Saul upon their missionary journey to Cyprus. Yet not a word is said of St. Peter's presence there in Acts xi. 27–30, nor is his name mentioned in the list of the leading Christians in the Church at Antioch given in Acts xiii. 1. It is needless to say that such a close companionship of St. Paul with St. Peter during this long period is absolutely inconsistent with any interpretation of the autobiographical passage in Galatians ii. 1–10. The hypothesis put forward by Mr. Browne appears to me to have all the faults of which an hypothesis can be guilty. Professedly it is an attempt to reconcile during a specific period certain historical facts with a particular tradition. It has been shown to be in flat contradiction to both.

GEORGE EDMUNDSON.

THE GREEK AORIST.

WHATEVER be our opinion as to his conclusions we may well acknowledge our indebtedness to Dr. Weymouth for having inspired students of Greek who followed him to more accurate thinking on this important subject than his predecessors had done. The twofold fact that the Greek aorist is essentially an indefinite tense and the English past essentially definite, were needing the emphasis which he gave them.[1] His Translation of the New Testament, already referred to in connexion with that of Moffatt, carries out with a fair degree of faithfulness the principles expounded in his pamphlet. Of this translation, Dr. Rendel Harris says in a recent number of the EXPOSITOR [2] that "it condenses into the form of a scientific revolt the dictum of Matthew Arnold that 'the aorist was made for man and not man for the aorist.'"

However I must venture to criticise Dr. Weymouth's position at one or two points. First with regard to his distinction between narrative and non-narrative composition. I admit that the distinction is in the main a true one, but from a practical point of view I fail to see that it is, as he says, "of prime importance." As we have seen, some three-fourths of the ind. aorists in John are translated by the English past in all the versions consulted.[3] With very few exceptions they are found in narrative, where the context shows them to refer to definite action. In scarcely a single case would any rendering other than the English past be thought of or deemed possible. The principle that aorists

[1] It was here that the Revisers fell into error. Their assumption that the aorist is the equivalent of our past tense seems to have blinded them *in practice* to what *in theory* they admitted—that the aorist is in its nature an indefinite tense. (See Preface to R.V. of N.T.)

[2] Dec. 1914, p. 523.

[3] Doubtless other N.T. books would show a not very different proportion.

in narrative are definite applies here to be sure, but it has no practical value, as there is no difficulty involved. When we read, *Μετὰ ταῦτα ἦλθεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν Ἰουδαίαν γῆν*, we do not need any principle regarding the aorist in narrative to inform us that the proper translation is, "After these things Jesus and His disciples *came*, etc." —not "have come" or any other tense. Now a large majority of the ind. aorists in the New Testament are quite as simple as this: it is with the troublesome minority that we need help. But when we come to these we are apt to find that the question of whether we have to do with narrative or non-narrative is not so easily answered. The character of the composition—even of the paragraph—as a whole, is not a sufficient guide. We have Weymouth's own warning that the "brief and fragmentary narrative" so often embedded in conversation, etc., is also to be considered. Let us take a few passages in John, where the versions differ as to the proper translation, and try applying the "narrative or non-narrative" test.

vii. 29. *ἐγὼ οἶδα αὐτόν, ὅτι παρ' αὐτοῦ εἰμι κἀκεῖνός με ἀπέστειλεν.* I confess that I found it hard to decide whether this was narrative or not. The sentence closes a "saying" of Jesus in which all the other verbs are present or perfect. Evidently Weymouth regarded it as narrative, for he translates "and He *sent* Me." I have no fault to find with the translation, but I fear that Weymouth's rule would not have helped me to determine the true rendering. viii. 56, *Ἀβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ἠγαλλιάσατο ἵνα ἴδῃ τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ἐμήν, καὶ εἶδεν καὶ ἐχάρη.* On the surface this would appear to be a much clearer case of simple narrative than the preceding; yet Weymouth translates: "Abraham your father exulted in the hope of seeing my day: he *has seen* it and *has been glad*." This gives a somewhat different interpretation, which may or may not be the

right one: what concerns us here is to note that his principle can scarcely have guided him to this interpretation. ix. 32, *ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος οὐκ ἠκούσθη ὅτι ἠνέῳξεν τις ὀφθαλμοὺς τυφλοῦ γεγεννημένου.* Weymouth translates, "From the beginning of the world such a thing *was* never *heard of*, etc." Thus he evidently takes the expression as narrative, and I suppose we may as well call it that. But is the English past the best translation? Is it even good English? I am reminded of Weymouth's own criticism of R.V.'s translation in 2 John vi., "As ye heard from the beginning." He says "'As ye heard *in* the beginning' would be intelligible," but holds that the context (which is practically the same in the case before us) precludes the possibility of the verb being definite. I think we have here a case where the narrative principle has proved positively misleading. xiv. 28, *ἠκούσατε ὅτι ἐγὼ εἶπον ὑμῖν· ὑπάγω καὶ ἔρχομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.* Weymouth: "You *heard* me say to you, 'I am going away, and yet I am coming to you.'" xv. 15, *ὑμᾶς δὲ εἴρηκα φίλους, ὅτι πάντα ἃ ἤκουσα παρὰ τοῦ πατρός μου ἐγνώρισα ὑμῖν*, Weymouth: "But I have called you friends, because all that I *have heard* from the Father I have made known to you." I question if it would be at once clear to every reader of the Greek New Testament that the former of these two examples is narrative and the latter non-narrative—each to be translated accordingly. In the same way compare xv. 16 and xv. 19, where Weymouth translates the same phrase, *ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐξελεξάμην ὑμᾶς*, in the one case with the past and in the other with the perfect.[1]

Further illustrative material might be drawn from the papyri. Cf., e.g., the following from O.P. II. 251 and 252.

[1] For further illustrations in John, see iii. 17 (*ἀπέστειλεν*), iii 19 (*ἠγάπησαν*), iv. 29 (*ἐποίησα*), x. 8, 10 (*ἦλθον*), x. 32 (*ἔδειξα*), xiv. 31 (*ἐντείλατο*), xvii. 6 (*ἐφανέρωσα*), xvii. 8 (*ἔδωκας* and *ἔλαβον*).

Both documents are "Notices of Removal" dating from the 1st century A.D. ὁ υἱός μου . . . [name, etc.) . . . ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς τὴν ξένην τῶι διελθόντι χρόνῳ, "My son some time ago removed abroad." ὁ ἀδελφός μου . . . ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς τὴν ξένην μηδενὸς ἑτέρου αὐτῷ πόρου ὑπάρχοντος, "My brother has removed abroad having no other property" (i.e., only a part of a house—previously mentioned). In the first example there is a note of time which makes it definite, hence we must render with the English past. The second is indefinite as to time, hence we render "*has* removed." But one is no more narrative than the other, and no less.

To sum up, then, our true criterion in deciding whether a given aorist is used in a definite or an indefinite sense will be found not in any general principle as to a distinction between narrative and non-narrative, but *in what the context has to tell us* as to this particular case.

With regard to the application of Dr. Weymouth's dictum that our true indefinite tense in English is the perfect, I think a word of caution might be timely. It is certainly true that our so-called perfect often has such a force, and it was well that our attention should be called to the fact.[1] But we should bear in mind that it is also possible for this tense to have the force of a *true* perfect, i.e., the idea of past action with present effect; in which case it is not a proper translation for the Greek aorist. It is not only "the circumstances, or a gesture, or other words in the sentence,"[2] which indicate that the verb has this true perfect force: sometimes the secret is to be found in the meaning of the verb itself—"Aktionsart"[3] the German grammarians

[1] Farrar (*Gr. Syntax*, 126 sq. misses this point entirely. He says emphatically, "The rule is, never translate the aorist by 'have.'"

[2] Weymouth's Pamphlet, p. 34.

[3] Moulton, *Prol.* p. 108.

would call it. Note, for example, Weymouth's translation of the following passages in John, the Greek verb in each case being ἦλθον: i. 31, "But that He may be openly shown to Israel is the reason why I *have come* baptizing in water"; x. 10, "I *have come* that they may have life"; xii. 27, "But for this purpose I *have come* to this hour." Now, if I mistake not, the English "I have come" is always and only a true perfect: it means in effect "I am here." "I have gone," "I have worked," "I have played," "I have eaten," "I have read," "I have travelled," etc., are often—perhaps usually—simply indefinite pasts.[1] But in the expression "I have come" the very meaning of the verb implies a present effect of the past action stated. In the sentences just quoted from John such a rendering is perfectly good English and gives an interpretation that in no way does violence to the context, but my contention is that it does not properly translate the aorist, ἦλθον. The writer of the Gospel *might* have used ἐλήλυθα, but he did not, and our task is to translate what he has written.

John ii. 20 affords another interesting example. Weymouth translates, "It has taken forty-six years to build this sanctuary,"—which certainly implies that the work of building had extended to the speakers' own time.[2] When I say "It has taken me an hour to write this letter," this is no question but that I refer to a letter *just completed*. But there is no suggestion of such an idea in the Greek aorist οἰκοδομήθη. Surely Moffatt's translation, "This sanctuary took forty-six years to build," is to be preferred. The familiar rendering of A.V. and R.V., "Forty and six years was this temple in building," is equally accurate in this

[1] It is not to be supposed, however, that these two uses of the English perfect are entirely separate and distinct. (See Murray's Eng. Gram. p. 121).

[2] As a matter of *history* this seems to have been the case—a fact which is doubtless responsible for Dr. Weymouth's rendering here.

respect. Cf. further in Weymouth, John v. 26, "He *has* also *given* to the Son"; v. 27, "He *has conferred* on Him authority"; ix. 21, "Or who *has opened* his eyes we do not know"; xv. 19, "I *have chosen* you out of the world." In each case the Greek tense is the aorist, but the English is strongly suggestive of the true perfect idea.[1]

In Weymouth's pamphlet on the Greek Aorist and Perfect he insists that there are many passages "in which the rendering of the aorist by our simple past *imports an idea of definite time which is not in the original*; and the introduction of any thought not in the original no one would attempt to justify."[2] I quite agree with both of the propositions involved in this statement, but have ventured to point out that there are also not a few passages in which the rendering of the aorist by our perfect *imports an idea of existing effect which is not in the original.* Thus we escape the shoals of the *past* Scylla only to be wrecked upon the rocks of the *perfect* Charybdis, and we have at least come to realise that the translation of the Greek aorist is not in all cases as simple a matter as it may have seemed.

IV. Aorists and Perfects in John xvii.

Only one thing more is needed to carry complete conviction as to the difficulties involved in our subject, and that is a brief examination of the indicative aorists in John xvii. As we have already seen, they are thirty in number, and R.V. settles the question of their translation simply and consistently by rendering them all with the English past. But for myself I cannot rest content with this solution, and I do not know of any independent translation made since R.V.—or before for that matter—which follows it in this. In their Preface to the R.V. the Revisers make special reference

[1] See Moulton, *Prol.* p. 136.
[2] P. 35 (the italics are his).

to this chapter, defending their rendering of the aorists on the ground that "the combination of the aorist and the perfect shows, beyond all reasonable doubt, that different relations of time were intended to be expressed." Their translation of this chapter has also been championed by no less an authority than Professor J. H. Moulton. He says: "That the majority were right there [in John xvii.] I cannot doubt: the English perfect . . . obscures a special feature of the great prayer, the tone of detachment with which the Lord contemplates His earthly life as a period lying in the past." [1] So also Eadie: "The meaning is apparent and impressive, for he speaks from a high and mysterious future point." [2]

It appears, then, that the argument for rendering all the ind. aorists in John xvii. with the English simple past rests upon (1) *the fact* that in our Greek text we find perfects (16 of them in Nestle) as well as aorists, and if possible the distinction between the two should be preserved; and (2) *the theory* that our Lord is represented in this prayer as contemplating His earthly life as a period lying in the past *and separated from the present.* As to the theory it should be remembered that it *is* a theory, and must stand or fall according as internal evidence in the prayer itself supports it or otherwise. It seems to me that the greater weight of evidence in the Greek text is against it. Indeed I cannot but think that the fact and the theory work against, rather than in support of, each other. *The theory* is that our Lord had in thought detached Himself from the present and was viewing His earthly life as a past event, hence the thirty aorists in the prayer are to be regarded as definite pasts. But *the fact* is that mingled with these thirty aorists we find also perfects—i.e. *Greek* perfects, presumably carrying

[1] *Prol.* p. 137.
[2] *The English Bible, II.*, p. 445.

the usual force of linking past action with the present. Some of the perfects in our text, as we shall see, are involved in uncertainty, but enough remain—when taken with the presents—to thoroughly establish our point. Note the following, and decide whether or not they support the detachment idea. (The translations are those of R.V.):—Verse 1, "Father, the hour *is come*" (ἐλήλυθεν); Verse 6, "And they *have kept* Thy word" (τετήρηκαν); Verse 7, "Now they [*have come to*] *know* that all things . . . are from Thee" (ἔγνωκαν); Verse 8, "For the words which Thou gavest Me I *have given* unto them" (δέδωκα);[1] Verse 19, "And for their sakes I *sanctify* Myself" (ἁγιάζω); etc. Now I grant that in perhaps all the examples cited, excepting that in verse 1, the Greek perfect (or present) would not be impossible even supposing that Jesus in thought had separated Himself from His earthly work, but I submit that such a view is forced and unnatural.

If the Greek aorist were essentially and necessarily a definite past tense—like our English past—then we would be obliged to take it as we found it and reconcile the perfects with the aorists as best we could. But the aorist is essentially an *indefinite* tense and to be regarded as such in each individual case unless there is reason for believing that the context gives a degree of definiteness to it. Hence in this chapter it is equally possible—and I think much more natural—to assume that Jesus was thinking of His work as lying in the past indeed, but in the immediate past—not separated from the present. ("I am no more in the world," in verse 11, need not be taken any more literally than "I come to Thee," which follows. In both cases the present is used by anticipation.) On this supposition the aorist would be used quite properly in the prayer—

[1] This is the only occurrence of the perfect of δίδωμι in the chapter which is not challenged by some MS. authority. See below, p. 524.

(1) Of acts of Himself or the Father at or preceding His incarnation. Thus ἀπέστειλας occurs six times (verses 3, 8, 18, 21, 23, 25). So also ἐξῆλθον (8); ἠγάπησας (24); ἔδωκας (2, twice in 6, 8). In all of these cases, of course, the reference is to a past act separated from the present, hence the time is definite and the English past is to be used in translation. R.V. has the past in all, but A.V. in only six of the twelve, the others being rendered with the English perfect.[1]

(2) Of features of His life upon earth regarded in its entirety; e.g., ἐγώ σε ἐδόξασα επὶ τῆς γῆς (verse 4). The remaining examples are as follows:—ἐφανέρωσα (6); ἔλαβον, ἔγνωσαν, ἐπίστευσαν (8); ἐφύλαξα, ἀπώλετο (12); ἐμίσησεν (14); ἔγνω, ἔγνων, ἔγνωσαν (25); ἐγνώρισα, ἠγάπησας (26). If the theory which I have advocated regarding the point of view of the prayer is correct all of the aorists in this class must be regarded as indefinite. And it follows that they should be translated by the English indefinite tense (with "has" or "have")—unless indeed such a translation be rejected to avoid confusion with the true perfect.

These two classes exhaust twenty-five of the thirty aorists in the chapter. Of the remaining five two (ἐλάλησεν and εἶπεν) are simple narrative aorists found in the opening verse; the other three require separate mention. In verse 18 I am tempted to take ἀπέστειλα as a "timeless aorist,"[2] "As Thou didst send Me so send I them"—not referring to Matthew x. 5, or to any other particular "sending," but to the great fact that His chosen disciples were to be *mission-*

[1] It is possible that ἔδωκας in some or all of the passages cited may refer to an action occurring *after* the incarnation (i.e., during Christ's earthly life), but in any case it was a *definite* action, which is what concerns us here.

[2] Moulton, *Prol.*, p. 134; Robertson, p. 837. Abbott thinks it possible that this verb has a future reference, the construction being influenced by the Heb. "prophetic perfect" (*Joh. Gram.* par. 2444). But I see no occasion for calling it a Hebraism. Moulton regards it as an aorist of the "Immediate Past."

aries as He had been. It is possible that ἠγάπησας (occurring twice in verse 23) takes a certain definiteness from the preceding ἵνα γινώσκῃ ὁ κόσμος, κ.τ.λ.—Jesus temporarily assuming the point of view of the later "world." On this ground the R.V. renderings here may be justified. As a matter of fact I think it makes very little difference in this case which of the two English tenses we use.

Summing up the evidence, then, I see no sufficient reason for supposing that the point of view of Jesus in this prayer was any other than the most *natural* point of view, namely, that of one who stood at the close of his life-work and looked back upon it as a completed, *but not detached*, whole.

But that troublesome *fact* of the presence of sixteen perfects scattered among the aorists of this chapter still confronts us. My classification calls for the English perfect (so-called) as a translation for thirteen of the thirty aorists in the chapter, and we cannot well avoid translating nearly all of the perfects by the same English tense. It was this confusing of the sense of aorist and perfect that the Revisers objected to, and they have here a defensive argument which cannot be lightly set aside. But before deciding to sacrifice all other considerations for the sake of maintaining the proper force of these perfects, let us notice two or three things about them.

(1) Twelve of the sixteen ind. perfects are repetitions of the one verb δέδωκα (or δέδωκας). Of the remaining four three are rendered by R.V. with the English present, so that there is no danger of confusion as far as they are concerned. Thus the problem of the perfects in this chapter resolves itself practically (for our present purpose) into a consideration of this *one* perfect δέδωκα.

(2) The usage of this perfect is hard to distinguish, in some cases, from that of the aorist ἔδωκας, which also occurs several times in the chapter. (Cf. e.g. δέδωκας in verse 2

with ἔδωκας in verse 6); and it (the perfect) is used in one case where a true perfect seems all but impossible (verse 4).

(3) Turning now to our *Apparatus Criticus* we find that in only one of its twelve occurrences is the perfect δέδωκα (or δέδωκας) undisputed by some MS. authority. In four cases the aorist form ἔδωκα (or ἔδωκας) is found in one or other of the two great uncials, ℵ and B, while in seven others the same reading (aorist) has the support of a greater or less number of the inferior MSS.

These facts are worthy of passing notice, at least. Various conclusions might be drawn from them:—that we can have no assurance of having the original readings before us in our text; that the perfect of this verb had become equivalent to the aorist in meaning as it closely resembles it in form and pronunciation; or perchance that the writer of the Gospel in his conscientious effort to reproduce the prayer from Jesus' own point of view as He uttered it overdid the matter and introduced some perfects that did not belong there. We cannot enter into a discussion of these possible theories here. For our purpose it will suffice to observe that the occurrences of δέδωκα in this chapter are involved in so much uncertainty that we cannot afford, out of consideration for them, to deviate from whatever rendering of the aorists in the chapter may be shown on independent grounds to be best.

V. Summary and Conclusion.

Leaving John xvii. we turn now to sum up one or two practical points under the general subject.

I trust what has been said has made it clear that if we are to understand the Greek aorist at all we must understand it first *as Greek*. The *sine quo non* with which we must start is a firm grip on the root idea in the tense itself, considered absolutely apart from any so-called English "equivalent."

This may not be easy, but it is worth the effort. The student of the Greek New Testament who adopts this principle will by and by discover that certain difficult aorists, which the grammars have devoted many pages to discussing, and perhaps befogging, now seem surprisingly clear to him—in the Greek. That does not say of course that he can classify them to a certainty under this or that heading, or settle at once the disputed points as to their translation, but he has at least come to see that they are not monstrosities of language—that their function in the sentence is a possible and a proper function for an aorist to have—and there ought to be some satisfaction in that. Take, for example, the much disputed εὐδόκησα (Matt. iii. 17, xvii. 5, Mark i. 11, Luke iii. 22, 2 Pet. i. 17). Burton [1] discusses five possible explanations for it, and does not seem quite satisfied with any of them. Now without expressing any opinion whatever as to the grammatical classification of this verb, we can see, I think, that the aorist was an eminently fitting tense to use. The *good pleasure* of the Father toward His Son was the thing to be stated and emphasised. Anything that would detract from that emphasis was to be avoided. Either the present or the perfect would have attracted some of the stress to its own peculiar idea of the time or state of the "good pleasure." The aorist is the nearest approach to a colourless tense, capable of obscuring itself as a tense and thrusting *the meaning of the verb* into prominence: therefore the aorist was a very proper tense to use. If we are unable to reproduce in our own language its peculiar force, that is unfortunate—but it is not the fault of the Greek.[2]

[1] Page 29 (*N.T. Moods and Tenses*).

[2] Prof. Moulton reminds me (Letter, Jan., 1915) that the aorist *indicative* has an element (the augment) which "most emphatically connotes past time." He objects, therefore, to the adjective "colourless" being applied to it. Yet even in the indicative—and notwithstanding the augment—may we not expect the original and essential timelessness of the aorist occasionally to appear? This seems to me not unreasonable,

That brings me to the second concluding remark which has to do with *translation*. Let it be understood that all that has been said in the preceding paragraph applies also to the translator. He too must understand the Greek as Greek before he can hope to render it faithfully into English. If this is his starting point, he will not need to be told that neither the aorist nor any other Greek tense corresponds exactly—scarcely even approximately—to any English tense, and he will therefore avoid the pitfall of misleading "equivalents." [1] The Revisers seem to have worked with the theory that the aorist was to be rendered by our past whenever the English idiom would bear it. That is practically to say that the aorist is to be regarded, wherever possible, as a definite tense. I should make my working principle almost the reverse of that—namely that the aorist is to be regarded as what it essentially is, *an indefinite tense*—except where it is seen to derive definiteness from the context. Where the action is shown to be *definite* the English past will be the translation in a great majority of the cases—occasionally our idiom will require the pluperfect. The *indefinite* aorist is usually to be translated by the English so-called perfect, but care must be taken lest our "have" tense prove to be a *real* perfect.

No attempt is made to give rules of hard and fast application. Not seldom it is impossible to decide with certainty whether a given aorist is best rendered into English by the perfect or the simple past. But let this be added for our comfort—that in such cases the distinction is *usually* as unimportant as it is uncertain. Where there is a real distinction that can be reproduced—at least in some measure—in English, the principles that have been stated will seldom fail us.

It would be an interesting historical study to trace through

and I think that in it we have the key to an understanding of some of these "peculiar" aorists.

[1] See Buttmann (Thayer's transl.), p. 195.

the past century the principal steps by which our present improved understanding of the Greek tenses as used in the New Testament has come down to us. The first appearance of Winer's Grammar, in 1822, started a vigorous protest against the looseness of translation and interpretation that had long prevailed. This reform movement had already gained considerable headway in England when the appearance of W. F. Moulton's improved English edition of Winer in 1870 gave it a new popular impulse. The Revisers in their translation gave us the benefit of much of what had been gained, and while they erred seriously in some points—notably in their conception of the aorist and its proper translation—we may well acknowledge with gratitude the general excellence of their work and be thankful that their errors were not more numerous. Weymouth in turn made his valuable contribution toward a solution of the Comparative Grammar phase of the problem—an important step in advance.

More recently, since the Papyri have shown us that the Greek of the New Testament was for the most part simply the every-day Greek of the people, a more or less widespread popular impression has arisen that the fine distinctions in the use of tenses pointed out by numerous commentators since Winer's time can no longer be maintained. Grammars appearing within the past few years—notably those of Blass, Moulton and Robertson—have rendered valuable service in correcting this false impression. It has now been made abundantly clear that when we find on the page before us a Greek aorist we may safely assume—until the contrary is proven—that the writer had a true aorist idea in mind; and it matters not greatly whether the page be from a discourse of Plato on the immortality of the soul, from a New Testament Gospel, or from a letter of Gemellus to his nephew reproaching him for the loss of two pigs.[1]

[1] Fayum Papyri, No. 111.

Thus a rich heritage of scholarship is ours, and it remains for the present-day student to be diligent in its use and improvement. FRANK EAKIN.

THE ANTIQUITY AND PERPETUITY OF SACRIFICE.

JUDGED by the actual practice of sacrifice, the history of the Jewish religion falls into two more or less equal periods. The practice of sacrifice was maintained, with two brief interruptions, from the origin of the nation to the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D.; for the last eighteen hundred years no Jewish sacrifice has been offered. But this by no means signifies that in theory sacrifice has ceased to be a part of Jewish religion. There was actual cessation of sacrifice, as is at least commonly believed, between the years 586 and 538 B.C., but, in consequence of the return from Babylon in the last-named year, sacrifice was resumed. Once again, in consequence of the defilement and occupation of the Temple by Antiochus Epiphanes, sacrifice ceased from 168 to 165 B.C., and was then resumed. Is the present a similar, though longer, period of cessation after which, at some yet future date, sacrifice will again be resumed? The answer to this question must turn on the Jewish theory or doctrine of the perpetuity of sacrifice, and this in turn is intimately connected with the theory of the antiquity of sacrifice.

An earlier inquiry, which was briefly referred to in the last article,[1] aimed at determining the question whether Jewish sacrificial custom was due to the absolute command of God, or existed simply by His permission, whether He required it or merely tolerated it. That inquiry, or at least the manner in which it was pursued, has been anti-

[1] "Interpretations of Jewish Sacrifice," EXPOSITOR, May, 1915.

quated by the development of Biblical Criticism; and it is fortunate that we may leave aside the special pleading by which every answer had to be supported so long as it was held that the entire Old Testament spoke with one voice on this matter. The simple facts are these: sacrifice is recorded before any divine command on the subject is mentioned; on the other hand, the divine commands on the subject of sacrifice cannot as a whole be treated merely as permissive. It is these two facts, and the theories that they suggest or reflect, that we have in the first instance to examine.

Among the many differences between the prophetic (JE) and the priestly (P) sources of the Pentateuch few are more striking than the different place occupied by sacrifice in the two works. In JE sacrifice belongs to the earliest ages of the world: Cain and Abel sacrifice, for that, as we may see at a greater length in the next article, is the meaning of Genesis iv.; in any case, Noah sacrifices, Abraham builds altars and sacrifices, and so do Isaac and Jacob. Moreover, the reason, which Moses gives to Pharaoh, why the Hebrews must leave Egypt for a short period is that they may sacrifice to Yahweh (Exod. iii. 18), and in the course of the negotiations Moses refuses the offer that the men of Israel may go alone, or that the men, women and children may go, unaccompanied by their flocks; he insists that the cattle must go too, for, at the feast which they are to celebrate, they must offer "sacrifices and burnt-offerings" (Exod. x. 25). Again, the form of the conversation between Moses and Pharaoh implies that the narrator looked upon sacrifice as no peculiarity of Israel, but as something that was common to them and the Egyptians, the difference lying merely in the gods to whom they respectively made their sacrificial offerings. And so to such writers it must have seemed perfectly natural to record

instances of sacrifice by the Midianite Jethro, the heathen Balaam or the Moabites. Briefly, then, in JE sacrifice appears as a custom that had always been practised alike by Jews and non-Jews: so long as there had been men, there had been sacrifice; so long as there had been a Hebrew or Jewish nation, there had been Hebrew or Jewish sacrifice.

We turn to P, and all is different. What is true of the Pentateuch as a whole, and of JE in particular, is not true of P: in P there is no record of sacrifice till, by a series of divine commands, the right place, the right times, and the right ministers for sacrifice have been determined. Throughout his narrative of the early ages of the world and of the ancestors of the Jewish people, P records no sacrifice nor the erection of any altar. In his story of the Exodus, P demands for his people that they may leave Egypt not for a brief period but for good and all, and with this modification of the story the sacrificial motive for departure which is given in JE becomes unnecessary and finds no place in P. Sacrifice and the consumption of domestic animals for food were according to early custom commonly, if not invariably, associated; to meet new conditions, Deuteronomy (xii. 20–22) provides that henceforward domestic animals may be slain and eaten non-sacrificially; P carries back this permissibility of profane slaughter to the age of Noah (Gen. ix. 2 ff.), before which, according to his theory, men and animals alike had been vegetarians (Gen. i. 29 f.); that is to say, according to Deuteronomy, sacrifice is of indefinite antiquity, profane slaughter an innovation; according to P profane slaughter is a custom as ancient as the days of Noah, sacrifice a later special form of the slaughter and consumption of animals.

There is one further consideration of importance in attempting to determine and interpret P's theory of the antiquity of sacrifice: the character and main purpose of

P's work is clear and well recognised; it is a history of the origin of Jewish institutions—of the Sabbath, of circumcision, of the Temple cultus; the Sabbath is traced back to Creation, circumcision to Abraham, the altar, the priesthood and sacrifice to the law-giving at Sinai. As there was no Sabbath before Creation, no circumcision before Abraham, so there was no sacrifice before the erection of the tabernacle and altar at Sinai. To heathen sacrifice P is indifferent: if he admitted its existence, and it is difficult to see how he could have entirely failed to do so, he looked upon Jewish sacrifice as upon Jewish circumcision, which also was not, as a matter of fact, confined to Jews, as a thing absolutely apart, and brought into existence by direct divine command.

The theory of P, then, is that sacrifice, Jewish sacrifice at all events, is not a custom of immemorial antiquity; that there was a period even in Jewish history when sacrifice was not; and that sacrifice began on a certain specific day in the lifetime of Moses in obedience to the direct and detailed command of God.

Whence came this theory? If we observe that it contains two distinct though closely related elements, we can probably trace one of these elements at least one stage further back. The theory involves the two beliefs: (1) that Jewish sacrifice dates from a specific moment in time, and (2) that it sprang from a direct divine command. It is the latter element in the theory that can be traced further back. Certain well-known passages in Amos, Isaiah and Jeremiah seem at least to be in line with the tacit theory of JE that sacrifice was immemorial custom, not springing from direct divine command. This theory is not immediately traversed by Ezekiel for the simple reason that he does not refer to the origin of sacrifice at all; but the whole question is really re-set by him. The cultus of the future is, accord-

ing to Ezekiel, to spring out of and conform to specific regulations precisely revealed by God. "In the twenty-fifth year of our captivity," i.e. in the year 572 B.C., he writes, "the hand of Yahweh was laid on me, and He brought me, in a divine vision, to the land of Israel, and set me down upon a very high mountain, whereon was a city-like mass of buildings opposite me. . . . And behold, a wall enclosing a temple. . . . He brought me to the east gateway, and ascended its steps, and measured the threshold of the gate.[1] . . . . He brought me into the outer court . . . then He brought me into the inner court.[2] . . . There was a chamber whose door opened into the vestibule of the gateway, in which the burnt offering was washed. In the vestibule . . . there were two tables on each side on which the burnt-offering, the sin-offering and the guilt-offering were slain . . . there were also four tables of hewn stone, a cubit and half square and a cubit high, on which were laid the instruments used in slaying the burnt-offerings, and the bloody offerings. . . . Then he brought me outside the gate, and in the inner court were two halls: And he said to me: The hall which faces south is for the priests, who have charge of the house, and the hall which faces the north is for the priests that have charge of the altar. . . .[3] And he measured the court . . . and the altar was in front of the Temple.[4] Then he said to me: The chambers on the north and south, facing the Temple-court, are the sacred chambers, wherein the priests who approach Yahweh shall eat the most sacred offerings: there they shall deposit the most sacred offerings, the cereal offering, the sin-offering, and the guilt-offering; for the place is sacred.[5] Then he took me to the gate that faced

[1] Ezek. xl. 1–6 (cp. Toy's translation in the Polychrome Bible).
[2] *Ib.* xl. 17–28.
[3] *Ib.* xl. 38–45. [4] *Ib.* xl 47. [5] *Ib.* xlii. 13.

the East. . . . I fell on my face, the glory of Yahweh entered the Temple by the East Gate. Then the spirit lifted me up, and took me into the inner court, and lo! the Glory of God filled the Temple. Then I heard one speaking to me from the Temple: Son of man, this is the place of my throne, the place for the soles of my feet, where I will dwell in the midst of the sons of Israel for ever." [1]

This is, it is true, a prophet's vision: but it is vision understood by the prophet to possess, and substantially accepted by a later age as actually possessing, the value of law: with these words this part of the vision concludes, "And do thou, son of man, show the House of Israel the Temple, its form and its pattern, its construction, its exits and entrances, and make known to them all its forms, ordinances and regulations; write them down in their sight that they may observe and perform all its forms and ordinances." [2] And the ordinances follow, regulating the exact size and form of the altar, the persons who shall offer sacrifice, the days of the several months in which sacrifice shall be offered, the amount and quality of the several offerings.

Certainly, then, to Ezekiel the sacrificial custom of that future temple to which he looked forward was an ordinance of God, directly and minutely regulated by Him. And what Ezekiel projected into the future, P projected into the past, into the age of Moses: he held the worship of the first temple, as also of the ideal forerunner of the first temple, the Tabernacle, to have been directly decreed in all its details by God: he knew no Jewish sacrifice, nor indeed any sacrifice worthy the name, independent of the express commandment of God to Moses. And so irreconcilable on this matter are JE and P that we must regard the latter as a deliberate doctrinal re-editing of the earlier work, as is Chronicles of Samuel and Kings.

[1] *Ib.* xliii. 1–7. [2] *Ib.* xliii. 10 f.

For a time JE and P existed apart, but, before the end of the fifth century B.C., they must have been united, and their conflicting theories of history and rules of conduct, though for a time the difference may have been overlooked by readers of the composite work in which they were now incorporated, must sooner or later have cried out for harmonising. It is about three centuries after the union of JE and P into the Pentateuch that we can actually detect this harmonising process which gave rise to another theory of the antiquity of Jewish sacrifice. This new theory dominates the Book of Jubilees, a work which, if we adopt Dr. Charles's date for it, was written in the last quarter of the second century B.C. A similar theory is present, though less conspicuous, in another work of the same period—the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.

In considering the theory of the Book of Jubilees we shall do well to bear in mind two things : (1) that the Pentateuch in its entirety had now been for some centuries scripture, and that we have not the least reason for believing that P still existed as a separate work ; (2) that a belief in the existence of a heavenly Temple was current—a belief which, as I have shown elsewhere,[1] was probably unknown to both P and Ezekiel.

The procedure of the author of Jubilees, writes Dr. Charles, "is, of course, in direct antagonism with the presuppositions of the Priests' Code in Genesis. For according to this Code, 'Noah may build no altar, Abraham offer no sacrifice, Jacob erect no sacred pillar. No offering is recorded till Aaron and his sons are ready.' This fact seems to emphasise in the strongest manner how freely an author reinterpreted his authorities for the past."[2] That

[1] See "The Heavenly Temple and the Heavenly Altar," in the EXPOSITOR, May–June, 1908, pp. 385–402, 530–546.

[2] R. D. Charles, *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha*, ii. 7.

the author of Jubilees re-interprets is true enough: that in the particular point in question he was himself conscious of, or indeed can by us be rightly regarded, as *correcting* his authorities in the way that the Chronicles clearly corrected Kings cannot be so readily admitted. The author was not re-interpreting P but the Pentateuch: and in the Pentateuch Noah does build an altar, Abraham does offer sacrifice, and Jacob does erect a sacred pillar. In representing Noah as building an altar and Abraham as offering sacrifice, the author of Jubilees is simply repeating, and not freely re-interpreting, his authorities. The re-interpretation in Jubilees consists in the attempt to do justice to two really conflicting points of view in his authority; according to that authority Noah and Abraham offered sacrifice, but the divine command to sacrifice is deferred to the time of Moses. The method of this re-interpretation is worth some attention.

The Book of Jubilees is a midrash on the Book of Genesis and a small part of Exodus, standing to its source much as Chronicles to Samuel and Kings. The earlier work is in large part reproduced with little alteration in the latter; but it is expanded to give scope for the dogmatic purpose of the writer. The book assumes the form of a divine communication to Moses on Mount Sinai, describing the chief events of the several Jubilees, or periods of fifty years, since the Creation, and, in particular, the circumstances under which institutions were founded and laws promulgated. Since many of the laws which in the Pentateuch appear *first* in the age of Moses are here referred to various earlier ages, the publication of the laws as described in the Pentateuch is, as Dr. Charles puts it,[1] in reality a *re-publication*. We are here merely concerned with the law of sacrifice. As to this these points are most important:—

[1] *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha*, ii. 7.

(1) Jubilees agrees with the Pentateuch, and with the separate source of the Pentateuch known as JE, in regarding sacrifice as primeval. Thus, he repeats from Genesis the record of the sacrifices of Cain and Abel: "In the first year of the third Jubilee Cain slew Abel, because God accepted the sacrifice of Abel, and did not accept the offering of Cain" (iv. 2); and he records sacrifices by Noah,[1] Abraham,[2] Isaac,[3] Jacob,[4] and Levi,[5] partly on the basis of Genesis, partly independently of any known source.

(2) Jubilees agrees with the Pentateuch, and with the separate source of that work known as P, in regarding Jewish sacrifice as resting on the direct mandate of God, although curiously enough even in Jubilees records of sacrifices precede commands to sacrifice; thus Adam, after expulsion from Eden, offered a daily sacrifice of sweet incense[6]; Cain and Abel sacrifice, and in chapter vi. the commandment to Noah follows the actual offering of sacrifice.

(3) Jubilees differs from the Pentateuch, and from all the sources of the Pentateuch, in regarding sacrifice as being not merely primeval, but pre-mundane.

(4) In Jubilees sacrifice on earth gradually assumes that harmony with sacrifice in heaven, for which the complete Jewish cultus appears to the author of Jubilees to have stood, by a series of stages resting on divine promptings or revelations to ancestors of the Jewish nation.

I have used the term "prompting" because even in those cases where a direct command is communicated, the actual sacrifice is offered before the general command for which it forms the occasion is given. However this is to be explained, whether as due to the influence on the author of Jubilees of his sources, or, since that seems a scarcely ade-

[1] vi. 1 ff., vii. 1–5. [2] xiii. 4, 9–16, xiv. 11, xv. 1 f., xvi. 20 ff.
[3] xxii. 3 f. [4] xliv. i. [5] c. xxxii.
[6] iii. 27, cp. and ct. Exod. xxx. 34 ff.

quate explanation, to some other cause which remains obscure, it does not affect the two main points, that the author " reconciles " or " harmonises " the conflicting points of view belonging to those sources of the Pentateuch, which, originally separate, now lay side by side in the Scriptures, by representing sacrifice as primeval, but the early Jewish cultus as due to the direct command of God.

One or two illustrations may suffice to recall his method. Following his source, i.e. Genesis, closely, he records that after the flood Noah built an altar and offered burnt-offerings ; then, expanding after the manner of midrash the brevity of his source by attributing to procedure defined in the source in general terms only the details familiar from the practice of his own times, he continues (vi. 3) : " And he placed the fat thereof on the altar, and he took an ox, and a goat, and a sheep, and kids, and salt, and a turtle-dove, and the young of a dove, and placed a burnt sacrifice on the altar, and poured thereon an offering mingled with oil, and sprinkled wine and strewed frankincense over everything, and caused a goodly savour to arise, acceptable before the Lord. And the Lord smelt the goodly savour, and He made a covenant with him." What were the conditions of this covenant on Noah's side for himself and his descendants follows (vi. 7 ff.) : (1) They were to abstain from eating blood—a point which we will not follow further now ; and (2) they were to observe the feast of weeks annually : I cite the more important part of the passage dealing with this point : " For this reason it is ordained and written on the heavenly tablet, that they should celebrate the feast of weeks in this month once a year, to renew the covenant every year. " And this whole festival was celebrated in heaven from the day of creation till the days of Noah . . . and Noah and his sons observed it . . . till the day of Noah's death, and from the day of Noah's death his sons did away

with it until the days of Abraham . . . But Abraham observed it, and Isaac and Jacob and his children observed it up to thy (i.e., Moses') days, and in thy days the children of Israel forgot it until ye celebrated it anew on this mountain (i.e., on Mount Sinai). And do thou command the children of Israel to observe this festival in all their generations, for a commandment unto them; one day in the year in this month they shall celebrate the festival" (vi. 17–20).

I observe in passing that according to this theory the sacrifices here enjoined were really of universal obligation, but after being universally abandoned they were resumed by Abraham, and passing on through the line of Isaac and Jacob, became a specifically Jewish institution—a theory quite at variance indeed with P but a sufficiently intelligible product of Midrashic imagination playing on *P combined with JE* in the Pentateuch.

The divine law as the source of Jewish sacrifice and the pre-Mosaic antiquity of Jewish sacrifice appears again in Abraham's command to his son (xxi. 5–7, 14 f.): "And do thou, my son, observe His commandments and His ordinances and His judgments. . . . And if thou dost slay a victim as an acceptable peace-offering, slay ye it, and pour out its blood upon the altar, and all the fat of the offering offer on the altar with fine flour and the meat-offering mingled with oil, with its drink-offering, and offer them all together on the altar of burnt-offering"; then follow details from Leviticus iii. 9–11, and then ordinances governing the species of wood that may be used for the altar, concluding thus: "Besides these kinds of wood there is none other that thou shalt place on the altar. . . . Observe this commandment and do it, my son, that thou mayest be upright in all thy deeds."

The last point we need here observe is that the institution of the tribe of Levi to the priesthood, which in the Penta-

teuch takes place *in the age of Moses*, is in Jubilees traced back to a divine ordinance by which the eponymous ancestor of the tribe was *in the time of Jacob* set apart to the priestly office (Jub. xxxi. f.; Testament of Levi, viii. f.).

Enough has been said, though I have attempted no complete presentation of the details, to show that, according to Jubilees, Jewish sacrifice antedates Moses, and was obligatory on Jews in consequence of divine commands given, in the first instance, to the patriarchs, and then repeated to Moses. Since Jubilees admits re-publication to Moses, it is difficult to trace the presence or absence of its influence as distinct from that of P; when, for example, we read in the New Testament of "offering according to the law of Moses," the reference is amply explained by the influence of the Pentateuchal tradition on popular thought, but it does not necessarily disprove that popular thought, under the influence of the theory reflected in Jubilees, may not also at times have dwelt on sacrifices by the patriarchs in obedience to divine commands given before the time of Moses.

Before passing from this survey of theories as to the antiquity of sacrifice, I must briefly refer to a sufficiently extraordinary theory, which, if the interpretation that has been set on the passage in which it is supposed to occur be correct, was held by at least one Jewish writer about 100 A.D., viz., the author of the fourth book of Esdras. In this passage (c. x. 44 ff.) Ezra receives from an angel an explanation of a vision which he has seen of a disconsolate woman: the interpretation is given in these words: "This woman, whom thou sawest, is Sion, whom thou now beholdest as a builded city. And, whereas she said unto thee that she was barren thirty years, the reason is that there were three thousand[1] years in the world before any

[1] Another reading is "three."

offering was offered in it. And it came to pass after three thousand years that Solomon built the city and offered offerings." Now what do the words "there were three thousand years in the world before any offering was offered in it" mean? The English translation just cited might well mean that no sacrifice was offered anywhere *on earth* till the year of the world 3000, i.e. till the days of Solomon; and this is the interpretation actually placed on the passage by Mr. Box. But the original has perished, and this is certainly not the meaning of the Latin version; for since Sion is feminine and *sæculum* is neuter, and the Latin version says *in ea*, that version asserts without any ambiguity that sacrifice *in Sion* began in the year of the world 3000—a very different matter, which is not, like Mr. Box's reading and interpretation, in conflict with the theory alike of Jubilees and the Priestly Code. In order to maintain the interpretation Mr. Box is obliged to read conjecturally *in eo* for *in ea* and to substitute *David* for *Solomon* in the next sentence: the first emendation is of course very slight, and the second has some support from a parallel passage,[1] and neither should be too hastily dismissed since earlier attempts to interpret the passage apart from emendation were not conclusively successful. The parallel passage to which Mr. Box refers is in chap. iii., where we read (vers. 23 f.): "So the times passed away and the years came to an end: and then thou didst raise up for thyself a servant whose name was David; and thou commandedst him to build the city which is called after thy name, and to offer thee oblations therein of thine own." This occurs in a survey of the world's history, and is, it is true, the first explicit reference to any sacrifice on earth. But is this really significant in so brief a survey—a survey which

[1] "Thou didst raise up for Thyself a servant whose name was David; and Thou commandedst him to build the city," iii. 24.

devotes just eighteen verses to the first 3000 years of the world's history? And can it therefore safely be argued that chap. iii. tacitly confirms the theory that there was no sacrifice *on earth* till the time of David? Was it necessary in so short survey for the author, in referring, as he does, to the giving of the law on Sinai, to mention that that law gave commandment with regard to sacrifice? And may not the manner of the reference to David be abundantly explained by supposing that the author held some such theory as that of the author of Jubilees, viz. that sacrifice was intermitted at times after it had been both commanded and practised? or is even so much explanation as this required?

If Mr. Box's interpretation is correct, which though for some reasons I should like to think otherwise seems to me very doubtful, we have this interesting state of things: Jubilees extends the antiquity attributed to sacrifice by P resting on divine ordinance, but 4 Esdras contracts it. Jubilees, as we have suggested, may have been led to its theory by statements in the received scripture of his time. But what could have led to such a theory as is attributed to 4 Esdras? We may possibly find a hint on this subject as we proceed to examine the subject of the perpetuity of sacrifice.

If we turn aside for a moment from theory to fact, we must hold with JE and against P that the Hebrews sacrificed *before* they were led to Sinai by Moses. The first period in their history, which was marked by actual absence of sacrifice, is that of the Babylonian Exile: that that period was marked by cessation of sacrifice is at least the common view, though it no longer passes unchallenged. It is urged by some, (1) that as a matter of fact the Jews left behind in Palestine continued to offer sacrifice; and (2), not without probability, that the Jewish Temple

at Elephantiné, with its cultus, which was certainly in existence in 525 B.C., existed also during the period of the Babylonian Exile. I must not discuss either of these points now; for the purpose of the present inquiry it is more important to make these two observations: (1) there is no evidence that the Jews *in Babylon* originated or carried on, even as a temporary substitute for the suppressed cultus of Jerusalem, any sacrificial system; (2) whether it was absolute fact or not, it certainly became part of later Jewish historical theory that sacrifice ceased after the destruction of the temple in 586 and was resumed after the exile, when the altar was re-erected and the Second Temple built.

The second cessation of Jewish sacrifice was briefer and lasted three years, from 168 to 165 (B.C.). This was due to the forcible appropriation of the Temple by Antiochus Epiphanes to the worship of Zeus.[1] Sacrifice was resumed after the Temple had been solemnly cleansed, and after the old altar, which had been desecrated, had been removed and a new altar set up in its place, with rites in commemoration of which the Feast of the Dedication has ever since been observed. Henceforward sacrifice was offered in the same single sacred place as before, but on a *new and different* altar.

The third period of cessation began in the middle of the year 70 A.D., on the seventeenth day of the Jewish month Tammuz (Ta'an. iv. 6), and still continues. Since the destruction of the Temple by the Romans no Jewish altar has stood on Mount Sion. There is so much curious and instructive parallelism between the circumstances associated with the destruction of the Temple in 586 B.C. and 70 A.D. that it is natural enough to find it re-appearing in our present examination. The statement that Jewish sacrifice ceased

[1] 1 Macc. i. 41–55, iv. 52 f.; 2 Macc. vi. 1 ff.; Dan. xi. 31, viii. 11 ff.

from the 17th of Tammuz in 70 A.D. requires to be qualified by reference to a fact and to a theory. It may or may not be the fact that when sacrifice in Jerusalem ceased with the destruction of the Temple by Nebuchadnezzar in 586, a small far away Jewish community in Elephantiné maintained its sacrificial customs: but it is certain that that strange and too little known feature of the Jewish Diaspora, the temple built by Onias in Egypt, survived the temple in Jerusalem for three years. Still that temple enjoyed no full official recognition: and it may be doubted whether it would really be more correct to date the present cessation of Jewish sacrifice from the year 73 rather than from 70 A.D. Again, just as some have questioned whether sacrifice really ceased among the Palestinian Jews in 586 B.C., so some have questioned whether it ceased in 70 A.D. Josephus, it is said, writing several years later, speaks of Jewish sacrifice in the present tense, as though it was still practised, and so do some others who wrote after the fall of Jerusalem. I will not here review the evidence for and against the theory: it has been well done, for example, by Schürer[1]; but I will make this general observation arising out of the present discussion; if the first shock to the established method of sacrifice had once so far been overcome that the one altar required by the law had been duly erected outside Jerusalem, it is difficult to see what subsequent event could have led to the cessation of sacrifice. It is not really difficult to conceive how the Jewish priesthood and Jewish thinkers might have justified the continuance of sacrifice on a *single* altar though Jerusalem was closed to them: what would be difficult to see is how, if the transition had once been made, any insuperable hindrance to the continuance of sacrifice could subsequently have arisen. The matter turns on the doctrine of *per-*

[1] E. Schürer, *Gesch. d. jüdischen Volkes*[3], i. 652–655.

petuity, which is, of course, entirely independent of the rude logic of events which enforced actual *cessation*.

The actual doctrine of the perpetuity of sacrifice can be quite briefly indicated; the question of its applicability in real life is another matter.

To early Hebrew thought sacrifice was subject to spatial limitations: the Hebrew might sacrifice to Yahweh within the land of Yahweh, but not outside of it. From the publication of Deuteronomy onwards this was still further limited: at *one place* only within the land of Yahweh might he sacrifice. There is no corresponding temporal limitation: and certainly the early Hebrews looked forward to a time when sacrifice would cease as little as they looked back to a point in time when it began; but neither early narrative nor early law explicitly enforces perpetuity. The case is not very different with Deuteronomy; in that book far more stress is laid on the provision that sacrifice shall be offered in the one defined place only than on the need that it should be always offered: and also in Deuteronomy we still have in the matter of sacrifice regulations and modifications of existing practice rather than the institution of entirely new practice. Should we state the theory lying behind Deuteronomy too strongly if we put it thus: Yahweh, as the prophets have taught, can dispense with sacrifice, what He cannot tolerate is sacrifice outside Jerusalem?

When we come to P—to the probable influence of Ezekiel I have already referred—it is otherwise. Here Jewish sacrificial custom starts from the direct command of God, and by that command sacrifice is an everlasting ordinance to be observed throughout all generations. In contrast to Deuteronomy P lays no *stress* on unity of *place*, though the unity of worship and *altar* is throughout assumed: briefly the standpoint of P is: One altar, one tabernacle;

but both, for a period at all events, migratory. The one legitimate altar is not, in P, as it is in Deuteronomy, glued to a single place. The law of unity of altar and the law of perpetuity are in P prior to the law of place: one altar only, one altar for ever, but not always from the day of institution onwards in one place only.

In Jubilees the perpetuity of Sacrifice is even more directly and emphatically enforced than in P. After recording the celebration of the various sacrifices at the Feast of Tabernacles by Abraham, the writer concludes, partly in the terms of P, but with even more insistence on perpetuity: "it is ordained on the heavenly tablets concerning Israel that they shall celebrate the Feast of Tabernacles seven days with joy, a statute for ever throughout their generations every year. And to this there is no limit of days: for it is ordained for ever regarding Israel that they should celebrate it." [1] Similarly of the blood ritual at the altar: for the law forbidding the eating of blood "there is no limit of days; for it is for ever. They shall observe it throughout their generations so that they may continue supplicating on your behalf with blood before the altar: every day and at the time of morning and evening they shall seek forgiveness on your behalf perpetually before the Lord that they may keep it and not be rooted out" (vi. 14).

But Jubilees, like P, recognises in the course of history more than one spot for legitimate sacrifice; it differs from P in more precisely explaining that Sion, once it had become the place for sacrifice, was to remain so. Levi, after his appointment to the priesthood, sacrificed at Bethel, and Jacob was resolved "to build that place and to surround the court with a wall, and to sanctify it and make it holy for ever, for himself and his children after him"; but "in a vision of the night behold an angel descended

[1] xvi. 29 f., cp. xlix. 8, xviii. 18 f., vi. 31 f.

from heaven with seven tablets in his hand, and he gave them to Jacob, and he read them and knew all that was written therein which would befall him and his sons throughout all the ages. And he showed him all that was written on the tablets, and said unto him : Do not build this place, and do not make it an eternal sanctuary, and do not dwell here : for it is not the place." [1] The true place is named elsewhere : " And He said to the angel of the presence : Write for Moses from the beginning of creation till my sanctuary has been built among them for all eternity. And the Lord will appear to the eyes of all, and all shall know that I am the God of Israel and Father of all the children of Israel, and King on Mount Sion for all eternity. And Sion and Jerusalem will be holy " (i. 27 f.).

Perpetuity of sacrifice without limit of days ; limitation of sacrifice to a single altar ; this altar to be fixed on Mount Sion : these three elements enter into the post-exilic Jewish doctrine. Thrice in their history have the Jews been restrained by force from giving full effect to the doctrine ; for seventy years from 586 B.C., for three years from 168 B.C., and from 70 A.D. to the present day. On all three occasions the Jews fought fiercely for the maintenance of access to their sacred city, but when force at last denied them that access they violated the command to maintain sacrifice in perpetuity without interruption rather than violate the command to sacrifice on Mount Sion only. That choice is now so familiar that it seems natural and even inevitable ; and yet was it so ? And if so, what made it or helped to make it so ? If, and in so far as, sacrifice ceased after 586 B.C., we are really confronted with a remarkable phenomenon which we ought not to allow familiarity to rob of its significance. The custom of sacrifice was of immemorial antiquity to the men of 586 ; the prohibition of all sacrifice outside

[1] Jubilees xxxii. 16–21 f.

Jerusalem had become known within the lifetime of all those who were over forty and within the lifetime of the fathers of the rest of the population. Yet this new principle outweighed old custom; *all* sacrifice was given up because sacrifice *in Sion* had become impossible. A remarkable tribute to the influence of the prophets who had conceived and taught that God *could* be served without sacrifice, and *would not* be served with sacrifice presented by those who deliberately disregarded His expressed will. His will, as expressed in Deuteronomy, clearly insisted on the sole legitimacy of the one definite place of worship, much less clearly, if at all, on the necessary perpetuation of sacrifice without intermission.

When the calamity of 70 A.D. befell them, and access to the Temple was forbidden them, the Jews were not without precedent, and the precedents of 586 and 168 B.C. may certainly seem to have suggested suspension of sacrifice when access to Sion became impossible. But as a matter of fact the situations were not identical. In 168 the Jewish pietists had to fight for their lives, and they established no religious centre during the years that sacrifice was suspended. On the other hand, in 70 A.D., almost immediately after the Fall of Jerusalem, Jamnia became, under the leadership of Yohanan ben Zakkai, a new centre of Jewish religious life, a seat of authority for determining matters of dispute and laying down lines of conduct. What could have seemed more natural, had it so happened, than that the one legitimate altar should have been set up in Jamnia, and the sacrificial service, which Scripture enjoined as of perpetual obligation, there carried on, till the time that Jerusalem should again be accessible? The precedent of 586 may have suggested suspension. But does that wholly account for the course adopted in 70 A.D.? Religious authority spoke with no such unambiguous voice at the later as at the earlier

date. In 586 it said through Deuteronomy, with recurring emphasis on the negative: Do *not* sacrifice outside Jerusalem. In 70 A.D. it said through the Law: Offer sacrifice *throughout all your generations*; and on this lay the stress of the Law as a whole; for Deuteronomy now formed only a part of the Law, and other parts of the Law recorded that the one altar had at first migrated from place to place till Jerusalem fell by conquest to the Jews. Now that Jerusalem was lost by conquest, what was the obvious conclusion? This question becomes the more pointed when we recall that speculation, between the completion of the Law and the Fall of Jerusalem, had also busied itself with the temporary residence of the one legitimate altar outside Jerusalem; of this Jubilees and the "Twelve Patriarchs" are proof.

Neither precedent nor Scripture entirely explains the suspension of sacrifice after 70 A.D. On the other hand, this suspension casts light backward on the relative vitality of various ideas in the Judaism of the first century A.D. Not only was the Christian community ready to break loose from the Jewish sacrifice system; not only had the Alexandrian Jewish thinker, Philo, prepared an ethical substitute for sacrifices; even in Palestinian Judaism the sacrificial system was borne up rather by the pillars of tradition than by the vital religious thought and feeling of the day; when the pillars fell, the system fell with it, for the religion of the Rabbis was not ready to build for the system fresh supports. The system fell partly, perhaps, by the very stringency of Rabbinic legalism: but that is hardly a full account of the matter; the breath of prophecy had not wholly ceased to blow; it is recorded of Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who had already returned to Jamnia before the fall of Jerusalem, that when the news reached him there of the fall of the Temple, he quoted the prophetic saying, "I have chosen mercy, and

not sacrifice," [1] and laid down the principle that henceforward acts of mercy would be accepted by God in lieu of sacrifice. Subsequently, too, an elaborate system of equivalents in prayer for the suspended sacrifices was developed.

I can but briefly glance at two questions that remain. Was the line of argument, which I have indicated as possible and natural, ever actually taken? As the years lengthened and Jerusalem remained inaccessible, did no one argue that the obligation of perpetual sacrifice must be fulfilled? If Mr. Box's interpretation of iv. Esdras, discussed above, were correct, we should, perhaps, have indirect proof of this in the existence of a polemic against a party who were arguing that unity of worship required that there should be only one altar, but was not necessarily bound up any more now than in the days of Moses, or of Jacob and Levi, with access to Jerusalem. For the argument of iv. Esdras, if correctly apprehended by Mr. Box, amounts to this, that the theory of a single yet migratory altar from the time of Moses, as it appears in P, and the theory of sacrifice by Levi at Bethel, as it appears in Jubilees, were false; and that never at any time had correct sacrifice been offered outside Jerusalem, not even in the Tabernacle in the wilderness, nor at Shiloh, nor elsewhere. If the world had continued 3000 years without sacrifice because the Jews had not yet obtained access to Jerusalem, it might well endure, if need be, another 3000 years without sacrifice because the Jews had ceased to have access to Jerusalem.

Jewish sacrifice has ceased for 1,800 years? Will it ever be revived? Has the law of the perpetuity of sacrifice become invalid? or, granted that circumstances should ever give back to the Jews access to the sacred spot on Mount Sion, would the doctrine be found to retain sufficient vitality to lead to a restoration of the sacrificial system?

[1] *Abhom d. R. Nathan*, 21.

This is obviously too large a question to deal with completely here, but some reference to it seems to be a fitting, if not a necessary, conclusion to our discussion.

The conviction that sacrifice is merely suspended, and not abrogated, and the hope that it may be restored, certainly both find expression in Jewish prayers. A quotation from the Authorised Daily Prayer Book may suffice to illustrate this: in the service for the Day of Atonement these petitions occur (p. 264 f.), and very similar ones in the Additional Service for Sabbaths (p. 161 f.): "On account of our sins we were exiled from our land, and removed far from our country, and we are unable to fulfil our obligations in Thy chosen house . . . because of the hand that hath been stretched out against thy sanctuary. May it be Thy will, O Lord our God and God of our fathers, that Thou mayest again in Thine abundant compassion have mercy upon us and upon Thy sanctuary, and mayest speedily rebuild it and magnify its glory. . . . Lead us with exultation unto Sion Thy city, and unto Jerusalem the place of Thy sanctuary with everlasting joy; and there we will prepare before Thee the offerings that are obligatory for us, the continual offerings according to their order, the additional offerings according to their enactment; and the additional offerings of this day of Atonement we will prepare and offer unto Thee in love according to the precept of Thy will."[1]

Then again, the principle that sacrifice is of perpetual obligation and only temporarily suspended through stress of circumstance, is clearly laid down by Dr. Friedländer in what may, I suppose, be regarded as a fairly central and representative exposition of the Jewish religion: he says, for example, "We are, in reference to these laws, in the same condition as a person who is physically prevented from doing what he is commanded to do, and what he is

[1] Add. Service for Chanukah, p. 275.

actually longing to do. The Law is not altered: our circumstances demand a *temporary* suspension of such laws and not their abrogation." [1] And again, "With the destruction of the Temple sacrifice ceased: with the Restoration of Israel and the Re-building of the Temple the sacrificial service will likewise be resumed. . . . If the law concerning offerings were only intended for a certain age, such limitation would have been indicated in the law. . . . It has been further argued that, according to Maimonides and his followers, the laws concerning sacrifices only served as a means of counteracting the idolatrous tendencies of the age. But Maimonides never went so far as to contend that these laws have served their purpose, and are now null and void. . . . Whether any of the laws of the Torah will ever be abrogated we do not know, but we are sure that, in case of such abrogation taking place, it will be done by a revelation as convincing as that of Mount Sinai: and however contrary the slaughter of animals, the sprinkling of their blood, and the burning of their flesh be to our taste, we ought to look forward with eagerness and pleasure for the revival of the full Temple Service as an event that will enable us to do the will of the Almighty revealed in this Torah." [2]

The Babylonian Exile and the first cessation of sacrifice enforced this truth:—

"The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit,
A broken and a contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not despise."

The second far longer and still continuing cessation has found for sacrifices regarded as gifts to God substitutes in acts of benevolence and prayer. Yet, if the earlier period combined with its appreciation of the broken spirit and

[1] M. Friedländer, *The Jewish Religion*, p. 141. [2] *Ib.* 416 f.

the contrite heart the hope expressed in the words,—

> "Do good in Thy good pleasure unto Sion;
> Build Thou the walls of Jerusalem;
> Then shalt Thou delight in the sacrifices required by the law, in burnt-offerings and whole burnt-offerings,
> Then shall they offer bullocks upon thy altar"—

it may seem reasonable enough for those who through this later period of cessation have found God's approval of benevolence and prayer to look forward nevertheless to a time when, while benevolence and prayer shall continue, they may once again resume the ancient sacrificial system.

If, then, the issue of the present war should be that the Jews regain access to the sacred site, shall we see Jewish sacrifices once again offered on Mount Sion? This is not altogether certain. In spite of the words I have already quoted, even Dr. Friedländer speaks with uncertain voice: for these also are his words: "The mere acquisition of the Temple Mount or of all Palestine by Jews, by war or political combinations, or purchase, would not justify the revival. It is only the return of the Jews to Palestine and the rebuilding of the Temple *by divine command and divine intervention* that will be followed by the restoration of the Sacrificial Service."[1] But if sacrifice could only be resumed on the strength of a *new* divine command, it would appear to follow that stress of circumstances has not only led to the actual cessation of sacrifice, but has also invalidated in the judgment of some Jewish authorities the earlier divine command to maintain sacrifice as an everlasting ordinance.

G. Buchanan Gray.

[1] *Ib.* 417. The italics are mine.

CORRECTIVE DISCIPLINE NOW AND HEREAFTER.

MARK ix. 33–50.

THE above passage is sometimes regarded as one among others in which the author or compiler of the gospel narrative is represented as combining, without much continuity of thought, isolated sayings of our Lord uttered on various occasions and having no real connexion. The most notable of the passages thus characterised is of course the Sermon on the Mount as reported by St. Matthew. The question whether that great discourse is indeed "a collection of sayings uttered at various times and places" rather than a connected exposition of the principles of the Kingdom of God, and a revelation of the new life, is one of the most important in the synoptic problem. It is certain that much of its authoritative character would be lost if the former hypothesis be adopted.

It is equally true that there is much to be gained if the passage now under review could be shown to be a consecutive and connected report of words spoken by our Lord on a special occasion as stated by the evangelist. It is at least clear that the concluding words in verse 50, "be at peace with one another," have direct reference to the dispute as to "who was the greatest." And the intervening 'instruction' is of extreme value as indicating our Lord's characteristic gentleness in rebuke (ἐπιείκεια 2 Cor. x. 1), and His method of teaching, and of judgment; and as setting forth the conscience as supreme judge and arbiter in the corrective discipline of life.

The restoration of the genuine text of the passage is important. For it has suffered both from interpolation and from false readings. In *v.* 38 ἔφη (said) should take the place of ἀπεκρίθη (answered). In the same verse ὅς οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ ἡμῖν is inserted from the parallel in St. Matthew's

Gospel; and the imperfects ἐκωλύομεν and ἠκολούθει should be substituted for ἐκωλύσαμεν and ἀκολουθεῖ. Less important for exegetical purposes are the changes from Λίθος μυλικός, v. 42, to μύλος ὀνικός, and σκανδαλίσῃ for σκανδαλίζῃ. The omission of verses 44 and 46 and of εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἄσβεστον in v. 45 has an important bearing on the interpretation of the passage. Lastly, the words καὶ πᾶσα θυσία πυρὶ ἁλισθήσεται (and every sacrifice shall be salted with salt), though admitted into the margin of R.V., are probably rightly elided from the text. They have certainly added to the difficulties of exposition.

It is not proposed to enter into a discussion of these readings or into a comparison of the parallel passages. St. Mark's report of the incident as it stands in the best supported text forms the basis of our remarks.

The incident opens with a question addressed to the disciples by our Lord when they were "in the house," "What were ye reasoning (διελογίζεσθε) in the way?" The Master apparently did not check or interrupt the dispute "on the way." It may have been usual for Him to precede His disciples as He is stated to have done on the way to Jerusalem, St. Matthew x. 32. But the sound of the dispute, in all probability carried on with the vehemence of language and gestures characteristic of an Oriental contention, would reach His ears. It was not, however, until they were in the house that Jesus took notice of the dispute. He asked the disciples, "What were ye reasoning in the way?" The question, or the tone in which the question was asked, was sufficient to bring the 'offence' home to the disciples. And this is characteristic of our Lord's manner of reproof. He was teaching His disciples to judge themselves, and by their own word and at the bidding of their own conscience (to use the figurative language which follows), they began to pluck out the eye and to cut off the limb that offended. They were their own judges and showed

their contrition when they became silent (ἐσιώπων). It was the silence of conviction; more than that, it foreshadowed for all time the manner of divine judgment. Both here and hereafter a man shall be judged by his own account of himself —the true meaning of Matthew xii. 36.[1] See also Romans ii. 15, 16. "They show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness herewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men according to my gospel by Jesus Christ."

In the scene which follows Jesus takes the posture of a Jewish Rabbi or Teacher (καθίσας, see ch. iv. 1 and Matt. v. 1., xiii. 2), and, having called the twelve, begins to give instruction on the subject of humility and on self-discipline and judgment, the connexion of which would be lost if the verses which follow are to be regarded as disconnected fragments torn from their context. The picturesqueness of the scene is heightened by the presence of the child. "Nihil humilius nihil simplicius puero," is the comment of Maldonatus. 'To receive a child,' therefore, is to accept the rule of humility and self-repression. As Bede notes: "The humble alone are worthy of the Saviour's embrace and love." The incident which intervenes, *vv.* 38–40, partly owing to the rejected reading "answered" in place of "said," is often thought to be irrelevant. Rightly viewed it is another instance of the indirect effect of our Lord's words on the now awakened conscience of His disciples. It was the words "in my name" that made St. John reflect. Was it possible that they had done wrong in endeavouring to hinder the work of a man who after all was doing good deeds in the name of the Christ? Again the shaft had reached its mark. St. John and those with him had been

[1] See note on that passage in Cambridge Greek Testament *ad loc.* It is here contended that ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου refers to the account which each shall render on the day of judgment.

acting, not from the highest motives of loyalty to their Master, but from some assumption of privilege and want of charity. Once more there is an eye to be plucked out and a hand to be cut off.

It is to be noted here that according to the true reading the apostles do not say that they forbade or hindered the man absolutely, but that they were setting themselves to hinder him (ἐκωλύομεν) and Jesus bids them not to continue to do this (μὴ κωλύετε).

This leads on to the pronouncement of a principle too often neglected in the long history of Christianity. "He that is not against us is for us." And as a consequence to a warning against offending Christ's little ones, meaning perhaps those who are not yet strong in the faith or instructed, but act with simplicity and childlike trust in the name and for the sake of Christ.

Once more the instruction reverts to the imperative need of correction in the present world. And what is implied here is of vital importance. It is implied that if corrective discipline be neglected here, the neglect will be compensated by more severe correction hereafter. So vitally important is this point that the words demand careful consideration. The symbolism is of course derived from the purifying fires of the Valley of Hinnom or Gehenna. The words themselves are a quotation from Isaiah lxvi. 24, where the redeemed, who had been loyal to Jehovah, are represented as "looking on the dead bodies of the men who have rebelled against Him, for their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched." As before noted, the last words are cited only in *v.* 48. In *v.* 43 our Lord's words are "to go into hell (Gehenna), into the unquenchable fire," and in *v.* 45 "to be cast into hell" (Gehenna).

It is to be observed, then, that, so far as this is an image drawn from the actual scenes in the valley of Hinnom, the fires of Gehenna were unquenched only so long as cor-

ruption lasted. As a matter of fact the fires were unquenched from "new moon to new moon" because corrupt matter was continually being cast into the lugubrious valley. When the corruption ceased to require the cleansing fire the flame itself would cease to burn. The word ἄσβεστος does not in itself convey the idea of unending existence. When Homer wrote: ἄσβεστος δ' ἄρ' ἐνῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν, *Ib.* i. 599 (unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods), it is implied that the laughter would die out when the cause of merriment passed. Again, in this particular connexion neither 'the worm' nor 'the fire' necessarily suggests the infliction of suffering, or torture. Both words suggest the destruction of that which is corrupt. If, then, the imagery be transferred to an existence beyond the grave, the natural inference would be that the same process of purification would be extended to another world. This contention is supported by the symbolic use of 'fire' in the phrase "salted with fire," which we will consider below. That phrase introduces the thought of corrective discipline, but not necessarily or primarily the thought of suffering, certainly not of endless suffering. It must also be remembered that the figure of speech which transfers the picture of a fire consuming inanimate corpses to that of a flame which tortures living bodies in the Gehenna of another world is wholly to change the metaphor, and is not required by the argument.

It is true, on the other hand, that the earliest interpretation of the passage and much of the later interpretation has seen in it the revelation of an eternity of endless torment. In later Judaism, however, "Gehenna is conceived as a Purgatory for faithless Jews who were afterwards to be admitted into Paradise, but still remained the place of eternal perdition for the Gentiles." [1]

[1] Dr. Charles in *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible, sub voc.* Gehenna; "Human Life and its Conditions," p. 115.

The interpretation suggested above would coincide with the deepest intuition of Greek philosophy. In *Phaedo*, p. 113, Plato describes three classes of the dead who come for judgment. The righteous "are released from their earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above," those who have lived neither well nor ill (*οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι*), after expiating their offences, are purified and restored. Others, who have committed such heinous sins as sacrilege and murder are irrevocably condemned.

Whatever decision, however, be reached in regard to the meaning of the words in Isaiah and to the citation of them by our Lord there can be no question as to the momentous gravity of them. "Nothing," says Dean Church, "in the whole gospel was more plain and certain than that the punishment of unforgiven sin would be something infinitely more awful than we had faculties to conceive of."

The word *κόλασις* (*kolasis*), 'correction'—derived from a root signifying to lop or prune—does not occur in this passage, but it gathers up the meaning of it. *Κόλασις* as punishment that corrects and reforms is distinguished by Aristotle from punishment in the form of vengeance (*τιμωρία*). With this the use of the word agrees in the two passages of the New Testament where it occurs—Matthew xxv. 46 and 1 John iv. 18. In both passages the reference is to the Day of Judgement. In the passage of St. Matthew the rebuke of the King is the beginning of the *κόλασις*, or corrective discipline. In 1 John iv. 18 the Apostle speaks of perfect love (*ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη*) giving confidence in the day of judgment. "Perfect love casteth out fear, because fear hath punishment" (R.V.). The sense of fear *is* a corrective discipline; until that has done its work, there can be no perfect confidence of love.

There are two interesting passages in Aristotle which further illustrate this word. He speaks of *κολάσεις* as "a sort of remedies" (*ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, Eth.*

Nic. ii. 3, 5) and as a process of chastening (*Eth. Nic.* x. 9, 10).

In the concluding paragraph the imagery changes, but the line of thought remains the same. "For every one shall be salted with fire," and (in accordance with the preceding argument) both here and hereafter. Salt, like fire, is a purifying element, with this difference, that salt preserves or keeps pure, fire destroys what is corrupt—to be salted with fire, then, is to be purified by correction. Not only is this universally needed—"for if we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us" (1 John i. 10), but the correction must come from within. "Have salt in *yourselves*." In other words, the conscience must be clear and active—the salt must be good. But "if the salt have lost its savour," if the conscience becomes dead and refuses to speak or judge, "wherewith will ye season it?" Nothing can take its place. Therefore "have salt in yourselves, and be at peace one with another." The silence that followed the Master's question proved that in their case the salt had not lost its savour, that the purifying fires were still unquenched, and that they were prepared to cast off the offending eye or limb, which meant for them at that moment the pride of rivalry and the spirit of contention.

The whole of the passage thus viewed and interpreted is full of suggestiveness as a New Testament *Purgatorio*. And it is interesting to note that it is essentially the argument of Dante's descriptive poem. There are many points of contact. Here, as with Dante, the first sin to be purged by those who would ascend the mountain of purification is pride. It is only where this has been expunged that the angel's message is possible: "Come for the steps are near, and the ascent is now easy." Here also, as in Dante's poem, the second offence to be purged is the sin of envy, the attitude of men who look with envious eyes on the happiness

and good of others. Both here and in *The Purgatorio* it is conscience that condemns and leads to repentance and purification. And in perfect agreement with the teaching of this passage Dante has described the surpassing difficulty of the first step to repentance, and the awfulness of the corrective discipline of those who have neglected to take that first step in the life on earth. ARTHUR CARR.

THE STYLE OF THE LOGIA.

THE microscopic examination of the Gospels has been pursued with results both good and bad. Among the latter we may count the tendency to dissolve the figure of Jesus into a thousand fragments. On the other hand there are those who multiply the dimensions of Jesus a thousand fold, as though the Spirit, like the new Jerusalem, were measured by a rod. Between these opposites there is room for a middle course.

Instead of yielding ourselves up to the mathematical calculations which threaten to take the place of scholarship and philosophy, we are at liberty to consult the witness of language itself to the utterances—and I will dare to say—the style of Jesus.

Our study of St. Mark has carried us past the formal Atticism at which St. Luke aimed. We have vindicated for St. Mark a nearness to oral tradition, which makes him the best stepping stone towards our goal—the words of Jesus Himself. It remains, therefore, to examine the record of the sayings of Jesus in the double tradition of Matthew and Luke, taking with us the style of Mark as a standard by which to judge between the testimonies—where they differ—of Matthew and Luke.

(2) But our investigation takes a wider scope. We put the question : is it not possible to forget the hieratic method of Matthew and Luke, and to look at Jesus and hear His

sayings through a clearer medium? Are we entirely limited to the sayings of Jesus as they appear in the first and third Gospels? Fortunately we are not so limited. There are sufficient parallels in Mark and Luke to enable us to distinguish the direction in which we are to turn for greater accuracy. We can trace Luke as he removes the figure of Jesus from its purely historical setting into the formulae of religious instruction. Jesus says to His disciple: ὃς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν καθ' ἡμῶν, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν (Mark ix. 40). Luke separates Jesus from His companions and substitutes ὑμῶν (ix. 50). This separation is further indicated by the striking substitution of the phrase ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου for the plural οἱ υἱοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (Luke xii. 10; Mark iii. 28). What in Mark is an instruction for "the sons of men," becomes in Luke an instruction with regard to "the Son of man." The presence of the Spirit of God is translated by Luke into "the utterance and wisdom of Jesus" (Luke xxi. 15; Matt. x. 20; Mark xiii. 11). A similar tendency is seen in the substitution of πνεῦμα ἅγιον for ἀγαθά (Luke xi. 13; Matt. vii. 11). Here, however, the change may be due, not to Luke, but to a transcriber, who interpreted the "good gift," ἀγαθὸν δόμα, by the "Holy Spirit." In the tendency towards a formal definition: first, of the Holy Spirit as the utterance and wisdom of Jesus; second, of the good gift of God as this same Holy Spirit, we trace the same method as that which Luke applies to the grammar of Mark. We are leaving the free and universal words of the Master for the stereotyped forms of regular instruction. We are leaving the voice of genuine authority, with its magical appeal to the throng, for the aloofness of the scribes. What was the secret of this magic? Jesus Himself gives the answer: "Come to Me, all you working men with your loads, because I am of an easy temper and homely mind."

(3) I have ventured to translate ταπεινός by "homely," because the context requires absence of pretension. Some theologians have regarded only the negative side of this admirable quality so rare and so divine, and have convicted themselves of moral blindness by ruling out a characteristic which Jesus Himself declares to be one of the chief grounds of His invitation to the hard-worked man. Instead of κένωσις, then, we find something positive, part of that fulness in which God Himself is manifested, "after the fire a still small voice." I suppose that one must have a poet's mind in order to understand the Jewish biographer who treats the "sound of a gentle stillness" as a climax beyond the wind, the earthquake, and the fire. At any rate the Gospel faithfully records the unexpected reserve of Jesus. He claims neither omniscience, "of that day or hour no one knows, not even the Son," nor yet perfect goodness, "no one is good save God alone." I do not dare to enter into the mind of Jesus except in so far as He Himself lifts the veil. But even He was moved by real temptations, and overshadowed by the greatest temptation of all. To claim the perfection of the victor, then, before the battle was fought, would not harmonise with this character so strong, so subtle, and therefore so unpretending.

(4) We shall have an opportunity later of tracing this intellectual strength and subtlety as it expresses itself in irony, parable, and retort. But Jesus might seem to condescend too much towards the violent language usual among disputants unless we first traced His serene temper. And here we must guard against Luke's tendency towards an altered emphasis. For the sake of clearness he deepens the main lines of the picture. And the portrait suffers. In Luke's narrative the hostility of the Pharisees towards Jesus, and His condemnation of them is more vivid than in Mark. But even in Luke the interjection οὐαί is used

in pity as often as in indignation. Weymouth [1] scarcely goes too far in translating it "alas!" Hence the English version with its translation "woe!" exaggerates the impression which Luke intended to give.

The term "hypocrisy" may denote either "pollution" or "pretence." The latter meaning is clearly indicated in one place (Luke xii. 1, 2), "Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees which is hypocrisy. For there is nothing covered which shall not be revealed." The Latin renderings of ὑπόκρισις given in *a* are instructive. In the passage just quoted from Luke we find *adfectatio*, "affectation; in Mark xii. 15 *simulatio* [2] occurs. The Vulgate takes over the Greek *hypocrisis* in the passage from Luke, but translates it by *versutia* in Mark. On the other hand, Matthew xxiii. 28 unites ὑπόκρισις with ἀνομία in such a way that the meaning "pollution" must be preferred for ὑπόκρισις. We can draw some interesting conclusions.

In the Sermon on the Mount, the hypocrite is to be understood rather as the "affected" person. The denunciations of Matthew xxiii., where the stronger meaning is found, are generalised from the particular case, such as that of Mark xii. 38, where special individuals are singled out and for special reasons. In other words the Pharisees were not condemned as such. For Jesus could scarcely have frequented their houses, if He treated them all as "polluted" persons. "Affectation," however, is the right name for the love of titles, of special dress, of the front seats, Matthew xxiii. 5–7. This more general and more superficial fault was met by Jesus with irony; He reserved His denunciation for the less frequent and graver offences of which the lighter offence was the cloak. We must recognise, therefore, much intercourse of Jesus with the Pharisees in which He did not

[1] *New Testament in Modern Speech.*

[2] Erasmus, in his Latin translation, also uses *simulatio* in this place. Was he acquainted with *a*?

go beyond the gracious expressions in which His teaching was mainly couched.

This graciousness found an outlet even in laughter. We owe to Luke vi. 21 the one saying in which laughter is spoken of as something good. But we are justified in understanding the references to the marriage festival in Luke vii. 32, v. 34 as showing a joyousness of bearing in which laughter found a place.

Now we are prepared to enter into the profound saying of Jesus that the laughing attitude towards life shows greater wisdom than the attitude of the ascetic, Luke vii. 35. The man who is loth to judge, Matthew vii. 1, and who is ready to forgive, Matthew vi. 12, can move freely and without danger amid the most varied society.

(5) If we seek analogies in Greece and Rome, we may find them *longo intervallo* in Socrates and Horace. In Socrates we trace the lack of intellectual pretension, the preference for homely illustrations, the calm temper, the unterrified purpose. But whereas Socrates is guided by an inspiration which only forbids, Jesus moves onward by an inner impulse which never fails. The following of Socrates leads to the New Academy and the paralysis of action; the following of Jesus is, of all pursuits, the most fruitful of consequences.

Horace, in his acceptance of life, seems as universal as Socrates and Jesus. His vignettes of character, found not only in the Satires and Epistles but in the Odes, prepare us to understand the dramatic power of the parables of Jesus. For example, the Roman millionaire of the *Odes*, iii. 1 may be set beside his Syrian brother Luke xii. 16. But Horace was a hanger on, protected from poverty and danger by Maecenas and Augustus. Jesus moved among men, the kindly but inexorable critic of life before whom all pretence shrivelled up.

(6) Thus by gleaning stray hints from the comparison

of Mark with Luke and Matthew, we have gained a slight clue towards the understanding of one side of Jesus' personality. I do not promise myself more than a negative result. But if we are saved from some errors, even a negative result may be valuable.

(7) We are informed by Loisy that "the teaching of Jesus was concentrated in a few ideas which were very simple at least in His manner of grasping them."[1] Yet the same writer proceeds to indicate, and with a master's touch, the rich resources of expression—the comparison and the parable—which were at the disposal of our Lord. I am surprised that a countryman of Pascal fails to render justice also to the irony which on the lips of Jesus was so terrible in defence and attack. But my surprise ceases when I read of the "naïve" faith of Jesus.[2]

(8) The study of the *κοινή* has thrown an indirect light upon the conditions amid which Jesus lived. The Greek language was spoken with scarcely any local differences over the whole of the eastern and some of the northern parts of the Roman Empire. The fiction, therefore, of a Galilee in which Greek was not understood must now disappear, and with the Greek language thus universally current there came familiarity with many of the social and political notions expressed in that language. Galileans who habitually used Aramaic in their homes were in continual contact with the Greco-Roman civilisation. Their very synagogues were classical in design. Thus the external demeanour of Jesus was precisely adapted by its very subtlety to the rich and complex antique life, a life which penetrated and included country districts even more remote than Galilee from the main roads of the Empire, It is time, therefore, that the historian dismissed the well meant caricature of Jesus which Renan presents to us in his

[1] *Jésus et la tradition évangélique*, 169.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 176.

simple Syrian peasant; and, along with Renan, Loisy, his successor, ceases to appeal to us.

(9) The character of Jesus included the tolerant irony of a kindly man of the world. This is a picture taken from a somewhat unaccustomed standpoint, but the main lines of it are marked out clearly enough. To be wise as a serpent and harmless as a pigeon is to combine two qualities which taken separately are as unlike their product, as oxygen and hydrogen are unlike the water which they make. But if we inquire into the use to which this wisdom and harmlessness are to be put, we find ourselves nearer the Christian society than might have been expected. For we have here a clue to the instructions about external behaviour which are so conspicuous an element in the sayings of Jesus. To avoid parade in its several forms is for many persons the only way of avoiding social mistakes. And let no one think that social mistakes are unimportant in the religious life. Self-assertion and intolerance are often found together. The only form of self-assertion which is allowed in the Gospel is that of service. "If any man wishes to be first of all, he shall be last of all and servant of all."

It is only possible, then, on the lines laid down here to avoid the *bêtises* which, for the individual, often spell social damnation. The social teaching of Jesus tempers the conflict of life, and the victory of the Church is prepared so far as her adherents exhibit in themselves this humanism, this manhood qualified by self-repression and readiness to serve.

(10) Schmiedel[1] selects from the Gospel as especially credible those sayings of Jesus in which He dwells upon His own limitations, but he fails to recognise the irony and tolerance from which we have learned so much. Perhaps the salient utterance of Jesus is contained in the Lord's Prayer: "as we forgive those that trespass against us";

[1] *E. Bi.*, 1881.

to recognise this power of forgiving sin as residing not only in God, but in the sons of men,[1] is the deep foundation of that tolerance and that irony which we have been tracing.

(10) Contrary to the assumption often made that the Christian religion is a makeshift on the way to a perfect civilisation, it must be maintained that the civilisation of Palestine in the time of Jesus reaches a high water mark. We have, therefore, to set the personality of Jesus against a background of material splendour, peace, security and toleration. The Jewish nation never enjoyed greater spiritual freedom than under the Roman government of Tiberius.[2] The injunction, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's," might, with Professor Schmiedel's consent, be added to the sayings of Jesus which are not likely to have been invented, precisely because such a standpoint was impossible to the fanatic and sectarian who always desire a grievance. Even the imperial troops were territorial, recruited at Samaria and Caesarea. There was a harmony, therefore, between the Roman government and the Jewish nation which is indicated by the friendly attitude of the centurions in the Gospel. The greatest hardship which the public mind attributed to Rome was the collection of the imperial taxes, a hardship avenged by the social ostracism of the tax-collector. The indulgence of the Roman government was only limited in one respect: the life-penalty was reserved to the procurator. Under this beneficent protection not only the religious enthusiast found scope for his mission, but, what is more rare, men like Gamaliel united tolerance and wide learning with profound religious feeling, and so displayed a character precisely adapted to the freedom which they enjoyed. St. Paul found in the Christian Church a home for his later and milder spirit, and devoted himself to discovering and proclaiming the secret of Jesus. With an insight which only

[1] Matt. ix. 6. [2] Mommsen, *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, ii. 188.

inspiration from above can explain, Paul seized upon the complete obedience of Jesus to the will of God, even to death, as the foundation of that type of character which alone renders possible the permanent civilisation of the world.

(11) Hence the increased knowledge of the political constitution and of the language and ideas of the eastern provinces compels us to recognise in the Gospel the portrayal of a personality adapted to its frame. So far as civilisation henceforth really advances, there will be more room for the imitation of such a personality.

But we must distinguish. The formal treatment of the Gospel which Luke displays in comparison with Mark is repeated from time to time. Amid the Arian controversies, Hosius the bishop of Cordova voices the spirit of conciliation and wisdom until he is overwhelmed by the louder definitions of the contending parties. Three hundred years later, the sunset of the old British Church in the person of Aidan makes us greet with mingled feelings the precise instructions which the Roman missionaries brought for the Saxon Church. Once more, four hundred years ago, Erasmus, by his translation of the New Testament, vainly recalled the world to toleration, only to be succeeded by the formalism of the rival controversialists. Hosius, Aidan, Erasmus, embodied a Christian ideal which may be traced not obscurely in the Gospel. Behind this ideal there was a mystery which could only be understood by the chosen. But the rarity of an enlightened toleration suggests that the gracious urbanity of Jesus is itself part of the divine mystery.

FRANK GRANGER.

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Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner, Frome and London.

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